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Abstract
Christianity arrived in the area which is now Pakistan well before the advent of Islam, but 
was extinguished for a while by Muslim persecution, before being re-introduced by 
Western missionaries. The Pakistani Christian community of today numbers about three 
million people, who are mainly the descendants of mass conversions of Chuhra people 
about a century ago. Consequently the community has a low socio-economic status on 
average.
Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, apparently intended equality for all citizens, but there has 
been a range of other opinions as to the place of Islam in Pakistan and the status of non- 
Muslim minorities. The passing of the Objectives Resolution in 1949 began a process of 
Islamization, which included changes to the legislation and constitution and an increasing 
level of discrimination against Christians at many levels of society, significantly by 
zamindars and the police. Some of the types of discrimination correspond to the 
traditional dhimmi status of Christians in a Muslim society; others do not, notably the 
“blasphemy law” which has interesting links with apostasy. The Shari’ah has gained 
increasing prominence in the legislation. As citizens of a state created to be a homeland 
for Muslims, many Christians have an identity crisis and some have emigrated.
For historical reasons, mainly connected with the influence of missionaries, Christians 
were apathetic in their response to Islamization and tended to withdraw from the majority 
society and from politics. The Punjabi biradari culture created disunity which also 
weakened their response. In recent years, they have become more active in national 
protests, inter-faith dialogue and engaging the international arena. They are now as 
active in politics as they can be within the separate electorates system. Many would 
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Pakistan came into being in 1947, the first state in modem times to be created on the 
basis of religion (quickly followed by Israel in 1948). Much has been written of the 
events leading up to its creation for there was scarcely a more significant event for the 
British Empire in the twentieth century than the loss of India, the jewel in the crown, and 
its splitting into smaller gems. Much has been written of the ideological and political 
development of Pakistan after independence, as the place of Islam in the homeland 
created for Muslims of the sub-continent was slowly and painfully worked out. But 
comparatively little has been written of the situation of the millions of Christians in the 
Muslim homeland.
Alone among the religions of the world, Islam has a defined set of rules in its Shari’ah for 
relationships with adherents of other faiths. These rules have been unaltered since the 
tenth century (C.E.)1 and assume a dominant role for Muslims. Christians fall into the 
category of “People of the Book”, who have a privileged position relative to other non- 
Muslims, though are of lower status than Muslims. Nowhere in the modem Muslim 
world are Christians treated exactly according to the Shari’ah, but almost everywhere 
they are discriminated against to some extent.
The very fact that little has been written about the situation of Christians (and indeed 
other non-Muslims, excepting Ahmadiyyas) in Pakistan is itself a symptom of their 
problems. Their existence is often ignored, and many Muslim authors writing on the
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social, political and religious situation of Pakistan make no reference to the presence of 
non-Muslim citizens. Christian scholarship includes some sociological studies by 
Westerners, mostly missionaries, and the excellent work of the Christian Study Centre 
(CSC) in Rawalpindi. But this material is limited in quantity. There is a lack of Western 
academic sources on the practical problems of daily existence faced by Pakistani 
Christians.
The lack of attention paid to their situation both by their Muslim compatriots and by their 
co-religionists in the West is one of the main grievances of Pakistani Christians. The 
discrimination and injustice which they face go unnoticed by others. “We are the 
voiceless,” said the Church of Pakistan Bishop of Peshawar, Munowar Rumalshah, about 
the Pakistani Christian community, in an address that repeatedly pointed to the inability 
of Christians in Pakistan to make known their situation.
It is the voicelessness of the Christians of Pakistan which has prompted this study. Its 
purpose is to trace the impact which the gradual Islamization of Pakistan has had on the 
Christian community and to examine their responses to it. In doing this it draws on 
studies of the ideological, legal and constitutional development of Pakistan and the 
implementation of Islamic law in historical and contemporary contexts, but the bulk of 
the study covers a subject area which has not, to the author’s knowledge, been traced at 
an academic level before.
1 Khadduri, Majid War and Peace in the Law o f  Islam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955) p.36
2 Rumalshah, Munawar “Hear the cry - o f the voiceless: being a Christian in Pakistan” in Sheridan, Sharon 
Hear the cry! Standing in solidarity with the suffering Church Report of a consultation organized by the
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The very voicelessness of the Christians has imposed certain constraints on the manner in 
which the study has been conducted. Although there is a wealth of scholarship on 
historical Islamic issues such as the Shari’ah, dhimmi, apostasy and blasphemy, with 
respect to the situation of Christians in Pakistan -  particularly in modem times - the 
number of detailed academic sources available is small. Even the Journal fo r  South 
Asian and Middle Eastern Studies has little of direct relevance to the subject of this study. 
CSC publishes a journal, Al-Mushir, as well as organising seminars and conferences with 
detailed reports. Their material was particularly valuable in the areas of the sociological 
understanding of the Christian community and the contemporary debates on the 
relationship between the Christian community and the Muslim majority in Pakistan. At 
what might be termed a semi-academic level, particular mention must be made of the 
carefully checked material produced in the publications of the two Pakistani Christian 
human rights organisations, the National Commission for Justice and Peace, and the 
Centre for Legal Aid Assistance and Settlement, both based in Lahore.
Given the limited academic sources, much information has therefore been extracted from 
accounts in contemporary newspapers and magazines. Collections of cuttings held by the 
CSC and by the F.S. KhairUllah Institute for the Study of Religion and Culture, Lahore, 
have been searched. With the exception of the publications mentioned above, most 
material produced by the Pakistani Christian community consists of unpublished papers, 
privately circulated pamphlets, private letters, open letters, church newsletters,
Episcopal Council for Global Mission, New York, April 1998 (New York: Anglican and Global Relations, 
1998) pp.39,44
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conference reports from the Church of Pakistan and other Christian groupings, press 
releases etc. Some of these are expressed in far from perfect English, which should not 
be allowed to detract from their importance as the first-hand expressions of the 
community which is the subject of this study. To this raw source material have been 
added articles in Pakistan’s lively and free press, in which a range of opinions including 
secular liberal Muslim, conservative Muslim and extremist Muslim are expressed. It is 
not often that Christians are able to gain space in the newspapers, though they may be the 
subject of articles by sympathetic journalists. (Though there have been several attempts 
to start Christian newspapers, none have survived for more than a month.) Most of the 
material used is in English, which, as it happens, is the language normally used in official 
church documents in Pakistan.
The author has paid three visits to Pakistan during the course of this study, not only to 
access papers and written materials, but also to interview individual Christians. By virtue 
of his position as a presbyter in the Church of Pakistan, the author has been able to 
include amongst these interviewees a number of senior Pakistani Christian leaders. Three 
have been particularly helpful, namely, Rt Rev. Dr Michael Nazir Ali, formerly Church 
of Pakistan Bishop of Raiwind, and now Church of England Bishop of Rochester, United 
Kingdom, Rt Rev. Mano Rumalshah, Church of Pakistan Bishop of Peshawar, and Mr 
Zafar Ismail, the international director of the Open Theological Seminary, Lahore.
Figures and statistics have been very hard to find. The last census was taken in 1981, so 
most recent statistics have been derived directly from that or estimated by extrapolation.
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But even the original figures of that census are challenged by many Christians who 
believe their numbers were underestimated for various reasons. More statistics would be 
an asset to this study, but, again, the very lack of detailed information can be seen as an 
indication of the marginalization of Christians.
Special mention must be made here of the section on Christian responses to Islamization 
(chapter 6). Most of the information in this chapter is common knowledge within the 
Pakistani Christian community, but for some issues it has proved difficult to find any 
significant written records or sources to refer to. Therefore they remain unannotated.
This is also true for some parts of the section on de facto discrimination against 
Christians (chapter 4).
Libraries visited have included the Christian Study Centre in Rawalpindi, the University 
o f London’s School of Oriental and African Studies, the British India Library in London, 
the Church Mission Society in London (which has good material on the Church of 
Pakistan), and the Institute for the Study of Islam and Christianity based originally in 
London but latterly in Pewsey, Wiltshire (which is particularly strong on human rights 
and religious liberty, including the documentation of individual cases).
Given the unusual nature of the source materials, the author has taken care to avoid 
sensationalist extremes and not to generalize from rare examples. Where individual cases 
are quoted these are chosen because they are representative of the experience of many 
Christians or indicative of a likely trend or have some other particular significance and
relevance. The author has kept in mind the self-editing and bias (whether conscious or 
unconscious) that are possible within personal narratives and has been careful to use a 
cautious and critical approach to such material, in an attempt to distinguish perception 
from reality.
This study begins with a history of Christianity in Pakistan from its origins in pre-Islamic 
times. It might be argued that this is irrelevant to the concerns of the Christian 
community today, who have no particular genealogical continuity with the earlier 
Christians of the north-west part of the sub-continent. Pressure from Islam had resulted 
in the apparent eradication of Christianity by the middle of the fourteenth century and it 
was not introduced again until the sixteenth century. However, it is of enormous 
psychological importance to today’s Christian community to know that their faith can 
validly be regarded as indigenous, not as a Western import. It could also be of political 
and social importance, lessening by one item the number of reasons for their rejection by 
the Muslim majority. Chapter 1 concludes with a survey of the Church in Pakistan today. 
Special consideration is given to the socio-economic status of the Christian community 
which is typically much lower than the average for the country as a whole. This poverty 
is one of the handicaps which the Christian community faces in asserting its rights as a 
minority.
The second chapter examines the ideological development of Pakistan, with special 
reference to its effects on the Christian community. The ideals of equality for all citizens, 
irrespective of religion, as famously expressed by the revered founder of Pakistan,
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Muhammad Ali Jinnah, soon yielded to a superior place for Islam in the ideology of the 
state. A wide spectrum of Muslim opinion is overviewed, ranging from those who 
advocated a sacred state excluding human will to those in favour of a secular state 
excluding divine will. With each successive constitution, Islam was more firmly 
ensconced and the rights of non-Muslims subtly reduced. When Zia seized power in 
1977 the process of Islamization escalated and began to be felt in a series of laws which 
had a negative impact on the lives of Christians.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 examine in detail the kind of discrimination faced by Christians in 
Pakistan. This is compared with the classical Islamic concept of dhimmi status, which is 
discussed in chapter 3, along with how that has been worked out in practice in the history 
of Islam. Other possible Islamic categories to which the non-Muslims of Pakistan could 
be assigned are considered, for strictly speaking they cannot be dhimmi, because they 
were not conquered by the Muslims. Nevertheless dhimmi status is by far the best known 
category and the only one which has a detailed set of rules laid down for it within the 
Shari’ah. Chapter 3 therefore examines aspects of discriminatory practice experienced by 
Pakistani Christians which have a link with the traditional restrictions on dhimmi. Some 
of these forms of discrimination are enshrined in Pakistani law, for example the legal 
status of witnesses in a law court and marriage laws. Others arise out of the attitudes and 
actions of the Muslim majority, for example, lack of promotion to high office and the low 
social status and mistrust of Christians. This chapter also includes a summary of the legal 
and constitutional safeguards which currently exist to protect the rights of Christians, 
whether or not they are enforced in practice.
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Chapter 4 continues the survey of discrimination against Christians by considering the 
types of discrimination which are in no way linked to the traditional Islamic treatment of 
dhimmi. Some of these are illegal activities, such as bonded labour and crimes against 
women and property, which are nevertheless prevalent because the police are not 
motivated to try to protect the legal rights of Christians. Chief amongst the legal forms of 
discrimination is the separate electorates system, which effectively disenfranchises 
Christians and other non-Muslims. Perhaps the next most important in this category is 
the “nationalization” of Christians schools in 1972 which has resulted in institutions set 
up to educate poor Christians being chiefly attended by wealthy Muslims. Lack of 
education prevents the majority of Christians from improving their socio-economic status 
and, arguably, also handicaps them in their attempts to seek better treatment for their 
community. Other issues covered are discrimination in employment and the media, and 
the relatively trivial but strongly symbolic belief of some Muslims that they cannot eat 
and drink with Christians.
Chapter 5 is logically a continuation of chapter 4, being a study of the so-called 
“blasphemy law” and its devastating effects on the Christian community. But this single 
issue is of such great importance to Pakistani Christians that it has been given a separate 
chapter. This is a relatively new issue, resulting from the insertion of Section 295-C into 
the Pakistan Penal Code in 1986 concerning defiling the name of the Prophet 
Muhammad, which became much more potent in 1991 when the death sentence was 
made mandatory. Although the numbers of Christians affected are relatively few, and
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none have yet been executed, the existence of the law has resulted in the murder of four 
Christians. It has created a definite increase in violence and intolerance on the part of 
Muslims and enormous fear in the Christian community. This chapter also looks at the 
issue of apostasy from Islam, which is not a crime in Pakistani law, although punishable 
in Islamic law. There is some linkage between the ideas of blasphemy and apostasy in 
Islam. This linkage also occurs in Pakistan where the blasphemy law is sometimes 
invoked as a way of punishing apostates.
Chapter 6 considers the various ways in which Christians have responded to their 
situation. A recurring theme is the disunity of the Christian community and the self- 
seeking nature of many of their leaders leading to lost opportunities to benefit the 
community as a whole. This disunity and a historic apathy have hindered Christians from 
engagement with the political arena, as has the system of separate electorates. Other key 
issues are Pakistani Christian identity and -  somewhat related to this -  whether or not 
they should seek support and help from the West. Since the 1970s, Christians have 
begun to stage protests and rallies to express their feelings on particular issues and 
sometimes about their situation in general. In 1998 a Roman Catholic bishop committed 
suicide as a protest against the blasphemy law. Christian human rights organisations and 
a Christian research centre are doing valuable work (as is the non-sectarian Human 
Rights Commission of Pakistan). In the last few years, appeals have been made -  with 
some success - to engage the assistance of Western governments and Western-based 
organizations concerned with human rights and religious liberty. Closer links have also 
been developed with Muslims by means of some interfaith dialogue initiatives. Some
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individuals who could afford to so do have emigrated. Many long for an independent 
state for Pakistani Christians, but recognize that it is not feasible in practice.
The final chapter concludes by discussing the inevitability of non-Muslims having a 
lower status than Muslims in Pakistan, given that the state was founded on the basis of 
Islam. If a modernist interpretation of Islam had prevailed, this would not necessarily 
have been the case, but the conservatives are very much in the ascendancy and appear 
likely to continue to dominate for the foreseeable future. In such a context, 
discrimination and marginalization of non-Muslims is bound to occur, despite any ideals 
of equality with which the state may have begun. Christians in Pakistan are therefore 
wholly dependent on the laws and constitution safeguarding their interests, though these 
are not properly enforced by the police and judiciary. The proposed fifteenth 
constitutional amendment would over-ride all the existing safeguards if it were to be 
passed. Even if it is never passed there seems little realistic hope that Christians could 
ever be completely equal with Muslims. The most feasible practical response to this 
situation might be for Christians to work within the Islamic paradigm to claim all the 
rights to which dhimmi are entitled rather than continuing to seek complete equality at the 
risk of ending up in a worse situation. Three possibilities that emerge from the study as a 
whole are highlighted: to seek the proper enforcement of the existing laws, to work for a 
change in the electoral system to give non-Muslims a political voice, and to overcome the 
disunity and passivity which have weakened the Christian community for many years.
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Generally speaking Pakistani Christians had high hopes of their new nation at partition in 
1947. They rejoiced in the white stripe on the green national flag, which indicated that 
minorities had a place in the Muslim state. But these hopes have been gradually 
disappointed, as Islamization has taken place.
A former Pakistani ambassador to several countries and a modernist, Afzal Iqbal in his 
1986 study of the Islamization of Pakistan makes an interesting comment linking the 
process of Islamization with the very name of the country. The name, as is well known, 
was coined in the 1930s by Choudhry Rahmat Ali, a student at Cambridge, by combining 
the initial letters of Punjab, Afghania (i.e. North West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Sind 
and the last three letters of Baluchistan. This name was later taken from the context 
which Rahmat Ali was considering and used for the proposed new state for Indian 
Muslims, which was to include also Bengalis. Perhaps the attraction of the not-wholly- 
appropriate3 name was the fact that its literal meaning in Persian was “land of the pure” 
or “pure land”.
The people in their enthusiasm believed in 1947 that they had achieved 
a land which was pure -  a concept associated with the early caliphate of 
Islam, an era o f expansion, justice, equality, and social welfare, a 
period which covered the caliphates of Abu Bakr, Umar, Usman and 
Ali. Not only that, the people found a parallel in the migration of  
Muslims from India to Pakistan with the migration of Muslim Arabs 
from Mecca to Medina under the leadership of the Prophet of Islam....
[The leaders o f the movement] readily made generous promises of
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ushering in a millennium, restoring the glory o f Islam, converting 
Pakistan into a citadel o f Islam, a laboratory o f Islam, where 
experiments in statecraft would be conducted to show to the world that 
Islam could provide a panacea for all its ills....
Pakistan came into existence in spite o f the opposition o f the ulama.
But once it came into existence the ulama thought they had an 
opportunity to play a role in changing its direction for they had serious 
reservations about the western educated elite. The ulama want to 
recreate, revive or reconstruct an Islamic state; they want to introduce 
the old Sharia Law, codifying all laws which were displaced by the 
British. This, then, is the process o f converting the country into a real 
Pakistan, the land of the pure, the process o f making it a good Muslim 
who abides by the laws o f the Qur’an and the Sunnah. It is this process 
of Islamisation...4
It may be that Iqbal’s link between the name “Pakistan” and the Islamization process is 
fanciful. Nevertheless Islamization is ongoing and indigenous Christians are increasingly 
finding themselves unwanted intruders in the land of the pure.
3 at least from the point o f view o f East Pakistan
4 Iqbal, Afzal Islamisation o f  Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd, 1986) p.vi
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Chapter 1
Historical and sociological factors affecting the Christian community in Pakistan 
History of Christianity in Pakistan
The history of Christianity in Pakistan was until 1947 necessarily part of church 
history in India. It is possible, however, to trace something of the early contacts of 
Christianity within those regions which now constitute Pakistan. The north-west part 
of the Indian sub-continent was from the third century a province of the Sassanid 
Persian empire called India, bounded on the east by the Indus river, which also 
marked the eastern most boundary of the empire. But the word "India" was also used 
in ancient times to cover a broad range of geographical locations including the rest of 
the sub-continent, parts of the Arabian peninsula and even the Horn of Africa.
Thomas
The Mar Thoma church of South India has a strong and ancient tradition that it was 
the Apostle Thomas who brought Christianity to the Indian sub-continent in the first 
century. A Syriac source, written at Edessa in Mesopotamia (modem Urfa in Turkey) 
about 250, asserts:
"India and all its countries, and those bordering on it, even to the furthest sea, 
received the Apostles' hand of priesthood from Judas Thomas, who was Guide and 
Ruler in the Church which he built there, and ministered there."1
1Epitome Canonum Apostolorum p.32 in Cureton, W. "Doctrine of the Apostles" in Ancient Syriac 
Documents (London: 1864) p.33 quoted in Young, William G. Handbook o f Source Materials fo r
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There is however, some doubt as to whether this Judas Thomas was the Apostle 
Thomas because he is listed on the same page separately from the Apostles.2
According to the "Thomas Christians" of south-west India, Thomas first arrived on 
the Malabar coast, near the port of Musiris, in about 50 or 52 A.D. Local Kerala 
traditions state that he founded seven churches, usually named as Cranganore, Quilon, 
Parur, Kokkamangalam, Nironam, Palayur and Chayal. In each of these towns he is 
said to have set up a cross, the seven crosses being known as "the crosses of St. 
Thomas". He preached in both east and west India, and many were converted - 6,850 
of the Brahmin caste, 2,590 Kshatriyas, 3,780 Vaishyas, as well as two kings and 
seven village chiefs whom he ordained as bishops and church leaders. His tomb at 
Mylapore, near Madras, is still held in reverence.3
Traditional songs, poems and other oral traditions from the Christian coummunities in 
South India refer to Thomas. Thomas Rabban Pattu [the song of Thomas] dates back 
scores of generations and gives a date of AD 50 for Thomas' arrival in India. Another 
song, Mar gam Kali Pattu, which was put into writing in 1732, records that Thomas 
built a king's palace in the kingdom of Chola, South India. The South Indian 
traditions state that Thomas' success was due not to his polemical ability but to his 
saintly life and his miracles. He is said to have suffered many false accusations and 
other forms of opposition. His martyrdom, according to a traditional poem, took 
place at Mylapore where Brahmin priests at the temple of Kali killed him after he 
refused to worship the goddess.4 These traditions, being both strong and ancient,
Students o f  Church History, (Madras: The Senate o f Serampore College and the Christian Literature 
Society, 1969) p.26
2Rooney, John "Exploring St Thomas" Al-Mushir vol.XXV nos. 1&2 (1983) p.80
3ibid. pp.81-82; Moffett, Samuel Hugh A History o f  Christianity in Asia, Vol. 1 Beginnings to 1550
(San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1992), pp. 25-36
4Thomas, P. Christians and Christianity in India and Pakistan (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 
1974) pp. 12-28; Moffett op. cit. pp.25-36
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should not be dismissed lightly. In the words of one Metropolitan of the Mar Thoma 
Church:
The History o f the Christian Church in the first century does not depend 
entirely on historical documents. Tradition is often more true and more 
compelling than plain historical proof. In this sense St Peter's founding o f  
the Roman Church and St Thomas' founding of the Malabar Church may 
be said to stand on the same footing. Both are supported by traditions 
which are sufficiently early and sufficiently strong.5
These South Indian songs and poems may be derived from the Acts o f  Thomas, an 
important early source - albeit apparently a fanciful adventure story - from which it 
has been inferred, however, that Thomas went first to the north-western part of the 
Indian sub-continent before going to the south. The Acts6 was written in Syriac 
between 180 and 230 probably at Edessa. It is thought to be a gnostic enlargement of 
an earlier work known as Passio Thomae.1 It has been preserved in both Greek and 
Syriac, though the Syriac was "censored1 more than the Greek version by orthodox 
scribes attempting to remove the gnostic elements.8
According to the Acts, the apostles in Jerusalem cast lots to decide which country 
each should preach in. India fell to the lot of Thomas, but he refused to go, despite a
5Juhanon Mar Thoma quoted in Alexander Mar Thoma The Mar Thoma Church: Heritage and  
Mission (Tirvalla, 1985) p.3, cited in Nazir-Ali, Michael From Everywhere to Everywhere (London: 
Collins, 1991) p.25
6English translations are found in James, M.R. The Apocryphal New Testament (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press? 1972) pp. 365-438 and Hennecke, E. New Testament Apocrypha (Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1965) II pp.442-531, both based on Wright, W. Apocryphal Acts o f  Apostles (London, 1871, re­
printed Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1968) cited in Rooney "Exploring St Thomas" p. 83
7Rooney "Exploring St Thomas" p.84-5, who cites Medlycott, A.E. India and the Apostle Thomas 
(London: David Nutt, 1905) pp.269-73 and Schmidt, C. Die Alten Petrussakten im Zussamenhang der 
Apocryphen Apostelliteraure (Leipzig, 1903)
8Nazir-Ali From everywhere p.26; Amjad-Ali, Christine "The Literary Evidence for Thomas in India"
in Rooney, John (ed.) St Thomas and Taxila: A Symposium on Saint Thomas (Rawalpindi: Christian
Study Centre, 1988) p.35
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dream in which Christ appeared to him and promised him grace. Nevertheless he 
found himself taken to India anyway, as a slave of an Indian merchant named Habban, 
who had come to the Middle East in search of craftsmen and labourers to build a new 
palace for King Gundapharos.9 Some time after their arrival at the King's court 
(probably at Sirkap, near Taxila, Pakistan) Thomas was summoned into the King's 
presence where he described himself as "a carpenter, the servant of a carpenter and an 
architect" who knew how to build "monuments and palaces for kings". The King 
was delighted, and entrusted him with money to build the new palace. Thomas, 
however, gave the money away to the poor and spent his time preaching Christianity 
in the villages. When challenged on this, Thomas told the King that he had built him 
a palace in heaven, an explanation which did nothing to mollify the King's wrath, 
until the King's brother Gad, who was very ill and close to death, had a vision of the 
heavenly mansions. Amongst them was a most beautiful palace which, an angel 
informed Gad, Thomas had built for King Gundapharos. As a result both 
Gundapharos and Gad were converted to Christianity. Thomas then went to another 
Indian kingdom whose ruler, Mazdai, had him speared to death by four soldiers.10
Although the Acts was written in distant Edessa, King Gundapharos was certainly a 
historical figure,11 who ruled parts of Persia and Pakistan, from his capital at Taxila, 
also holding court at Kabul and Peshawar. According to coins discovered in the 
Kabul valley and the Punjab and other archaelogical evidence, he probably ruled from 
A.D. 21 to 50/60.12 However, there is no independent evidence that he was converted 
to Christianity. His brother Gad may also have been historical,13 but of course the
9There are many forms o f his name, e.g. Gundapharos (Greek), Gudnaphar (Syriac), Vindafama 
(Persian). See Dar, Saifur Rahman "Gondophares and Taxila" in Rooney, John (ed.) St Thomas and 
Taxila: A Symposium on Saint Thomas (Rawalpindi: Christian Study Centre, 1988) p. 19
10Acts o f  Thomas, summarised by Farquhar, quoted in Young Handbook o f  Source Materials, pp.25- 
26, and by Rooney, John Shadows in the Dark (Rawalpindi: Christian Study Centre, 1984) pp.29-31
1 ^ a r  op. cit. passim
12 Rooney Shadows in the Dark pp 31-38; Rooney "Exploring St Thomas" pp. 83-86
13Dar op. cit. pp. 18,27
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introduction of historical figures does not prove a work to be factual rather than 
fictional. Mazdai seems to be legendary.14 A number of descriptions of Indian 
culture are considered by some to point to the Acts being an authentic account of 
events in India15, though others feel they carry little weight.16 Thomas's visit to India 
was certainly believed by many of the early Church Fathers.17 The fact of the 
existence of a Church in South India from very early times is concordant with an 
apostolic visit. The assertion that the apostle Thomas visited Pakistan thus seems 
reasonable and credible, but the case is far from proven.18
Local traditions in Sind maintain that Thomas also passed some time there. A small 
and secretive group known as the Tatta Naga Fakirs claim to be descended from 
Christians baptized by Thomas at Thatta on the Indus. They claim to possess books 
(perhaps Matthew's Gospel) and relics which would prove this historical link, but 
these are not shown to outsiders. They are known to practise some Christian rites, but 
these could, of course, have been derived from later Christian missionaries and do not 
necessarily have to have been taught them by Thomas.19
Christianity in India in the 2nd to 5th centuries
Whatever the truth of these traditions surrounding the coming of Christianity to India, 
there is strong evidence that Christianity had reached parts of the sub-continent by the 
third century A.D.20 Certainly there appear to have been Indian Christians and 
Christians in India. Bardaisan, who converted to Christianity at Edessa in 179,
14Young Handbook o f Source Materials p.26
15Rooney, "Exploring St Thomas" p.85
16Amjad-Ali, Christine "The literary evidence” p.38
17Rooney, "Exploring St Thomas" pp.80-81
18Nazir-Ali From Everywhere p.25
19Rooney Shadows in the Dark p.45
20Hoke, Donald The Church in Asia (Chicago: Moody Press, 1975) pp.475-99
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mentions in his Dialogue on Fate (written in the same city about 196, either by 
himself or by one of his disciples) that there were Christians among the Kaishans who 
were then ruling Afghanistan and most of Pakistan.21 The Chronicle o f  Se'ert is a 
document dating from either the 9th or the 13th century, which uses earlier sources to 
trace the history of the Patriarchs of the Church of the East up to about 640. It refers 
to Dudi [David], Bishop of Basra, who went to India where he evangelized many 
people. This visit would probably have been between 295 and 300.22 Writing in the 
ninth century, Ishu'-dad of Merv, the bishop of Haditha in Assyria, commented that a 
certain "Daniel, the Presbyter, the Indian" had helped to translate the epistle to the 
Romans from Greek into Syriac. This would have probably been in the early decades 
of the fifth century.23 The Chronicle o f  Se'ert mentions a Ma'na, Metropolitan of 
Fars, who sent books of his own translations of various Christian works to India. 
Ma'na's translation work probably took place about 470. However, it must be 
remembered "India" and "Indian" were very broad categories.
Evidence that an Indian Church existed as such by the early fourth century is 
suggested by the fact that one of the church leaders who signed the Nicene creed in 
325 was John the Persian, who signed "on behalf of [the churches] in the whole of 
Persia, and in the great India..."24 There is some uncertainty, however, as to what the 
term "India" means in this context - it could be modem India or part of Arabia or the 
Persian province of India [modem Pakistan].25 In the middle of the fourth century, 
"Theophilus the Indian",26 a zealous Arian, visited various parts of India and
21 Young Handbook o f  Source Materials p. 19
22Chronicle o f  Se'ert (Sa'ard)\:% quoted in Young Handbook o f Source Materials p.27
23Ishu'-Dad o f Merv Commentary on Romans, collophon, quoted in Young Handbook o f  Source 
Materials p.28
24Gelasius o f Cyzicus Ecclesiastical History 2:17 quoted in Young Handbook o f  Source Materials
p.28
25 Stewart, John Nestorian Missionary Enterprise: the story o f a Church on fire  (Trichur: Mar Narsai 
Press, 1961) pp.92-93
26According to B.J. Kidd's History o f  the Church to AD 461, Theophilus was from Sri Lanka. 
Assemani, however, believes that he came from the island of Divu [modem Diu] which was then at the 
mouth o f the Indus. See Stewart op. cit. pp.53-54,92
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"reformed many things which were not rightly done among them, for they heard the 
reading of the gospel in a sitting posture and did other things repugnant to the divine 
law". Stewart deduces from this that there were resident congregations, with regular 
church services and a resident clergy which he believes "show beyond any reasonable 
doubt that the Christian community in India in AD354 was an indigenous 
community".27 Some of the hymns of the Syrian writer St Ephraem Syrus (c.306- 
373)28 contain references to Christianity in India and suggest, by their racist 
metaphors, that it is Indian Christians, rather than fairer-skinned immigrants, which 
the saint had in mind 29 Ardashir Pharihd in Baluchistan had a bishop or metropolitan 
as did other parts of Baluchistan.30 Baith Lapat [later Gundeshapur, now Shahabad, 
North India] had a bishop from at least 225. One scholar comments on the Christian 
community in North India in early times:
"The majority o f these were undoubtedly Indians by blood and ancestry 
who had embraced the new faith for its own sake, as proselytes of 
Christian missionaries from Persia and Mesopotamia."31
27Philostorgius, referred to in Stewart op. cit. pp.88-89
28The hymns (Carmina Nisibena) are quoted in Medlycott op cit. pp. 22-31 29For example, "In India
are thy miracles, O Thomas", "The sun-burnt India thou hast made fair, the tainted mind of dark people 
thou hast purified", "The cross of light has obliterated India's darkened shades", quoted in Stewart op. 
cit. p.88
30Stewart op. cit. p.86
31Mingana, A. "The Early Spread of Christianity in India" in Bulletin o f  the John Rylands Library 
Library Vol. X, no. 2, (1926) p.437 quoted in Stewart op. cit. p.87
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The Taxila Cross
In 1935 a small cross was discovered in a field near the site of the ancient city of 
Sirkap, near Taxila. It is now housed at the Anglican Cathedral in Lahore. This cross 
has become an object of great sentimental significance to Pakistani Christians, who 
see in it tangible proof that Christianity is part of the heritage of Pakistan. It was 
adopted as the symbol of the Church of Pakistan at its inauguration on 1 November 
1970, which declared:
Adopting the Taxila Cross as our Symbol, we want to establish the fact that the 
Christian Church is not a recent addition in this country. Its heritage and past go 
back to the early centuries o f the Christian era.32 (The Pakistan Times, 1 November 
1970?)
In fact, archaeologists are uncertain as to whether the cross really dates from the 
second century, as the Church of Pakistan claims, and even as to whether it is in fact a 
Christian symbol. It is a cross with arms all of equal length, and equilateral crosses 
like this are not uncommon in pre-Christian and Buddhist artefacts.33
Nestorian34
Cosmas Indicopleustes [the India-sailor], a well-travelled Alexandrian merchant, 
writing about 525, reported that there were churches in Malabar and in Kalyan, near 
Bombay. He also mentioned Christians in the Ganges valley, as well as churches and
32 The Pakistan Times (1 November 1970)
33Rooney Shadows in the Dark pp.42-45
34This commonly used term is actually a misnomer for the East Syrian Church and repugnant to the 
Church o f the East itself because it smacks o f heresy.
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Christian communities amongst ’’the rest of the Indians", a phrase which in context 
almost certainly means the people of present-day Pakistan. Furthermore he reported 
that there was a church with clergy in Sri Lanka, but that it was composed entirely of 
immigrant Persians, not of the indigenous people.35 According to Cosmas 
Indicopleustes (himself a Nestorian), Christians in the sub-continent were served by 
clergy and bishops appointed from Persia, so from the sixth century at least the 
Church in India must be reckoned Nestorian.36
After the Muslim Arab conquest of Persia in the middle of the seventh century, the 
Nestorians became a ray ah (protected people, dhimmi) on the usual terms according 
to which Christians under the Caliph's rule were treated, that is, somewhat better than 
they had been treated under the Sassanid monarchy in Persia.37
They were able to continue developing their tremendous missionary effort across 
Asia. As already noted, they had sent missions to the west coast of India and Sri 
Lanka, churches being established in these areas by the first quarter of the sixth 
century. In Hindu areas the Nestorian missionaries seem to have faced a very 
determined counter-offensive from Brahmins, which, according to some historians, 
included the rapid fabrication of various Hindu legends. This followed what may 
have been earlier efforts by Brahmins (perhaps working in collaboration with 
Buddhists) in the third century A.D. to halt the progress of Christianity by forging 
"ancient" pillar and rock inscriptions ascribed to Asoka in the third century BC.38
35Cosmas Indicopleustes Topographia Christiana Books 3 and 11 quoted in Young Handbook o f  
Source Materials pp.29-30
36ibid. loc. cit.
37Fortescue, Adrian The Orthodox Eastern Church 3rd edition (London, Catholic Truth Society, 1911) 
pp.92-93
38Stewart, op. cit. pp.236-252
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Despite this opposition, the Nestorian Church appears to have become well 
established in the sub-continent. Because the part of Pakistan which lies west of the 
Indus was within the Persian empire, itwas automatically included in Nestorian 
structures. But many sources indicate that much or all of the rest of the sub-continent 
was also included. In the middle of the seventh century the Nestorian Patriarch Isho- 
Yahb III rebuked the metropolitan of Riwardashir for actions which had caused the 
interruption of the episcopal succession in India. The Patriarch defined this India as 
stretching from the borders of the Persian empire (the Indus) to Kalah, which is 
sometimes identified as Galla in Sri Lanka and sometimes as Quilon in South India. 
Whatever the southern boundary of the Nestorian bishoprics was, this source indicates 
that their ecclesiastical structures covered most or all of the sub-continent.39 This is 
confirmed later by Morinus who speaks of the Nestorian Patriarchs sending bishops 
and archbishops all over India, as the Catholic Pope does for Catholic countries.40 
Another Nestorian Patriarch, Timothy I (779-823), also refers to "the Indians" as a 
province under his jurisdiction.41
Nestorian metropolitans of India are referred to in the ninth century and later, for 
example by Patriarch Theodore (852-858).42 Gundeshapur [modem Shahabad, North 
India] is mentioned as the seat of a Nestorian metropolitan by Elijah of Damascus in 
893. At this time there was also a metropolitan of India.43 Patna was the seat of a 
metropolitan in 1222.44 Gundeshapur is also included in the list of Nestorian 
metropolitans given by 'Amr ibn Matta in 1349. (Indeed it had had a bishop since at
39Mingana op. cit. pp.90-91
40ibid. p.91
41 Stewart op. cit. p.91
42ibid., loc. cit.
43Young, William.G. Patriarch, Shah and Caliph: A study o f the relationships o f  the Church o f  the 
East with the Sassanid Empire and the early Caliphates up to 820A.D. with special reference to 
available translated Syriac sources (Rawalpindi: Christian Study Centre, 1974) p.41
44Wiltsch Geography and Statistics o f  the Church pp. 163-168 quoted in Stewart op. cit. p.93
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least 225, as mentioned above, and a metropolitan since at least 410, i.e. since before 
the development of the Nestorian church as a separate entity.)45
In the course of time, various traditions began to circulate concerning good relations 
between Muslims and Nestorian Christians in the earliest days of Islam. 
Consequently, Nestorians came to be given more favourable treatment than other 
dhimmis. This was especially the case while the Caliphate was based at Baghdad 
(750-1258), although there were intervals of intense persecution. During most of this 
time the Nestorian Patriarch was also based at Baghdad. Nestorians were treated by 
the Caliphs as the senior Christian community, and their Patriarch had, at least at 
times, civil authority over all Christians under the Caliph's rule. Nestorians, by virtue 
of their great scholarship inherited from Greek culture in Syriac translation, had 
much influence at the Caliph's court. Their learning was contributed to Arab 
civilization, which in turn passed it on to Spain and thus to medieval Europe.46
However, Christians in the northern part of India began to face severe difficulties as 
successive bloody Muslim invasions occurred from 1001 onwards. Gradually more 
and more territory was conquered. When Marco Polo visited central India around the 
end of the thirteenth century, he reported not only three Christian kingdoms, but also 
three "Saracen" kingdoms.47 By 1330 the whole of India down to the Vindhya 
mountains was under Muslim domination. In 1344 the southward movement of the 
Muslim forces was halted by an alliance of Hindu states - the empire of Vijayanagar - 
but by this time Christianity had in all likelihood been more or less eliminated from
45 Stewart op. cit. pp 77-102; 'Amr History o f the Nestorian Patriarchs p. 126 quoted in Young 
Handbook o f  Source Materials p.22; Mashiha-Zakhka Chronicle o f  Arbffl, and Synodicon Orientate 
[Records o f  Eastern Synods], quoted in Young Handbook o f  Source Materials p.23
46Fortescue op. cit. pp.91ff
47Cordier Marco Polo, Vol. II p.427 quoted in Stewart op. cit. p.93
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the whole of India north of the Vindhya mountains and also from much of the Deccan 
to their south.48 Stewart comments:
"That the decay o f Christianity in central and northern India was due largely to 
subversion by the Muhammadans is confirmed by the fact that as late as A.D. 1784 
Tippu Sultan, the Muhammadan ruler of Mysore, forcibly circumcised thirty 
thousand Christians (some writers say fifty thousand) and removed them, and 
presumably their families with them, to the country above the Western Ghauts. He 
harassed the Christians in their hiding places and compelled them, under pain of 
having their ears and nose cut off, to abjure their religion and embrace Islam. How 
many o f the forebears o f the more than a million Mapilla (Moplah) and other 
Muslims in the Malabar and South Canara districts o f the west coast o f India today 
were originally Christians, who similarly became Muhammadans under compulsion, 
we have no means o f knowing."49
Following the virtual elimination of the Nestorian Church in the late fourteenth 
century by Timur Leng's Tartar forces, the only Nestorians who remained - that is, 
alive and unconverted to Islam - were in South India50 and Kurdistan.51 Nicolo Conti, 
visiting India in the fifteenth century reported a thousand Nestorian Christians in 
Malepur [Madras] and added that Nestorians "are scattered all over India as the Jews 
are among us".52 In 1442 the vizier of Vijayanagar was a Christian called Nimeh- 
pezir.53 In the eighteenth century there was a numerous and devout Christian 
coummunity amongst the Marathas.54 Some Hindu Marathas had family names
48Stewart op. cit. pp.232-234
49ibid. pp.235-236
50including those in Mysore referred to in the quotation by Stewart above
51 It is interesting to note that as late as 1503 Nestorian patriarch Elijah V ordained three metropolitans
and sent them to India, China and Java. Stewart op. cit. p.91
52Nicolo Conti India in the Fifteenth Century p.7 quoted in Stewart op. cit. pp.93-94
53Report by Abd-er-Razzak Hakluyt Library, 1st Series, Vol. XXII p.41 quoted in Stewart op. cit. p.93
54Lettres Edifiantes et Curieuses quoted in History o f (R.C.) Telugu Christians (Trichinopoly, 1928).
See Stewart op. cit. p.96
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which indicated that their forebears had been Christian.55 The Nabob of Arcot had 
many Christians amongst his troops, and there were also many Christians in a Sudra 
caste called the ill' ellani Kamavarus.56
The large Roman Catholic communities which exist in South India today are probably 
the descendants of Nestorian Christians who were absorbed into Roman Catholicism 
after the advent of Catholic missionaries to India.57 This absorption process was far 
from smooth and easy, involving even guns and the threat of bloodshed, as the 
Nestorians, proud of their race and ancient traditions, reluctantly submitted to the 
imposition of a Catholic hierarchy from Europe. A critical event occurred at 
Mattanchery in 1653 when a huge mob of Indian Christians, eager to welcome a 
Syrian Orthodox Patriarch from Antioch and to free themselves from the domination 
of the Portuguese in Goa, swore on the cross at Mattanchery Church that they would 
not accept the authority of Goa. It is interesting to note that this revolt was against the 
authority of the Portuguese rulers of Goa and the Jesuits rather than against the 
authority of the Pope, and that most of the former Nestorians continued as Catholics 
calling themselves Syrian Catholics or Catholic Chaldeans.58
There is, however, one nominally Nestorian group in India known as the Church of 
Trichur or, informally, the Mellusians, which has about fifteen thousand adherents. 
They are a schismatic sect which arose in the second half of the nineteenth century 
from Catholic Chaldeans in Malabar, and are led by the Metropolitan of Malabar and 
the Indies, who is based at Trichur.59
55Hunter, Sir W.W. The Indian Empire p.240 referring to Gazetteer of the Kanara district o f the 
Bombay Presidency Vol. XV p.397. See Stewart op. cit. p.96
56History o f  (R.C.) Telugu Christians (Trichinopoly, 1928) pp.258,294 referred to in Stewart op. cit. 
p.97
57Stewart op. cit. pp.291-300
58Thomas op. cit. pp.76-104,224
59Attwater, Donald The Dissident Eastern Churches, (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company,
1937) pp 221, 231-232; Fortescue op. cit. pp. 108-109; Janin, Pere Raymond The Separated Eastern 
Churches translated by P. Boylan (London: Sands & Co., 1933) pp.209-210
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Catholic
Vasco da Gama, who sailed into the Indian Ocean in 1498, was probably the first 
Roman Catholic to reach the sub-continent. He was closely followed by the first 
Catholic missionaries, Franciscan brothers, who arrived from Portugal in 1500.60 In 
1542 the first Jesuit missionary to India, Francis Xavier, arrived in Goa. Meanwhile 
Portuguese enclaves were being set up along the Indian coasts. The Mughal emperor 
Akbar had a fascination with religions of all kinds, and abolished the jizya  imposed by 
his predecessors, thus creating a common citizenship for all his subjects, Hindus and 
Muslims alike.61 In 1579 he sent an ambassador to Goa with a letter to the Jesuits 
requesting that they "send me two learned priests who should bring with them the 
chief books of the Law and the Gospel, for I wish to study and learn the law and what 
is best and most perfect in it". It seems that his choice of Jesuits rather than any other 
kind of Christian could have been prompted by a report he had heard three years 
earlier of two Jesuit priests in Bengal who had refused absolution to some Portuguese 
merchants who had defrauded the Mughal officials of taxes which were legitimately 
due to the Mughal government. A group of Jesuit missionaries was duly sent, and 
arrived at Akbar's court at Fatehpur Sikri in February 1580. Akbar allowed them to 
preach and make conversions; he even donated funds for the construction of the first 
church in Lahore in 1600. Akbar's interest in Christianity waxed and waned. At one 
point (1590) he ordered that all minarets in Lahore be demolished and that the 
mosques be turned into grain stores and stables. In 1601 he finally agreed to issue a 
written firman granting freedom of worship and the right to preach publicly and make 
converts, thus making official his earlier verbal statement. However, he never
60W.W. Hunter The Indian Empire p.244 referred to in Stewart op. cit. p.98
61 Sharma, Sri Ram The Religious Policy o f  the Mughal Emperors (first published Calcutta, 1940, 
reprinted Lahore: Panco Press, 1975) p.23
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converted to Christianity, and died in 1605, his own personal beliefs still a mystery to 
the rest of the world.62
Akbar's son, Salim, who changed his name to Jehangir when he acceded to the throne, 
seemed at first even more favourable to Christianity than his father had been. He 
gave generous gifts for the building and maintenance of churches in Lahore and Agra, 
and always wore a golden crucifix around his neck. He was friendly to the 
missionaries and seemed pleased when they out-argued the Muslim ulema in debates. 
However, he also restored the mosques which his father had desecrated and 
sometimes attempted to force Christians to apostasize.63
In 1608 and 1612 the first English ambassadors arrived at Jehangir's court. The 
Portuguese Goans, resenting the attention paid by the Mughals to the English, seized a 
Mughal galleon in 1613.64 Jehangir immediately severed trade and diplomatic 
relations with them, cut off his allowances to the Jesuit priests, and closed the 
churches at Lahore and Agra. Life continued to be so difficult for the Christians in 
Lahore that the following year the entire Christian community of Lahore moved to 
Agra. By 1615, however, good relations were restored between Jehangir and the 
Portuguese, and in 1624 the church in Lahore was opened again, but it does not seem 
that an indigenous Christian community developed there again, nor that the refugees 
ever returned from Agra. In his later years, Jehangir became even more open to 
Christianity, but never actually converted.65
62Barrett, David (ed.) World Christian Encyclopedia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) p.543; 
Hoke op. cit. p. 493; Stock, Frederick and Margaret People Movements in the Punjab (1975) pp.309- 
26; Rooney, John The Hesitant Dawn (Rawalpindi: Christian Study Centre, 1984) pp.21,26,34- 
5,40,49,54; Thomas op. cit. p. 106
63Guerreiro, F. and Payne, G.H. Jahangir and the Jesuits (London, 1930) p.47 ff. cited in Rooney The 
Hesitant Dawn pp.57-60
64Calendar o f  State Papers, Colonial Series, East Indies (1862) 1513-1616 No. 659 p.258 cited in 
Rooney The Hesitant Dawn p.63
65Rooney The Hesitant Dawn pp.63-64; Thomas op. cit. p .l 14
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Meanwhile other Catholic orders were active in other parts of what is now Pakistan. 
An Augustinian friar is known to have died in Sind in 1598, and in 1613 the 
Carmelites Fr Louis Francis and Brother John Baptist arrived in Thatta [near 
Karachi], a large and important city whose population was mainly Hindu, with a small 
number of Portuguese. Circumstances called Fr Louis away after six months, but in 
1618 he returned and quickly built a church and a small convent. The church, 
beautifully decorated for its opening, was an object of great fascination to the local 
people but after a fortnight of constant visitors, local Muslims threatened to bum it 
down and murder the priest. The Mughal governor stepped in to prevent this, but Fr 
Louis decided to restrict access to the church somewhat. Fr Louis also opened a 
chapel at the port of Lahri Bandar, two days journey away. He made only three 
converts - one Hindu and two Muslims - whom he baptized the day before he died. In 
1624 Augustinian friars arrived at Thatta and Lahri Bandar. There was great rivalry 
between them and the Carmelites, but neither group managed to win many converts.66 
Jesuit missionaries were also active in Kashmir. During a severe famine in 1607-8 
many starving children were abandoned on the streets. The Jesuits gathered as many 
as they could, baptized them, and tried to nurse them back to health, but all died.67
Muslims in the sub-continent at this time were much more tolerant towards the 
preaching of other religions than were Muslims further west. For example, an English 
traveller named Coryate who acted as muezzin in a mosque, calling the faithful to 
prayer with the words "There is no God but God, and Hazrat Isa [Prophet Jesus] is the 
Son of God", lived to tell the tale.68
Jehangir's son, Prince Khurram, succeeded to the imperial throne in 1626 under the 
title Shah Jehan. The Portuguese Jesuits, who had already antagonized him by
66Rooney The Hesitant Dawn pp.65-70
67ibid. pp.47,70
68Thomas op. cit. pp. 121-2
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refusing to support his rebellion against Jehangir in 1622, were immediately deprived 
of their imperial pensions and lost their influence at court. Having ruthlessly dealt 
with various other enemies, Shah Jehan then turned on the Jesuits in earnest and in 
1632 ordered that the Portuguese settlement at Hugh in Bengal be destroyed, which 
resulted in the capture of 4,000 Christians, who were taken to Agra. Some were 
killed, some were sold as slaves, some escaped death by converting to Islam, and 
some were forcibly converted. In 1633 (or perhaps 1634) Shah Jehan ordered the 
closure and destruction of all Christian places of worship. The church at Lahore and 
its bell tower were duly destroyed, so was the church at Thatta. By 1655 the 
Augustinians had left Thatta. It is not known what happened to the buildings at Lahri 
Bandar, but the mission there was soon abandoned. Buildings at Agra were also 
destroyed. Some time between 1632 and 1634 Shah Jehan also issued a decree 
forbidding conversions from Islam, but this was not rigorously enforced. Public 
Christian worship was also forbidden.
Although Shah Jehan later permitted some re-building (e.g. at Agra) and in 1641 even 
gave permission for the re-opening of the missions in Sind, the Catholic work in 
Pakistan was much reduced. At the end of his reign there was still a Jesuit presence in 
Lahore, but this was now seen by the Jesuits mainly as a convenient staging post on 
the way to their new missons in Tibet. Meanwhile, the Carmelite priests at Thatta did 
little more than perform church services for the shrinking Portuguese community.69
In 1658 Aurangzeb rebelled against his father Shah Jehan, and seized the empire from 
him. In 1668 he began to introduce a series of Islamic reforms. The first of these 
ordered stricter standards of behaviour at court, the destruction of Hindu temples, and 
forbade non-Muslim public religious displays. In 1669 he ordered the closure of
69Rooney The Hesitant Dawn pp.85-91; Stock op. cit. pp.309-26
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schools at Thatta and Multan where Hindus were reported to be teaching from 
"unholy books" and banned "the teaching and infidel practices of the unbelievers".
It appears that these decrees had little effect on the Christians at Lahore, but at Thatta 
the Mughal authorities interrogated the Carmelite priests and confiscated their library. 
One of the accusations against them was that they had been instructing Muslim 
children and sending them to Goa for baptism. In addition, popular anti-Portuguese 
sentiments resulted in further harassment of the priests by the Muslims whenever the 
Portuguese seized a local ship. Some time before November 1672 the mission was 
closed.
The Christian presence in Lahore continued into the eighteenth century, by which 
time there was a signficant Dutch presence. Fr E. de Figueiredo wrote in 1735 about 
Lahore as follows:
Here is generally stationed the elite o f the Mughal army, composed for the greater 
part o f Christian officers, who by their fidelity and courage in all dangerous attacks 
on the enemy prepare the way for the Emperor's felicitous victories. They carry on 
their banners the holy cross, fulfil during their military service their Christian duties, 
and make themselves more redoubtable to the enemy by their piety than by their 
military tactics. Since the time o f Fr Jerome Xavier... no permanent resident priest 
was stationed there. For the spiritual consolation o f these officers and other 
Christians who are in great numbers, Lahore is visited twice a year by a priest, who 
extends his apostolic zeal also further northwards, visiting the Provinces o f  Multan,
Backar, Kabul and even Candar or Candahar.70
70Weldbott, band 31, p. 1 quoted in Rooney The Hesitant Dawn p.94
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Jesuit work in the northern part of the sub-continent effectively finished in 1760, as a 
result of the suppression of their order in all Portuguese territories by the Marquis de 
Pombal, who had become dictator in Portugal in 1755. Some Jesuits continued to live 
and work in Goa, which was beyond the jurisdiction of Portugal. In 1783 the whole 
of north India was assigned to the Italian Capuchin mission to Tibet, but they did not 
have the resources to cope with such a large area. Sind and Baluchistan remained the 
responsibility of the Carmelites in Bombay. This divison of responsiblity was largely 
academic since Catholic work in Pakistan was in abeyance until the conquest of Sind 
by the British in 1842.71
Immediately the Carmelites became active in Sind, setting up a centre in Hyderabad 
and a school in Karachi. Ten years later the Jesuits took over the work. Early work in 
the Sind concentrated on Goans, South Indians, Anglo-Indians and Europeans rather 
than indigenous people, but in the 1860s there were some conversions of Sindis. In 
the succeeding decades Catholic work blossomed and flourished all over Pakistan.
By 1880 Lahore had a missionary centre and an orphanage for girls. By 1889 Sialkot 
had become an important missionary centre, with six missionaries. In 1892 work 
began in the canal colonies. The latter two locations were very significant in the 
Chuhra movement which began in 1884.
The first decades of the twentieth century saw considerable growth in the numbers of 
Catholics. For example, in the Punjab, an estimated 1,500 Catholics in 1901 had 
increased to 45,641 by 1931. Many of these converts were from other Christian 
denominations, but others were from the Chuhras (basically Hindus but strongly 
influenced by Islam). In the 1930s and 1940s there were also numbers of conversions 
from other scheduled castes,72 for example Bhils and Kohlis. Growth of the Catholic
7 lo o n e y  The Hesitant Dawn pp.91-96
72 The Indian terminology “scheduled castes” is used here because the normal modem Pakistani terms 
-  that is, “minorities” or “backward classes” - seem respectively confusing in this context and
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Church continued after the Chuhra movement had waned, and between 1949 and 
1972 the number of Roman Catholics in Pakistan almost tripled to 341,231. The vast 
majority of these new converts came from Protestant denominations.73
Protestant74
Apart from the presence of British army chaplains, Protestant Christianity in Pakistan 
began with the visit of John Lowrie, an American Presbyterian missionary based at 
Ludhiana, to Lahore on 8 December 1835. The Sikh ruler of Lahore invited him to 
open a school there, but ill-health forced him to return to the US. His successors, 
John Newton and Charles Forman, arrived in 1849, the year after the second Sikh war 
had brought the Punjab under British rule. Forman spent more than 40 years in the 
Punjab and founded the college in Lahore which is still known by his name. From 
this work developed the Lahore Church Council.
In 1850 Anglican British missionaries with the Church Missionary Society (CMS) 
settled in Karachi. In a few years they had moved into all four provinces of modem 
Pakistan, often at the request of British civil officers. CMS missionaries were more 
widely spread over Pakistan than any those of any other group.
The Associate Presbyterian Church of North America - soon to become the United 
Presbyterian Church of North America and not to be confused with the American
unsuitable for an academic study. The term “scheduled castes” was included in the title o f a political 
party as late as 1949. See Tinker, Hugh India and Pakistan: a political analysis 2nd ed., revised, 
(London: Pall Mall Press Ltd, 1967) p.74. It was also used by Khurshid Ahmad in 1955. See Ahmad, 
Khurshid’s editorial footnote in Maududi, S. Abul A ’la The Islamic Law and Constitution translated 
and edited by Khurshid Ahmad 7th edition (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd, 1980) p.70
73 Stock op. cit. pp.309-26
74 Barrett op. cit. pp 542-5; Campbell op. cit. pp.9-15; Hoke op. cit. pp 475-99; Stock op. cit. pp 17- 
32, 57-139, 280-1; Webster op. cit. passim
35
Presbyterian Church mentioned above - started misson work in the Punjab in 1855. 
The work was initially centred on Sialkot. From this developed the United 
Presbyterian (UP) Church of Pakistan, which grew to be the largest Protestant 
denomination in Pakistan.
Yet more Presbyterians, this time the Church of Scotland, arrived in Pakistan in 1856. 
The work began in Sialkot but got off to a very shaky start with the murder of the 
missionary, his wife and baby son by an escaped prisoner during the Indian Mutiny 
the following year. The Scottish mission resumed in 1861.
In 1873 American Methodists began work in Karachi. The Salvation Army entered in 
1883 and the Brethren in 1892. Lutheran work was begun on the north-west frontier 
by the Danish Pathan Mission in 1903. Adventists, Baptists and Pentecostals have 
also been involved in work in Pakistan.
In the early decades of Protestant mission, progress in winning converts was very 
slow. The Church of Scotland mission had fewer than 200 after 20 years of labour. 
After a similar period of time, the American UP missionaries had 153 adult 
communicants. The British CMS missionaries were much the same. During this 
period, missionary work was mainly directed towards the educated and high castes.
In some cases this was a deliberate policy. For example, the German missionary, 
Pfander, who opened a CMS mission station in Peshawar in 1854, saw a number of 
learned Muslims converted through his writings and public disputations. In other 
cases it was quite unwitting. For example, the first UP missionaries spent a lot of 
time preaching in Urdu in the city bazaars and distributing tracts. Their audience was 
limited because only educated people spoke Urdu, only men went to the bazaar, only 
1% of Muslim, Hindu and Sikh people could read, and the rural population had no 
opportunity to hear the Gospel at all. Schools, orphanages and medical work were 
also established. Individuals who did become Christians were usually rejected by
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their families and thus became dependent on the missionaries, many of them living in 
the mission compound.
However, all this changed with Chuhra movement (see above). The Chuhras formed 
the largest of the scheduled castes in the Punjab. Occupying an inferior position even 
among scheduled castes75 they were amongst society's lowest and most despised 
people. They carried out dirty and menial jobs. Their religion was a kind of 
"islamized Hinduism" which included belief in a mediator and the need for sacrifices.
The mass conversions to Christianity, which became known as the Chuhra movement, 
began in 1873 with an illiterate elderly Chuhra man called Ditt. Ditt was converted to 
Christianity by a young Hindu convert. He went to the Presbyterian mission in 
Sialkot requesting baptism. This the missionaries reluctantly agreed to, after much 
pleading from Ditt. Against the missionaries' wishes, Ditt returned to his village 
where he faced ostracism and rejection. Nevertheless he stayed there, and before long 
his wife, daughter and two neighbours had become Christians. They were baptized by 
the missionaries. In 1874, Ditt's uncle and three other men converted. Gradually the 
number of Chuhra Christians in the Sialkot area grew. Many heard the Christian 
message from Ditt himself as he travelled from village to village selling hides.76
Meanwhile, Chuhras in other areas were also converted. In 1873 a Chuhra from 
Gujranwala was baptized, and soon afterwards two others from Gurdaspur area were 
baptized. The movement grew. Like the UP, the Anglicans and American 
Presbyterian missionaries also began to turn their attention to rural people. The 
Church of Scotland grew 40-fold in a decade, to number 8,000 by 1892. By 1904 the
75 Streefland, Pieter H. The Christian Punjabi sweepers: their history and their position in present day 
Pakistan (Rawalpindi: Christian Study Centre, 1974) p. 1
76 Pickett, J. Waskom Christian Mass Movements in India (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1933) 
p.23
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UP Church had 10,000 communicant members. The first Sialkot convention, held in 
1904, was another milestone, and in the following decade a further 22,000 
communicant members were added to the UP Church. Between 1902 and 1915 
Methodists increased in number from 1,200 to 15,000. The Salvation Army, who 
always chose to be involved with the poor rather than the wealthy elite, were also 
active amongst the Chuhras in evangelism and with schools and clinics. Growth in 
Salvation Army numbers was steady but unspectacular until 1906 when it rose to a 
rate of nearly 1,000 new members a year. The 1911 census reported that in the 
Punjab alone (meaning both Pakistan’s Punjab and modem India’s Punjab) there were 
163,994 Christians,77 which included 92,739 Presbyterians, 29,051 Anglicans, 18,007 
Salvation Army, 11,723 Methodists, 8,497 Roman Catholics and 1,117 Baptists. 
Christians were most heavily concentrated in the mass movement areas.78 In the 
following decade the number of Christians in the Punjab almost doubled again to 
reach 315,031.79 By 1935 almost all the Chuhras had become Christians.
Modern Period
Partition
The creation of Pakistan in 1947 profoundly affected Christians living there. The 
number of Christians in Pakistan (West and East) at this time was estimated to be
5 16,000.80 Large numbers of Muslims from India moved into Pakistan and their co-
77 The rapid growth can be seen by comparison with the corresponding figures for the three preceding 
censuses were: 3,823 in 1881, 19,547 in 1891, 37,980 in 1901 -  quoted in Campbell, Ernest Y. The 
Church in the Punjab (place o f publication not stated, perhaps Nagpur: National Christian Council o f  
India, 1961) p. 11
78 Kaul, Harikishan Punjab. Part II Tables, Census o f  India, 1911, vol. XIV, pp.444-51 quoted in 
Webster, John C. The Christian Community and Change in Nineteenth Century North India (Delhi: 
The Macmillan Company o f India Limited, 1976) pp.227-8
79 1921 census, quoted in Webster op. cit. p.247
80 Streefland op. cit. p.26
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religionists felt obliged to provide them with work. This often meant that agricultural 
jobs formerly done by Christians were given to the newly arrived Muslims. The 
Christians were forced into the towns to seek work, for example, sweeping, often 
displacing scheduled caste Hindus from these jobs (see chapter 4).81 They settled in 
squalid bastis, but were frequently moved on as their homes were demolished to make 
room for new buildings. This moving had extra complications for Protestant 
Christians owing to the policy of "comity" which had evolved at the Edinburgh 
missionary conference of 1905. For if they moved far they were likely to find 
themselves in an area assigned to a different Protestant denomination from that in 
which they had lived before. Their former pastor was unable to visit them, and they, 
as rural poor, were not necessarily welcomed by the "respectable" town Christians of 
the other denomination. Catholics, on the other hand, having no system of comity, 
found Catholic churches wherever they went, which welcomed them. Many 
Protestants converted to Catholicism.
Independence also triggered two mass movements of conversion to Christianity in the 
Lahore area. One was the Balmiki Hindus, who, some Christians believed, feared 
persecution after independence and turned to Catholicism in the hope of escaping this. 
The other was the Mazhabi Sikhs, many of whom converted to Islam while others 
converted to Christianity, perhaps also in the hope of avoiding persecution.82
Socio-economic status of Christians
The socio-economic profile of the Pakistani church is a matter of some controversy, 
since few precise figures are available. Undoubtedly a large proportion of Pakistani
81Nazir Ali, Michael "Pakistani Christians" 21 October 1991 p.2
82 Rooney, John Into Deserts: A History o f  the Catholic Diocese o f  Lahore, 1886-1986 (Rawalpindi: 
Christian Study Centre, 1986) pp.99-101
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Christians today are descendants of scheduled castes such as the Chuhras. But this is 
not a unique characteristic of Christianity. Islam, Buddhism and Sikhism have all 
attracted converts from among lower caste Hindus, who have naturally been eager to 
escape from their marginalized and oppressed status within Hinduism.
Christians who have come from the scheduled castes have been compared, in their 
psychology as a suppressed people, with the black community of the USA.83 While it 
is true that many Christians are “sweepers” and many sweepers are Christians, there 
are also Christians in every area of business and professional life (especially teaching 
and nursing) and there are also sweepers who are Hindu and even Muslim (musalli, 
the descendants of scheduled caste Hindus who converted to Islam).84
Early converts to Christianity in Pakistan were often from Muslim and caste-Hindu 
backgrounds and their descendants are a part of the Church today. Many of the most 
famous church leaders in Pakistan came from these backgrounds. The mass 
movements amongst the scheduled castes began, as described above, in the late 
nineteenth century. Although missionaries feared that these movements would have a 
detrimental effect on the work amongst Muslims and caste-Hindus who despised the 
scheduled castes, this did not prove to be the case. It should also be noted that some 
mass movements took place amongst Muslim groups, for example, the Narowal 
Khojas.
The Pakistani Christian community can be divided into five groups:
(i) Christian dynasties originating from affluent families belonging to one of the 
South Indian churches who had moved to the North some time in the past
83 Heinrich, J.C. The psychology o f a suppressed people (London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1937) 
passim
84Nazir Ali, Michael "Pakistani Christians" op. cit.; Streefland op. cit. pp.29-30
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(ii) Converts from Muslim or caste-Hindu backgrounds
(iii) Goans, from the former Portuguese colony in India
(iv) Anglo-Indians i.e mixed race
(v) Christians with a background in the mass movements amongst the scheduled 
castes of Sind and the Punjab, included formerly nomadic groups85
Surveys in the 1930s and 1950s indicated that the Christian community was on the 
whole severely deprived economically and socially. A 1938 study of certain Christian 
communities in the Sialkot district of the Punjab concluded that “until the economic 
level of this entire group is very substantially raised, very little progress beyond that 
already made can be attained”.86 A 1955 survey of Christian education in Pakistan, 
particularly the Lahore area, organised by the American Presbyterian Mission in West 
Pakistan, recommended that education be given a high priority, in particular 
elementary education.87 A1956 study and report for a conference on “The Economic 
Life of the Church” held in Lahore that year found that it was essential for Christians 
to be enabled to increase their incomes, and various recommendations about 
education, training, agriculture and cottage industries were made.88 A survey was 
conducted from November 1956 to February 1957 of 61 village churches, mainly 
around Lahore, Multan and Rawalpindi, which used a questionnaire including a 
question asking the nature of the major problems of the Church and the community. 
The two most frequently listed problems of the Church were illiteracy and poverty, 
seen as linked, and the two most frequently listed problems of the community were
85 The main nomadic groups were the Bhil, Kohali and Marwaries and were sometimes known 
collectively as “tribal peoples”.
86 Lucas, E.D. and Thakur Das, F. The Rural church in the Punjab (Lahore: Forman Christian College,
1938) p.52
87 De Young, Chris The Pakistan Educational Survey (1955)
88 Vaugh, Mr and Mrs Mason A study o f  Economic Development in West Pakistan, Report and 
Recommendations (unpublished paper, 1956)
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unemployment and the inability to get land to farm, also seen as linked to each 
other.89
Probably the most detailed research on the socio-economic status of Christians in 
Pakistan was a survey conducted by the Research and Social Action Committee of the 
West Pakistan Christian Council between December 1954 and December 1959. The 
1951 census had recorded 541,000 Christians in Pakistan,90 of whom 434,000 were in 
West Pakistan.91 For the survey, 28,520 families (totalling 152,789 individuals) were 
questioned. More than 90% of these were Protestants, and thus the survey was in this 
respect unrepresentative of the Pakistani Christian population as a whole. The survey 
report summarized some of the findings as follows:
(a) We have noticed that the per capita income is very low (Rs9/- $2.00 per month) and 
that probably is due to the fact that a major section o f the community are unskilled 
labour. A larger section of the community do not own property o f any description.
There is quite a good deal o f unemployment and a great deal more o f under employment.
40% of the people interviewed were under-employed. The number o f  people in 
Business and Industry is practically negligible.
(b) The situation of literacy in the community is also disappointing. It perhaps may 
sound strange to some who have a feeling that the Christian community is well up in 
literacy and education. It was found that excluding those under 5 years o f age the 
literacy percentage for Christians is 14.5 whereas for the whole country it is 18.1 and for 
the majority community 18.3. A more discouraging factor is regarding the school going 
children. The percentage o f children o f school going age who actually are in schools is
89 Comfort, Richard O. The village church in West Pakistan: Report o f  a  consultation held under the 
auspices o f  the West Pakistan Christian Council, November 10, 1956 to April 1, 1957 (printed for 
private use, no date given) pp.39,172
90 Streefland op. cit. p.26
91 Comfort op. cit.p.27
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20.3 whereas the perecentage for the country is 43%... It was also noticed that there is a 
sharp decline in the percentage after the primary stage from 14% primary, to 4% at the 
middle stage, and in the college stage it drops down to 0.4%. That means that out o f 203 
of the community which go to school, only 4 reach the college level...
(c) A third disappointing factor is in the sphere of social life. It was found that debt has 
been the one great scourge o f the social life o f the community. The figures o f debt were 
found out to be 33 per capita, i.e. to say that a family of 6 members with limited means 
o f income was under a debt o f RSI 80/- or $40.00 which certainly is no ease (sic) to the 
family.92
With regard to the above, the survey also noted that in 1921 Christians had had a 
substantially higher literacy rate than the national average. Only 0.1% of the 
Christians questioned in the 1950s survey had to beg for their living.93
A survey of Christians in the North West Frontier Province was conducted by Laurits 
Vemmelund from February to September 1972, examining 44 different Christian 
communities. With reference to the overcrowding and limited access to facilities such 
as latrines, water and electricity, Vemmelund comments: “More than 80% of all 
Christians domiciled in the N. W.F.P. live under conditions not congenial for any kind 
of family life.”94 Child mortality is well over 15% 95 Of all employed Christians, 
72% worked as sweepers.96 The number of children aged between 6 and 18 who were
92 West Pakistan Christian Council Survey Report o f  the Chuch in West Pakistan: A Study o f  the 
Economic, Educational and Religious Condition o f the Church 1955-1959 (Lahore: West Pakistan 
Christian Council, 1960) pp 39-40
93 West Pakistan Christian Council, Survey Report 1955-1959 p.41
94 Vemmelund, Laurits “The Christian Minority in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan” Al- 
Mushir Vol XV Nos. 4-6 (April-June 1973) pp. 117-119
95 ibid. p. 103 The uncertainty of this figure reflects the fact that most women were very reluctant to 
admit that any o f their children had died, feeling that it brought shame on them (see p.99)
96 ibid. p. 130
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not receiving any kind of edcuation was 48%.97 Among married adults, 64% of men 
were illiterate and 84% of women were illiterate.98
Urbanization
In the early days of the nineteenth century missionary work, most converts to 
Christianity were city-dwellers. However, the mass movements which began in the 
last quarter of that century changed the Christian community to a predominantly rural 
community, as confirmed by the occupations of Christians listed in the 1911 census.99 
Webster states by 1914 the composition of the Christian community of North India 
(by which he meant Pakistan’s Punjab and a large part of North India on the modem 
map) was “about ten per cent urban high caste and about ninety per cent rural 
outcaste”.100 As noted already, after partition Christians began to drift towards the 
cities in a search for better conditions and for work, many of their jobs having been 
taken by the Muslim immigrants from India.101 By 1961,15% of Christians in the 
Punjab lived in cities.102 Twenty years later 55% of the Christian population had 
become urban,103 in comparison with a Muslim population that was only 29%
97 ibid. p. 141
98 ibid. p. 146
99 Webster op. cit. p.228
100 Webster op. cit. p.229
101 Campbell op. cit. pp.4-5,17,35,62
102 Campbell op. cit. p.74
103 Addleton, Jonathan “A demographic note on the distribution o f minorities in Pakistan” Al-Mushir 
Vol. XXVII No. 1 (Spring 1985) gives tables (pp.41-43) from the 1981 census, which are summarised 
in McClintock, Wayne “A sociological profile o f the Christian minority in Pakistan ” Missiology : An 
International Review  Vol. XX No.3 (July 1992) p.346
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urban.104 While it is hard to say whether working life is better as an agricultural 
labourer or as a street-sweeper, it is certain that Christians living in urban contexts are 
safer from violence and injustice than are rural Christians. The tyrannical zamindar 
system (see chapter 4) -  apparently an immovable feature of rural life105 - does not 
function in the cities, and the security forces and judiciary are more in evidence.
While police may often not exert themselves on behalf of Christians, especially if the 
Christians are poor, it is still true as a general rule that lawlessness is less prevalent in 
urban situations than in the country and this in itself improves the security of 
Christians. This is particularly interesting given the fact that rural Christians consider 
themselves superior to urban Christians.
Church structure
The Pakistan Christian Council was formed in the 1920s, and loosely links together 
the Protestant denominations.
The 1960s saw a growing self-government within the Pakistani Church. In 1960 the 
Diocese of Karachi was formed under the first Pakistani Anglican bishop, Chandu 
Ray.106 In 1961 the UP Church gained independence from its American mother- 
church.107 At this time the total number of Christians in Pakistan was 733,000 of 
whom 584,000 lived in West Pakistan.108 As the 60s went on, various factions
104 The author’s own calculations using data from Addleton op. cit. pp.41-3
105 Malik, Iftikhar H. State and civil society in Pakistan: politics o f  authority, ideology and ethnicity 
(Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1997) p.85
106Barrett op. cit. p.543
107 Stock op. cit. p. 185
108 1961 census quoted in Streefland op. cit. p.26
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developed. Since Christians in Pakistan have little opportunity for leadership in 
politics or community affairs, leadership positions within the Church assume a great 
importance and the competition for them is intense.109 Eventually these factions led 
to schisms in the UP Church, the Lahore Church Council, the Methodists and 
Anglicans in 1968.110
Soon afterwards the trend reversed. Following India's example where several major 
denominations united to form just two groupings - the Church of North India and the 
Church of South India - the Church of Pakistan was formed in 1970 by a merger of 
the Anglicans (110,000 ), United Methodists (60,000), Presbyterians of the Sialkot 
Church Council i.e. Church of Scotland (20,000) and Lutherans (2,000). Its four 
original dioceses have now been expanded to eight: Karachi, Lahore, Sialkot, 
Faisalabad, Peshawar, Multan, Hyderabad and Raiwind. The Church of Pakistan now 
numbers 460,000, and is the largest Protestant denomination. Some elements of the 
bodies involved in this union chose to remain separate, and thus several small new 
groups were formed, such as the National Virgin Church of Pakistan, the Orthodox 
Church of Pakistan (Anglican), and the Methodist Church of Pakistan.
In the 1920s the Pakistan Christian Council had been formed, which loosely links 
together some of the Protestant denominations including the Church of Pakistan, the 
United Presbyterians, Presbyterians of the Lahore Church Council, the Associate 
Reformed Presbyterians (110,000) and the Salvation Army (42,000).1H
Protestant groups outside the Pakistan Christian Council include the United Church in 
Pakistan (40,000), the National Methodist Church (38,000), the Christian Brethren
109 McClintock op. .cit. p.344
110 Barrett op. cit. p.543; Webster, Warren in Hoke, op. cit. p 477; Stock op. cit. pp.185-187
i n Webster, Warren in Hoke op. cit. p 476; Johnstone, Patrick Operation World, 5th edition 
(Bulstrode: WEC Publishing, 1993) pp.432-433
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(32,000), the Seventh Day Adventists (18,800), the Full Gospel Assembly (16,100), 
the Indus Christian Fellowship (3,020), International Missions (3,000), Pakistan 
Christian Fellowship (1,590) and Evangelical Alliance Churches (1,200), as well as 
many smaller groups. The total number of Protestants is estimated at 1.3 million. 




The following analysis is based on the 1981 census. Of course, the situation will have 
changed considerably since then, not only because of natural growth of the Christian 
community (Pakistan has one of the highest population growth rates in the world), but 
also because of other factors, for example, the current mass movement among tribal 
groups in the Sind.113 The 1981 census gave a figure of 1.3 million (1.6%) for the 
Christian community, but Pakistani Christians themselves believe this to be a gross 
underestimate. Some believe the figure today may be as high as 3.5 million, which 
amounts to nearly 3% of the population. A more accurate figure may be 
approximately 3 million.
Almost 97% of the population of Pakistan is Muslim. But the Christian community 
of 1.3 million (1.6%) is the largest religious minority (closely followed by the Hindu 
community). Four-fifths of Pakistani Christians live in the Punjab, but Christians are
112 Johnstone op. cit. pp 432-433
113Nazir Ali, Michael "Pakistani Christians” op. cit. p.2
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found in each of the country's more than 60 districts. Most of the Christians who live 
outside the Punjab are of Punjabi origin. An analysis by province reveals the 
following:
Punjab
The district with the largest number of Christians is Lahore, which has a Christian 
community of about 190,000 (5.4% of the district's total population). Faisalabad, 
Sialkot, Gujranwala and Sheikhpura also have Christian communities of over
100,000. Of Punjab Christians as a whole, 38% live in urban areas.
Sind
Two-thirds of the Christians in Sind live in Karachi, which is the only division to 
have more than 100,000 Christians. The second greatest concentration of Christians 
is in the Hyderabad area. More than 82% of Sind's Christian community are city 
dwellers.
Baluchistan
There are only about 20,000 Christians in Baluchistan, half of whom live in Quetta. 
The rest are thinly scattered across the remaining districts. Baluchistan is an 
overwhelmingly rural province, yet two-thirds of the Christians live in urban areas. 
Institutional church structures are probably very rare outside of Quetta.
North West Frontier Province 
The Christians in this province number 38,500, of whom almost half live in Peshawar. 
More than half the Christian population live in urban areas, which is a far higher 
proportion than for the province's population as a whole. Many of the districts have 
very small and isolated Christian populations.114
114Addleton op. cit. pp 32-45
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Barrett's estimates





all Christians 1,475,500 1.8 2,909,000 2.0
crypto-Christians116 310,500 0.4 679,000 0.5
professing 1,165,000 1.4 2,230,000 1.5
Protestants 696,000 0.8 1,330,000 0.9
Roman Catholics 386,000 0.5 750,000 0.5
Pakistani indigenous 83,000 0.1 150,000 0.1
affiliated 1,475,500 1.8 2,909,000 2.0
total practising 1,032,850 (70% of affil.) 1,890,900 (65% of affil.)
non-practising 442,650 (30% of affil.) 1,018,100 (35% of affil.)
Protestants 805,000 1.0 1,470,000 1.0
Evangelicals 396,000 0.5 725,000 0.5
Neo-pentecostals 5,000 0.0 20,000 0.0
Roman Catholics 480,000 0.6 1,028,000 0.7
Catholic
Pentecostals
6,000 0.0 30,000 0.0
Pakistani indigenous 190,000 0.2 410,000 0.3
Marginal Protestants 500 0.0 1,000 0.0
115 Barrett op. cit. p 542
116Crypto-Christians are defined by Barrett as "secret believers in Christ not professing publicly nor 
enumerated or known in government census or public-opinion poll, hence unknown to the state or the 
public or society (but usually affiliated and known to churches)".
Conclusion
Although accurate up-to-date figures are not available, the present Christian 
community of Pakistan probably numbers about three million, and forms the largest 
religious minority (something over 2%), though official figures are lower. Almost all 
are ethnically Punjabi, most of them still living within the Punjab. Protestants form 
the majority, and were divided into many denominations until the formation of the 
Church of Pakistan in 1970 merged some of these denominations together. Catholics 
outnumber any single Protestant denomination. Compared with the population as a 
whole, the Christian community is more urbanized, more impoverished and 
comprised of a larger proportion of lower caste.
It is of great pyschological significance to Christians in modem Pakistan to know that 
their faith was present in their country before the advent of Islam, and even before the 
birth of Islam. Although Christianity was apparently eliminated in the fourteenth 
century so that it had to be re-introduced again by Europeans, Christians are 
encouraged by reminding themselves that they follow a faith which is neither new to 
Pakistan nor (originally) a Western import. They also set great store by the fact that 
they are indigenous “sons of the soil”, not immigrants.
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Chapter 2
The ideological development of the state of Pakistan and its ramifications for the 
Christian community 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah
Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), the undisputed founder of Pakistan, brought into 
being a country whose purpose was to serve as a homeland for Indian Muslims. The 
"two-nation theory", on which Jinnah based his argument for a separate Muslim- 
majority state after India's independence from Britain, was first hinted at by Sir Syed 
Ahmed Khan (1817-1898), the Muslim reformer who "successfully wrested the 
leadership of the Muslims from the hold of the orthodox divines and sent them on the 
road to modernism".1 Sir Syed spoke of "two races" or "two eyes", between which a 
rift might open or be closed.2 Seven hundred years of Muslim rule over Indian 
Hindus, followed by Hindu ascendancy under the British, had created a strong 
antagonism between the two faith-communities, reinforced by their radically different 
cultural and societal norms.3
A brief survey of the events which led to the creation of Pakistan indicates that a 
significant preliminary was the founding of the All-India Muslim league in 1906 
which pressed successfully for separate electorates for Muslims,4 considered by many 
a telling indication of the separateness of the Muslim and Hindu peoples.5 The two-
^yder, Khurshid "Pakistan under Bhutto" Current History Vol. 63 No. 375 (November 1972) p. 202
2Tinker op. cit. pp. 12-13
3This analysis is given by authors from as widely differing stances as the arch-secularist Muhammad 
Munir [From Jinnah to Zia 2nd ed.(Lahore: Vanguard Books, Ltd, 1980) pp. 19-20] and the pro- 
Jamaat-i-Islami Z.A. Suleri ["Counter-revolution in Pakistan" The News International (14 August 
1996) p. 12].
4Wheeler, RichardS. The politics o f  Pakistan: a constitutional quest (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1970) pp.9-11
5Munir From Jinnah to Zia p.6
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nation line of argument was revived and focused by the poet-philosopher, Sir 
Muhammad Iqbal (1876-1938), who proposed in a speech to the Muslim League in 
1930 the establishment of a unified Muslim state in the north-west.6 In 1940 the 
Muslim League under Jinnah passed the Lahore Resolution calling for independence 
for the Muslim-majority states in the north-west and east of India.7 This Resolution 
contained in its third paragraph a commitment to the protection of the rights of 
minorities which ran:
That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be 
specifically provided in the Constitution for minorities in these 
units and in the regions for the protection o f  their religious, 
cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and 
interests in consultation with them ...8
An alternative way of viewing the desire of Muslims for their own nation was their 
unwillingness to be a minority in a Hindu-majority context, particularly having 
experienced rule by the Indian National Congress in several provinces for a few years 
prior to 1940. Jinnah himself declared: "Pakistan started the moment the first non- 
Muslim converted to Islam in India long before Muslims established their rule ... As 
for a Muslim it was a duty imposed on him by Islam not to merge his identity and 
individuality in any alien society."9 The highly respected left-wing journalist M.A. 
Niazi asserts: "It was not a paradox, but inevitable, that the Muslims of minority areas
6Wheeler op. cit.p.26
7Wheeler op. cit. p.28; Richter, W.L. "Political Dynamics o f Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan" Asian 
Survey (June 1979) pp.547-557
8 quoted in William, Javed “What role have the political parties played regarding the identity o f  
religious minorities in Pakistan?” -  a paper given at a seminar on “Religious Minorities in Pakistan: 
struggle for identity” (July 1996) reproduced in a book o f the same titie ed. Moghal, Dominic and 
Jivan, Jennifer (Rawalpindi: Christian Study Centre, 1996) p.64
9quoted in Burke, S.M. and Quraishi, Salim Al-Din Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: His 
personality and his politics (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997) p.252
10Niazi, M.A. "In the name of Islam" The News International (25 August 1996).
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felt this competitive pressure [between Hindus and Muslims] more, and thus were 
more convinced by the arguments in favour of a separate Muslim nation, which 
required a state of its own, than their co-religionists who were in majorities in their 
provinces."10 G.W. Choudhury, who later became professor at the University of 
Dacca and federal Minister for Communications, described the concern felt by the 
Muslims of India to safeguard their rights and concluded “Pakistan was, in a sense, 
itself the product of minority problems.”11 Iqbal believed, in Mangha’s summary, that 
“Muslims had deteriorated because they were no more in power”.12 This all fits with 
traditional attitudes, for as Zebiri points out, “Classical Islamic jurisprudence as 
formulated from the ninth century onwards pre-supposed a situation where Muslims 
enjoyed political hegemony.”13 It is relevant here to remark how rarely debated is the 
subject of how Muslims should live if they are a minority in a non-Muslim state.14 
Hakim is one of the few Muslim writers to discuss this subject,15 and Al-Faruqi makes 
a passing reference to it.16
What then of those who would be minorities in a Muslim-majority state? These were 
a substantial size in East Pakistan (approximately 25%, mainly Hindus)17 and would 
have been an even greater proportion of West Pakistan (some estimate 26%, others 
30%) if the enormous cross-migration at independence had not occurred.18
11 Choudhury, G.W. “Religious Minorities in Pakistan” The Muslim World Vol. XLVI No. 4 (1956) 
p.315
12 Mangha, Raphael “Iqbal and the Reinterperation o f Islam: A Ground and Guide for the Theological 
Task” Al-Mushir Vol. 38 No. 2 (1996) p. 37
13 Zebiri, Kate “Relations between Muslims and Non-Muslims in the Thought o f Western-Educated . 
Muslim Intellectuals” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations Vol. 6 No. 2 (1995) p. 257
14 The Hedaya has 4 pages on this [The Hedaya: Commentary on the Islamic Laws, transl. by Charles 
Hamilton, Vol. II, 1791 (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, reprinted 1985) pp. 192-196] out o f a total of 
1,849.
15Hakim, Khalifa Abdul Islamic Ideology: the fundamental beliefs and principles o f Islam and their 
application to practical life, 8th edition (Lahore: Institute o f Islamic Culture, 1994) pp.251-3
16A1-Faruqi, Ismail “Rights o f Non-Muslims Under Islam: Social and Cultural Aspects” Journal o f  the 
Institute o f Muslim Minority Affairs Vol. 1 No. 1 (1979) pp.99-100
17Richter op. cit. pp.547-557
18Munir From Jinnah to Zia p.33
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Jinnah famously declared, just days before independence, that the religion of Pakistani 
citizens should be immaterial from the state's point of view.
You are free, you are free to go to your temples. You are free to go to 
your mosques or any other place of worship in this State o f Pakistan. You 
may belong to any religion or caste or creed - that has nothing to do with 
the business o f the State.... We are starting in days when there is no 
discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no 
discrimination between one caste or creed or another. We are starting with 
the fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens o f one 
State.19
This was not a new stance, adopted for the benefit of international onlookers as 
partition drew near. It was preceded and followed by similar statements about the 
equality of all citizens.20
Christian aspirations
Unlike Muslims, Indian Christians could not look forward to a state in which they 
would be a majority, but they did face the prospect of a choice between being a 
minority within a Muslim majority or being a minority within a Hindu majority. This 
choice was particularly relevant for Punjabi Christians whose homeland straddled the 
national boundary that was eventually created.
19Speech as president o f the Constituent Assembly, 11 August 1947, quoted in Munir From Jinnah to 
Zia p.30
20Munir From Jinnah to Zia p.29-32
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A minority of Christians, headed by Mr E. Bannerji, of the Nationalist Christian 
Association (an organisation derided by its opponents for being very new and very 
small), emphasised the homogeneity of Christians throughout the sub-continent and 
expressed fears that Christians in Pakistan would not be able to have contact with 
Christians in India. They therefore argued for Christians to remain in India after 
partition.21
The opposite view was taken by the Joint Christian Board, an organization formed in 
1947 by the All India Christian Association, Punjab, the All India Christian League, 
Punjab, the All India Anglo-Indian Association, Punjab and the Catholic Association, 
in order to present the case of Christians to the Boundary Commission. Emphasizing 
that he spoke for a mass organisation with wide support,22 the Joint Christian Board’s 
representative, Dewan Bahadur S.P. Singha, expressed the Punjabi Christians' feeling 
of affinity and solidarity with Muslims rather than with Hindus:
Our people have been living with the Muslims for a long time and they 
have become Muslimised more or less in culture and outlook. They trust 
the Muslims more. They dress like them... They are economically as poor 
as the Muslims. With Muslims they have a religious affinity.23
As well as similarities in culture and religion, Singha explained, the Christians felt 
more comfortable with Muslims than with Hindus because the Hindu caste system 
excluded and stigmatized them, and summarized, "Because they have been living with 
Muslims, a Christian in the village is of the same type as his Muslim neighbour. He
21E. Bannerji in "Proceedings o f the Punjab Boundary Commission Lahore, 21-31 July 1947" in 
Sadullah, Mian Muhammad (compiler) The Partition o f the Punjab 1947 Vol. II (Lahore: National 
Documentation Centre, 1983) p.190-198 especially p.196
22 Evidence for broad support, including lists o f members, given by Singha in Sadullah, Mian 
Muhammad op. cit. pp. 221 ff.
23Singha, Dewan Bahadur S.P. in "Proceedings of the Punjab Boundary Commission Lahore, 21-31 
July 1947" in Sadullah, Mian Muhammad op. cit. p.225
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prefers to be in Pakistan."24 Conscious of their poverty and powerlessness as a 
community, they were also aware that their percentage would be greater in Pakistan 
than it was currently in the Punjab as a whole 25
Punjabi Christians expressed their desire for the whole of the Punjab to become part 
of Pakistan, rather than the eastern part to remain in India, as preferred by the Sikhs. 
Apart from maintaining the unity of the Punjab, this would have had the distinct 
advantage of increasing the number of non-Muslims in Pakistan as a whole. 
Expressing in passing his confidence in the democratic nature of the future Pakistan, 
Singha offered as a compromise "Eastern Punjab could rejoin Hindustan if Pakistan 
really proves to be a non-democratic state, which some fear it is going to be. We 
ourselves have no such apprehensions."26 If the eastern part was not to join Pakistan, 
then the Christians of eastern Punjab should be allowed to move to West Punjab and 
be part of Pakistan.27
Another reason why most Punjabi Christians wished to be part of Pakistan rather than 
India, was the strongly felt issue of electoral representation. Separate electorates had 
been introduced in India for Muslims in 1909 and for Christians and Sikhs in 1935, 
but they would be removed when India gained independence and a joint electorate 
system was established. It was expected, however, that Pakistan would grant a 
separate electorate to Christians. Christians very much wanted to have a separate 
electorate to ensure a minimum number of Christians elected.28 In due course 
Pakistani Christians discovered the disadvantages of separate electorates (see chapter 





28Memorandum of the Joint Christian Board to the Viceroy and other submissions in "Proceedings o f  
the Punjab Boundary Commission Lahore, 21-31 July 1947" in Sadullah , Mian Muhammad op. cit. 
p.228-232
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Having once made public their preference for Pakistan, the urgency was redoubled by 
the fear of retaliation if they had after all to remain in India. Singha reported that 
some Christians had already begun to experience persecution in the villages.29 Thus, 
Punjabi Christians became Pakistanis at partition on 14 August 1947 enthusiastically 
and with high hopes of increased freedom, political power and social acceptability in 
their new state.
The place of Islam in the fledgling Pakistan
The widely difffering aspirations for the new state of Pakistan are summed up by 
Ishtiaq Ahmed:
Pakistan meant different things to different people. To the landlords it 
meant continued leadership; to the doctrinal-minded Muslims, a unique 
opportunity to create an Islamic state in the light o f their ideas; to the 
Muslim intelligentsia and the poorer classes, a state where social and 
economic justice would prevail and their dignity established, according to 
Iqbalite teachings; to the peasants, freedom from the yoke o f the Hindu 
money-lender; to the regional leaders, greater autonomy than was 
exp ected in a united India dominated by the Congress; to the Muslim 
bourgeo tsie, the necessary environment where they could develop their 
potential, which seemed choked in a united India due to the many times 
greater strength o f Hindu and Parsee capital based in Bombay and 
Calcutta; to the bureaucrats and the military, an excellent opportunity to 
secure quick promotions; and to the military establishment it brought a
29Singha, Dewan Bahadur S.P. in "Proceedings of the Punjab Boundary Commission Lahore, 21-31 
July 1947" in Sadullah, Mian Muhammad op. cit. p.235
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central role in a country where civilian political process was dependent 
from the very beginning upon its support and active participation.30
The relationship of the Indian Muslims' homeland to the religion of Islam has been 
ambiguous and hence much debated from the very start.31 According to Niazi, "one 
of the major problems confronting Pakistan, and the Pakistani people, since the new 
country came into existence, has been its relationship with Islam. There has always 
been a strange ambivalence, which has its roots in how proto-Pakistanis defined 
themselves..."32 As Niazi points out, the leadership of the movement for the creation 
of Pakistan was in the hands "of those who could fight the British with their own 
tools, that is, the hands of those who were thoroughly steeped in the Western 
intellectual tradition of the time, and who had indeed reduced the presence of Islam in 
their own lives to personal observance and a loose ethical code, which did not have 
much to do with the running of the state." Thus there was an inbuilt bias towards a 
Western view of the relationship between religion and state, and of the role of religion 
in nationalism. This was of course the way in which contemporary Christianity in 
Europe related to the state and to nationalism - a far looser, less structured, more 
personal way than Islam teaches. According to Niazi, to relegate Islam to a religion 
which is part of the national culture but does not impact on daily life "leaves both the 
people and rulers of Pakistan in a somewhat hypocritical position, for unlike 
Christianity, Islam does not take kindly to being ignored by the state."33
The ulema naturally sought a traditional Islamic state.34 For example, the All India 
Jam’iyyat Ulama-i-Islam adopted at their founding session in 1945 in Calcutta a
30Ahmed, Ishtiaq The Concept o f an Islamic State in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd, 1991)
pp.80-81
31Dil, S.F. "The myth of Islamic resurgence in South Asia" Current History (April 1980) pp. 167-178
32Niazi, M.A. loc. cit.
33ibid.
34 The range o f opinion amongst the ulema is surveyed in Choudhury, Golam W. Islam and the 
Modern Muslim World {Kuala Lumpur: WHS Publications Sdn Bhd, 1993) pp. 53-60
58
resolution for the establishment of a worldwide Islamic caliphate, and reintroduction 
of Shari’ah-based law. The following year the All India Sunni Conference declared 
their commitment to the establishment of Islamic government based on Qur’an, 
Muhammad’s teachings and the principles of Islamic jurisprudence.35 It was their 
belief that the proposed state would not be sufficiently Islamic which led some of the 
religious parties to oppose the calls for the formation of Pakistan, for example 
Mawdudi’s Jama’at-i-Islami and the Jam’iyyatul Ulama-e-Hind under Madni.36
Jinnah's words have been quoted as support for the mutually exclusive assertions that 
he intended to found a secular state37 and that he intended to found an Islamic state.38 
Amjad-Ali believes that as Islam gained an increasingly dominant role in the state this 
was reflected in retrospective writings about the movement for the creation of 
Pakistan, in which the role of secularists was increasingly down-played.39 What is in 
no doubt is that following Jinnah's death in September 1948 a process of official 
Islamization began, traceable in the framing of successive constitutions as well as new 
specific legislation. This process was at first gradual and fairly subtle, but received a 
great impetus under General Zia ul-Haq (president 1977-88).
Those in favour of an Islamic state tend to claim that the process of Islamization goes 
right back to the origins of Pakistan, for example, the assertion of Justice Lodhi, a 
judge in the Baluchistan High Court, that:
35 Pirzada, Sayyid A.S. “The oppositional role of ulama in Pakistani politics” Monthly Current Affairs
Digest 49 (September 1998) pp.29-30
36Iqbal, Afzal op. cit. p.54; Pirzada op. cit. p.30
37for example, Munir From Jinnah to Zia pp.30-33; Amjad-Ali, Charles "Islamisation and Christian- 
Muslim Relations in Pakistan" Al-Mushir Vol. 29 No. 3 (Autumn 1987) p.75
38for example, Burke and Quraishi op. cit. p.368 ; Perwez, Ghulam Ahmed cited in Ahmed, Ishtiaq op. 
cit. p. 131; Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin interviewed in Faruqi, M.H. “Jinnah’s Pakistan: Islamic or 
secular?” Impact International (August 1995) p.21
39Amjad-Ali, Charles "Islamisation and Christian-Muslim Relations” p.76
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"Fortunately for us, we are one such country which has never overlooked 
the necessity o f ordering lives o f its people strictly in accordance with 
Islam, eversince (sic) emancipation from foreign rule, though the pace o f  
progress has been slow till recently, when some serious efforts were made 
to speed up such efforts. In fact the creation o f Pakistan itself was for the 
purpose to establish a truly Islamic State..."40
According to Lodhi, an Islamic state such as Pakistan should use a "relaxed, liberal 
and realistic interpretation" of Islam which is to be achieved by ijtihad41 He also 
declared that the Islamization of laws and punishments was not sufficient on its own 
to achieve an Islamic state, but rather it was necessary to introduce Islamic education 
and training and to lay down "a definite Islamic system in all walks of life". He 
recommended that "real emphasis should be on the laying down of principles in 
different walks of life and then to resort to laws to ensure that such principles were 
enforced stricto senso (sic)”.42
Objectives Resolution
In contrast to Lodhi's assertion, the process of the Islamization of Pakistan is generally 
considered to have started with the adoption of the "Objectives Resolution" by the 
Constituent Assembly on 12 March 1949, less than six months after the death of 
Jinnah.
40Lodhi, Justice Zakaullah "Ijtehad in the process o f Islamization o f laws" address at the seminar on 
the "Application o f the Shari'ah" held at Islamabad October 9-11, 1979, reprinted in All Pakistan Legal 
Decisions, Vol. XXXII (1980) Journal 21
41 Ijtihad is the use o f independent reasoning in interpreting the Qur'an and Sunna. Around the tenth 
century, leading scholars felt that all essential questions had been answered and therefore there should 
be no more ijtihad, but only an unquestioning acceptance o f the opinions o f earlier scholars. In 
modem times some reformers are calling for "the door of ijtihad" to be re-opened.
42Lodhi, op cit. 22-3
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A statement about the nature of the state of Pakistan to be embodied in a future 
constitution, the Objectives Resolution was a very significant document, given that 
the Constituent Assembly (1947-1954) failed in its seven years of existence to 
accomplish its task of formulating a constitution for Pakistan. The minorities thus 
remained without constitutional protection until 1956. It is important to note that the 
members of the Constituent Assembly were chosen by Jinnah from the elected 
members of the provincial assemblies. There were 17 Hindus and 2 Sikhs, but no 
Christians, in a total assembly of 72. There is little evidence as to the reason for this 
omission but it seems more likely that he simply did not see them as being significant 
rather than indicative of a mistrust of Christians. He did nominate two Christians, 
C.E. Gibbon and S.P. Singha, to be on the Constituent Assembly’s sub-committee on 
“basic rights of minorities”. Perhaps he saw this as appropriate to their status as a 
weak and virtually voiceless minority within the non-Muslims, but this is conjecture.
The Objectives Resolution affirmed principles such as equality, justice, and freedom 
of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association. It also declared that 
provision must be made for religious minorities "freely to profess and practise" their 
faiths and that their "legitimate interests" should be safeguarded. Democracy, 
freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice were affirmed, with the proviso "as 
enunciated by Islam". But the key wording, which came to have so much significance 
in the future as a justification for many of the stages of Islamization, stated of the 
constitution:
"... the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and
collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of
Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunna".43
43Quoted in Mehdi, Rubya The Islamization o f  the Law in Pakistan, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 
Monograph Series No. 60 (Richmond: Curzon Press Ltd, 1994) p.73. Full text is found in Constituent 
Assembly o f Pakistan Debates, Vol V, No. 1 (7 March 1949) p.l or in Iqbal, Afzal op. cit pp. 42-3
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The fact that there are many variations of Islamic law, each based on the Qur'an and 
Sunnah, created the possibility of numerous different interpretations of the Objectives 
Resolution. For example, the Jama’at-i-Islami claimed that the Objectives Resolution 
incorporated the four principles necessary for an Islamic constitution, which their 
leader Mawdudi (see below) had demanded in a speech the previous month. The 
vagueness and ambiguity of the Objectives Resolution has made it a far more 
powerful tool in the hands of the Islamic religious groups than most people envisaged 
at the time it was first passed.44 In the words of Bishop Michael Nazir-Ali it was “a 
Trojan horse” in that the legislators at the time did not realise the implications.45
The main concern of non-Muslims at the time of the passing of the Objectives 
Resolution was the clause which stated that "sovereignty over the entire universe 
belongs to God Almighty alone, and the authority which He has delegated to the State 
of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him 
is a sacred trust". These words were interpreted by the Islamic groupings as a 
political and constitutional statement indicative of a theocratic rather than a 
democratic state i.e. a state governed by the Shari'ah. This is what alarmed some non- 
Muslim members of the constituent assembly, such as B.K. Datta and S.C. Chattopad 
(both Hindus).46 By others the words were interpreted as merely a spiritual principle 
of no relevance to practical politics 47 Joshua Fazl-ud-Din, a Christian advocate in the 
Lahore High Court who later became Deputy Minister for Law, Finance and 
Parliamentary Affairs for West Pakistan, saw that without constitutional safeguards 
this phrase could be used to justify the relegation of non-Muslims to dhimmi status as
44Mehdi, Rubya op. cit pp.21-24; Dawood, Jan Mohammed The religious and political dilemma o f  
Pakistan (Karachi: Hasan Publisher, 1993) pp.32-3
45 Rt Rev. Dr Michael Nazir-Ali, Bishop o f Rochester, interview with the author (11 May 1998)
46Mehdi, Rubya op. cit. pp.74-5
47For example, Iftikharuddin, Mian in Constituent Assembly o f  Pakistan Debates Vol. V No. 4 (10 
March 1949) p.51
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well as particular problems for Christian converts from Islam.48 The phrase was in 
fact a compromise devised to satisfy different opinions by a wording which permitted 
varying interpretations 49 It was ruthlessly analysed -  indeed, ridiculed - by Fazlur 
Rahman, a member of the Council of Islamic Ideology in the Ayub Khan era, who 
considered it an absurdity resulting from the traditionalists’ lack of understanding and 
the modernists’ pragmatism.50
Another section of the Objectives Resolution which was criticized by non-Muslim 
members of the Constituent Assembly was the statement in the fourth paragraph that 
"principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as 
enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed". B.K. Datta asserted that if these 
principles were "as enunciated by Islam" non-Muslims would enjoy very little of 
them, being condemned "forever to an inferior status".51
Despite the reassurances of the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and other ministers, 
the non-Muslims remained uneasy about the Objectives Resolution. This feeling was 
doubtless reinforced by statements by the Islamic traditionalists that the resolution 
placed too much emphasis on the rights of minorities.52
48 Fazl-ud-Din, Joshua Future o f Christians in Pakistan (Lahore: The Punjabi Darbar Publishing 
House, 1949) pp.l 14-5,120, 122
49Ahmed, Manzooruddin "Sovereignty o f God in the Constitution o f Pakistan: A study in the Conflict 
o f Traditionalism and Modernism" Islamic Studies Vol. IV, No. 2 p.210 Rashiduzzaman, M. Pakistan: 
A Study o f  Government and Politics (Dacca: Ideal Library, 1967) p. 86
50 Rahman, Fazlur “Islam and the Constitutional Problem o f  Pakistan” Studia Islamica Vol. XXXII 
No. 4 (Dec 1970) pp. 277-9




One of the main reasons for the lengthy period of nine years spent formulating the 
first constitution was the debate about what Fazlur Rahman, calls the “Islamicity” of 
the constitution.53 The ulema, though not directly involved in formulating the 
constitution, were able, through the medium of the Board of Talimat-e-Islamiyyah 
(Board of Islamic Teachings) established by the Constituent Assembly, to call for a 
constitutional requirement for all laws to be in line with the requirements of the 
Shari’ah.54 When the Constituent Assembly did not appear to be taking sufficient 
notice of their recommendation, the ulema followed this up in 1951 with a charter of 
22 fundamental principles of the Islamic state on which the constitution should be 
based.55
Many authors have traced the Islamic provisions in the various constitutions of 
Pakistan;56 the main points will be outlined below. Writing after two constitutions 
had been in turn enacted and abrogated, Rahman claims a lack of logic in the 
scattering of references to Islam throughout the text. He is “startled” to find that, 
rather than having the principles, values and goals of Islam embodied in the every part 
of the Constitution, “Islam appears as an item among a host of other matters of goals 
and policy”.57 He calls the constitution an “Islamic fetish: a mere ad hoc and 
mechanical application of the term “Islamic” to certain concepts to the exclusion of 
others.”58 It is the appearance and disappearance of these references to Islam in 
various parts of the Constitution which have been so closely traced by traditionalist
53 Rahman, Fazlur “Islam and the Constitutional Problem” p.275. The other main reason, according 
to Rahman, was the difficult relationship between East and West Pakistan.
54 Pirzada op. cit. pp.30-1
55 ibid. p.34
56a detailed version is given in Mehdi, Rubya chapter 2
57 Rahman, Fazlur “Islam and the Constitutional Problem” pp.276, 279-80
58 ibid. p.285
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Muslims, modernist Muslims and non-Muslims, as an indication of the progress of 
Islamization.
1956 constitution (abrogated 1958)59
This, the first constitution of Pakistan, was a compromise designed to appease both 
the traditionalists and the modernists.60 The Objectives Resolution was made the 
preamble (to the satisfaction of the ulema61), with the insertion of a new clause stating 
that Jinnah had founded Pakistan to be a democratic state "based on Islamic principles 
of social justice" - a phrase that was not clarified. As Rahman points out, it was a 
phrase interpreted by different groups according to their own wishes, and in the eyes 
of revivalists would imply the Muslim community’s special status as distinguished 
from non-Muslims.62 Rahman also cites the addition of the word “Islamic” to the 
concept of “social justice” as one example of what he considers the senseless 
sprinkling of references to Islam in a document which he believes should, by virtue of 
its Islamic nature throughout, not have needed to refer to Islam at all.63
Part I Article 1(1) named Pakistan as the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan" but this was 
not held to imply that Islam was the state religion. Part II - on fundamental rights - 
assured religious minorities of equal treatment (Articles 5(1), 13, 14(1), 17(1), 21) and 
the freedom to profess, practise and propagate their faith (Article (18). The President 
was to be a Muslim (Article 32(2)), but there was no such condition attached to
59Govemment o f Pakistan Ministry o f Law The Constitution o f  the Islamic Republic o f  Pakistan 
(Karachi, Manager o f Publications, the Government o f Pakistan, 1956)
60Choudhury, G.W. Constitutional Development in Pakistan (London: Lowe and Brydone, 1971) 
p. 103; Esposito, John L. "Pakistan: Quest for Islamic Identity" in Esposito, John L. (ed.) Islam and 
Development (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980) p. 143; Huq, Mahfuzul "Some reflections on 
Islam and Constitution-making in Pakistan 1947-56" Islamic Studies, Vol. V, No. 2 (1966) pp.209-10
61 Pirzada op. cit. p.35
62 Rahman, Fazlur “Islam and the constitutional problem” p. 283
63 ibid. p. 279
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Speaker of the National Assembly who was to exercise the functions of President in 
the President's absence or illness or between Presidents (Article 36(1)).
Various articles promoted Islamic teaching and practice following the principle that 
the state should "enable the Muslims of Pakistan individually and collectively to order 
their lives in accordance with the Qur'an and Surma" (Article 25(1)). In a similar vein, 
article 198(1) stated that "No law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the 
Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and Surma... and existing law 
shall be brought into conformity with such Injunctions." This wording later came to 
be of great importance in the Islamization process. Article 198(4) affirmed that 
nothing in the article should affect the status of non-Muslims as citizens. Provision 
was made to set up an organization "for Islamic research and instruction to assist in 
the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis" (Article 197(1)).
Amidst all the ambiguities, checks and balances, the only clearly discriminatory 
provision was the ban on non-Muslims as head of state. The word "Shari'ah" was 
conspicuous by its absence. The articles intended to increase the Islamic character of 
the country were not enforced - the Islamic Research Institute was not set up until 
after the constitution had been abrogated and no steps were taken to bring laws into 
line with the Qur'an and Sunnah.64 In the words of Afzal Iqbal, "The Constitution had 
an Islamic fa£ade, but the hard core was missing."65
64Mehdi, Rubya pp.80-87
65Iqbal, Afzal op. cit p.65
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1962 constitution (abrogated 1969)66
The 1962 constitution was formulated under President Mohammad Ayub Khan, who 
had seized power in a military coup in 1958. In its early days the new regime 
appeared to favour a secular state, reasoning that Islam could not serve as the basis of 
the state in Pakistan because of the variety and divergence of Islamic sects. But 
before long the government’s attitude changed and emphasis was placed on the 
primacy of Islam in Pakistan.67 Ayub Khan favoured a progressive and liberal 
interpretation of Islam, and this was reflected in some of the differences seen in the 
1962 constitution when compared with the 1956 constitution.68 However, many of 
these changes were reversed in amendments, particularly those made in the 
Constitution (First Amendment) Act of 1963, which came into force in 1964.69
The Objectives Resolution retained its place in the preamble to the 1962 constitution, 
but with some modifications which prepared the way for a more liberal interpretation. 
For example, the 1956 version required that Muslims should be enabled to "live their 
lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam, as set out in the 
Holy Qur'an and the Sunna". The inclusion of the Sunna, and the exclusion of ijma 
and qiyas, was the most restrictive combination which could be chosen of the four 
sources of Islamic law.70 By contrast the 1962 constitution’s preamble omitted "the 
Holy Qur'an and Sunna" and in the constitution itself replaced "the Holy Qur'an and 
Sunna" with "the fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam" (Article 8(2) 
principle 1.1) - a much broader definition. Rahman states that this change “led to
66original in Mahmood, Shaukat The Constitution o f  Pakistan 1962 (Lahore: Pakistan Law Times 
Publications, 1962), amended version in Mahmood, Shaukat The Constitution o f  Pakistan (as amended 
upto date) (Lahore: The Pakistan Law Times Publications, 1965)
67 Rahman, Fazlur “Some Islamic Issues” p.284
68 Ahmed, Manzooruddin "Islamic aspects o f the new constitution " pp.249-77
69Text o f this Act given in Mahmood, Safdar Constitutional Foundations o f  Pakistan pp.596-605
70Rahman, Fazlur "Some Islamic Issues" pp. 284-302; Anderson, J.N.D. "Pakistan: an Islamic state?" 
in Code Holland, R.H. and Schwarzenberger G. (eds.) Law, Justice and Equality (London: Sir Isaac 
Pitman & Sons, Ltd, 1967) pp. 129-30
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general suspicion that this had been done in order to eliminate the Sunna of the 
Prophet as the second binding Islamic source besides the Qur’an”, probably under the 
influence of Ghulam Ahmed Parwez (see below).71 However, this change and most of 
the others were reversed by the amendments passed under pressure from the 
traditionalists, which came into effect in 1964, restoring references to the "Holy 
Qur'an and Sunna".11 Similarly, the 1962 constitution renamed Pakistan as "the 
Republic of Pakistan" (Article 1(1)) but in 1964 this was amended to the 1956 name, 
"the Islamic Republic of Pakistan".73
Another liberalization was made in Part II with respect to the ban on the enacting of 
laws "repugnant" to Islam (Article 6 principle 1). As in the preamble, the qualifying 
phrase of 1956 referring to the Qur'an and Sunna -  “as laid down in the Qur’an and 
Sunna” - was omitted. Unlike the equivalent article in 1956 (i.e. Article 198(1) 
quoted above) this ban was not enforceable in a court of law.74 Also unlike the 1956 
constitution, there was no requirement for existing laws to be brought into conformity 
with the injunctions of Islam. But the amendments which came into effect in 1964 
restored the wording of 1956 in both respects.75 In all other fundamental rights non- 
Muslims were guaranteed equal treatment (e.g. Article 6 principle 2).
The rights of non-Muslims were also safeguarded by Article 6 principle 7 and Article 
8 principles 3,14; this included the provision that no law would prevent a religious 
community from professing, practising and propagating their religion (Article 6 
principle 7 (a)) and no law would compel anyone to any religious practice other than 
their own (Article 6, principle 7(b)). For Pakistani Muslims, a number of principles 
were laid down to promote Islamic morals and practices (Article 8 principles 1,18,
71 Rahman, Fazlur “Some Islamic Issues” p.286
72Constitution (Firs.t Amendment) Act, 1963, sections 2 and 4
73Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1963, section 3
74Mehdi, Rubya op. cit. p.90
75Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1963, section 4
68
19, 20) and to strengthen links with Muslim countries (Article 8 principle 21). As in 
the 1956 constitution, the only directly discriminatory clause was that the president 
must be a Muslim (Article 10).
The most significant lasting innovations of the 1962 constitution were the provisions 
for the establishment of two new institutions, the Advisory Council of Islamic 
Ideology (Article 199) and the Islamic Research Institute (Article 207). The function 
of the Council was to make recommendations to the government on methods to enable 
Muslims "to order their lives in all respects in accordance with the principles and 
concepts of Islam". The Council could also be consulted about the Islamic soundness 
of specific pieces of legislation. But its decisions were not to be binding on the 
government or any other authority. When the significantly absent phrase referring to 
the Qur’an and Sunnah was inserted by an amendment of 1963,76 this gave the 
Council freedom to interpret from these sources for themselves rather than adhering to 
the traditional schools of law (madhahib).77 The members of the Council formed 
under the 1962 constitution were constantly criticized by the traditionalists for being 
too modernist in their interpretation of Islam, but the Council recommended the de- 
liberalizing constitutional amendments which came into effect in 1964.78
As mentioned, the Islamic Research Institute, originally provided for in the 1956 
constitution, had not been established until 1959. According to the 1962 constitution 
its function was to "undertake Islamic research and instruction in Islam for the 
purposes of assisting in the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis".
76Article 204(1) as.amended by Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1963, section 8
77 The judiciary tends to refer to the Qur’an and Sunnah whereas the legislature has to take madhhab
into account, due to tensions with the Shi’as.
78Mehdi, Rubya op. cit. pp.92-3,206-7
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Like the Council of Islamic Ideology, the Institute's recommendations were not 
binding on the government, as Ayub Khan was at pains to make clear.79
1973 constitution80
If the 1962 constitution - at least before amendment - was coloured by Ayub Khan's 
desire to liberalize, the 1973 constitution reflected President Z.A. Bhutto's socialism 
but also his concern to appease traditionalist critics. He came to power in December 
1971, just after the loss of Bangladesh. Pakistan without its eastern wing was much 
more homogeneous in terms of religion (a quarter of the population of East Pakistan 
had been non-Muslim) and felt itself more closely linked with the Middle East which 
was beginning a period of dramatic increase in power and prestige.81 Interestingly 
Caroe, writing long before eastern Pakistan began to seek independence, asserts that 
this more westward focus had been a characteristic of the area of West Pakistan in 
pre-Muslim times and that "below the conscious level of thinking though it be, is one 
of the emotional bases of the patriotism of West Pakistan today."82 Whatever the 
truth of this, the loss of the eastern half of the country resulted in a renewed emphasis 
on Pakistan's Islamic identity. Professor Waheed-uz-Zahman asserted:
If we let go the ideology o f Islam, we cannot hold together as a nation by
any other means... If the Arabs, the Turks, the Iranians, God forbid, give
79Khel, Muhammad Nazeer Kaka "The role o f ideology in constitutional development in Pakistan" 
Journal o f  Law and Society Vol. I No. 1 (1982) pp.67-77
80Full text in Butt, M. Rafiq The Constitution o f the Islamic Republic o f  Pakistan, 1973 (Lahore: 
Mansoor Book House, 1991)
81Richter op. cit. pp.547-557; Dil op. cit. pp.167-178
82Caroe, Sir Olaf The Pathans (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1958) p.257
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up Islam, the Arabs yet remain Arabs, the Turks remain Turks, the Iranians 
remain Iranians, but what do we remain if  we give up Islam?83
In this context the 1973 constitution was framed. The ambiguous wording of the 
earlier preambles was expanded with a paragraph on preserving democracy and 
creating an egalitarian society through a new order. To the disappointment of some 
modernists the term "Islamic socialism" was absent from the constitution,84 but 
scattered throughout were provisions concerned directly or indirectly with the 
economic system, nationalisation, the provision of basic necessities and preventing 
the concentration of wealth and the means of production and distribution in the hands 
of the few.85
As regards the place of Islam in the 1973 constitution, Pakistan continued to be 
described as an Islamic Republic, not a Socialist Republic (Article 1(1)), and the 
requirement for the President to be a Muslim continued (Article 41(2)). To this was 
added the provision that Islam was to be the state religion (Article 2), and that the 
Prime Minister also must be a Muslim (Article 91(2)).
As in the 1962 constitution, Pakistani Muslims were to be enabled to live their lives in 
accordance with Islam and to "understand the meaning of life according to the Holy 
Qur'an and Sunna" (Article 31). There was also the familiar prohibition of laws - 
future and existing - repugnant to the "injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy 
Qur'an and Sunna" (Article 227). The fundamental rights of non-Muslims were 
safeguarded in a similar way to the previous constitution.
83uz-Zahman, Waheed "Editor's Note" in The Quest fo r  Identity (Proceedings o f the First Congress on 
the History and Culture of Pakistani held at the University o f Islamabad, April 1973. Islamabad: 
University o f Islamabad Press, 1974) p. iv
84Rahman, Fazlur "Islam and the new constitution o f Pakistan" in Korson, Henry (ed.) Contemporary 
problems o f  Pakistan (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974) pp.31.33
85Mehdi, Rubya, op. cit. pp. 101-2
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A difference from the earlier constitutions was seen with respect to the two advisory 
bodies. The Council of Islamic Ideology was retained from the 1962 constitution 
(Articles 228-231), whereas the Islamic Research Institute, which had been in both the 
earlier constitutions, was omitted.86 Significantly, the Council was by now composed 
of conservatives while the Institute was modernist.87 Thus the government would 
receive more conservative and reactionary recommendations. Indeed, the constitution 
as a whole was not only more socialist but also more Islamic than earlier 
constitutions. Still, the position of non-Muslims was little affected in practice until 
the last months of Bhutto's presidency (April-July 1977) during which a number of 
laws were passed enforcing Islamic practice on such matters as alcohol, gambling and 
the weekly day of rest, and the introduction of Shari'ah promised for later in the year. 
These moves were apparently a response to the nine-party oppostion grouping, the 
Pakistan National Alliance, which challenged Bhutto in the March 1977 elections. 
They included the Jamaat-i-Islami and other extreme Islamic parties, and their 
common rallying call was nizam-e-Mustafa, literally "order of the Prophet" but freely 
translated as "Islamic system".88
The 1985 amendments to the 1973 constitution89
Prior to the presidency of General Zia ul-Haq (1977-88), the constitutions were 
inconsistent in that Islamic provisions were written in but not put into practice. The 
intention appeared to be to satisfy both traditionalists (by the wording) and modernists 
(by the lack of implementation). Christians and other non-Muslims were largely
86 The Islamic Research Institute lost its status as a consultative body on Islamization and became an 
autonomous research institute.
87Rahman, Fazlur "Islam and the new constitution " p.41
88Richter, op. cit. pp.547-557
89Full text o f amended constitution in Butt op. cit.
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unaffected, except in the matter of being prohibited from the highest political 
offices.90
Under Zia, who seized power from Bhutto in a coup on 5 July 1977, the Islamization 
of Pakistan moved from rhetoric to reality. Nizam-e-Mustafa was proclaimed as a 
political, social and economic panacea.91 The Revival of the Constitution of 1973 
(Presidential Order 14 of 1985) was promulgated with the aim of radically Islamizing 
the 1973 constitution. A very widely debated change made by this Order concerned 
the Objectives Resolution which according to a newly inserted Article 2A, was to 
"form part of the substantive provisions ... and shall have effect accordingly”. Zia 
commented:
Now that the Objectives Resolution has been made a part o f the 
Constitution, rights flowing from the Resolution shall be justiciable (sic).
You have secular human rights given in the first part together with Islamic 
rights defined in the Objectives Resolution. Thus liberties and privileges 
given by religion will be enjoyed by citizens as much as their other human 
rights o f a secular nature.92
While still unspecific as to practice, this constitutional sanction for Islamic human 
rights was widely perceived as a turning point in the Islamization process. The 
intention to promote Islamic human rights had clear repercussions for non-Muslims. 
Furthermore, a slightly different version of the Objectives Resolution was substituted, 
which omitted the word "freely" from the clause about religious minorities professing 
and practising their faiths. Thus, the new version, contained in an annexe to the 
constitution ran:
90Mehdi, Rubya op. cit. p. 107
91Richter op. cit. pp.547-557
92General Zia ul-Haq in an interview published in the Pakistan Times (5 March 1985)
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Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to profess and 
practise their religions and develop their cultures;93
The previous version had said the minoritjes would be able "freely to profess and 
practise their religions ..."94 Alarmed Christians protested about the possible 
implications of the omission of "freely".95 Similar hints of a changing status for non- 
Muslims were given by other small changes, such as the requirement for National 
Assembly members to be Muslims (Articles 51(1)), indeed practising Muslims 
(Article 62) - apart from those in the seats reserved for minorities (Article 51).96
Legislation
As the 1985 amendments were drafted and came into effect, creating a constitutional 
framework for Islamization, practical changes to the law - which very much affected 
Christians and other non-Muslims - were passed in the years before and after 1985. 
The main innovations concerned the creation of Shariat benches in the superior courts 
(1979) and then a Federal Shariat Court (1980), the passing of a number of laws 
putting into practice the hudood punishments of Islam (1979), a more Islamic Law of 
Evidence (1984), and the Enforcement of Shariah Act (1991). These are dealt with in 
detail in chapter 3. A landmark decision in the Supreme Court in 1993 ruled that the
93Butt op. cit. p. 190
94ibid.p. 1
95for example, Amjad-Ali, Charles "Islamisation and Christian-Muslim Relations” pp.76-7; a 
delegation o f bishops to the parliamentary committee reviewing the Shariat Bill, reported in Malick, 
Nasir “Religious Minorities provided protection, says Niazi” Dawn (6 January 1991); Shahani, M.L. 
(Advocate in the Supreme Court) Constitution, Law and Status o f  Minorities (unpublished paper, 26 
April 1992) p.4 •
96 The practical effects o f these Articles are limited to preventing non-Muslims from contesting seats 
other than their reserved seats. No challenge has ever been issued to a Muslim candidate or Muslim 
sitting MNA on the basis o f not being a practising Muslim.
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fundamental rights guaranteed in the constitution were limited by whether they 
conformed to “the injunctions of Islam as contained in the Qur’an and Sunnah” (see 
chapter 3).
Competing ideologies
We have outlined above the evolution of the constitution of Pakistan, which before 
Zia reflected presidential preference tempered by more or less vague Islamic 
formulations to appease the traditionalists. Zia changed the pattern by his enthusiasm 
for the Islamic provisions. However, there was a prolonged and vociferous debate 
about the appropriate framework for a Muslim state such as Pakistan. Many have 
attempted to classify the thinkers of this period by various systems. Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith, writing just before independence, separated intellectual movements, 
political movements and theological groups, each category being further 
subdivided.97 The spectrum of opinion is analysed by Ishtiaq Ahmed into four main 
approaches: The sacred state excluding human will, the sacred state admitting human 
will, the secular state admitting divine will, the secular state excluding divine will.98 
The difficulty here is that of identifying the demarcation lines between one category 
and the next. The common three-fold subdivision often applied to analyses of Islam 
in general -  that is, radical, conservative and modernist -  is too simplistic to apply to 
theories of the* Islamic state as applied to Pakistan, and in particular with reference to 
attitudes to Christian minorities.99 The following studies of leading groups and
97 Cantwell Smith, 'WilfredModern Islam in India, 2nd Indian edition (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 
1946) passim
98Ahmed, Ishtiaq op. cit p.31
99 Iftikhar H. Malik follows Hamza Alavi’s division into eight categories o f Muslim elite groups in 
British India which went on to have an enduring and reinvigorated influence in post-partition Pakistan: 
(i) Islamic traditionalists -  the Deobandis (ii) Islamic traditionalists -  the Brelvis and Pirs (iii) Islamic 
fundamentalists (iv) Islamic modernists (v) Secular and nationalist Muslims (vi) Secular / trans- 
communal rightist provincial politics (vii) Secular non-communal provincial politics (viii) Secular non- 
communal nationalists. See Alavi, Hamza “Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology” in Halliday,
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thinkers therefore are arranged according to their different understandings, beginning 
with the most traditional and conservative and concluding with the most liberal and 
secular.
The Tanzim Islah-i-Pakistan
The first approach, the absolutist position seeking a revival of traditional Islam and 
the full implementation of Shari'ah, would, according to the majority of the ulema,100 
have given non-Muslims the status of dhimmi, without the right to participate in 
politics.101 Converts from Islam to another faith would be punished by death. Typical 
of this position was the Tanzim Islah-i-Pakistan, which asserted that Pakistan should 
be a model Islamic state, governed by sacred law alone without manmade laws.102 
Where interpretation of divine injunctions was found to be required only qualified 
experts in Islamic law could make the necessary ijtihad.103 Democracy of any kind 
was anathema.104 The Tanzim expressed bitter disappointment that Pakistan fell so 
far short of the ideal of the pious caliphs.105
Abul Ala Mawdudi
Fred and Alavi, Hamza (eds.) State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan (London:
Macmillan, 1988) p.79, quoted in Malik, Iftikhar H. op. cit. p.45
100Maulana Abul Hasanant, who held that dhimmi may not even hold public office, Maulana Ahmad 
Ali, who held that dhimmi could hold public office but not make or administer the law, Mian Tufail 
Muhammad who stated that minorities should not have the same rights as Muslims, all in the Report o f  
the Court o f  Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II o f 1954 to enquire into the Punjab disturbances o f  
1953 (Lahore: Government Printing, Punjab, 1954), often called the “Munir Report” after its chairman, 
Muhammad Munir, pp.212-4 . See chapter 3.
101but see the arguments in chapter 3, that non-Muslims who were not a conquered people were 
mu'ahids rather than dhimmi.
102Report o f  the Court o f Inquiry p.25.




Somewhat less extreme was the position of Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979), an 
immensely influential writer and thinker who founded the Jamaat-i Islami in 1941 and 
during his lifetime produced over 120 books and pamphlets and over 1,000 speeches 
and press statements.106 Mawdudi believed that an Islamic state should be free of all 
traces of nationalism,107 its purpose being to uphold and enforce the sovereignty of 
God.108 Three other conditions were necessary for such a state to exist: acceptance by 
the government of the limitation that it would exercise its powers within the bounds 
laid down by God, the repeal of all existing laws contrary to the Shari'ah, and that all 
new laws would be "in consonance with the real spirit of Islam and its general 
principles".109 He believed that by its very nature an Islamic state distinguishes 
between Muslims and non-Muslims living within its jurisdiction.110
Unlike the Tanzim, Mawdudi envisaged an elected government, in which non- 
Muslims could participate indirectly by means of a separate representative Assembly 
for non-Muslims through which demands for their collective needs could be submitted 
to the (Muslim) Parliament.111 Only Muslims would be allowed to fill posts related to 
state policy.112 Non-Muslims would be in a separate category of citizenship, distinct 
from Muslim citizens, either as conquered dhimmi paying jizya  or as those who 
voluntarily accept the hegemony of an Islamic state and enter into a contact with it,
106Hussain, Asaf Islamic Movements in Egypt, Pakistan and Iran: an annotated bibliography (London: 
Mansell Publishing Ltd, 1983)p.47-8
107Mawdudi, S. Abul A'la The process o f  Islamic revolution (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd, 1970) 
quoted in Hussain op. cit. p.48. Z.A. Suleri, a pro-Jamaat-i-Islami commentator, and at one time chief 
editor o f the Pakistan Times, wrote that the birth of Pakistan was "a flagrant breach o f the western 
notion [of nationhood] based on race, language and geography..." ("Counter-revolution in Pakistan" 
The News International, 14 August 1996 p. 12)
108Maududi, S. Abul Ala The Islamic Law and Constitution translated and edited by Khurshid Ahmad, 
7th edition (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd, 1980) p.212-9
109Mawdudi, S. Abul A'la "Twenty-nine years o f the Jamaat-e-Islami" The Criterion (Karachi) Vol. 6 
No. 1 (Jan-Feb 1971) p. 29 Maududi The Islamic Law and Constitution pp.75-6
110 Maududi, S. Abul A’la Rights o f  Non Muslims in Islamic State, 7th edition (Lahore: Islamic 
Publications Ltd, 1982) pp. 1 -3
111 Maududi The Islamic Law and Constitution p.296
1I2ibid. pp. 188-9
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mu'ahids.113 They would have the same criminal and civil law as Muslims, though in 
personal matters they could follow their own law.114 For reasons of general public 
welfare and self-defence, there should be a prohibition of “such cultural activities as 
may be permissible in non-Muslim creeds, but which, from the point of view of Islam 
are corrosive of moral fibres and fatal”.115 A Muslim woman was not permitted to 
marry a non-Muslim man.116 Though non-Muslims were free to propagate their faith 
and win converts from amongst other non-Muslims,117 Muslims who converted to 
another faith were to be punished by death.118
Muhammad Asad
From Mawdudi's scheme for a traditional Islamic state, it is not a great leap to the type 
of state envisaged by Muhammad Asad, despite the fact that the latter is generally • 
characterised as a modem state. Asad, a European convert to Islam, was director of 
the Department of Islamic Reconstruction from 1948 to 1961. He presented his views 
to the Constituent Assembly in his thesis "Islamic Constitution Making" under the 
auspices of the government of the Punjab in March 1948. Dismissing as naive and 
unrealistic the purist traditionalists, he still sought something more Islamic than a 
Westem-style parliamentary democracy, something that "would be Islamic in the full 
sense of the word and would also take the practical requirements of our time into 
consideration". He developed his concept of a modem Islamic state by returning to
113ibid pp. 278-80. See also Maududi Rights o f  Non Muslims passim
114Maududi The Islamic Law and Constitution pp. 147, 282-286
115 Maududi, Abul A'la. Jihad in Islam (Kuwait: International Islamic Federation o f Student 
Organisations, no date) being a version o f a speech delivered on Iqbal Day (April 13) 1939 at Lahore 
Town Hall
116Maududi, S. Abul Ala Purdah (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd, 1981) p. 241
117Maududi The Islamic Law and Constitution p. 297
1 ^Report o f  the Court o f  Inquiry p.218
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basis of the Qur'an and Sunnah, finding clear-cut political principles from the former 
and details and methods of application from the latter.119
Asad differed significantly from Mawdudi and the absolutists in considering that only 
the small part of the Shari'ah derived directly from the Qur'an and Sunnah remained 
valid permanently. Other parts had been derived by ijtihad and this could be done 
afresh by each generation. Although Mawdudi believed in the possibility of human 
legislation in areas not covered by earlier ijtihad, he limited the scope of this to a 
much smaller range of issues than did Asad.120
The result Asad arrived at from this process was a political system which consisted of 
a government elected by Muslims only, and headed by a president.121 Non-Muslims 
were to be a separate nation from the Muslim community and were not to be 
"entrusted with any key position of leadership".122 Non-Muslims who wished to serve 
in the armed forces would be permitted to do so, and would on that account be exempt 
from paying jizya .123 Asad explicitly insisted that non-Muslims should not be 
discriminated against "in ordinary spheres of life".124
Ghulam Ahmed Parwez
Another very influential scholar whose concept of an Islamic state, like Asad's, falls 
into Ahmed's category "sacred state admitting human will" was Ghulam Ahmed
119 Asad, Muhammad The principles o f  state and government in Islam, new edition (Gibraltar: Dar Al-
Andalus Limited, 1980), a development o f Asad's essay Islamic Constitution-Making, published in
1948, when he was director o f the Department o f Islamic Reconstruction, pp. ix-xi
120Asad op. cit. pp. 14-17; Ahmed, Ishtiaq op. cit. p. 190
121 Ahmed, Ishtiaq op. cit. p. 123
122Asad op. cit. p.40
123ibid. p.74
124ibid. p.40, see also p.87
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Parwez (1903-1985). Parwez was a keen follower and exponent of the Iqbalian 
school, and a progressive thinker. One of his recurring themes was that of din - Islam 
as a "code of life", with detailed instructions for behaviour in every situation. He 
argued that Islam can only become a living reality when Qur'anic laws can be 
enforced upon a definite geographical territory. This then was the purpose for which 
Pakistan was created, he asserted.125
Parwez differed significantly from Asad in that he believed the constitution of an 
Islamic state should be based on the Qur'an alone, not on the Sunnah.126 According to 
Rahman, Parwez was following a trend in the sub-continent, which began with Syed 
Ahmed Khan in the late nineteenth century, of historically discrediting the hadith.127 
Ignoring the Sunnah was indeed revolutionary, since the vast majority of Muslims 
have always looked on the prophet's example as an essential part of Islam; Parwez 
thus earned himself a fatwa issued in 1962 by more than a thousand ulema which 
declared him to be an unbeliever for this heretical teaching.128 The political structure 
which Parwez believed to be Qur'anic was that of a "controlled democracy", that is, 
the people exercising their freedoms within the limits prescribed by the Qur'an.129 
Like Asad, he believed that the Islamic state must make a distinction between 
Muslims and non-Muslims, although only in the political arena.130 Like Asad, he 
believed in complete religious freedom - Muslims should be permitted to change their 
faith and non-Muslims should not be forced to embrace Islam.131
125Parwez, Ghulam Ahmed Quaid-i-Azam Aur Do Quomi Nazaria (Lahore: Idara-Tulu-e-Islam) pp.2-3 
cited in Ahmed, Ishtiaq op. cit. p. 129
126Parwez, Ghulam Ahmed Qurani Aein Kay Bunyadi Khat-o-Khal (Lahore: Idara-Tulu-e-Islam) pp.2- 
3 cited in Ahmed, Ishtiaq op. cit. p. 130
127 Rahman, Fazlur “Some Islamic Issues” p.286. See also Faruqi, M.H. “Integral to Islam” Impact 
International (February 1998) p.44
128Ahmed, Aziz Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1968 (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1967) p.233; Rahman, Fazlur “Some Islamic Issues” p.286
129Parwez, Ghulam Ahmed Qurani Aein Kay Bunyadi Khat-o-Khal (Lahore: Idara-Tulu-e-Islam) pp.4- 
8 cited in Ahmed, Ishtiaq p. 130





One step closer to secularism than Asad was the teaching of Dr Khalifa Abdul Hakim, 
a renowned thinker regarded as an authority on the Iqbalian philosophy. He 
emphasised that Islam was a religion of peace, surrender, harmony and good deeds, 
and that all theistic religions should be united in a Brotherhood of Faith.132 
He asserted that “The Muslim State shall be a Socialist Republic... It shall be a 
theocratic democracy with no priesthood and no Church. It shall be a theocracy only 
in the sense that it derives its authority from God. God shall be the symbol for 
universal social justice.”133
Despite acknowledging both the Qur'an and Sunnah as sources,134 Hakim placed 
greatest emphasis on the Qur'an.135 Although non-Muslims were still a separate 
nation and obliged to pay jizya136 they could hold key posts and should have 
“complete liberty of religious belief’.137 A Qur'anic distinction was to be drawn 
between "People of the Book" (Jews, Christians and Sabeans, according to the Qur'an) 
and polytheists (Hindus) the latter being viewed far more severely, but Muslims and 
non-Muslims were guaranteed equal civil rights,138 with non-Muslims having their 
own personal law.139
132 Hakim op. cit. pp.ix-x, 11, 13
133 ibid. p.247
134ibid. p.265; Ahmed, Ishtiaq op. cit. p. 191
135Hakim op. cit. p.264
136ibid. p.246





Unlike the scholars mentioned above, Dr Javid Iqbal, the son of Sir Muhammad Iqbal 
and a senator and supreme court judge, saw value in secularism, which he considered 
to be "an integral part of Islam" in the sense that Islam does not distinguish between 
the spiritual and the profane. He therefore asserted that "the Islamic state assimilates 
the qualities of an ideal 'Secular State1."140 He also placed emphasis on the concept 
that the Muslim state existed before Pakistan was created, in Indian Muslims' 
consciousness of their distinct identity. The creation of the state of Pakistan was 
required to implement the pre-existing "ideology of Pakistan".141
This state, he asserted, was an ideal secular state, at least as envisaged by Jinnah. "In 
the political sense, irrespective of their religion or race, all Pakistanis are citizens of 
the State of Pakistan on equal terms."142 Yet, at the same time he states that 
"Pakistani nationhood is not the real basis for the unity of the state of Pakistan; it is 
merely an apparent basis". The primary consideration, he says, is "Islam, which 
cements us as a nation and also provides the basis for the unity of the State".143 Any 
loyalty to or love for the geographical territory of Pakistan he condemns, thus 
eliminating the basis for non-Muslim patriotism.144 This seems to completely 
undermine his use of the term "secular state" to describe the kind of state he 
envisaged. He also affirms that the head of state must be a Muslim and non-Muslims 
cannot be part of the elected Muslim assembly. Legislation must be based on the 
Qur'an and Sunnah, although the ijma of the past was not binding.145 The Muslim 
assembly could even withhold the application of Qur'anic laws in certain




l44Ahmed, Ishtiaq op. cit. pp. 145-6
145IqbaI, Javi d op. cit. pp.51-2
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circumstances.146 An Islamic state should provide maximum freedom for its citizens, 
including freedom of religion.147
Syed Muhammad Zafar
If Javid Iqbal's concept of Pakistan was secular more in name than in practice, Syed 
Muhammad Zafar advocated a truly secular state in the modem sense, albeit seeking 
continuity with the political spirit of Islam - Ishtiaq Ahmed's "secular state admitting 
divine will". Zafar was law minister and constitutional adviser in various Muslim 
League governments and is chairman of the Human Rights Society of Pakistan. In his 
1980 work Awam, Parliament, Islam, he argued that government through consultation 
was a principle of Islam, and therefore concluded that a Westem-style parliamentary 
democracy fitted well with the teachings of Islam.148 He believed that past ijma need 
not be adhered to now, and that elected representatives had the right of ijtihad, not just 
religious scholars. His secularism, however, did not extend to disregarding specific 
Qur'anic laws, such as those of inheritance and the hudood punishments, which must 
still be followed.149 How this affected non-Muslims he did not discuss, but freedom 
of religion would follow from his reasoning. He recognized territorial nationalism as 
not contrary to Islam150 which indicates a less precarious position for non-Muslims 
than in Javid Iqbal's version of a "secular state".
146Ahmed, Ishtiaq op. cit. p. 146
147Iqbal, Javid op. cit. pp.64,72-7





Prof. Muhammad Usman, socialist writer and thinker, also favoured a democracy as 
the appropriate political system for Pakistan, with Islamic socialism as the economic 
basis. In contrast to Zafar he did not believe that a democracy would always and 
automatically be the way in which the Qur'anic principle of consultation was best put 
into practice. But for the contemporary context he held that a modem democracy was 
the best system. He did not examine the position of non-Muslims, but religious 
freedom can be assumed from what he says on other subjects. Despite his assertion 
that Islam does not specify any particular type of government, he still adhered to clear 
Qur'anic legislation where that exists, mentioning, for example, inheritance and 
marriage laws. He did not comment on the hudood laws.151
Muhammad Munir
Muhammad Munir, who was a highly respected lawyer and eventually Chief Justice 
of Pakistan, took his place at the extreme end of the spectrum of opinion, described by 
Ishtiaq Ahmed as "the secular state excluding divine will". He dismissed any idea of 
an "ideology of Islam"152 and advocated a straightforwardly secular democratic state, 
whose legislation would be unaffected by the fact that most of its citizens were 
Muslim. This he believed was what Jinnah had intended. In this state non-Muslims 
would have complete equality with Muslims.153 He criticized the Objectives 
Resolution for stating that sovereignty rests with Allah (it should rest with the people) 
for referring to the protection of religious minorities (there should be no distinction 
between religious majorities and minorities) and for the provision relating to enabling
151Usman, Muhammad Islam Pakistan Mein (Lahore: Maktab-i-Jadid, 1969)
152Munir From Jinnah to Zia pp.25-8
153ibid. p.33
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Muslims to lead their lives in accordance with Islam (contradictory to the concept of 
secular state).154 He condemned the death penalty for apostasy,155 and cast doubt on 
the levying of jizya from non-Muslims156 and the concept of separate electorates for 
non-Muslims.157
Conclusion
In the main, Christians had chosen freely to remain in Pakistan and not to join the 
mass emigration of Hindus at partition because of the greater empathy they felt with 
Muslims. They had looked forward to a free and equal existence in the new nation­
state. Perhaps a hint of the way things would develop could have been seen in the fact 
that the Constituent Assembly formed to guide Pakistan through independence and in 
its first years had no Christians among its members, although there were 19 non- 
Muslims of other faiths amongst the total of 72 members.
Despite the ambiguities of the various constitutions and the variety of arguments 
debated in the public arena, the Christian community have felt themselves 
increasingly weakened and marginalised by the process of Islamization. Writing in 
1987, after ten years of Zia's Islamization, Amjad-Ali asserted that the problems of 
non-Muslim minorities were caused by Pakistan's ideological framework "since there 
is no place in it for pluralism of belief and existence. In fact we are experiencing a 
concerted attempt to produce a more entrenched homogeneity within the country, 
inspite of major differences within Islam itself."158
154ibid. p.36
155ibid. p. 133; Report o f  the Court o f  Inquiry p.220
156Munir From Jinnah to Zia p. 107
157ibid. pp. 115-6
158Amjad-Ali, Charles "Islamisation and Christian-Muslim Relations p.73
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The issue of religious minorities is a two-edged weapon in the Christian community's 
experience. Firstly, it was the reluctance of Muslims to exist as a minority within a 
Hindu majority which resulted in the creation of Pakistan. From there the rapid 
evolution of ideology following Jinnah's death soon led to the argument that a 
Muslim-majority nation must function as a traditional Islamic state. Despite a 
vigorous public debate (in which, however, the voice of Christians was seldom heard), 
the traditionalists began gradually to gain ground. First the texts of the constitutions 
were adapted to allow a more conservative interpretation. Modifications here and 
there began increasingly to imply that minorities were not full and equal citizens of 
the nation. Eventually the constitutional wordings were given practical force by a 
series of laws, beginning in Z.A. Bhutto's last months and then continuing with 
greater impetus under Zia. Again the concept of the inferiority of minorities, which 
appears inherent to traditional Islamic view, reappears, and this time with a direct 
effect on Christians.
The protest suicide of John Joseph, Catholic bishop of Faisalabad, on 6 May 1998, in 
response to the helplessness of Christians in the face of the "blasphemy laws" (see 
chapter 5) prompted a comment from Zia-ul-Qasmi, leader of the Sipah-e-Sahaba:
Nobody has forced Christians to live in Pakistan and if  they have to live in
Pakistan then they have to live in respect of the constitution and law o f the
land.159
This would suggest that traditionalists are almost as reluctant to have minorities in the 
“Pure Land” as to be a minority themselves.
159"Tense Faisalabad prepares for bishop's funeral today" The News International (10 May 1998)
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Chapter 3
The relevance of the concept of dhimmi in theory and practice
Dhimmi in classical Islam
An examination of Qur’anic texts in the order of their revelation1 shows that initially 
Jews and Christians -  ahl al-kitab (people of the book i.e. who had their own revealed 
scriptures) -  are considered favoured by God (unlike the pagans) though not of equal 
status with Muslims. Also in this category are the mysterious Sabeans whose identity 
is uncertain (mentioned only three times). To this some would add the Magians 
(mentioned in S.22:17) usually considered to be Zoroastrians.2 The early references 
to Jews and Christians are peaceable and commendatory; they are virtually embraced 
within the fold of Islam as honorary Muslims. For example:
Those who believe (in the Qur’an), and those who follow the 
Jewish (scriptures), and the Christians and the Sabians, - any who 
believe in God and the Last Day, and work righteousness, shall 
have their reward with their Lord: on them shall be no fear, nor 
shall they grieve.^
1 a task complicated by the fact that there is no unanimity on the exact chronological order o f  the 
revelations
2 Zebiri op. cit. p.256
3 S.2:62, an early Medinan surah. This and other quotations from the Qur'an are taken from A. Yusuf 
Ali's The Holy Qur'an: Text, Translation and Commentary (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1975), 
except where otherwise stated. Another good example is the Meccan S.29:46 forbidding disputes with 
the People o f the Book (apart from evil-doers) and acknowledging “our God and your God is one”. A 
very late Medinan surah contains a similar sentence though without the promise o f heavenly reward 
(S.5:72) but is followed very soon after with explicit condemnation o f those who believe Christ is God 
and believe in the Trinity i.e. Christians (S.5:75,76).
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This distinguished them from other non-Muslims who were called kafirun 
(unbelievers) and who, as polytheists, were unequivocally condemned. For example, 
“O ye who believe: truly the Pagans are unclean”4 and the famous “sword verse” 
commanding Muslims to “fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find them.”5
Later texts, however, present the ahl al-kitab as refusing to accept Muhammad’s 
teaching. An interesting verse in Sura 5 commends Christians and condemns Jews 
and polytheists.
Strongest among men in enmity to the Believers wilt thou find the 
Jews and Pagans; and nearest among them in love to the Believers 
wilt thou find those who say, “We are Christians”: because 
amongst these are men devoted to learning and men who have
renounced the world, and they are not arrogant. ^
Jews and Christians are then criticised and condemned together,7 though some 
scholars believe that the references to Christians were added later to passages which 
were originally hostile only to Jews.8 Sura 9, one of the last suras, makes a definite 
separation9 between Muslims on the one hand and Jews and Christians on the other.10
4 S.9:28
5 S.9:5
6 S.5:85 Also, the sin o f polytheists will never be pardoned according to S.4:116.
7 For example, S.5:54 prohibits Muslims from friendship with Jews and Christians and S.2:135-141 
attacks the religion o f Jews and Christians
8 Watt, W. Montgomery Muhammad at Medina (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1981) pp.317-8
9 For example S.9:29, quoted below, which commands that people o f  the Book must be fought if they 
do not follow Muhammad’s teaching
10 Reviews o f the gradually changing Qur’anic attitudes are found in Arkoun, Mohammed “The 
Notion o f Revelation” in Havemann, Axel and Johansen, Baber (eds.) Gegenwart als Geschichte:
Some scholars consider this apparently progressive hardening of attitude towards the 
ahl al-kitab to be the result of the deterioration in relations between Muslims and 
Jews in Medina and later the military conflict with the Byzantine Christians.11 
Whatever the reason, by the time the revelations of the Qur’an ceased, there were 
three categories of people -  Muslims, ahl al-kitab and kafirun. It was the ahl al-kitab 
who were eligible to became dhimmi, if conquered by Muslims. Kafirun were 
supposed to be eliminated altogether by conversion or killing, though this became 
impracticable when the Muslim armies encountered them in large numbers and they 
tended to be treated as ahl al-kitab.12
The hadith mainly take a similar stance to the People of the Book as do the later 
Qur’anic verses i.e. they are dhimmi - protected people, paying jizya and submitting to 
a number of restrictions.13 With regard to the status of Christians specifically, Wijoyo 
describes varying attitudes according to the geographical location of the Christians 
concerned. Egyptian Christians were most favourably regarded, because one had 
given Muhammad his only male descendant. Second in favour were the Abyssinian 
Christians who had offered hospitality to the persecuted Meccan Muslim refugees.
The Byzantine Christians -  against whom many wars were fought during the Islamic
Islamwissenschaftliche Studien (Leiden: Brill, 1988) pp.82-3 and Sherif, Faruq A guide to the contents 
o f  the Qur’an (London: Ithaca Press, 1985) pp.91-4
11 Zebiri op. cit. p.256
12 Cahen, C. “Dhimma” in Encyclopaedia o f  Islam Vol. II (Leiden: Brill, 1983) p.227
13 Discussed in detail by Fattal, Antoine Le Statut Legal des Non-Musulmans en Pays d ’Islam 
(Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 1958)
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conquests - receive the most unfavourable accounts in the hadith, being considered 
treacherous and unreliable.14
Jews and the Constitution of Medina
The first dhimmi were the Jews of Khaybar, near Medina, a disparate group among 
whom the most prominent were the Banu ‘n-Nadir who had fled there after their 
expulsion from Medina in 625. They were attacked and besieged by Muhammad in 
628, eventually surrendering under the terms of a treaty by which the Jews were 
permitted to continue cultivating their land there but had to hand over half the produce 
to the Muslim conquerors. About the same time similar treaties were forced on the 
Jewish colonies at Fadak and Wadi ‘1-Qura. In another treaty made at this time with 
the Jews of Tayma, the tribute levied was called jizya.15
Such treaties were a novelty in Muhammad’s dealings with Jews, since previous 
military engagements (with the three main Jewish tribes of Medina itself -  the 
Qaynuqa in 624, the Banu ‘n-Nadir in 625 and the Qurayzah in 627) had resulted in 
the expulsion or death of the Jews concerned until there were no important groups of 
Jews left in Medina. There had been no option of remaining in situ and paying 
tribute.16
14 Wijoyo, Alex Soesilo “The Christians as religious community according to the hadit” 
Islamochristiana Vol. 8 (1982) pp.84-5
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An ancient document known as the Constitution of Medina17 includes much material 
about the rights and duties of Jews in Medina. The exact date of the document, 
preserved by Ibn Ishaq, is uncertain, though agreed to be authentically from 
Muhammad’s period in Medina (622-632).18 The three main Jewish groups of 
Medina are not mentioned by name, although many other Jewish groups are listed, 
which might suggest that the document post-dates the expulsion of the Qurayzah. 
There are reasons for thinking that it is a collection of documents of different dates.19 
The most significant feature of the Constution in the context of treatment of non- 
Muslims is the fact that nine Jewish groups are listed as being part of the umma, the 
Muslim community.20 Membership of the umma is precisely what dhimmi do not 
have in later Islamic legislation. Yet the Jews, though members of the umma, do not 
seem to be of exactly equal status with the Muslim members of the umma. They are 
apparently subordinate and somewhat mistrusted.21
Much debate surrounds the definition o f “umma” in the Constitution, for on this 
hangs, it can be argued, Muhammad’s original intention for non-Muslim minorities in 
an Islamic state. Clearly it is not religiously defined, but does involve political and 
military loyalties. Humphreys discusses various arguments, including Gil’s egregious
15 Watt op. cit. p.218
16 ibid. pp.209-214,216
17 translation in Watt op. cit. pp.221-5
18 The reasons for its authenticity are given by Wellhausen, Julius “Muhammads Gemeindeordnung 
von Medina” Skizzen und Vorarbeiten (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1884-99) Vol. IV (1889) pp.65-83, 
especially p.80, who dates it to 622 or 623. They are summarised by Humphreys, R. Stephen Islamic 
History (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991) pp.92-8
19 Watt op. cit. pp.225-8
20 sections 25-33 in Watt’s translation. This fact is one o f  the arguments for an early date for the 
Constitution.
21 Humphreys op. cit. p.97
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assertion that the Jews were obliged to convert to Islam. Other scholars, however, 
agree that the Jews were allowed to retain their old religion and law.22 Matters were 
clearly different by the time of Umar II (717-720) who considered himself primarily a 
Muslim, secondarily an Umayyad and an Arab. He aimed to hold the fragile 
Umayyad Arab empire together by transforming it into a Muslim empire. His first 
step was, naturally, to try to persuade the non-Muslim subjects to become Muslims, 
offering them a lifting of jizya and equal citizenship with Muslims, irrespective of 
their tribe, in other words membership of the umma depended only on religion.23 The 
rescript he circulated to all his governors for this purpose “carries every indication of 
genuineness” according to Gibb.24
Christians and the Covenant of Umar
With regard to Christians the first detailed document purports to be an agreement with 
the Christians of Najran, to the south of Mecca, who sent a deputation to Muhammad 
in 630. A peace treaty was made according to which Muhammad would not interfere 
with ecclesiastical affairs or property and would protect the people of Najran. In 
return he was to receive an annual payment of 2,000 garments of a stipulated value, 
and in time of war armour, horses and camels were to be lent to the Muslims, though 
the Christians themselves did not have to fight.25 Some scholars believe the alleged
22 ibid. pp.95-8
23 Shaban. M.A. The 'AbbasidRevolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) p.89
24 Gibb, H.A.R. “The Fiscal Rescript o f ‘Umar II” Arabica Vo. II no. 1 (Leiden, January 1955) quoted 
in Shaban op. cit. p.89 who also quotes Gibb’s translation o f the rescript.
25 Watt op. cit. pp. 127-8 (translations o f Muhammad’s letters are given on pp.359-60)
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copies of this treaty to be a fabrication.26 Around this time Muhammad began to 
demand also that the Christian tribes to the north of Mecca either convert to Islam or 
pay tribute.27 Christians are not mentioned in the Constitution of Medina. They are 
however, the subject of the so-called Covenant of Umar.28 This key document is 
attributed by Arab historians to Caliph Umar I (634-644) - or sometimes to Umar II 
(717-720) - but is generally considered by Western scholars to date from the period of 
Abbasid rule (750-1258), perhaps around 1100.29 Whatever its origin the Covenant of 
Umar became the pattern for the definition and codification of the status of dhimmis, 
but was rarely enforced in its entirety.
The dhimmi were considered to be beneficiaries of a treaty or dhimma, by which the 
Muslim community granted them hospitality and protection in return for their 
submission. In the Hedaya, the authoritative text-book of Hanafi law, particularly 
used in Pakistan and also Turkey, India, Bangladesh and parts of Central Asia, this 
treaty is described as a “contract of subjection”.30 In the early years various 
regulations were imposed, differing according to local conditions, many of which 
appeared to be designed either to secure supplies for the victorious Muslim troops or 
to guard against espionage by the non-Muslims (e.g. maintaining a distinctive dress 
code).31 But the most characteristic and lasting stipulation was the imposition of a 
poll-tax on adult males known as jizya. This was intended to cover the costs incurred
26 Young Patriarch, Shah and Caliph p. 159
27 Watt op. cit. pp. 115-6,126
28 Discussed in Tritton, A.S. The Caliphs and their non-Muslim Subjects: A Critical Study o f  the 
Covenant o f  Umar (London: Oxford University Press, 1930)
29 Lambton, Ann K.S. State and government in medieval Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1981) p.203
30 The Hedaya Vol. 2 Book IX, pp.221-2
93
by the Muslims in protecting the dhimmi,32 or in lieu of the military service which 
they were not allowed, as non-Muslims, to perform33 or both.34 If a Muslim ruler 
failed to protect the life and property of non-Muslim citizens, he was obliged to return 
the j izy a 35 (Muslims still recall with pride an example of this happening, when the 
Muslim army in the eighth century had to withdraw from various nearby cities for a 
campaign at a certain place in Syria thus leaving the dhimmis unprotected.)36
Despite this reasoning, jizya was recognised by both Muslims and non-Muslims as a 
humiliating sign of submission.37 According to Klein it was sometimes called 
“captivity-tax”.38 In the words of the Qur’an:
Fight those who believe not in God nor the Last Day, nor hold that 
forbidden which hath been forbidden by God and His Apostle, nor 
acknowledge the religion o f truth (even if they are) o f the People 
of the Book, until they pay the jizya with willing submission, and 
feel themselves subdued.39
31 Cahen op. cit. p.227
32 Khuri, Fuad I. Imams and Emirs: State, Religion and Sects in Islam (London: Saqi Books, 1990) 
p.83
33 The Hedaya vol. II Book IX p.212
34 Doi, Abdul Rahman I. Non-Muslims under Shari'ah (Maryland: International Graphics, 1979) p.55
35 ibid. loc cit.
36 Baig, Khalid “Moral World Order” Impact International (September 1998) p.4. See also Maududi, 
Rights o f Non Muslims pp.23-4
37 Doi op. cit. p.59
38 Klein, F.A. The Religion o f  Islam, (London: Curzon Press Ltd, 1979) p. 176
39 S. 9:29
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According to some jurists, the jizya was to be paid in a public ceremony in which the 
one paying was struck on the head or neck.40 Because of the subservient position 
implied by payment of jizya , the Banu Taghlib (a tribe of Christian Arabs who fought 
on the side of the Muslims) preferred to pay four times as much tax, provided it was 
called zakat (obligatory alms, required of Muslims according the Qur’an) and not 
jizya.41 Bat Ye’or summarises the symbolism of the jizya as follows:
The vanquished had to pay the victor for the right to survive in his 
homeland, and the product of his labour was not merely paid to the 
state, but was intended to finance the jihad  and consolidate its 
acquisitions. Thus the dhimmi worked for the benefit o f the power 
that oppressed him, and for the community from which he was 
excluded 42
The later-developed rules for dhimmi were stricter and mainly emphasised their 
inferiority, including restrictions on their buildings and mounts. The erection of new 
places of worship was forbidden and some outward expressions of worship, such as 
processions and bells, were also limited. A dhimmi man could not marry a Muslim 
woman although a Muslim man could marry a dhimmi woman. Children of a mixed 
marriage were Muslims. A dhimmi could not own a Muslim slave although the 
converse was permitted. Dhimmi merchants had to pay higher customs duties.
40 Ibn ‘Abidin iii.294, quoted in Klein op. cit p. 176
41 Khuri op. cit. p.83. See also the Hedaya Vol. II Book IX pp.222-3
42 Bat Ye’or The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians Under Islam revised and enlarged English edition 
(London: Associated University Presses, 1985) p. 144
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According to most schools of law, the blood-money for a dhimmi was less than that 
for a Muslim.43
It is significant to note that the tightening of regulations concerning dhimmis in the 
late Middle Ages accompanied the growing numerical dominance of the Muslim 
population, who at the time of the original conquests, at least beyond Arabia, were a 
minority in relation to their subject peoples. Cahen points out that this was 
accompanied by a growing distinction between the treatment of Christians and the 
treatment of Jews. Christians were considered to be “friends of foreign powers” and 
thus were treated more harshly than Jews, who could not be so considered at that 
time.44 Bat Ye’or writes of a “dhimmi syndrome” being the “combined psychological 
effects of vulnerability and humiliation. Reduced in extreme cases to a precarious 
survival, evaluated in monetary terms, the dhimmi perceives himself and accepts 
himself as a dehumanized being.”45 While such language may be considered emotive 
it nevertheless indicates the detrimental effect on self-image which non-Muslim 
minorities commonly experience.
Perhaps unexpectedly, dhimmis were not excluded from government bureaucracy. 
Despite hints of prohibition in the Qur’an46 and explicit prohibition by rulers such as 
Umar II (717-720),47 the help of non-Muslim administrators was indispensible to the
43 Lists o f the rules are given in many sources, for example the Hedaya Vol II Book IX pp. 219-222, 
Klein op. cit. p. 176, Khuri op. cit. pp. 84-6, Cahen op. cit. pp.227-8
44 Cahen op. cit. p.228-9
45 Bat Ye’or The Decline o f  Eastern Christianity Under Islam: From Jihad to Dhimmitude (London: 
Associated University Presses, 1996) pp. 235-9
46 For example S.3:28 and 5:54
47 Lambton op. cit. p.206
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Muslim rulers of the newly conquered lands. But this practice continued for 
centuries, for example the Nestorians of Iraq and the Copts of Egypt held important 
positions in the administration of their respective countries.48 From time to time 
during the Middle Ages there were public outcries against the presence of dhimmi in 
high administrative positions, and a number of dhimmis converted to Islam in order to 
keep their positions 49 The issue of how much authority and power a non-Muslim can 
have in a Muslim state is one which continues to be debated, not least amongst 
Pakistani scholars discussing their country’s mode of government. (See chapter 2.)
Indeed, the whole issue of the rights, restrictions, role and status appropriate for 
dhimmis continues to be discussed by contemporary Muslim scholars. The 
Palestinian Ismail al-Faruqi (1921-1986), though Western educated, added to the 
traditional limitations on political influence, further restrictions in the areas of 
education, culture, social and moral issues, whose necessity arises from the 
assumption that modem dhimmis mix daily with Muslims, rather than living in their 
own fairly closed communities; thus strict regulations about public behaviour were 
deemed necessary by al-Faruqi to preserve the Islamic character of society.50 A 
contrasting Pakistani view is that of Fazlur Rahman (1919-1988) who believed that 
the modem situation calls for a relaxation of the rules imposed on dhimmi rather than 
increasing the restrictions.51 A wide range of other views exist, some even more 
radical than that of Fazlur Rahman, but one characteristic of modem thinkers is that
48 Cahen op. cit. p.228-9
49 ibid. p.229
50Al-Faruqi op. cit. pp. 90-102; see also discussion in Zebiri op. cit. pp.258-262
51 His thinking on the subject is reviewed in Zebiri op. cit. pp.262-4
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the classical distinction between ahl al-kitab and other non-Muslims has been 
abandoned by most so that the word dhimmi is usually synonymous with “non- 
Muslim minorities”.52 It is interesting to note how the word “minority” has acquired 
in some contexts the same stigma which “dhimmi ” used to have.53 Two examples of 
the defence of Christians indicate clearly how “minority” is sometimes used by 
Muslims in the sense of “second-class citizen”. Thus Benazir Bhutto, as leader of the 
opposition and former Prime Minister, when speaking of Christian minorities in 
Pakistan said “I do not like referring to minorities, I believe that we are all 
Pakistanis”.54 Similarly, Asma Jehangir, a leading lawyer with the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan, said of a Pakistani Christian, “I do not think that the fact he 
is a Christian makes him a minority... Today we announce that there are no 
minorities in our country, all are citizens of Pakistan.”55 Christians themselves, on the 
other hand, make free use of the word56 and are keen to be considered a minority as 
this carries with it the implication that they deserve preferential treatment like the 
lowest castes.
52 Zebiri op. cit. pp.270-1
53 The Christians of Malaysia and Egypt strenuously resist the use o f the term “minority” to describe 
themselves, though they are numerically well below 50% o f the population
54Her speech at a Seminar on the Constitutional Rights o f  Minorities and Women in Pakistan, held in 
Lahore, on October 21, 1991, is published as Bhutto, Benazir “Minorities, Women and the Political 
Processes” Al-Mushir Vol. 33 No. 4 (Autumn 1991) p. 110
55 Speaking at the same seminar, and published as Jehangir, Asma “Minorities and women in Pakistan” 
Al-Mushir Vol. 33 No. 4 (Autumn 1991) p. 125
56 For example, the National Commission for Justice and Peace entitles its human rights monitor 97 “A 
Report on the Religious Minorities in Pakistan”.
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M u'ahids
In contrast to dhimmi, who are non-Muslims conquered by Muslims, there is another 
class of non-Muslim within an Islamic state, the mu'ahids. They are non-Muslim 
minorities living within an Islamic state who were not conquered by the Muslims. 
They are considered to have voluntarily chosen to live in the Islamic state and to have 
made an agreement with the state. They are not liable to pay jizya.51 Some ulema and 
others argued that Christians and other non-Muslims living in Pakistan fall into this 
category58 but others stated that they could not be mu'ahids since no agreement had 
been made with them.59 Christians themselves have often argued that they are "sons 
of the soil", native inhabitants of Pakistan whose ancestors had lived there as far back 
as they could trace, unlike many Pakistani Muslims who migrated to Pakistan from 
other parts of India at independence.60 In the words of Michael Nazir Ali, speaking 
soon after his appointment as Bishop of Rochester, “The Christians of Pakistan have 
nowhere else to go. They are not from anywhere else.”61 Joshua Fazl-ud-Din points 
out that Christian Pakistanis had not been conquered by Muslim Pakistanis, indeed 
had struggled side by side with them for liberty from the British, so dhimmi status is
57 Maududi Rights o f Non Muslims pp.7-9.
58Ahmed, Ishtiaq op. cit p.87; Shehab, Rafi Ullah “Status o f Non-Muslims under Holy Prophet’s 
administration” Pakistan Times (April 12, 1979) p. 4
59Maulana Abdul Hamid Badayuni, president of the Jami'at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan in Report o f  the Court 
o f  Inquiry p.213
60For example, Group Captain Cecil Choudhury, Pakistan Air Force, in a radio report on The World 
Tonight (BBC Radio 4, 10 June 1998); also, Moghal, Dominic “The right o f dual vote for non-Muslim 
Pakistanis and the anxieties o f the religious groups: A moment o f reflection for inter-faith harmony in 
Pakistan” Urdu version in Al-Mushir Vol. 38 No.2 (1996), English version in Al-Mushir Vol. 39 No. 2 
(1997) p.64 [of English version]; Rumalshah “Hear the cry” p.40
61 quoted by Shahed Sadullah in “From Raiwind to Rochester” Daily Jang, August 26, 1994
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inappropriate.62 However, the m u’ahid argument is relatively rare, and is not often 
cited in the discussion of the status of Christians.
A third category of non-Muslims
If Pakistani Christians have neither been conquered (<dhimmi) nor made an agreement 
with the state (mu ’ahids) then there must be a third category of non-Muslims to which 
they belong. Mawdudi lists the non-dhimmi non-mu ’ahid non-Muslims as “those who 
are in the Islamic State in any other way” although he appears at a loss as to how they 
should be treated.63 This may also be the argument of Maulana Abdul Haamid 
Badayuni, formerly president of the Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan, when questioned at 
the Court of Inquiry which investigated serious disturbances in the Punjab in 1953, 
who stated that non-Muslim communities are neither dhimmis nor mu ’ahids (nor 
citizens). Muhammad Munir, who chaired the Court of Inquiry and produced the 
report, condemns this response as confused but Maulana Abdul H ajn id  Badayuni was 
apparently given no opportunity to suggest what category they did fall into.64 Some 
Christians have argued that Pakistani Christians fall into this third category, for 
example, Dominic Moghal, director of the Christian Study Centre in Rawalpindi,65
62 Fazl-ud-Din Future o f  Christians p. 108
63 Maududi Rights o f Non Muslims pp.6-7
64 Report o f  the Court o f Inquiry pp.213-4
65 Moghal, Dominip “The status o f non-Muslims in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan: a confused 
identity” -  a paper given at a seminar on “Religious Minorities in Pakistan: struggle for identity” (July 
1996) reproduced in a book o f the same title ed. Moghal, Dominic and Jivan, Jennifer (Rawalpindi: 
Christian Study Centre, 1996) p.27
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and also the Catholic scholar Geijbels who calls for ijtihad to determine the status of 
this third type of minority in a contemporary Islamic state.66
The Shari'ah in Pakistan’s legislation
It is in the Shari’ah that the status of dhimmi is codified. The place of the Shari’ah in 
Pakistan’s legislation is therefore of the greatest importance in determining the status 
of Christians.
Before independence
Throughout the history of the subcontinent, villages have had a significant degree of 
autonomy. Even under the sophisticated and highly centralised Mughal government 
(1526-1727) law enforcement rarely reached village level. The exceptions to this 
were cases involving a considerable breach of the peace or cases in which revenue due 
to the government had not been paid.67 Thus the traditional village organization with 
all its Hindu institutions continued to function.68
66 Geijbels, M. “Pakistan, Islamisation and The Christian Community. Part two: The Status and
Calling o f Christians” Al-Mushir Vol. XXII No. 3 (Autumn 1980) p. 105
67Calkins, Philip B. "A note on lawyers in Muslim India" Law and Society Review Vol. Ill No. 2
(1968/9) pp.403-6
68Mehdi, Rubya op. cit. pp.3-4
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Under British rule, a system known as Anglo-Muhammadan law developed, which 
was a fusion of British common law with Islamic law. Criminal justice was 
administered according to the British system, but personal law for Muslims continued 
to be governed by the Shari'ah (often as interpreted by British judges or by Indian 
judges with British training). Non-Muslims were unaffected by this law, apart from 
those who converted away from Islam, who, for example, lost their inheritance rights. 
It was this Anglo-Muhammadan law which became the original legislative system of 
the newly independent Pakistan.69
The origin of the campaign to enforce Shari'ah
The first constitution (1956) was carefully formulated to avoid references to the 
Shari'ah as the authoritative source of Islamic law. Rather, it referred to the "Holy 
Qur'an and the Sunna", intending to facilitate a new ijtihad, as envisaged by 
Muhammad Iqbal, which would be formulated by parliament and the courts rather 
than by the ulema.10 The various military and civilian governments which held power 
in the following two decades each made their own adjustments to the degree of 
attention paid by the law to Islam. The general trend, though rather superficial until 
1977, was to give Islam an increasingly influential role and gradually to erode the 
rights of the non-Muslim minorities. (See chapter 2.)
69ibid. pp.4-9
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The campaign to enforce Shari’ah began in 1977 with the Pakistan National Alliance 
and their anti-secular slogan, nizam-e-Mustafa, which was taken up by Zia's military 
government later the same year.71 (See chapter 2.) Zia made the Islamization of the 
laws a primary objective.72
Shariat73 benches and the Federal Shariat Court
In 1979 Zia created Shariat benches within the superior courts,74 and soon followed 
this by an amendment to the constitution to establish this reform.75 According to 
Chapter 3-A, inserted into the 1973 constitution, Shariat benches were to be created 
within the High Courts when required to "decide the question whether or not any law 
or provision of the law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the 
Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet"76 and this was to be done 
"notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution".77 Laws which were found 
not to conform with the injunctions of Islam were to be amended.78 An explanatory
70Lodhi op. cit. p.22; Ahmad, Salah-Ud-Din "Ijtihad" reprinted in All Pak. Legal Decisions Journal 1, 
p.l (1980)
71 Amjad-Ali, Christine and Charles The legislative history o f the Shariah Act (Rawalpindi: Christian 
Study Centre, 1992) p. 1
72Khan, Justice Gul Muhammad "Islamization of the Laws in Pakistan" Presidential address at 5th 
Pakistan Jurists Conference, Karachi, reprinted in All Pak. Legal Decisons Vol. XXXVIII (1986) 
Journal 261; Korson, J. Henry "Islamization and Social Policy in Pakistan" Journal South Asian and  
Middle East Studies Vol. 71 (1982) p.72
73The Persian version of the Arabic "shariah", ending with "t" is often used in Pakistan.
74 President's Order 22 o f 2 December 1978, Shariat Benches o f Superior Courts Order, 1978, with 
effect from February 10, 1979 reprinted in All Pakistan Legal Decisions Vol. XXX (1978) Central 
Statutes 6
75 President's Order 3 of 1979, section 2, with effect from February 7, 1979
76 Article 203-B o f the 1973 Constitution o f Pakistan, as inserted by Presidential Order 3 o f 1979
77 Article 203-A o f the 1973 Constitution o f  Pakistan, as inserted by Presidential Order 3 o f 1979
78 Article 203-B (4)(a) o f the 1973 Constitution o f Pakistan, as inserted by Presidential Order 3 o f  
1979
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note, however, excluded from the jurisdiction of Shariat benches virtually any kind of 
law which they might have been expected to examine. It ran: “In this Chapter, ‘law’ 
includes any custom or usage having the force of law but does not include the 
Constitution, Muslim personal law, any law relating to the procedure of any Court or 
Tribunal or, until the expiration of three years from the commencement of this 
Chapter, any fiscal law, or any law relating to the collection of taxes and fees or 
banking or insurance practice and procedure.”79 It is interesting to note the use of the 
word “Shariat” in the name of these benches. Although their task was defined as 
comparing the laws of Pakistan with the Qur’an and Sunnah (not with the Shari’ah), 
perhaps the very name indicates the beginning of a shift away from the concept of a 
new ijtihad and towards the use of the classical Shari’ah.
This effectively toothless constitutional provision was then ostensibly strengthened by 
General Zia in 1980 by the creation of a Federal Shariat Court.80 This Court had the 
same role81 accompanied by the same limitations as the Shariat benches had had. The 
Shariat Court had jurisdiction "notwithstanding anything in the Constitution" to 
"examine and decide the question whether or not any law or provision of law is 
repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of 
the Holy Prophet".82 Further amendments to the Constitution with regard to the 
Federal Shariat Court were made in 1982, 1984 and 1985, which considerably 
strengthened its power. It gained the power to initiate examination of laws of its own
79 Explanation appended to article 203-B
80Constitution (Amendment) Presidential Order 1 o f 1980, section 3
81 Article 203-D o f the 1973 Constitution, as amended by Presidential Order 1 o f 1980
82Pakistan Constitution of 1973, article 203-D, amended 1982, in Mahmood, Safdar op. cit. p.938-41
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volition83 and the power to review any decisions or procedures of any other court 
enforcing hadd crimes, and to "enhance the sentence" if necessary.84 Many laws, 
however, were still excluded from its jurisdiction.85 By 1986 the Shariat Court had 
found portions of 55 federal laws (out of 512 examined) and 212 provincial laws (out 
of 999 examined) to be contrary to the Shari'ah.86
Hudood Ordinances and the Law of Evidence (Qanoon-e-Shahadat)
In 1979 a number of Hudood Ordinances were put into effect, enforcing hadd 
penalties87 for the offences of drinking intoxicants (including drugs),88 theft,89 
adultery,90 and false accusation of adultery.91 This was followed by legislation
83 Article 203-D section (1) o f the Pakistan Constitution, amended by Constitution (Second
Amendment) Presidential Order 5 of 1982
84Pakistan Constitution o f 1973, Article 203DD section (2)
85Article 203-B (c) reads: "law" includes any custom or usage having the force o f law but does not 
include the Constitution, Muslim personal law, any law relating to the procedure o f any Court or 
Tribunal or, until the expiration o f ten years from the commencement o f this Chapter, any fiscal law or 
any law relating to the levy and collection o f taxes and fees or banking insurance practice and 
procedure;
86Khan, Justice Gul Muhammad op. cit. pp.264-5
87 A hadd crime is an offence against the “boundaries” set by God, with a fixed punishment as stated 
in the Qur’an (or in the case o f drinking alcohol, the ahadith) from which no deviation is allowed.
88President's Order 4 o f 1979, Prohibition (Enforcement o f Hadd) Order, 1979 reprinted in All 
Pakistan Legal Decisions, Vol. XXXI (1979) Central Statutes 33-41 (1979)
89Ordinance VI o f 1979, Offences Against Property (Enforcement o f Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 
reprinted in All Pakistan Legal Decisions Vol. XXXI (1979) Central Statutes 44-51
90Ordinance VII o f 1979, Offence of Zina (Enforcement o f Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 reprinted m A ll  
Pakistan Legal Decisions Vol. XXXI (1979) Central Statutes 51-56
91Ordinance VIII of 1979, Offence of Qazf (Enforcement o f Hadd) Ordinance, 1979 reprinted in All 
Pakistan Legal Decisions Vo. XXXI (1979) Central Statutes 56-60
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concerning the Islamic punishment of whipping,92 the payment by Muslims of zakat 
(compulsory alms) and ushr (tithes),93 and the enforcement of the Ramadan fast.94
The administration of justice under Islamic law depends heavily on the number of 
qualified witnesses who give evidence in court. In 1984 President Zia promulgated 
the Qanoon-e-Shahadat (Law of Evidence) which replaced a previous Law of 
Evidence dating from 1872. This had a grave effect on Christians and other non- 
Muslims because of the following proviso concerning who is competent to appear as a 
witness in a Court of Law:
"Provided further that the Court shall determine the competence o f a 
witness in accordance with the qualifications prescribed by the injunctions 
of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah for a witness, Mid, 
where such witness is not forthcoming, the court may take the evidence o f  
a witness who may be available."95
This would give a judge trying a hadd case the freedom to define women as half­
witnesses in comparison with men.96 (It is relevant here to note that Article 17 
specifies that business transactions require two male witnesses or one male and two 
female -  four female witnesses are not allowed.) Likewise non-Muslims can be
920rdinance IX o f 1979, Execution of the Punishment of Whipping Ordinance, 1979 reprinted in All 
Pakistan Legal Decisions Vol. XXXI (1979) Central Statutes 60-62
93 Ordinance XXIX o f 1979, Zakat and Ushr (Organisation) Ordinance, 1979, reprinted in All Pakistan 
Legal Decisions, Vol. XXXI (1979) Central Statutes 277-285
940rdinance XXIII o f 1981, Ehtram-E-Ramazan Ordinance, 1981, reprinted in All Pakistan Legal 
Decisions Vol. XXXIII (1981) Central Statutes 278
95Law o f Evidence Order, 1984, Chapter II, section 3, quoted in Dawood op. cit. p.l 13
96based on Sura 2:282 "... and get two witness out o f your own men, And if there are not two men, 
Then a man and two women..."
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defined as half-witnesses in comparison with Muslims, making the evidence of a non- 
Muslim woman worth only a quarter of the evidence of a Muslim man. Furthermore, 
under the Hudood Ordinances there are certain cases in which women and non- 
Muslims are not admissible as witnesses at all97 (see below). The effects of this on 
Christians brought to court under the Hudood Ordinances are clearly very negative. A 
report by the International Commission of Jurists in 1985 wrote of the inequalities 
resulting from the Hudood Ordinances:
... this is not being done on an entirely even handed basis since 
Muslims can give evidence against non-Muslims but not vice versa 
and, while the Presiding Officer in a trial o f a non-Muslim for any 
o f the offences other than “Qazf ’ must also be a non-Muslim, an 
appeal to the Federal Shariat Court will be heard by exclusively 
Muslim Judges. At least in some respects, therefore these 
ordinances may offend against the constitutional guarantees o f  
freedom and equality before the law, but they are possibly immune 
from constitutional challenge because of the validation given to all 
the ordinances made by the President during Martial Law through 
the introduction of Article 270A(3) into the Constitution . . .98
97Dawood op. cit. p*. 111-123; Mehdi, Rubya op. cit. pp. 147-150; Bouma, Cees "Pakistan's Islamization 
1977-88: The Zia Era in Retrospect" in Al-Mushir Vol.31 No. 1 (Spring 1989) p.21
98 Pakistan After Martial Law a report by the International Commission o f Jurists, 1985 pp. 101-2, 
quoted in Shahani op. cit. p.4
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Qisas and Diyat Ordinance
In 1990 the Shari'ah law of retaliation by causing similar hurt (qisas) and 
compensation (diyat) for murder and intentional bodily harm had been introduced by 
means of a presidential ordinance." This law had been in preparation since Zia 
directed the Council of Islamic Ideology to start work on a draft in 1979, and had 
passed through numerous other committees and bodies.100 The law caused resentment 
amongst Pakistani women because the diyat for female victims was only one half of 
the diyat of male victims, and because women were not admissible as witnesses in 
murder cases.101 Christians were alarmed by the implication that, following the 
pattern of the Shari’ah, they would be considered to be worth only half the diyat of 
Muslims.102 The Ordinance was not considered by Parliament and therefore lapsed 
after four months.103
In April 1997 an amended version was passed by Parliament, which had no 
discriminatory references to women or non-Muslims.104
"Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Ordinance (No. VII of 1990) published in Gazette o f  Pakistan 
Extraordinary. (5 September 1990) and reprinted in Mehdi, Rubya op. cit. pp. 298-323
100 Amin, Mohammad Islamization o f  Laws in Pakistan (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1989) 
pp.82-3
101 Mehdi, Rubya op. cit. pp. 152-3
102 Shahani op. cit. pp.7-8
103 According to Article 89 (2) o f the 1973 Constitution concerning the promulgation o f ordinances by 
the president
104 Criminal Law (Amendment) Act (II o f 1997) which substituted new sections 299 to 338 in the 
Pakistan Penal Code, available in an edition with commentary by Nizami, Muhammad Mazhar Hassan 
(Lahore: PLD Publishers, 1998) pp.277-321
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The Eighth and Ninth Amendments
In 1985 General Zia introduced an Eighth Amendment to the constitution which 
served the dual purpose of ratifying various of his past actions and furthering the 
Islamization of the legislation. This amendment provided a constitutional basis for 
the separate electorates system (see chapter 4), and incorporated the Objectives 
Resolution as an integral part of the constitution,105 rather than simply a preamble. 
Thus the clause stating that "Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the 
individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements 
of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah" became legally obligatory (see 
chapter 2).106
The conservative religious groups considered the Eighth Amendment inadequate, 
since it did not extend the powers of the Federal Shariat Court to cover fiscal laws, 
Muslim personal laws and the judicial system; they voted for it only on condition that 
the government would introduce legislation to deal with this issue at a later date. 
When the government appeared to be delaying on this, two senators, Qazi Latif and 
Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, introduced a private Shariat Bill into the Senate on 13 July 
1985. While this bill was at the committee stage, the government proposed a Ninth 
Amendment to the constitution which covered the areas that the conservative religious 
groups had considered lacking in the Eighth Amendment. The Ninth Amendment bill 
declared that "the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah
105 Amjad Ali, Christine and Charles The legislative history p.2
I06pakistan Constitution o f 1973, article 2A (amended 1985) in Mahmood, Safdar p.842
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shall be the supreme law and source of guidance for legislation to be administered 
through laws enacted by the Parliament and provincial assemblies, and for policy 
making by the Government".107 It allowed the Shariat Court to examine any law at 
all, excluding only the Constitution from its jurisdiction.108 It also mandated that 
taxes, banking and insurance law be brought into "conformity with the injunctions of 
Islam".109 The Ninth Amendment bill was passed unanimously by the Senate on 9 
July 1986, but before it had finished its passage through parliament, Zia dissolved the 
National Assembly and dismissed the government (May 29, 1988). One of the stated 
grounds for the President’s action was the failure of the government to Islamize the 
country. The Sami-Latif Shariat bill, having suffered major criticism by the select 
committee, had continued to be circulated for further comment and had also failed to 
become law.110
The Enforcement of Shari'ah Act (1991)
The newly developed power relationship between Parliament and the Federal Shariat 
Court - in which the law-making role of Parliament was subordinate to the law- 
checking role of the Federal Shariat Court - was reinforced by the Enforcement of 
Shari'ah Ordinance of 1988, promulgated by President Zia.111 This stated that 
Shari’ah shall be the “supreme source of law in Pakistan and grund norm (sic) for
107Clause 2 o f the Ninth (Constitutional) Amendment Bill
108Clause 3 o f the Ninth (Constitutional) Amendment Bill
109Clause 4 o f the Ninth (Constitutional) Amendment Bill
110 Amjad Ali, Christine and Charles The legislative history pp.2-3
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policy making of the state” (clause 3).112 The ordinance lapsed after Zia's death in 
August 198 8113 but its text formed the basis of the bill which was later passed as the 
Enforcement of Shari'ah Act (1991).114
After Zia’s death, a Pakistan People’s Party government was formed by Benazir 
Bhutto, having been voted into power. This government had no intention of 
furthering the lapsed Shari’ah legislation and sought, indeed, to repeal the Eighth 
Amendment. Nevertheless Qazi Latif and Maulana Sami-ul-Haq introduced another 
private bill, called The Enforcement of Shariah Bill, on 26 March 1989. Although 
based largely on General Zia’s Shari’ah Ordinance this bill went a significant step 
further in speaking of the Shariah as the “supreme law in Pakistan” rather than the 
“supreme source of law in Pakistan and grund norm (sic) for policy making of the 
state”. The bill was referred to a special committee, which made amendments and 
presented it to the Senate on 13 May 1990, which promptly passed it. However, the 
passage of the bill through Parliament was halted once again by the dissolution of the 
National Assembly and the dismissal of the government (6 August 1990).115
A new Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI, Islamic Democratic Alliance, formerly the 
Pakistan National Alliance) government was formed after elections in October 1990. 
While in opposition the IJI had spoken out in favour of the Enforcement of Shari’ah
1 ^ Enforcement o f Shari'ah (revised) Ordinance, 1988 reprinted in All Pak Legal Decisions Vol. XLI 
(1989) Central Statutes 18
112 Amjad Ali, Christine and Charles The legislative history p.4
113Pakistan Constitution of 1973, article 89, clause (1) (a) declares that a presidential ordinance will 
stand repealed four months after its promulgation
114Enforcement o f Shari'ah Act, 1991, reprinted in All Pak. Legal Decisions Vol. XLIII (1991) Central 
Statutes 373-378
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Bill, and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif now formed a committee to examine the bill
again.
Many minority groups, women’s groups, human rights groups and Shi’a groups were 
strongly opposed to the bill.116 They perceived a threat to the constitutional 
guarantee that all citizens are equal before the law and entitled to equal protection 
under the law. Another objection centred on the immense power to be given to the 
ulema, who could be appointed as judges, friends of court and lawyers, to interpret 
and determine what is, or is not, in accordance with Shari’ah; this would have 
effectively shifed the legislative power from parliament to non-elected individuals 
chosen by the president. A third objection concerned the vagueness of definition of 
the Shari’ah; a conservative rather than a progressive interpretation of the Qur’an and 
Sunnah was indicated but it was felt that the lack of precision would be likely to lead 
to conflicts between followers of different schools of Islam.117
The Enforcement of Shari’ah Bill was brought before the National Assembly on 11 
April 1991, and again referred to a select committee. This bill was considerably more 
moderate than the initial bill presented by Sami and Latif, and was characterised
115 Amjad Ali, Christine and Charles The legislative history pp.4-6
116Bouma, Cees "Ninth Amendment and Shariat Bill" Al-Mushir Vol. XXVIII No. 4 (Winter 1986) pp. 
163-5; "IJI determined to adopt Shariat Bill" Frontier Post (28 December 1990) p.l
117 "Observations, comments and reactions to the Shariat Bill submitted by the Christian group, 
meeting with the Shariat Bill Committee on 27th December 1990" signed by Bishop Alexander John 
Malik of Lahore Diocese o f the Church o f Pakistan and Rev. Dr Charles Amjad-Ali, director o f  the 
Christian Study Centre, Rawalpindi; letter to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on the subject o f  "Problems 
arising for Christians from the Shariat Bill" from Bishops Trinidade, Malik, Lobo, Pereira, Joseph and 
Azariah (4th December 1990)
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principally by vagueness and “pious hopes”118. The substance was contained in just 
two of the 22 clauses. Clause 3 declared the Shari’ah to be the supreme law and 
Clause 4 instructed courts to interpret laws in the light of the Shari’ah. The bill was 
opposed not only by liberals but also by religious conservatives. The latter felt the 
bill was too weak owing to the use of the word “Shari’ah” which carried the 
implication of a variety of schools of law and a limited scope focusing mainly on 
inheritance and divorce. They wanted the “Qur’an and Sunnah” to be made the 
supreme law (as was later promulgated in the 1998 Shari’ah bill described below). 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had promised to introduce another bill to amend the 
constitution to make the Qur’an and Sunnah the supreme law of the country, thus 
taking precedence over the constitution, but did not in fact ever table such a bill. The 
conservative religious parties held that such an amendment would be unnecessary if 
the preamble could refer (as it had done in the original Sami-Latif bill) to the 
Objectives Resolution, which since 1985 had been incorporated in the constitution. 
This change was duly made by the committee to the preamble of the draft bill. 
Opposition from the other end of the political/religious spectrum resulted in the 
government proposing amendments which were supposed to protect the constitutional 
rights of women and minorities and the existing democratic and political system. The 
value of these clauses was doubted by some observers, since the passing of the 
Shari'ah Act raised questions about the status of the constitution itself, which was now 
apparently secondary to the Shari'ah.119
118 Editorial in The Muslim (April 25, 1992) p.6. See also Khan, Shujaat Ali in The News (April 15,
1991) p.4 who argued that the bill was more like a declaration of intent than a draft law. Both cited in 
Amjad Ali, Christine and Charles The legislative history pp. 10-11
113
The Enforcement of Shari’ah Bill was passed by the National Assembly on 16 May 
1991 and by the Senate on 28 May 1991. Despite the amendments, its heart was still 
found in clauses 3 and 4 which made Shari'ah the supreme law in Pakistan and 
required laws to be interpreted in the light of the Shari'ah. The rest was mainly 
concerned with wide-ranging and ill-defined aims (such as "eradicating social evils"), 
or with giving parliament powers and duties it already had. Two sub-sections 
(clauses 1(4) and 3(2)) were supposed to protect the minorities120 but did not define 
what would happen in cases involving both Muslims and non-Muslims or non- 
Muslims and the state. The question remained as to whether a sub-constitutional 
enactment could decide what should be the "supreme law" of the country. The 
Objectives Resolution, which had been included in the preamble specifically to deal 
with this issue, does not in fact mention the word "Shari'ah" or its supremacy, but 
only states:
(para 5) Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the 
individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and 
requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah;
Opponents of the Act also pointed out that the Islamization of laws had already been
prescribed in Article 227 and Part IX of the Constitution, which stated that the process
was to involve the recommendations of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII); the
119Amjad Ali, Christine and Charles The legislative history pp. 15-16
120See below for more detail. Clause 1(4) Nothing contained in this Act shall affect the personal laws, 
religious freedom, traditions, customs and way of life o f the non-Muslims.
Clause 3(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Judgement of any court or any other 
law for the time being in force, the present political system, including the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) 
and Provincial Assemblies and the existing system of Government, shall not be challenged in any 
court, including Supreme Court, the Federal Shariat Court or any authority or tribunal:
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Shari'ah Act itself was not based on the recommendations of the CII, and thus could 
perhaps be deemed unconstitutional. Charles Amjad Ali, former director of the 
Christian Study Centre, Rawalpindi, and his wife Christine summarized the 
constitutional status of the Shari’ah Act as:
... either the Act is meant to be understood and used in terms of the already 
existing constitutional provisions - in which case it is a superfluous piece 
of legislation, or it moves beyond the constitutional provisions - in which 
case it is unconstitutional.121
Another unresolved area was the nature of the Shari'ah which was now to be the 
supreme law of the country - no particular school of law was named. Furthermore, 
there was the question as to whether every part of the Shari'ah was to be made a legal 
requirement of the state, for example the injunction to pray five times a day or to wash 
the body in a certain way.122
Writing a year after the passing of the Act, Charles and Christine Amjad-Ali describe 
the effect of the Act, despite its vagueness:
Where the Act has had an influence is in adding to a particular atmosphere 
of religious intolerance, anti-constitutionality, and a refusal to take into 
account the consequences of actions taken in the name o f Islam.123
Provided that nothing contained herein shall affect the rights o f the non-Muslims guaranteed by or 
under the Constitution.




The following year a landmark ruling in the Supreme Court demonstrated the state’s 
obligation to protect Islam, even when at variance with constitutional rights. In the 
case of Zaheer-ud-Din v. The State, which was concerned with the constitutional 
validity of some anti-Ahmadiyya legislation, Judge Abdul Qadeer Chaudhary held 
that the “Constitution has adopted the Injunctions of Islam as contained in the Qur’an 
and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet as the real and effective law. In that view of the 
matter, the Injunctions of Islam as contained in the Qur’an and Sunnah of the Holy 
Prophet are now the positive law.” From this Chaudhary concluded that “every man- 
made law must now conform to the Injunctions of Islam as contained in the Qur’an 
and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.) Therefore even the Fundamental Rights as 
given in the Constitution must not violate the norms of Islam ... Anything, even in 
any fundamental right, which violates the Injunctions of Islam thus must be 
repugnant.”124 As Lau points out, this was a new and much more restrictive 
interpretation of fundamental rights (including freedom of religion) which were listed 
in Part II, chapter I of the Constitution.125 According to Chaudhary Islamic law was 
to be regarded as the positive law of the land, capable of restricting all fundamental 
rights, and binding on both the courts and the legislator. Lau comments that 
“consistently applied, such a principle would make the continued existence of statute 
law superfluous since judges could apply Islamic directly without any reference to 
other sources of law.”126
124 All Pakistan Legal Decisions Vol. XLV (1993) SCMR 1774-5
125 reproduced in Butt op. cit. pp.5-14
126 Lau, Martin “Islam and Fundamental Rights in Pakistan: the case o f  Zaheer-ud-Din v. The State 
and its impact on the fundamental right to freedom o f religion” Centre o f  Islamic and Middle Eastern 
Law YearbookVoX. 1 (1996)
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The Fifteenth Amendment Bill127
On 28 August 1998 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif introduced to the National 
Assembly a bill to amend the constitution so as to make the Qur’an and Sunnah 
“constitutionally and legally supreme”.128 This fifteenth amendment bill was greeted 
by widespread condemnation, from the opposition Pakistan People’s Party to the 
Islamic political parties such as the Jamaat-i Islami and Jamiat-i Ulema.129 and even 
from some members of Nawaz Sharif s own Muslim League.130 The bill was seen 
almost universally as a mechanism to increase the Prime Minister’s power to an 
unacceptable level and by the minorities as also detrimental to their interests. Asma 
Jehangir, chair of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, asserted that if  the bill 
were to be passed it would become impossible for the minorities to live in Pakistan.131 
Vociferous protests were made by many Christian organizations including the 
Pakistan Christian National Party,132 the Pakistan Christian Action Forum,133 the 
Christian Lawyers Association134 and the Christian Liberation Front Pakistan.135
127 Text o f first version reproduced in Dawn (29 August 1998)
128 Sharif, Nawaz, speech to the National Assembly, 28 August 1998, quoted in Dawn (29 August 
1998)
129 Newsline (September 1998) pp. 16-18
130 For example, Abdul Hameed Jatoi MNA, interviewed by Faraz Hashmi in The Herald (September 
1998) p.41
131 Interviewed by Asha’ar Rehman in Newsline (September 1998) p.26
132 “Christians Against 15th Amendment” Dawn (8 September 1998)
133 “Christians for withdrawal o f 15th Amendment” The News (3 September 1998)
134 “Minorities to boycott Shariah Bill moot” The News (7 September 1998)
135 “CLF joins PPP in struggle against Shariah Bill” The News (2 September 1998)
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Christian and other minority parliamentarians also spoke out against the bill and 
expressed their willingness to resign over the issue.136
The bill had only two changes to make to the constitution. Firstly, there was the 
introduction of a new article 2B. Section (1) of this stated that “The Holy Qur’an and 
Sunna of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) shall be the supreme law of Pakistan.” 
This was explained as a logical step following the incorporation of the Objectives 
Resolution as a substantive part of the constitution. Furthermore, it will be 
remembered that the Enforcement of Shari’ah Act of 1991 had declared the Shari’ah 
to be the supreme law, but without any amendment to the constitution on this issue. 
Nawaz Sharif had promised at the time to make the required amendment, but had 
taken no action until this 1998 bill. The effectiveness of the constitution as a 
safeguard for the minorities137 would be removed at a stroke by this article if  passed.
Secondly, there were proposed amendments to Article 239 which set out new 
procedures for passing legislation with the purpose of removing any impediments in 
enforcing Shari’ah and implementing the injunctions of Islam. These new procedures 
reduced the majority required for constitutional changes and reduced the power of the 
upper house, giving the government -  effectively the Prime Minister -  vastly 
increased powers to amend the constitution and make laws. Hence the outcry from all
136 “Christians reject Islamization bill” Dawn (3 September 1998); “Minority lawmakers to oppose 
bill” Dawn (5 September 1998); “Minority MNAs reject Bill” The News (18 September 1998)
137 Joshua Fazl-ud-Din had recognised many years earlier that for non-Muslim minorities “their main 
source of strength lies in the fact that in the last resort they can always fall back on the Constitution as 
their mainstay”. [Fazl-ud-Din, Joshua “Separate electorates: the Life-Blood o f Pakistan” originally 
published in Punjabi Darbar (Lahore, date not given) and later reproduced in Grover, Verinder and
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sides, for example, Sajjad Ali Shah, former Supreme Court Chief Justice,138 even 
from Syed Munawar Hasan, the general secretary of the Jamaat-i Islami.139
The minorities had further reason to protest, seeing more restrictions for themselves as 
the government would be required to “take steps to enforce the Shari’ah” (section (2) 
of article 2B) within which was included the traditional Islamic formula “to prescribe 
what is right and to forbid what is wrong”. This was reinforced by sections (3) and 
(5) of Article 2B which asserted the government’s power to override “any state 
functionary for non-compliance” and “anything contained in the Constitution, any law 
or judgement of any Court”. Thus they feared they would have been left without any 
legal or constitutional protection.140
A revised version of the bill was presented to the National Assembly on 9 October 
1998, and passed by 151 votes to 16. The revised bill omitted the proposed changes 
to legislative procedure, thus obtaining broad support, but left unaltered the 
amendment to make the Shari’ah the supreme law and the government’s obligation to 
take steps to enforce it, as well as to prescribe what is right and forbid what is wrong. 
The clause placing the government’s power above constitution, law and courts
Arora, Ranjana (eds.) Pakistan Fifty Years o f  Independence (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications,
1997) p. 182]
138 Interviewed by Idrees Bakhtiar in The Herald (September 1998) pp.38-40
139 He expressed support for the bill only on condition that Article 239 was removed. See “Special 
Report” The News International (12 September 1998)
140 Statements by, for example, Bishop Armando Trinidade (head o f the Roman Catholic church in 
Pakistan) and Bishop Alexander Malik (head of the Church o f Pakistan) at a press conference on 2 
September 1998, reported in Dawn (3 September 1998), Dr R. Julius Sunday, a Christian member of  
the national assembly reported in Dawn (7 September 1998), a group o f thirty minority organisations 
including Hindus, Sikhs and Christians, at a meeting convened by the Chirstian Liberation Front 
Pakistan reported in Dawn (7 September 1998), Joseph Francis, secretary general o f the Pakistan 
Christian National Party, quoted in The News International (12 September 1998)
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remained.141 Yet the revised bill was still condemned by the amir (equivalent to 
chairman) of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, who said its purpose was to 
divert attention from the Prime Minister's failed policies on economics and law and 
order, and to “make the government supreme under the garb of the Qur’an and 
Sunnah”. Interestingly Qazi Hussain Ahmed asserted that the existing constitutional 
provisions regarding the promotion of Islamic rule were sufficient.142 The bill should 
have then passed to the Senate, where it would have been unlikely to obtain the two- 
thirds majority required.143 On 14 December 1998 twenty-two religious parties 
announced that they had entered into an alliance called the United Shari’ah Front, 
with the aim of “besieging” all MNAs and senators who were opposed to the Shari’ah 
Bill until they changed their opinion.144 In fact, the three months period during which 
the bill could have been considered by the Senate (ending 9 January 1999) passed 
without any Senate vote on it and, at the time of writing, it appears to have been 
unofficially set aside. However, on 30 January 1999 President Muhammad Tarar 
expressed his confidence that the bill would be passed by the Senate and that 
Pakistan’s “real success” would come the day Shari’ah was imposed.145
141 “National Assembly passes Shariat Bill” The News (10 October 1998); “Pakistan Deputies back 
Islamic law” International Herald Tribune (10-11 October 1998); “Betraying the Quaid” The News (12 
October 1998)
142 “Jamaat chief warns o f consequences o f insulting national institutions” The News (12 October
1998)
143 “Pakistani Christians Fearful o f Islamic Law” Catholic World News Service (3 November 1998)
144 “22 parties unite for Shari’ah” The News (15 December 1998)
145 “Imposition o f Shariah to be real success: Tarar” The News International (31 January 1999)
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Implementation of Shari’ah in certain areas
In 1994 an armed uprising in which scores of people were killed occurred in the 
Malakand Division of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), led by the Tehrik-i- 
Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Mohammadi (TNSM), demanding the imposition of Shari’ah law. 
Nizam-i-Shari ’ah [Shari’ah system] regulations were introduced in Malakand as a 
response, including amputation for theft, stoning to death for adultery and flogging for 
consumption of alcohol. While these punishments were also possible in the rest of the 
country under the Hudood Ordinances, in Malakand they were now the only 
punishments legally permitted. Nevertheless they have never actually been enforced 
in Malakand, let alone anywhere else.
After Nawaz Sharif introduced the Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment Bill in 
August 1998, the TNSM became active again,146 and on 16 January 1999 , the 
government of NWFP signed two statutes to promulgate Shari’ah in Malakand 
Division147 and in the neighbouring Kohistan District of Hazara Division.148 All 
judges in the area were required to go on a three-month refresher course in Islamic 
law, and were also able to call on ulema to assist them in reaching judgements.
Ulema were to be allowed to act as lawyers. Non-Muslims in the areas were to have 
their cases tried under their own religious laws, but no statement was made regarding 
cases in which one party is a Muslim and the other a non-Muslim. The NWFP’s chief 
minister, Sardar Mehtab Ahmad Khan, said that he saw these areas as a model for the
146 Hyman, Anthony “The Impact of the Taleban on Pakistan” Dialogue (published by the Public 
Affairs Committee for Shi’a Muslims, London) (May 1999) p.5
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rest of the province, and Maulana Sufi Muhammad, leader of the TNSM, said that in 
March 1999 they would re-start their “struggle for total enforcement of Shari’ah in the 
country”149 but at the time of writing no further areas have been affected. Malakand — 
but not Kohistan -  is part of the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, lying along 
the Afghanistan border and inhabited by the Pakhtun, which have long been permitted 
a large degree of self-government.150
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), also inhabited by the Pakhtun,
have even greater freedom from central control than the Provincially Administered
Tribal Areas. Society follows a rigid, highly traditional pattern. The supremacy of
dthe Taliban in nearby Afghanistan has motivatejjthe religious groupings to take the 
law into their own hands and enforce Shari’ah. Various groups, often described 
jointly as “the Pakistan Taliban”, are active in the FATA, one being the Tehrik-i- 
Tulaba in Orakzai Agency, whose declared goal is to fully Islamize first Orakzai, then 
all the FATA, and then the whole of Pakistan, by enforcing a system of Shari’ah, like 
that in use in the Taliban’s Afghanistan. Already in Orakzai, music, television and 
games have been banned.151 On 13 December 1998, a condemned murderer was 
publicly executed in Orakzai Agency on the orders of the “Pakistan Taliban”. Khial 
Ghaffar was shot by his brother and uncle according to the Islamic principles of qisas, 
whereby the closest relative of the murderer must perform the execution. As
147 Nifaz-i-Nizam-i-Shariat [Promulgation o f  the System o f Shari’ah] Regulation, 1999
148 Nizam-i-Adl [System o f (social) Justice] Ordinance, 1999.
149 “Country Focus” Al-Mushir Vol. 41 No. 1 (1999) pp.33-35
150 “Shariah enforced in Malakand, Kohistan” The News (17 January 1999)
151 Hyman op. cit. p.5
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announced by the Pakistan Taliban this was a significant step towards enforcing 
Shari’ah in the FATA.152
Official safeguards for religious minorities
Most discussions of minority rights focus primarily on the process of Islamization, but 
an alternative perspective can be considered, tracing the various ways in which legal 
and constitutional provision for the protection of minorities has been made. Some of 
these have already been discussed, but will be mentioned again below for the sake of 
completeness. The effectiveness or otherwise of these provisions is the subject of this 
study as a whole.
Jinnah and the Constituent Assembly (August 1947)
As described in chapter 2, Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s famous speech as president of the 
Constituent Assembly, a day after the formation of the Constituent Assembly and 
three days before independence, emphatically asserted the fact that religion “has 
nothing to do with the business of the State” and that “there is no discrimination 
between one caste or creed or another”.153 As already noted, one of the first acts of 
the Constituent Assembly, accomplished even before independence, was to set up a 
committee called the Basic Rights Committee to advise it on the fundamental rights of
152 “Murder executed Taleban style in Pakistan” Straits Times (15 December 1998)
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citizens of Pakistan and on matters relating to the minorities.154 Given Jinnah’s lead, 
it was not surprising that this committee recommended the equality of Muslim and 
non-Muslim citizens. Its place was later taken by a Ministry of Minority Affairs, 
created in 1973.
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (December 1948)
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations 
Assembly on 10 December 1948, contains various provisions concerning freedom of 
religion and prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion. The most relevant 
articles are:
Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set 
forth in the Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
property, birth or other status....
Article 18. Everyone has the right to freedom o f thought, 
conscience and religion; this right includes the freedom to change 
his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 
belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
153 Jinnah’s speech was made on 11 August 1947, and quoted in Munir From Jinnah to Zia p.30
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A year earlier, in December 1947, when the United Nations Assembly was discussing 
the draft Declaration, some Muslim delegates (mainly from Arab countries) expressed 
reservations with regard to Article 18, particularly the phrase guaranteeing the right to 
change one’s faith. At the time of voting these delegates abstained. By contrast, the 
leader of the Pakistan delegation, Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, was in favour of 
Article 18 and explained that his delegation approved it on the basis of the Qur’an’s 
teaching in S. 18:29.155 He also argued that what the Qur’an condemned was not 
unbelief but hyprocrisy, and that Islam is a missionary religion and recognizes that 
other faiths also have the right to try to make converts.156 It is relevant to note that Sir 
Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, as an Ahmadi , himself belonged to a religious 
minority which in later years was severely restricted and discriminated against (see 
chapter 5).
The Objectives Resolution (March 1949)
The Objectives Resolution, adopted by the Constituent Assembly in March 1949, 
listed a number of principles on which it was intended a future constitution should be 
based. Amongst these were a guarantee of freedom of belief, faith and worship, 
provision for minorities “freely to profess and practise their religions and develop
154 Choudhury, Golam W. Pakistan: transition from military to civilian rule (Essex: Scorpion 
Publishing Ltd, 1988)p.l20
155 “Let him who will, Believe, and let him Who will, reject [the truth]”
156 “Islam en Godsdienstvrijheid” Begrip No. 45 (May/June 1979) pp. 1-2, cited in Geijbels “Pakistan, 
Islamisation” pp. 105-6
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their cultures”, and that “adequate provision shall be made to safeguard the legitimate 
interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes”.157 
As has been described in chapter 2, the Objectives Resolution was used as a preamble 
to all three constitutions, and was then given added authority by Zia in his 1985 
amendments which made it part of the “substantive provisions” of the constitution 
(Article 2A). The minorities focused their aspirations on the clause stating that they 
should be able “freely to profess and practise their religion”. This phrase was present 
in the 1956 constitution, but absent from the 1962 constitution, though within the 
1962 constitution itself was the guarantee that every citizen had “the right to profess, 
practice (sic) and propagate any religion” (Article 6, principle 7(a)). The original 
wording re-appeared in the 1973 constitution’s preamble but amongst the 1985 
amendments was one which removed the word “freely” from this clause. This caused 
a furore amongst the minorities.158
The Liaquat-Nehru Pact (April 1950)
In the context of deteriorating relations between Pakistan and India in the first quarter 
of 1950, communal disturbances, refugee movement between the two countries, and 
talk of outright war, an agreement was signed on 8 April between the Pakistani prime
157 Full text o f Objectives Resolution is quoted in in Iqbal, Afzal op. cit pp.42-3
158 Even in 1998 this was still a cause of complaint by the minorities, as reported by the Federal 
Minister for Religious and Minorities Affairs, Raja Zafarul Haq, when a delegation o f minorities’ 
leaders met Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to discuss the proposed Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment 
Bill. The representatives of the Hindu community requested four amendments to the bill, including the 
re-insertion o f the word “freely” in the Objectives Resolution. See “Nawaz meets minorities’ 
representatives” Dawn (9 September 1998)
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minister Liaquat Ali Khan and the Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru. It opened 
with an undertaking by both governments that “each shall ensure to the minorities 
throughout its territory complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of religion, a full 
sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honour, freedom of 
movement within each country and freedom of occupation, speech and worship, 
subject to law and morality".159
Constitutions
The growing Islamization of the Constitutions has been traced in chapter 2. However, 
even the latest version retains a number of safeguards -  explicit or implicit - for 
various rights of religious minorities, scattered throughout its text (in addition to the 
Objectives Resolution, discussed above). For example, the freedom of every citizen 
to profess, practise and propagate his faith (Article 20 (a)),160 the right to establish, 
maintain and manage religious institutions (Article 20(b)),161 the equality of all 
citizens before the law (Article 25(1)),162 a safeguard against discrimination in the 
services on the basis of religion (Article 27(1)),163 and a safeguard of “the legitimate
159 Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad The emergence o f Pakistan (Lahore: Research Society o f Pakistan, 
University o f the Punjab, 1996) pp.273-4
160 Butt op. cit. p.l 1
161 ibid. loc. cit.
162 ibid. p. 13. NB. Sections (2) and (3) o f this article imply that the differences under consideration 
are sex and age rather than religion.
163 ibid. p. 14
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rights and interests of minorities, including their due representation in the Federal and 
Provincial services” (Article 36).164
Legislation
Even the Shari’ah Act of 1991 and the Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment Bill of 
1998 contain clauses apparently intended to safeguard the rights of minorities. The 
1991 Act had two sub-sections referring to non-Muslims. One affirmed that nothing 
in the Act should affect their personal laws, religious freedom, traditions, customs or 
way of life,165 the other that nothing in the Act should affect their constitutional 
rights.166 However there was no indication of what would happen in cases involving 
both Muslims and non-Muslims or involving non-Muslims and the state.
The Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment Bill of 1998 contained a clause which ran 
“Nothing in this Article shall affect the personal law, religious freedom, traditions or 
customs of non-Muslims and their status as citizens.”167
164 ibid. p. 16
165 Clause 1(4) Nothing contained in this Act shall affect the personal laws, religious freedom, 
traditions, customs and way o f life o f the non-Muslims.
166 Clause 3(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Judgement o f any court or any 
other law for the time being in force, the present political system, including the Majlis-e-Shoora 
(Parliament) and Provincial Assemblies and the existing system of Government, shall not be 
challenged in any court, including Supreme Court, the Federal Shariat Court or any authority or 
tribunal:
Provided that nothing contained herein shall affect the rights o f the non-Muslims guaranteed by or 
under the Constitution.
167 Text quoted in Dawn (29 August 1998)
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It should be noted that Christians have their own laws for marriage, divorce, 
inheritance, charitable and religious trusts, religious and ecclesiastical property etc.168 
Various definitions of a Christian occur in these laws, making reference to racial 
background. The broadest is simply “Christian”, used in respect of marriage law, 
which includes not only Pakistanis but “Christian British subjects domiciled in 
Pakistan, Anglo-Pakistanis, and “British Pakistani subjects residing in acceding 
States”. Marriage law also refers to “native Christians” who are “the Christian 
descendants of Natives of Indo-Pakistan sub-continent converted to Christianity, as 
well as such converts”. For inheritance law the term “Pakistani Christian” is defined 
as “a native of Pakistan, who is, or in good faith claims to be, of unmixed descent and 
who professes any form of the Christian religion”. It is noted by Joshua that 
professing Christianity is a personal action, unrelated to any action of the Church.169 
The concept of conversion between Islam and Christianity and its legal implications 
for children, marriage and property are dealt with in detail.170
Institutional arrangments
A Minority Affairs Division has been established in the Federal Government to 
safeguard the minorities’ rights, promote their welfare, protect them from 
discrimination, represent them on international bodies and conferences, and 
implement international agreements and commitments on minorities. Under the
168 Manuals o f Christian laws are available, the earliest by P.N. Joshua (1957) and a recent one by S. A. 
Khan (1995). See bibliography.
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auspices of the Minority Affairs Division, a Federal Advisory Council for Minorities 
Affairs has been set up to advise the government. A National Commission for 
Minorities has been constituted by the government, chaired by the Minister for 
Minorities Affairs, to promote the minorities’s welfare and uplift, to assist with the 
grievances of members of the minority communities, and to make recommendations 
to the Government to ensure the fuller participation of the minorities in national life. 
At a more local level, each District of the country has set up a District Minority 
Committee to try to resolve the problems of the minorities.171
Attitudes to dhimmi (minorities), in particular Christians
Joshua Fazl-ud-Din wrote as early as 1949 that the Objectives Resolution had the 
potential to allow Christians to be treated as traditional dhimmi because it made a 
fundamental distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims: the former were to be 
enabled by the State to attain certain ends172 but no equivalent provision was made for 
the latter.173 Eleven years later he still believed that “the problem of the minorities is 
the cornerstone of Pakistan as an Islamic state.”174 He reviews the many
169 Joshua, P.N. A manual o f  laws for Christians (Lahore: Punjab Religious Book Society, 1957) p.7
170 ibid. pp.8-12
171 Fourteenth Periodic Report of States parties due in 1996, Addendum Pakistan, submitted to the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination o f the United Nations (International 
Convention on the Elimination o f all Forms o f Racial Discrimination) CERD/C/299/Add.6 (13 June 
1996) pp.5-6
172 i.e. to “order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings 
and requirements o f Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunna”.
173 Fazl-ud-Din Future o f  Christians pp. 114-5, 120
174 Fazl-ud-Din, Joshua Pakistani Revolution and the Non-Muslims (Lahore: The Punjabi Darbar 
Publishing House, 1960) p.32
130
commitments to the protection of the rights of the minorities made by Jinnah and the 
Muslim League before the formation of Pakistan175 and applauds the economic help 
given to Christians and other non-Muslims by the government.176 He identifies the 
source of the problems of the Christian community as two-fold: firstly, an inequitable 
distribution of land to Christians by the British before independence and, secondly, to 
a lack of “magnanimity” on the part of Muslims. This lack of maganimity he 
attributes to two causes -  the two-nation theory177 and the communalism fostered by 
British rulers before independence. “Under the influence of communalism the 
majority conducts itself with the psychology of a minority which is always cautious 
and careful, even suspicious and disgruntled.”178 Forty years after independence and 
partition, Charles Amjad-Ali argued similarly that the Muslim attitude towards 
minorities in Pakistan was partly determined by "an anachronistic but historically real 
... legacy of Islam and Muslims as being themselves a minority in undivided India". 
This he believes, in conjunction with the communal memory of the "humiliation of 
Islam" at the hands of the Christian West for the previous four centuries, created what 
he calls a "false sense of vulnerability" amongst Muslims so that they feel threatened 
by a Christian minority of only 2.5%.179 Similarly the respected journalist Mubarik 
Ahmed describes as “preposterous” the argument that the non-Muslims of Pakistan, 
few in number, representing many different faiths and mainly very poor, could be 
seen as a threat to the Islamic character of Pakistan.180
175ibid. pp. 11-13
176 ibid. p.30
177 ibid. loc. cit
178 ibid. p.29
179Amjad-Ali, Charles "Islamisation and Christian-Muslim Relations" p.78
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While it is impossible to make definitive evaluations of theories about historical “folk 
memories” and their influence on contemporary attitudes and behaviour, a much 
clearer factor is the Shari’ah’s teaching on dhimmi described above. Some Muslims 
have stated unambiguously that non-Muslims in Pakistan are dhimmi who are given 
protection by the Muslim majority.181 Coming from the other end of the Muslim 
spectrum, Akbar Hussein, writing in the influential Herald magazine, described what 
he saw as an irony in the use of the term “protected” with respect to non-Muslims who 
had no external enemy to threaten them.
But more serious ... is the humiliation non-Muslims suffer every 
day o f their lives. And yet our leaders continuously reassure them 
that they will be protected. But protected from whom? The 
majority i.e. the Muslims? The implication of this assurance is that 
we are some kind of barbarians who pose a constant threat to the 
relatively few non-Muslims who still live in our midst.
... when [Jinnah’s] successors talk about ‘protecting’ the minorities 
they make it seem as though some kind o f endangered species is 
involved -  and in a sense they are not far wrong, judging by the 
way we treat them. Given a free choice and the means to emigrate, 
how many non-Muslims would willingly stay in the Land o f the 
Pure? 182
180 Ahmad, Mubarik “Woes o f the minorities” The News International (11 March 1997)
181 For example, Ismail Qureshi Advocate at the Supreme Court on 8 February 1994, reported in Ali, 
Rafaqat “Government takes ambivalent position” The Muslim (9 February 1994) p. 12
182 Hussein, Akbar “The Silenced Minority” The Herald (January 1992) pp.5-6.
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Another extreme view is suggested by the columnist Riaz Ahmad writing in Dawn, 
who raises the question of whether there is any need now to maintain a distinction 
between the social identity of Muslims and non-Muslims, seeing that practice as 
appropriate only for certain historical contexts when “the cultural and social identity 
of the Muslims” had to be proved.183
Some aspects of the dhimmi traditions are or have been practised in Pakistan either 
officially or unofficially. Christians sometimes write of their perception that they are 
considered second-class citizens,184 a phrase often used to summarize the restrictions 
placed on dhimmi.185 A questionnaire answered by 60 Christians in Faisalabad 
(probably in 1980) revealed that almost 80% felt that Zia’s nizam-e-Mustafa had 
heightened their feeelings of being second-class citizens. It is relevant to point out 
that most of those questioned had the relatively high status job of teachers in a 
secondary school.186 Sometimes Christians assert their rejection of second-class 
status, as for example in the final statement of a seminar on the identity of non- 
Muslim minorities in Pakistan, held in Rawalpindi from 18 to 20 July 1996, which 
contained the pledge: “We do not accept ourselves as second class citizens of this 
country and we do not give anybody a right to impose these categories on us.... We
183 Ahmad, Riaz “Non-Muslims in an Islamic State” Dawn (16 November 1979) p.7
184 David Paul, president o f the Pakistan Christian Community Council writing passionately under the 
title “The Untold and Unknown Christian Sufferings in Pakistan”, speaks o f Christians being “perhaps 
fourth or fifth class citizens” (unpublished paper, probably 1992)
185 It should be noted that none o f the constitutions o f Pakistan have defined the category o f citizen, as 
pointed out by Charles Amjad Ali “Islamisation and Christian-Muslim Relations” p.72
186 Butler, R.A. “Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan and the Church” -  a lecture given to the pastoral 
workers o f the Catholic Archdiocese of Karachi in September 1980, and reproduced in Al-Mushir Vol. 
XXIII No. 2 (Summer 1981) p.49
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shall make concerted efforts to fight against those laws and legislations which have 
reduced our status of full citizens.”187
A review of some of the specific ways in which the traditional restrictions on dhimmi 
are experienced by non-Muslims in Pakistan is given below.
The right of dhimmi to hold high office
Traditionally, dhimmi were prohibited from high political office in an Islamic state so 
that they were not in a position to make major political decisions, nor sit in judgement 
over Muslims or take the initiative in matters concerning Islam.188 Some of the most 
conservative ulema in Pakistan have asserted their belief that dhimmi should be far 
more restricted than that. The Munir Report records Maulana Abul Hasanat Sayyad 
Muhammad Ahmad Qadri’s statement that dhimmis in an Islamic state of Pakistan 
should “have no voice in the making of laws, no right to administer the law and no 
right to hold public offices”.189 Maulana Ahmad Ali held that “they will have no say 
in the making of law and no right to administer the law. Government may, however, 
permit them to hold any public office.”190 Maulana Abdul Haamid Badayuni, 
president of the Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan, asserted that “non-Muslims cannot be 
taken in the army or the judiciary or be appointed as Ministers or to other posts
187 reproduced in AI-Mushir Vol. 38 No. 3 (1996) p. 105
188 Cahen op. cit. p.229
189 Report o f  the Court o f  Inquiry p. 213
190 ibid. loc. cit.
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involving the reposing of confidence.”191 The same view was expressed by Maulana 
Shabbir Ahmed Osmani in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly in the course of the 
debate on the Islamic state.192 Mawdudi held that non-Muslims could hold any 
position except “key-posts” such as those connected with the formulation of state 
policy or the control of “important departments”. Examples he gave of the kind of 
posts which a dhimmi could hold were Accountant-General, Chief Engineer or Post- 
Master General.193 He held that dhimmi could not perform military service in an 
Islamic state.194
In Pakistan, as mentioned above, the constitution forbids non-Muslims from holding 
the posts of President or Prime Minister. They are not forbidden to hold posts in the 
military, judiciary, civil service or police, and have reserved seats in the National 
Assembly (see chapter 4). There is, however, a perception amongst Christians that 
they are in practice excluded from senior posts in the government, civil service, 
medical professions, judiciary, armed forces and academia. Mohan Lai Shahani, a 
Christian lawyer, was appointed Advocate General in Sind in 1996 and then in 1997 
made a judge in the Sind High Court. However, his appointment was not renewed in 
1998, apparently because of complaints that he was a “committed Christian”.195 This 
kind of discrimination with respect to senior posts has been vocalized by, for example, 
Joseph Francis, Secretary General of the Pakistan Christian National Party, and 
Saleem Sylvester, General Secretary of the Christian Organisation for Human
191 ibid. pp.213-4
192 Choudhury, GoLam W. Islam and Modern Muslim World p.55
193 Maududi Rights o f  Non Muslims p.30
194 ibid. pp.22-3
195 “Interview with Mohan Lai Shahani” in Rutherford International Vol. 2 Issue 8 (August 1998) p.2
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Rights,196 David Paul, President of the Pakistan Christian Community Council,197 and 
the participants at a 1996 seminar on “Religious Minorities in Pakistan: Struggle for 
Identity”.198 However, in the past there were greater numbers of Christians in 
positions of high office, for example, Chief Justice Alvin Robert Cornelius199 who 
was largely responsible for the drafting of the 1973 constitution and Air Vice Marshal 
Eric G. Hall, who was Deputy Chief of the Air Staff of the Pakistan Air Force.200 
Some Christians assert that the state appears “embarrassed when it finds itself having 
to acknowledge the national value of a particular person from the minority community 
whose status makes that recognition unavoidable”. For example, Christians felt 
aggrieved that no one from the federal or provincial government attended the funeral 
of Chief Justice Cornelius and that official condolences and obituaries omitted to 
mention his religion,201 and his draft constitution had to be re-worked because 
President Z.I. Bhutto felt that the constitution of a Muslim state should not be written 
by a dhimmi. 202
It is difficult to find accurate recent figures, but according to government figures for 
January 1983, there were no non-Muslims in the two highest grades of federal 
government civil servants. The overall percentage of Christian employees was 1.15%,
196 Sadiq op. cit. p.3; Balchin, Cassandra “Some are less equal than others” Frontier Post (21 
December 1991)
197 Paul, David (President o f the Pakistan Christian Community Council) “Recruitment policy and 
minorities” The Frontier Post (24 January 1992); Paul, David “Do minorities enjoy equal rights” The 
Frontier Post (2 March 1992)
198 Final Statement o f the seminar published in Moghal, Dominic and Jivan, Jennifer (eds.) Religions 
Minorities in Pakistan: Struggle fo r  Identity (Rawalpindi: Christian Study Centre, 1996) p.96
199 Ahmad, Mirza Mahmood “A.R. Cornelius a giant among mortals” The News International (28 
December 1991)
200 Ansari, Athar Hasan “Minorities Contribution to Pakistan” The Muslim (9 July 1998)
201 Amjad-Ali, Christine “Opening the curtains: minorities and women in Pakistan” Al-Mushir Vol. 33 
No. 4 (Autumn 1991) pp. 131-2
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a little lower than the census estimate two years earlier of the percentage of Christians 
in the country’s population (1.6% - a low figure according to many Christians). Of 
the Christian employees, 69.8% were in the lowest three grades and 0.1% in thee 
highest three grades. The comparable figures for Muslims were 28.7% and 0.5%, 
indicating that, if similar levels of education amongst Christians and Muslims are 
assumed, it would appear that Christians are indeed discriminated against with regard 
to the higher posts.203
Similar statistics are available for 1986 for employees of autonomous and semi- 
autonomous corporations / bodies under the administrative control of the federal 
government. These indicate that Christian employees number 1.9%, possibly slightly 
higher than their number in the population as a whole. But, of these, 87.5 % are in the 
lowest three grades and only 0.2% in the highest three grades. The equivalent figures 
for Muslim employees are 66.8% and 0.7%. Here the difference between Muslims 
and Christians is less marked, though it still exists.204
In examining figures such as these, it is essential to know whether Christians are as 
well qualified and well educated as Muslims when seeking to establish whether there 
is discrimination in the allocation of more senior posts. Mano Rumalshah, Church of 
Pakistan Bishop of Peshawar, has quoted the latter set of figures for Christians as
202 Samdani, Zafar “Cornelius, a man always at peace with him self’ Dawn (22 December 1991)
203 Figures from the Government o f Pakistan’s Public Administration Research Centre, reproduced in 
Kennedy, Charles Islamization o f  Laws and Economy: Case Studies on Pakistan (Islamabad: Institute 
of Policy Studies, 1996) p. 178
204 Figures from the Government of Pakistan’s Public Administration Research Centre, reproduced in 
Kennedy op.cit. p. 179
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evidence of the lowly social position of Christians205 without specifying whether this 
is due to discrimination or to lack of qualifications. On the other hand Sardar Feroze 
Khan, a former moderator of the United Presbyterian Church in Pakistan, sees the 
problem as one of poverty leading to lack of educational opportunities and hence a 
lack of better jobs.206 The influential journalist Cassandra Balchin similarly considers 
the problem to be complicated by “the discrimination process which begins from birth 
where Christians are less likely to have access to health and education facilities than 
members of the majority community [i.e. Muslims] of the same socio-economic 
background. Less educated and in poorer health, they are automatically poor 
employment material.”207 Nevertheless, religion can be a conscious factor as in the 
case of Vivian John, an engineer who found many difficulties put in the way of his 
promotion and was told that if he were to embrace Islam all the problems would 
speedily solved.208 It would appear that religious discrimination per se is the primary 
cause, but a lower level of education is the cause in some cases.
Law of evidence
According to the Shari’ah, specific and complex rules govern the system of witnesses 
and the weight to be attached to their evidence at any trial. The number and sex of 
witnesses required to gain a verdict varies according to the severity of the crime.
205 Rumalshah, Mano A New Paradigm: the Future o f  the Christian Community in Pakistan 
(unpublished paper produced by Diocese o f Peshawar, Lent 1996) p.2
206 Khan, Sardar Feroze An overview o f Pakistan and socio-economic-political and religious issues 
facing the Christian community (unpublished paper, probably 1991)
207 Balchin op. cit.
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Thus, under Hanafi law, the school of law which predominates on the Indian 
subcontinent, adultery requires four male witnesses, whereas for other hudood crimes 
and qisas, two male witnesses are sufficient. In other cases, two male witnesses or 
one male and two female witnesses will be acceptable.209 An exception is matters 
about which men should not be required to make an inspection, such as virginity and 
childbirth. For these the evidence of a single woman is permitted 210 These witnesses 
must be adult Muslims, not disqualified by virtue of insanity, servitude or any other of 
a number of possible factors.211 Non-Muslims, in Hanafi law, may give evidence for 
and against each other, though in the other schools of law the evidence of a non- 
Muslim is never permitted.212
As described above, Zia promulgated a new law of evidence (<qanoon-e-shadat) in 
October 1984, which replaced the existing law, dating from 1872, which he - and 
many others - had condemned as un-Islamic.213 Despite a strongly Islamic draft 
produced by the Council of Islamic Ideology, the final version of the new law hardly 
differed from the 1872 law, except in replacing the statement “No particular number 
of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact” with a requirement 
for two men, or one man and two women, to attest documents “pertaining to financial 
or future obligations” (Article 17). The same section also stipulated that “the
208 ibid.
209 Mughal, Dr Justice Munir Ahmad writing in the foreword to Anwarullah The Islamic Law o f  
Evidence (Lahore: Research Cell, Dyal Singh Trust Library, 1992) pp.4-5; The Hedaya Vol. II Book 
XXI pp.666-7
210 Mughal, Dr Justice Munir Ahmad op. cit. p.5; The Hedaya Vol. II Book XXI p.668
211 Anwarullah op. cit. pp.671-2
212 ibid. pp.690-1
213 Kennedy op. cit. p.39; Tanzil-ur-Rahman, Tanzil-ur- “Some Aspects o f the Islamic Law o f  
Evidence” All Pakistan Legal Decisions Vol. XXXV (1983) 199-207
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competence of a person to testify and the number of witnesses required in any case 
shall be determined in accordance with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the 
Holy Quran and Sunna ”.214 While Kennedy claimed that the new law made virtually 
no difference,215 many women were indignant,216 and Benazir Bhutto called for its 
repeal.217
For non-Muslims the significant aspect of the law was the freedom given to courts to 
decide whether any individual was a competent witness according to the Qur’an and 
Sunnah, specified not only in Article 17 but also in Article 3. The possibility of 
different courts coming to different conclusions on this question was envisaged by 
various lawyers,218 but non-Muslims feared that they would be deemed inadmissible 
as witnesses in cases involving Muslims, in accordance with Hanafi law described 
above.
Worse still for non-Muslims, some of the hudood ordinances prohibited non-Muslim 
witnesses in cases involving a Muslim defendant. For example “at least two Muslim 
adult male witnesses” are required when a Muslim is accused of theft,219 and “at least 
four Muslim adult male witnesses” when a Muslim is accused of adultery.220 This 
clear discrimination against non-Muslims, following closely the requirements of the
214 Article 17 o f the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order (1984) is quoted in full in Mehdi, Rubya op. cit. p.149
215 Kennedy op. cit. pp.41,76
216 for example, Mehdi, Rubya op. cit. p. 148; Patel, Rashida hlamization o f  laws in Pakistan? 
(Karachi: Faiza Publishers, 1986) p. 81
217 Kennedy op. cit. p.76
218 M ehdi, Rubya op. cit. p. 148; Patel op cit. p.80; Changez, Justice (retd.) A.R. “The Qanune- 
Shahadat, 1984” Pakistan Times (8 November 1984)
219 Offences against property (Enforcement o f Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979) section 7 (b) 
reproduced in All Pakistan Legal Decisions Vol. XXXI (1979) 44-51
220 offence o f zina (enforcement o f hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979) section 8 (b) reproduced in All 
Pakistan Legal Decisions Vol. XXXI (1979) 51-56
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Shari’ah concerning dhimmi, is a matter about which Christians have voiced 
protests,221 just as women have protested the discrimination they suffer from the same 
legislation.
Restrictions and attacks on places of worship
Early Muslim jurists were almost unanimous in interpreting in a very restricted sense 
the undertaking made on behalf of Muslims to uphold the places of worship of non- 
Muslims. This undertaking was generally considered to apply only to buildings 
which were already in existence at the time of advent of the Islamic power, with the 
result that new buildings were forbidden (at least in and near Muslim centres of 
population).222 This aspect of dhimmi status is a major problem in certain other 
Muslim countries today, notably Egypt and lately in Indonesia, but it is less prominent 
in Pakistan. Nevertheless difficulties do occur in erecting new churches,223 and also 
in the closely linked problem of establishing new Christian cemeteries. The Bishop of 
Lahore, Alexander John Malik, appealed in 1991 for land to be allotted for new 
churches and cemeteries.224 Seven years later, the Bishop of Peshawar reported that it 
was becoming increasingly difficult to get permission to build new churches.225 In
221 for example, Bouma “Pakistani’s Islamization” p.21
222 Cahen op. cit., p.228
223 Sadiq op. cit. p.3
224 Malik, Alexander John (Bishop o f Lahore) Welcoming speech at the 31st session o f the Church o f  
Pakistan Lahore Diocesan Council (24 October 1991)
225 Rumalshah, Munawar “Being a Christian in Pakistan” the testimony o f  Bisho Munawar (Mano) 
Rumalshah o f the Diocese of Peshawar, Pakistan before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 17 
June 1998, reproduced in Sheridan, Sharon Hear the cry! Standing in solidarity with the suffering
141
some parts of the country, such as the North West Frontier Province, overt church 
buildings are not allowed at all. Churches can only be erected if they are described as 
“community centres”.226
Another kind of problem relating to church property is exemplified by a small plot of 
land in the centre of Rawalpindi on which a priest’s house stood. The land had been 
leased to the church by the British army in 1908 under a perpetual lease yet was sold 
improperly in 1989 and the house demolished by the purchaser. In this case the 
authorities have now responded to Christian protests by taking steps to facilitate the 
reversion of the land to the church, including the posting of army guards to protect the 
site.227
Separate from official restrictions, but related to the issue of Islamic attitudes to places 
of worship is the phenomenon of communal violence. Christian buildings are liable 
to be attacked228 and this has increased in recent years. The Church of Pakistan’s 
Diocese of Lahore had many difficulties with erecting a building in Islamabad. Land 
was allocated and work began on a new building in 1986, but soon met opposition 
because of its proximity to mosques. In January 1989 construction re-started, but 
within weeks was forcibly halted after angry Muslim students attacked the site.
Further attempts to continue the construction were opposed by the police who feared
Church Report o f a consultation organised by the Episcopal Council for Global Mission, New York, 
April 1998 (New York: Anglican and Global Relations, 1998) p.46
226 Rumalshah “Hear the cry” p.42; Sneddon, Sandy, a missionary with the Church o f Scotland Board 
o f World Mission who is Secretary of the Development Board o f Peshawar Diocese, interview with the 
author (9 August 1999)
227 “Church claims its land sold illegally” Dawn (4 September 1998); “Property being restored to 
church” Dawn (18 September 1998)
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more violence. A protest march resulted in Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto using her 
influence to have an alternative site offered.229 In all, the building work had to be 
begun three times before the church was finally built.230 More recently, existing 
Christian buildings such as churches and schools have been attacked in riots, for 
example, those in Shanti Nagar and Khanewal in February 1997 (see chapter 5). On 
28 January 1998 a United Presbyterian pastor, Rev. Noor Alam, was stabbed to death, 
apparently by Muslims who believed him determined to erect a church building in 
Sheikhupura, near Lahore. The partly finished building had been demolished by a 
Muslim mob on 5 December 1997, and threats issued against the pastor should he 
plan to re-build it.231 On 23 December 1997 a Catholic church in Faisalabad was 
attacked by Muslims, who pulled down the crucifix and Bible and removed the 
microphone system.232
It is important to note that the issues are not only practical but also psychological.
The lack of church buildings and cemeteries is inconvenient at the very least for the 
Christian community, and their destruction is expensive. But also there is a powerful 
symbolism in the visible presence of a Christian community through its buildings. 
Lack of a visible presence -  especially its violent removal - generates feelings of 
insecurity and diffidence for the community.
228 Sadiq (op. cit.) p.3
229 “Foundation only in Islamabad” Berita NECF (April/May 1990)
230 Rumalshah “Being a Christian in Pakistan” p.46
231 “Pakistani pastor murdered in church land dispute ” Compass Direct Flash News (Santa Ana: 
Compass Direct, 4 February 1998, an electronic mail service)
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Low social status
Many of the restrictions imposed on dhimmi at different periods of Islamic history 
served to reinforce visibly their inferior position in society. Such rules included 
sometimes the part or side of the road on which they could walk, the height of their 
buildings and doorways and the kind of animal they were permitted to ride.
While no such rules exist in Pakistan, there is a widespread understanding that 
Christians are rightly poor and hold a lowly position in society. A newspaper 
cartoon233 depicts a Christian by showing him wearing patched clothes and carrying a 
broom, thus signifying his poverty and his dirty and despised job as a sweeper. 
Christians themselves complain of their resourcelessness and powerlessness.234 Large 
numbers are indeed “sweepers” cleaning the streets and sewers, a job not only 
unpleasant and dangerous, but held in great contempt by Muslims (though there are 
small numbers of Muslim sweepers). The majority of bonded labourers (effectively 
slaves) are Christians (see chapter 4).
The situation is not uniform, and some Christians are keen to point out that members 
of the Christian community are in respected positions within the professions,235 while 
the percentage of Christians who are actually sweepers has decreased in the last 
twenty years from 70% to 40%.236 Nevertheless there is undoubtedly a perception
232 ibid.
233 The Friday Times (29 May - 4 June 1998)
234 For example, Khan, Sardar Feroze op. cit. pp.7-8; Rumalshah A New Paradigm p.2
235 for example, Nazir-Ali Pakistani Christians p.2
236 Moghal, Dominic Changing Realities and Churches’ Response (Rawalpindi: Christian Study 
Centre, 1997)
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amongst Christians that they are generally considered inferior by Muslims, in keeping 
with the dhimmVs status as a second class citizen. A powerful comment made by a 
Muslim lawyer in 1992 ran: “Christians must realize that they have become the 
‘niggers’ of this country, even though the cottonfield chores may have been replaced 
by that of sweeping the city streets.”237
Some Christians attempt to raise their social status by changing their family name to 
that of a higher and more prestigious caste (The family name and the place of origin -  
which must conform with each other in order to convince -  are very important in 
determining social status in Pakistan, more so than, for example, accent.) The desire 
to be dissociated from low castes can sometimes lead to a decrease or absence of the 
biradari system, whereby members of a group of inter-related extended families (the 
biradari, somewhat akin to a clan) take responsibility for each other’s well being. 
Christians who are unwilling to admit to their low caste origins may refuse to take on 
this responsibility for members of their biradari. 238
237 Malick, Mohammad “Minorities large and small” Horizons (The Frontier Post magazine) (7 
January 1992) pp.8-9
238 Ismail, Zafar, interview with the author (December 1996)
M arriage regulations
The Shari’ah permits a Muslim man to marry a dhimmi woman but forbids a dhimmi 
man to marry a Muslim woman.239 One consequence of this is that if the female 
partner of a dhimmi marriage converts to Islam, her husband must either convert also 
or allow the marriage to be dissolved. This ruling has been affirmed several times in 
Pakistani courts, for example, the case of Mukhtaran Bibi in the Lahore High Court in 
1992240 and the case of Safia Bibi, also in the Lahore High Court, in 1996.241 In both 
cases the marriage * . was dissolved because the wife had
embraced Islam. The existence of this law is the basis of the Muslim practice of 
abducting Christian women, forcibly converting them to Islam and then marrying 
them (see chapter 4).
Jizya
The primary mark of dhimmi, the payment of jizya, has never been enforced in 
Pakistan, though the possibility was raised by Fazl-ud-Din in 1949 with respect to 
possible future repercussions of the Objectives Resolution.242 Some Christians 
expected it as a result of Zia’s Islamization process,243 but still it did not come. The 
introduction of jizya was, however, cited by one commentator as an example of the
239 Cahen op. cit. p.228
240 Judgement sheet in the Lahore High Court at Lahore, Judicial Department on appeal no. 4835-B/ o f  
1991.
241 “Convert Muslim woman’s marriage with non-believer stands dissolved” Pakistan Times (10 
February 1996)
242 Fazl-ud-Din Future o f Christians p. 120
243 Butler op. cit. p.48
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kind of changes which could be introduced on the word of a single high court judge as 
part of the federal government’s obligation “to prescribe what is right and to forbid 
what is wrong” according to the proposed fifteenth amendment to the constitution.244 
The same fear was expressed by the Pakistan Christian Action Forum at a meeting to 
protest about the draft fifteenth amendment on 2 September 1998 245 It is certainly 
likely to be considered an obvious omission to be rectified in the eyes of religious 
conservatives wishing to re-create a traditional Islamic state in Pakistan. The lawyer 
Naheed Jehan Lodhi argues that jizya  would bring harmony between Muslims and 
Christians and goes so far as to suggest that therefore “the possibility exists that the 
ruling class of Pakistan attempted to abrogate the jizya tax to selectively victimise the 
Christian minority of Pakistan”.246
Conclusion
A process of Islamization of the laws and constitution of Pakistan has taken place, 
which has served to negate the ideals of equality between Muslims and non-Muslims 
with which Jinnah founded the nation. This began as early as 1949 with the 
Objectives Resolution and proceeded more or less without interruption though at 
varying rates. Exceptions to the direction of change were Ayub Khan’s liberal
244 Raja, Salman Akram “A blow to the federal structure o f the state” The News International (12 
September 1998)
245 “Christians for withdrawal of 15th amendment” The News (3 September 1998)
246 Lodhi, Naheed Jehan Pakistan: Religious Minorities and Adultery (Muslim laws) (Lahore, date 
unknown) p.5
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constitution of 1962, which was reversed within two years, and the 1997 amendment 
to the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance.
The gradual Islamization has inevitably eroded the status of non-Muslims to some 
extent, despite the safeguards ostensibly built into each new constitution or relevant 
piece of legislation. For if the Shari’ah deems non-Muslims to be dhimmi, different 
from and inferior to Muslims (albeit protected), then each step towards greater 
enforcement of the Shari’ah brings as an automatic “by-product" a lessening in status 
of non-Muslims. This may not always involve practical changes in the law, but will at 
the very least take place simply by reinforcing in the mind of Pakistani Muslims the 
place of the Shari’ah in their faith, including its teaching on the rights and status of 
dhimmi in comparison with the rights and status of Muslims. An indication that this 
has been occurring in Pakistan can be seen in the increasing number of incidents of 
anti-Christian violence against both buildings and individuals in recent years; while 
this violence has been illegal, its growth has accompanied the growth of legal 
Islamization. The pre-meditated murder of nine Christians, including children and 
babies, in Nowshera, near Peshawar, on 18 November 1998 was linked by both the 
Bishop of Peshawar247 and leader of the opposition Benazir Bhutto248 to a change in 
Muslim attitudes due to the Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment Bill going through 
Parliament at the time.249 Other possible factors contributing to the growing anti- 
Christian violence include a perceived increase in “Islamophobia” in the “Christian”
247 Bishop Mano Rumalshah, interview with the author (25 November 1998)
248 “Murderers claim dead Christians were using black magic” The Guardian (20 November 1998)
249 The fact that these murders were later discovered to be non-sectarian does not invalidate the 
significance o f the comments by the Bishop and Mrs Bhutto which are still indicative o f the general 
“climate of opinion”.
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West and reaction against Pakistani Christians’ demands for the abolition of the 
blasphemy law.
It can be argued that a Muslim-majority state, even if democratic in form, can never 
result in permanent equality for non-Muslims. Sooner or later steps will be taken to 
alter the status of non-Muslims to be more in line with the Shari’ah’s teaching. 
Democracy will not hinder this process unless a majority of citizens embrace 
democratic principles to such an extent as to give them pre-eminence over Islam. 
Rather, democracy will provide an easy mechanism for the Muslim majority 
constitutionally to enforce their will with regard to non-Muslims. Wilfred Cantwell 
Smith reasons th a t:
... the rights accorded to any minority or other non-powerful group 
in any state depend on the ideal o f those in power... A state may be 
democratic in form but unless it is democratic also in ideal, unless 
the majority of its citizens are actively loyal to the transcendent 
principles of democracy, recognizing the ideal validity o f every 
man’s status as a man, then the arithmetic minority has, through the 
democratic form, no right at all... Many outsiders and several 
Pakistani Christians and Hindus ... have stated or supposed that 
these minorities would be better off if Pakistan was simply a 
“Democratic” instead o f an Islamic state. This is irresponsibly 
glib. For if Muslims do in fact treat non-Muslims unjustly then a 
democratic framework (without the Greco-Roman and religious 
tradition o f democracy to vitalize it) would merely give them as a
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majority the constitutional authority for doing so without let or 
hindrance.250
It is therefore not surprising to find that the articles and clauses in constitutions and 
laws considered above which ostensibly safeguard the rights of non-Muslim citizens, 
are not invariably effective. All can be relativized if the Shari’ah is given precedence. 
A phrase like “all citizens” begs the question as to whether non-Muslims are full 
citizens of an Islamic state. Similarly, the phrase “legitimate rights of a minority” 
raises the question as to what are the “legitimate rights” of non-Muslims according to 
the Shari’ah -  not necessarily the same as the “legitimate rights” of Muslims.
Provisos to safeguards with wordings such as “subject to law, public order and 
morality” have been used in other Muslim countries, for example Egypt, to suppress 
religious freedom. A common argument by the authorities in those countries is that 
conversion from Islam to Christianity is going to cause such outrage in the 
community that the convert must be placed in detention in order to preserve public 
order. It is for this reason that non-Muslims and human rights bodies have been so 
concerned about the Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment Bill to make the Shari’ah 
supreme in constitution as well as in law.
Other -  non-Islamic - reasons for discrimination against Christians in Pakistan will be 
considered in the next chapter.




De facto discrimination against Christians
Introduction
The previous chapter examined the extent to which the traditional restrictions on dhimmi 
are practised (or not) against Christians in Pakistan, whether officially according to laws 
and constitution, or unofficially by virtue of individual and community actions. But there 
are other forms of discrimination that Pakistani Christians encounter which are not 
included within Islamic teaching on dhimmi. These include the two issues of greatest 
concern to Christians, namely, the “blasphemy law” which is unique to Pakistan (see 
chapter 5) and the system of separate electorates (see below).
The most significant single reason for discrimination not sanctioned by the Shari’ah 
appears to be the resilience of the Hindu caste system. This has remained entrenched in 
the community consciousness of Pakistanis in Punjab and Sind (the two provinces where 
most of the Christians live), despite the conversion of almost all from Hinduism to Islam
many generations ago.1 As seen in chapter 1, the vast majority of Pakistani Christians,
♦ 2  • •wherever they may now be living, are Punjabis, and it is amongst Punjabis that the caste
■j # .
system remains particularly strong. The great majority of Punjabi Christians are 
descendants of converted Chuhras, who had occupied the lowest place in the caste
1 Streefland op. cit. p. 16
2 Moghal states that 98% of Pakistani Christians are ethnically Punjabis, though many do not live in the 
Punjab. See Moghal, Dominic Human Person in Punjabi Society: a tension between religion and culture 
(Rawalpindi: Christian Study Centre, 1997) p. 10
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system, being in fact scheduled castes. Formerly known as outcastes, the scheduled 
castes were without any caste at all and therefore without any status at all. The stigma of 
impurity they carried had three distinct origins -  the nature of the work they did, the fact 
that they ate carrion (strongly prohibited in both Islam and Hinduism) and their very dark 
skins.4 This social stigma has by and large remained with the Christian descendants of 
the Chuhras. This is not only from other Punjabis, but also from non-Punjabi Muslims in 
Pakistan. According to Vemmelund, it is their low social status as sweepers which is the 
primary reason for the isolation of Punjabi Christians in the North West Frontier Province 
from the Pathan Muslims who constitute the majority in the province.5 It is important to 
note that the social stigma of the Chuhra-descent Christians appears to have spread to 
their co-religionists of higher caste status, for many Christians report examples of 
discrimination on this basis irrespective of their actual caste background.6
Discrimination which apparently originates from the remnants of the caste system is 
rationalized by the Muslims who practise it as a religious duty against non-Muslims. In 
other words, a religious pretext is used to justify a social phenomenon which existed 
centuries ago when Punjabis were all Hindus, rather than (mainly) Muslims and 
Christians. The link is the concept of purity and impurity within Pakistani Islam. One of 
the causes of impurity, which would prevent a Muslim from praying because of his
3 Moghal discusses the caste system in Punjabi culture in Human Person in Punjabi Society pp.43-9
4 Streefland op. cit. pp.3-4
5 Vemmelund op. cit. p.l 18
6 For example, the experience o f Christian journalist Noshin Jacob and her sister and Christian friends, 
described in her article “Stranger at home” The News (24 July 1997). See also Streefland op. cit. pp.21-22
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defilement, is touching certain objects such as excrement. Those, such as many of the 
Chuhras, whose work involves doing this, therefore, make themselves “impure”.7
A second important reason for what might be termed “non-dhimmi discrimination” 
appears to lie in the political consciousness. The condemnation of Christians by village
O
mullahs in Friday prayers increases with events such as the Gulf War of 1990-1 
(perceived by many Muslims as a Westem-Islamic conflict). Similarly the occupation of 
the Ka’ba by a mixed group of Sudanese and others in November 1979 (considered by 
many Pakistanis to be an Anglo-American conspiracy) resulted in unusual anti-Christian 
violence such as an attack on a Christian hostel.9 This phenomemon might be compared 
with the hardening attitude of Muhammad (and his successors the Caliphs) towards 
Christians as the military conflict with the Byzantine Empire developed (see chapter 3).
A distinct but similar third factor could be termed the side-effects of the Islamization 
process. It can be postulated that, as the laws and constitution become increasingly 
Islamic and therefore increasingly anti-Christian, public attitudes evolve in response to 
become less tolerant of minorities. Attitudes may be expressed in actions, and thus more 
discriminatory behaviour towards Christians and other non-Muslims occurs. (This can 
also apply to dhimmi-typt discrimination, as discussed in chapter 3.)
7 Streefland op. cit. pp. 2-3; Dumont, Louis Homo Hierarchicus: the caste system and its implications 
translated from the French by Mark Sainsbury, Louis Dumont and Basia Gulati (London, 1970) p.47
8 Ahsan, Ijaz “A religious civil war” The Nation (2 March 1997)
9 Ismail, Zafar, who was living in the hostel which was attacked, interview with the author (18 February 
1999)
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A fourth important factor is the jajmani system.10 This term refers to the land-ownership
and economics of rural areas, which is based on the power of small numbers of
zamindars who own most of the land.11 Often translated “landlord”, zamindars are
immensely powerful local figures, wielding huge influence in local society and politics in
rural areas, in a system somewhat akin to Europe’s medieval feudal system. As the
local patron, the zamindar can confidently rely on being elected to the National Assembly
should he choose to stand, which almost all of them do. His word carries great weight.
Not only the local agricultural labourers but also the local mullah and local police are
effectively under his control. There is little possibility of getting a job in the civil service
without a safarish (recommendation) from the local Member of the National Assembly
(MNA), i.e. the local zamindar. Until partition, the majority of Christians lived in rural
areas and, being mostly landless, were thus at the mercy of the local zamindar
11economically and socially.
While the jajmani system is not intrinsically biased against non-Muslims, in combination 
with the separate electorates system it adds greatly to the difficulties of Christians and 
other minorities in rural contexts. There is no incentive for a zamindar to assist non- 
Muslims. Thus, some Christians feel that zamindars could have prevented the 
development of the practice of misusing the blasphemy law against Christians (see 
chapter 5), if they had chosen to speak out against such injustice in the early days after
10 Campbell op. cit. p. 19
11 Khan, Mahmood Hasan Underdevelopment and Agrarian Structure in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard 
Publications Ltd, 1994) pp. 134-138. Moghal states that in Punjab 70% o f the cultivated land is owned by 
15% o f  the people, who are zamindars. See Moghal Human Person in Punjabi Society p.9
12 Even Jinnah did not dare to antagonize the zamindars -see Khan, Mahmood Hasan op. cit. p. 139
13 Comfort op. cit. p.6
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the introduction of the legislation. As will be seen below, the immigration of Muslims 
from India at partition forced many rural Christians into the cities. While this enabled 
them to escape the jajmani system, it left them with little option but to do sweeping jobs, 
a lowlier position in society than agricultural work.
Having considered possible general reasons for “non-dhimmi discrimination”, some of 
the more common ways in which this occurs will now be surveyed. Documentation on 
this kind of discrimination is rather rare, but records of various individual cases have 
been collected by the National Commission for Justice and Peace (NCJP). This body was 
established by the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Pakistan in 1984, as the process of 
Islamization gathered speed.
Separate electorates
The concept of separate electorates for religious minorities originated amongst Muslims 
in India before partition, and was practised under British rule from 1909 until partition in 
1947. After the formation of Pakistan, some Islamic parties continued to press for 
separate electorates for the purpose of preserving the Islamic character of the state.14 The 
1956 constitution permitted the National and Provincial Assemblies to decide whether
14 See for example Maudoodi, Syed Abul A ’la “Psychological Basis o f Separate Electorates” originally 
published in The Punjabi Darbar (Lahore, date not given) and later reproduced in Grover, Verinder and 
Arora, Ranjana (eds f  Pakistan Fifty Years o f  Independence (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 
1997)
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elections would be held with a joint electorate or separate electorates (Article 145).15 The 
four provinces of West Pakistan decided in favour of separate electorates, but East 
Pakistan (now Bangladesh) decided to have a joint electorate. However, no elections 
were ever held under the 1956 Constitution. In the 1962 constitution, certain seats were 
to be reserved for women (Article 162)16 but there were no distinctions made on religious 
grounds. The 1973 constitution specified direct elections by a joint electorate with no 
special treatment on the basis of sex or religion. There were, however, in the National 
Assembly ten extra seats reserved for women and six extra seats reserved for religious 
minorities, which were to be filled by indirect election i.e. election by the directly elected 
members of the Assembly (Article 51).17 Interestingly, there was a time limit on the 
special representation of women of ten years or two general elections, but no time limit 
for the special representation of religious minorities. At least some Christians interpreted 
this as an indication that women were expected soon to become integrated into society to 
such a degree that they would cease to need special representation, whereas apparently
1 Q
non-Muslims were not expected to do so.
The system of separate electorates, so much resented by Christians and other minorities, 
was introduced by Zia in 197819 and ratified by means of the Eighth Constitutional 
Amendment in 1985 (see chapter 3). In this system, the minorities were not permitted to 
vote with their Muslim neighbours for someone to represent their local constituency, but
15 Reproduced in Government o f Pakistan Ministry of Law The Constitution o f  the Islamic Republic o f  
Pakistan p. 43
16 Reproduced in Mahmood, Safdar op. cit. p. 560
17 Reproduced in Butt op. cit. pp.25-7
18 Amjad-Ali, Christine “Opening the Curtains” p. 135
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had to vote from a list of candidates of their own religion, each of whom represented the 
whole country. Ten seats are reserved for the minorities: four for Christians, four for 
Hindus, one for Ahmadiyyas and one for the Sikh, Buddhist and Parsi communities and 
any other non-Muslims (Article 51(2A)). In the Provincial Assemblies, seats are 
similarly reserved for the minorities, the figures varying in the different provinces in 
proportion to the populations of the various non-Muslim communities in each province
91 99(Article 106 (3)). There are no seats reserved for minorities in the Senate.
Before the introduction of this system, some Christians had been actively seeking it. 
Joshua Fazl-ud-Din considered that non-Muslim minorities could only enjoy religious 
freedom and their constitutional rights if their elected representatives could “reflect their 
deepest thoughts and feelings in their entirety and utmost sublimity”. (Likewise, he felt 
that Muslims should not be represented by non-Muslims.)23 Others called for separate 
electorates on the basis that it would at least guarantee them some co-religionists in the 
National Assembly whereas in the joint electorate system there were unlikely to be any 
Christians elected.24 However, once the system had been introduced and put into practice
19 Election Commission (Amendment) Order, 1978, issued by President Zia on 24 September 1978 (text 
reproduced in Pakistan Times 27 September 1978)
20 The history o f the introduction of separate electorates is reviewed in various places, for example, Amjad- 
Ali, Christine “Opening the curtains” pp. 134-6
21 Reproduced in Butt op. cit. p. 65
22 The lack o f minority senators is very rarely discussed, but one example is a letter from F. Ali o f Karachi 
published in The Muslim (25 March 1996). This letter expresses warm appreciation on behalf o f the 
minorities to Benazir Bhutto’s government for their proposal o f a dual voting system for minorities, but 
raises the fact o f the complete absence of minority representation in the Senate, since the current 
constitution came into effect. The writer ends by asking the Prime Minister, in the light o f forthcoming 
Senate elections, not to “miss this opportunity to set right a wrong being done for the last 23 years.”.
23 Fazl-ud-Din “Separate Electorates” p. 176
24 For example, the Christian Democratic Party, as referred to in “Separate electorate demands criticised” in 
The Pakistan Times (18 April 1977). See also Christians welcoming the new system when introduced in 
“Minorities wanted separate electorates” The Pakistan Times (2 January 1979); “Masihi leader hails
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(which occurred for the first time in February 1985, when Pakistan’s third general 
election was held) the disadvantages soon became manifest. At this election there were 
26 Christian candidates, each of whom had to canvass the whole country for votes. They 
were assisted in this by government permission to spend twice as much on campaigning 
as Muslim candidates could and by some free airtime on radio and TV. Newspapers, 
especially The Pakistan Times, reported the activities of minority candidates. 
Nevertheless it was an immense undertaking. Non-Muslim voters also had practical 
difficulties, as the Christian candidates could not provide polling station workers to assist 
them and the Muslim staff were too busy with Muslims to give any help to non- 
Muslims.25
But these practical difficulties were overshadowed by the long-term repercussions of the 
fact that the non-Muslim vote was of no value to Muslim MNAs representing a local 
constituency. So the non-Muslim opinion could be safely disregarded by the local 
zamindars and other Muslims with political power. Thus there was no incentive for these 
influential Muslims to treat their Christian workers well.
The powerlessness and loss of political weight which resulted from the separate 
electorates system has been described recently by one Christian leader as turning
Of* 97Christians into “political dhimmi” and earlier by others as “political death”. The
separate electorates” The Pakistan Times (3 January 1979); “Separate electorate welcomed” The Pakistan 
Times (22 February 1979)
25 Kraan, J.D. “News from the country” Al-Mushir Vol. XXVII No. 1 (Spring 1985) pp.60-63
26 Ismail, Zafar, international director o f the Open Theological College, Lahore, interview with the author 
(16 September 1998)
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system was condemned by Benazir Bhutto on the grounds that it had “isolated minorities 
from the mainstream of the national politics”. In the words of Asma Jehangir of the 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, speaking of the brick-kiln workers, who are 
mainly Christian:
Their owners beat them severely. They would not treat Muslims like 
this, their only concern is votes. The Christians complain that no MNA 
or member o f the local bodies is concerned about them. Even the 
police do not listen to them... These Christian brothers think they 
would have been better off making their Muslim brother their 
representative, at least he would have paid attention to their needs.29
Another example is given by the National Commission for Justice and Peace (NCJP) 
which reported the case of Benyamin Masih, a Christian school-teacher who received no 
salary for the entire four years (1993-1997) of his service in various government primary 
schools. The reason given was that his school exam marks were not high enough, though 
Benyamin Masih claimed to know 30 Muslims in his district with the same marks who 
were in the same kind of job. He held the separate electorates system responsible for the 
discrimination he suffered.30
27 Joseph Francis (General Secretary o f the Pakistan Christian National Party) and Saleem Sylvester 
(General Secretary o f the Christian Organisation for Human Rights), quoted in Sadiq op. cit. p.3
28 The Frontier Post (2 September 1993)
29 Jehangir, Asma “Minorities and Women in Pakistan” pp. 129-30
30 Human Rights Monitor 97: a report on the religious minorities in Pakistan (Lahore: National 
Commission for Justice and Peace, Catholic Bishops’ Conference o f Pakistan, 1998) p. 12
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A further shortcoming of the separate electorates system is that successful candidates for 
the minorities are virtually certain to come from areas that have large minority 
populations. This is a natural result of the propensity of people to vote for a candidate 
known to them or known to come from the same area, and a system in which the four 
candidates with the highest number of votes are elected. The candidates with the highest 
number of votes will always be those who come from the areas of densest Christian 
population. In the National Assembly elections in 1985,31 1988 and 1990 all the 
Christian MNAs came from the densely Christian areas of the Punjab. When Christians 
in other parts of the country faced problems which needed the help of a MNA, they had 
to travel large distances to meet their MNA or even their MPA (Member of the Provincial 
Assembly).32 Furthermore, the few votes of Christians in areas of sparse Christian 
population are of little value to Christian candidates who may concentrate all their 
attention on the populous Christian community of central Punjab with little detrimental 
effect on their chances of being elected. Thus a Christian in the North West Frontier 
Province, for example, finds that his vote is of negligible value to the national Christian 
candidate and none at all to the local Muslim candidate, so neither is likely to be 
interested in his affairs or well-being.
Many church leaders have protested against the separate electorates system. These 
include Roman Catholic leaders Bishop Paul Bonaventure, Bishop Armando Trinidade 
(Vice-Chairman of the Roman Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Pakistan) and Fr James
31 Kraan “News from the country” p.62
32 Mendes, Bonnie “The Separate Electorate: Election 90” Focus Vol. 12 No. 4 (1990)
33 Mehdi, Tabir “Polls Apart” Newsline (January 1997) p. 104
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Chanjan (Major Superior of the Dominicans in Pakistan), and Protestants Bishop John 
Alexander Malik (Church of Pakistan Bishop of Lahore), Col. Farman Masih (of the 
Salvation Army and Chairman of the National Council of Churches of Pakistan), 
Chaudhry Naeem Shakir (Chairman of the Justice and Peace Committee), leaders of the 
YWCA, and many others.34
In 1988, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan launched a signature campaign 
against separate electorates.35 In 1993, as the next election approached, a spate of 
protests was voiced by Christian leaders/6 The Justice and Peace Commission of the 
Major Religious Superiors of the Roman Catholic Church called for a boycott of
37elections by minorities as long as they were held under the separate electorates system. 
Although this call generated substantial publicity in the national media, when the 
elections were held in October that year the figures indicated that it had made little 
difference to the number of minority voters. Very likely this was at least in part due to 
the Protestant attitude, which, led by the National Council of Churches of Pakistan, was
o o
to participate in the elections but “under protest”.
The reason the Protestant leaders did not want to urge their followers to boycott the 
elections is that they were fielding a Christian candidate in the Provincial Assembly 
elections as a test case. While the constitution clearly prohibited non-Muslims from
34 Amjad-Ali, Christine “News from the country” Al-Mushir Vol. 35 No. 3 (Winter 1993) p.98
35 The Christian Voice (23 October 1988)
36 See for example “Church leaders demand joint electoral system” The Muslim (23 September 1993)
37 Justice and Peace Commission (of Major Superiors of Pakistan) News Letter Vol. 1 No. 1 (September 
1993)
38 Amjad-Ali, Christine “News from the country” p.99
161
standing as candidates in the National Assembly (Article 51(1)), there was no specific 
constitutional prohibition on non-Muslims standing for election to a Provincial Assembly 
(Article 106 (1)). The Awami Jamoori Party nominated as its candidate for the Punjab 
Assembly (constituency PP-126 in Lahore) a Christian, Chaudhry Naeem Shakir, a 
lawyer and human rights activist, who was chairman of the Justice and Peace Committee. 
After some delays by the Returning Officer and the Lahore High Court, an appeal to the 
Supreme Court resulted in a provisional ruling allowing Chaudhry Naeem Shakir to file 
his nomination papers.39 The Supreme Court also ordered the Election Commission to 
prepare joint voting lists in that constituency “since, prima facie, both Muslim and non- 
Muslim voters of PP-126 are eligible to vote in the elections in this constituency and are 
to be allowed to do so”. On October 4, just days before the elections, the Supreme Court 
reversed its decision40 and the elections went ahead in the normal way with only Muslim 
candidates and only Muslim voters.41
If Chaudhry Naeem Shakir had been permitted to stand in the Punjab Provincial 
Assembly elections in 1993, and if non-Muslims had been permitted to vote, the non- 
Muslims would have had two votes -  one in the main election and one for the specially 
reserved non-Muslim seats. Such a system of “dual votes” for non-Muslims was 
proposed by Benazir Bhutto’s government in February 1996 to be applied throughout the 
country.42 (A very similar system, in which minorities could contest the general seats and
39 Babar, Najma “Minorities want joint electorate” Dawn (30 September 1993)
40 Abbasi, Ansar “SC withdraws order granting minorities right to joint electorate” The News (5 October 
1993)
41 Amjad-Ali, Christine “News from the country” pp. 101-2
42 Ismail, Muhammad “Major electoral reforms approved” The Frontier Post (27 February 1996)
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also vote in separate electorates, had been proposed seventeen years earlier by P.S. 
Ramdasia, secretary-general of the Pakistan Minority Alliance.43) Welcomed by the 
minorities44 and defended by Qazi Jamil, the Attorney General,45 the proposal was 
vehemently opposed by some of the Islamic religious groups,46 such as the Tanzeem-i- 
Islami47 and the Milli Yak’ Jahti Council48 and came to nothing. However, calls for a 
joint electorate continue to be voiced by Christians and human rights bodies, with support 
being added in 1997 by the Election Commission 49
Women
Another area in which the Christian community feels extremely vulnerable and powerless 
is the abuse of its women by Muslim men. Abduction, rape, forced conversion to Islam 
and marriage to the kidnapper are the kinds of abuse most often practised, and it is 
extremely rare that the perpetrators of the crimes are brought to justice. This is 
particularly common in rural areas where the women of poor families are needed to 
contribute to the economic support of the family, and thus must be out and about in the 
village and fields. (Whole families work together as agricultural labourers and brick kiln 
workers). Moreover, the more remote the area, the more difficult it will probably be to 
communicate with city-based human rights organizations -  a necessity given the near
43 “Minority alliance’s appeal to Zia” The Pakistan Times (12 October 1979)
44 “Minorities welcome dual voting right” The Frontier Post (2 March 1996)
45Jan, Matiullah “Dual voting right: a constitutional discovery?” The Frontier Post (29 February 1996)
46 Moghal “The right o f dual vote” passim
47 “Protest against dual vote right” Dawn (12 March 1996)
48 “MYC to oppose dual voting rights” Dawn (31 March 1996)
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impossibility of poor Christians getting just treatment from their local police.50 However, 
Alexander John Malik, Church of Pakistan Bishop of Lahore, asserted in 1991 that the 
abduction and forced conversion to Islam of Christian women was beginning to happen
S I *  S9in cities as well as villages. Hindu women also are vulnerable, but Christians are 
more so because, as described by Mohani Ghosh of the Young Women’s Christian 
Association, some Muslims believe them to have lax morals so they “can be seduced very 
easily”. This belief arises mainly because of Western films depicting immorality which 
is taken as the behaviour of Christians, all Westerners being considered Christians. A 
second reason why Christian women are more vulnerable than Hindu women stems from 
the distribution of their respective communities. Most Hindus live in a large, solidly 
Hindu area, and therefore tend not to meet Muslims in their daily lives. Christians, 
however, are much more scattered, and often live amongst Muslims.54 The NCJP wrote 
in its 1997 report on human rights in Pakistan:
The incidents are rampant where minority women are deprived of their 
rights. They are even more vulnerable than ordinary citizens and 
Muslim women in the contemporary male dominated society in 
Pakistan.
49 “Election Commission for joint electorate” The Nation (5 September 1997)
50 For example, when a Christian woman and her two daughters from Gujranwala were kidnapped and 
raped by an influential local Muslim, the local police did not lodge a case against him until forced to do so 
by the High Court because o f a writ petition filed by the Centre for Legal Aid, Assistance and Settlement 
(CLAAS), as described in CLAAS’s Update (1 January -  30 June 1996) p.5
51 Malik, Alexander John “Welcoming speech”
52 Hussain, Sheher Bano in Newsline (August 1997) p.79
53 Quoted in Sadiq op. cit. p.3
54 See Addleton op. cit. pp.32-39
164
While coping with the underdevelopment and marginalization which 
[the] majority o f the non-Muslims are also facing, the minority women 
carry an additional burden o f being legally and socially disadvantaged.
Personal laws and social norms of their own communities are obsolete 
and meant to sustain male supremacy. To make economical (sic) 
contribution to their families, they have to be socially active but there is 
a price for such daring.
The non-Muslim women living in remote rural areas are most prone to 
mischief.55
It is hard to estimate the real scale of this problem. The kidnapping of seven girls from 
seven different places in upper Sind in a single month (January 1994) resulted in an 
organized protest by the non-Muslim community leaders,56 which suggests that this was 
probably an abnormally high rate of abduction. The knowledge that the police are 
unlikely to act, combined with the high risk of finding themselves accused of zina 
(adultery, a crime which is punished by lashing), keeps many Christians from reporting 
rapes and abductions. The case of Angelina Peter, a sixteen-year-old Christian girl from 
Tharparkar who was raped by a Hindu in June 1997, is noteworthy. In this case, 
Angelina’s family managed (with the help of protests from the Christian community) to 
persuade the police to register a case against her rapist, who was a well known criminal 
in the area. Whether the fact that he was a Hindu rather than a Muslim had anything to 
do with this success is unclear, but many other people then submitted complaints o f rape
55 Human Rights Monitor 97  p. 18
56 “ ‘Minorities’ rights in serious danger’ ” The Frontier Post (16 February 1994)
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and sexual harassment. This is interpreted by NCJP as an indication that Angelina’s 
success encouraged others, who had previously thought themselves unlikely to succeed.57
The NCJP report details various cases in which women and girls were abducted or rape 
was attempted, most of whom were not able to obtain justice. One problem is the legal 
system itself, particularly the Hudood Ordinances (see chapter 3) whereby the evidence 
of a Christian woman carries only a quarter of the weight of the evidence of a Muslim 
man. Furthermore, while a human rights organization may fight a court case for such 
women, the victims and their families continue to have to earn their livelihood in the 
village where the attackers are probably also living, released or bailed by the police, and 
free to intimidate or harass the family.
Another major cause of miscarriages of justice is the claim of “conversion and marriage”, 
which is often used to disguise the facts of crime and coercion. Behind this lies the 
ruling in Islamic law (and also in Pakistani law -see below) that conversion of a Christian 
woman to Islam automatically dissolves her marriage with her Christian husband, since a 
Christian man is not allowed to be married to a Muslim woman. It should be emphasized 
that the conversion is necessary only in order to dissolve the existing marriage and free 
the woman to marry again. There is nothing in the Shari’ah to prevent a Muslim man 
from marrying a single or divorced Christian woman, who is permitted in theory (though 
often not in practice) to continue in her original faith.
57 Human Rights Monitor 97 pp.21-22; Fleming, Fr James “One victim’s ordeal” The Herald (September 
1997)
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While women may agree publicly with their new husbands that they have converted to 
Islam and re-married of their own free will, it is easy to suppose that many do so out of 
fear of the consequences should they disagree. A statement by Raj an Victor, a Christian 
man, alleges that his wife Mary was abducted. When he found her, under the wing of 
Wajid, an influential Muslim who had abducted her temporarily once before, he says 
“there were many people and she appeared to be terrorised. She appears to have been 
tutored and said that she had converted to Islam on 17th May 1993 at Amrot Sharif and on 
18th May 1993 she married with Wajid son of Rustam Kandhro.”59 The NCJP cites the 
case of two sisters from Sheikhupura, Veronica and Sonica Bashir, who were abducted 
by police officers on their way home from college in 1996. Six months later the girls 
stated to the High Court that they had converted to Islam , married the policemen and 
therefore did not want to return to their parents. However in January 1997 both sisters 
returned to their parents. Veronica, who was pregnant, went back to her husband again
briefly but soon divorced him. Sonica did not return to her husband. In the words of the
60NCJP, “ the outcome of this case amply explains what must have been the reality”. 
Nasreen Daniel, a fourteen year old Christian girl was claimed to have been kidnapped by 
a Muslim, but the alleged kidnapper told the police who arrested him that she had 
converted to Islam and married him. The police refused to register a case against him. 
According to NCJP the police were very hostile to Nasreen and her father, who claimed 
that his daughter had been held in custody by the police and even raped by them.
58 Sylvester, Saleem, General Secretary o f the Christian Organisation for Human Rights, and Ghosh, 
Mohani, leader o f the Young Women’s Christian Association, as reported in Sadiq op. cit. p.3
59 Statement b y  Victor, Rajan addressed to the Station Officer, Lakhidar Police Station, District Shikarpur 
(22 May 1993)
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Shahida Mughal, a fourteen-year old Christian girl ffrom Faisalabad, dropped out of 
school in 1990 because the principal of the school, a  Muslim, demanded custody of her, 
on the basis that she had converted to Islam and entered into a marriage contract with 
him. Shahida denies this and believes that, in the process of filling out admission forms 
for her matriculation examinations, the principal tricked her into signing a blank sheet of 
paper which he later used to forge appropriate documents. The case was decided in the 
principal’s favour in April 1996.61
Those who attempt to make protests or lodge complaints against rape and abduction often
ftOfind themselves ignored. Worse, they may be targeted in retaliation. A common way to 
do this is to have the woman accused of zina (adultery). When the case concerning 
Sonica and Veronica Bashir was registered, it was mot under Sections 364 and 365 of the 
Penal Code63 which are concerned with kidnapping. It was registered instead under 
section 10 of Ordinance VII (1979) of the Hudood Ordinances, that is, zina.64 This 
choice was challenged in the High Court by tlhe Centre for Legal Aid, Assistance 
and Settlement on the grounds that “the police created a vagueness in charges to protect 
the accused”.65
60 Update on cases from July to December 1997 Centre for Legal Aid Assistance and Settlement (Lahore) 
p. 14; Human Rights Monitor 97 pp. 18-20; “Special Report o f  CLAAS” Human Rights Today (May-June 
1996)
61 Human Rights Monitor 97 p.20
62 For example the cases o f the abduction o f seven unmarried girls from seven different towns in Sind in 
January 1994, reported in “’‘Minorities’ rights in serious danger The Frontier Post (16 February 1994)
63 Nizami op. cit. pp.340-1
64 This section is headed zina or zina-bil-jabr liable to tazir and can be found in “Shariat Criminal Laws”in 
Nizami op. cit. p. 10 o f the section on Shariat Criminal Laws
65 “Special Report of CLAAS” op. cit.
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Another way in which those who complain of abduction or rape may be targeted is 
through unrelated accusations against the woman’s relatives. In 1997 Ghulam Masih, a 
Christian from the village of Sharqpur, District Shekhupura in the Punjab, found his 
seven-year-old daughter being raped by four Muslim men in a cow shed. Many other 
villagers who saw the men running away from the cow shed gave their names to the 
police. The hospital confirmed that the child had been raped. The rapists were arrested 
but then released on the grounds of insufficient evidence. But Ghulam Masih continued 
to press for justice, and nineteen months later received £200 in compensation from the 
Human Rights Ministry. A few days after receiving this, in October 1998, he was 
arrested by the Sharqpur police, accused of the murder of an elderly woman. The only 
witnesses of the alleged murder were his daughter’s rapists, whereas other villagers stated 
that Ghulam had been working in the fields at the time of the murder. Speaking to 
journalists from the Sunday Times, the police inspector, Mushtaq Ahmed, explained that 
his prisoner was a Christian whereas his accusers were good Muslims and he had no 
reason to disbelieve them. “My first duty is to Islam. The courts will take a similar view, 
and Ghulam Masih will be hanged. You’ll see.”66 This prediction could well prove to be 
correct, as in the case of Gul Pervaiz Masih who was convicted on the evidence o f a 
single Muslim witness whose beard convinced the judge that, as a good Muslim, he must 
be speaking the truth (see chapter 5).
An interesting twist is given to the tactic of accusing the accusers by the fact that a 
Christian wife who converts to Islam is automatically divorced from her Christian
66 Scott-Clark, Cathy and Levy, Adrian “Beyond Belief’ The Sunday Times Magazine (24 January 1999)
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husband. This rule, from the Shari’ah, applies also in Pakistan and was upheld by the 
Lahore High Court in March 1992 (thus reversing the decision of a lower court in 
Faisalabad which had ruled in November 1991 that the woman’s conversion was not 
genuine and therefore her abductor had probably committed an offence).68 It allows 
Muslim abductors and rapists of Christian women to evade conviction by forcing their 
victim to convert to Islam (i.e. to recite the shahada - Muslim creed - in front of two 
witnesses, who can sign a mullah’s certificate confirming her conversion). If this is 
accomplished, the woman’s former marriage is annulled, and her abductor can freely and 
legally marry her (conditional, strictly speaking, on her consent).
The bizarre legal consequences which can follow from this are illustrated by the case of 
Yunis Masih, which began in the early 1990s. He and his wife Piari had been married 
since 1976 and had five children. One day Piari did not come home from the rice factory 
in Lahore, where she and her husband both worked. After several days of searching for 
her, Yunis Masih filed a complaint at the police station. Some time later he received a 
letter from the first wife of Gulam Rasool, the Muslim owner of the rice factory, saying 
that Piari had been forcibly converted to Islam, forcibly married to Gulam Rasool and 
that she wanted to return to Yunis Masih. Yunis then found his wife and brought her 
home (31 July 1992). Gulam Rasool filed a complaint against Yunis Masih under section
pp.29-30
67 Judgement sheet in the Lahore High Court at Lahore, Judicial Department on appeal no. 4385-B/ o f  
1991. A similar decision was reached in the Federal Shariat Court on 14th April 1988, a precedent which 
was referred to in the hearing in the Lahore High Court.
68 The additional sessions judge in Faisalabad wrote in his judgement dated 12 November 1991:
“Moreover, in my view, this is not the proper (sic) to abduct a woman and then claim that she has embraced 
Islam and contracted marriage especially in this case where Mst. Mukhtaran Bibi is the mother o f  seven
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16/7/79 of the Hudood Ordinances which is entitled “Enticing or taking away or 
detaining with criminal intent a woman”.69 Yunis was duly arrested and imprisoned.
Piari was returned to Gulam Rasool, whose eldest son murdered her on 8 July 1994, 
while Yunis was still in prison. Gulam Rasool registered a murder case against his son, 
but later withdrew it. The son was released on bail.70 Yunis was released on bail in 1998 
but has to live in hiding.71 What is striking about this case is that, because of Piari’s 
conversion to Islam, the law is all on the side of her Muslim abductor, despite the fact 
that the evidence strongly suggests that she converted against her will.
To set these events in context, it must be made clear that Christian women do sometimes 
choose to convert to Islam, generally in order to escape an unhappy marriage.72 (While 
Christian men can divorce their wives on the grounds of adultery alone, it is much harder
73for Christian women to divorce their husbands, as they have to provide more reasons. ) 
Yet it appears that the existence of this law, which removes most of the risk for a Muslim 
man who abducts and/or rapes a non-Muslim woman, must surely be a factor in the 
prevalence of this form of abuse.74
children. The petitioner is using Islam as a tool to specify (sic) his sexual desire and he cannot be allowed 
to do so.”
69 “Enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a woman -  Whoever takes or entices away any 
woman with intent that she may have illicit intercourse with any person, or conceals or detains with that 
intent any woman, shall be punished with imprisonment o f either description for a term which may extend 
to seven years and with whipping not exceeding thirty stripes, and shall also be liable to fine.” - Nizami op. 
cit. pp. 11-12 o f section on Shariat Criminal Laws
70 Centre for Legal Aid Assistance and Settlement Update (1 January -  30 June 1996) p.3
71 Joseph Francis, co-ordinator o f the Centre for Legal Aid Assistance and Settlement (Lahore) in interview 
with Zafar Ismail (January 1999)
72 Bokhari, Sadia “More sinned against...” The Nation (Sunday Review) (25 May 1997) p. 4
73 Section 10 o f the Divorce Act (1869) reproduced in Khan. S. A. op. cit. p.97, see also p.76
74 This opinion was expressed by the Rt Rev. Dr John A. Malik [actually Alexander J. Malik], Church o f  
Pakistan Bishop o f Lahore, as reported in “Bishop criticizes discrimination against Christians” Dawn (21 
November 1997) p. 6
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It could be argued that rape occurs in every country and even in Pakistan it is not always 
the rape of a Christian woman by a Muslim man. This is, of course, true, but it is
n c
noteworthy that the rape of a Muslim girl by a Christian man is reported in the press 
whereas the reverse is rarely publicized. Christine Amjad-Ali has asserted that rape is 
used in Pakistan as a means of punishment or even political intimidation.
In Pakistan, as in the rest o f the world, rape is a constant feature o f the 
reality o f women. While the fact o f rape is universal, however, the 
particular social shape it takes varies from situation to situation. In 
Pakistan, as well as being an act of violence perpetrated by an 
individual man against an individual woman, rape is also a means o f  
“punishment” or “teaching a lesson” carried out by one family or class 
group against another family or class group. Thus the police, as agents 
o f the status quo, routinely use rape against lower class women as an 
instrument of intimidation. In Sindh particularly the intelligence 
agencies have used rape as a means of political intimidation.76
The phenomenon Amjad-Ali is describing does not have a religious element, but clearly 
demonstrates an attitude from which it is but a small step to seeing rape as a weapon 
against a despised minority.
75 For example “Christian man molests Muslim girl” The News (20 August 1997)
76 Amjad-Ali, Christine “Opening the curtains” pp. 132-3
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Land and property issues
As indicated above, one of the areas in which Christians feel particularly vulnerable 
through lack of local political representation is in relation to zamindars. Forced eviction 
of Christians is a commonplace occurrence, with legal restitution a rarity.77 The 1997 
report of the NCJP lists five cases under the heading “Eviction, demolition and land 
grabbing” some of them involving the homes of dozens of individual Christians. 
Noteworthy features of these cases include the use of firearms by the Muslims seizing the 
land, the Christians’ feelings of insecurity and helplessness even if they form the majority 
in a particular village, and false criminal accusations made by the landlords against the
no
Christians. In Sahiwal in September 1998, the homes of 600 Christians -  and their 
church - were razed by bulldozers. A few weeks later the Christians returned and began 
to re-build from the rubble. In October a Muslim mob marched on the community and 
destroyed the buildings again. Posters were put up stating “The Christians are into
70suspicious activities against Islam.” Christian cemeteries and graveyards are often
• O Aencroached on, seized or damaged with apparent impunity.
Another way in which Christians face discrimination in relation to their property is the 
provision of amenities such as street lights, gas and sewerage. The Frontier Post reports
77 Malik, Alexander John “ Welcoming speech”
78 Human Rights Monitor 97 pp. 26-30
79 Scott-CIark and Levy op. cit. pp.35-6
80 Human Rights Monitor 97 p.30; Sadiq op. cit. p.3
173
examples in which Christian districts had completely inadequate amenities whereas
• Q1nearby Muslim districts were well provided for.
Employment
While chapter 3 examined the obstacles faced by some Christians in gaining promotion, 
in line with traditional Islamic teaching about the role of dhimmi, there is a separate but 
related issue which has no basis in the Shari’ah. This is the high proportion of Christians 
found in the worst jobs. Higher castes often deem it appropriate for the Christians, as 
Chuhras, to perform the dirty and menial jobs (which, following the underlying pattern of 
Hindu thinking still held by many Punjabi Muslims, may cause religious defilement as 
well as being physically dirty). In 1997 it was reported that a Christian in prison (for 
possessing illegal videos) was forced by the Muslim prisoners to clean the latrine -  a not 
unusual situation. When he refused, they beat him up and made him lick the excrement 
from the bottom of the latrine.82 Advertisements for vacancies as sweepers occasionally 
state “only for Christians”. In the early 1990s the mayor of the Lahore Municipal 
Corporation ordered that only Christians were to be recruited as Corporation sweepers. 
Although this was presented as positive discrimination designed to assist the economic 
uplift of the Christian minority, the fact that Christians were discriminated against in
♦ ♦ O '!other sectors of the Corporation tended to negate this explanation. As well as
81 Sadiq op. cit. p.3
82 Shirvanee, Imran “Crisis o f identity” The News International (27 December 1997)
83 Balchin op. cit.
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Christians, low-caste Hindus also are employed as “sanitary workers” - a euphemism for 
“sweepers”, a term embracing not only street-sweeping but other dirty jobs such as 
cleaning houses and sewers.
There are also some Muslim sanitary workers, but in much smaller numbers. The NCJP 
reports an example of a company whose work included keeping clean the city of Lahore 
which had 8,000 Christian employees and 500 Muslim employees. (Strangely, when 
Christmas came and all the Christians went on holiday, all the Muslims were found to 
have left their jobs.) Though Muslims may be employed as sanitary workers, they 
normally delegate their actual work to non-Muslims thus avoiding the social disgrace 
associated with the job, but continuing to draw their wages. Typically, the Muslim 
divides his wages between himself, the Christian who performs his work for him and the 
supervisor who knows about the arrangement. In August 1997 Christian sanitary workers 
in Lahore threatened to go on strike, demanding that the Muslim sanitary workers be
QA
asked to perform the work they were employed for.
The working conditions of sanitary workers are often very poor, failing even to meet 
legal requirements. For example, workers often do not receive compensation for 
accidents or injuries, nor a pension when they retire, even though they are in government 
service. Several deaths are reported each year, but little official concern is expressed. 
Those who have attempted to go on strike find themselves dismissed or new workers are
84Human Rights Monitor 97 p.42
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brought in to do their jobs. Wages may be left unpaid for long periods of time, and 
female workers beaten and mistreated.85
The population movements and consequent demographic changes which resulted from 
partition created an increase in the number of Christians in sweeper jobs. Many of them 
had previously worked as agricultural labourers for Hindu and Sikh landowners, who 
migrated to India. Their land was given to the Muslim muhajirun, who migrated 
simultaneously to Pakistan from India. Considered to have given up everything for 
Allah, these newly arrived Muslims had great prestige in Pakistan and were given the 
land left by the Hindus and Sikhs. Because there were so many muhajirun they tended to 
get rather small parcels of land, which they could work themselves without hiring other 
labourers. If they did want labourers, they often preferred Muslims.86 Large numbers of 
Christians were left without any means of earning their livelihood from the land and
87moved to the towns and cities to look for work, where many of them became sweepers. 
This was a step down the social hierarchy for former agricultural labourers for whom 
sweeping had been only a small part of their work before. Even worse, much of the 
“sweeping” in the cities was “wet” work i.e. sewers etc. which was more despised even
oo
than “dry” work such as street-sweeping and cleaning houses. Nevertheless it was 
work, and the only kind of job for which the Christian applicants would not find 
themselves in competition with the respected muhajirun. In fact, there were extra
85 ibid. pp.43-5; Balchin op. cit.
86 Comfort op. cit. pp.6,14
87 Streefland op. cit. pp. 10-11; Jardine, Kenneth W.S. “Church and State in Pakistan” The East and West 
Review  Vol. XV No. 4 (October 1949) p. 115
88 Streefland op. cit. pp. 12-13
176
numbers of sweeper jobs available because of the growth of urban populations and the 
migration of some former town-based sweepers to India.89 If cleaning private houses it 
could even be a relatively well-paid job.90
Not all Christians are sanitary workers, but many find difficulties in getting promotion to 
a level appropriate to their qualifications and experience, or in getting a job at all. 
Reports in 1991 indicated that the Habib Bank had a policy of not employing Christians 
and that the Punjab government stopped recruiting Christian nurses for one of its 
hospitals in 1989 91 Najma Sadeque, a respected feminist journalist, writes:
One o f the saddest reflections o f the bias and the state o f mind that 
poorer Christians constantly live with is when they seek jobs and ask 
tentatively whether the prospective employer has any objection to a 
Christian working on Muslim premises. As ‘people o f the Book’, that 
question should not have to arise, yet i i  often does. The grounds 
sometimes given is (sic) that they were originally converts from 
Hinduism and not even genuine Christians. Now that begs the 
question: what were the sub-continent’s Muslim ancestors before Islam 
came to South Asia.92
This highlights an interesting phenomenon. Apparently there is a feeling among some 
Muslims that genuine dhimmis would be eligible for employment but Christians are
89 ibid. pp. 14-15
90 ibid. p.24
91 Balchin op. cit.
92 Sadeque, Najma “Leaving some issues to God” The News (26 May 1998)
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considered only pseudo-dhimmis. Presumably the reluctance to concede full dhimmi 
status to Christians is because only a few generations have passed since the conversion of 
the Hindu ancestors of most of today’s Christians. A distinction appears to be drawn, 
consciously or unconsciously, with Muslims who have many centuries of Muslim 
ancestors between them and their Hindu forebears. Whether this is normally a sincere 
religious conviction or a pious excuse to keep Christians out o f the workplace is hard to 
determine.
The question of being refused appropriate promotion is hard to analyse since each 
individual case would need to be examined on its merits to determine if there is religious 
discrimination or whether the employee is less well qualified than he or she believes. 
Illuminating statistics are difficult to obtain, but it is relevant to state that the literacy rate 
amongst Christians has traditionally been high relative to the population as a whole. The 
1911 census showed that Christians in the Punjab (meaning both the Punjab of modem 
Pakistan and the part which remained in India after partition) had a higher percentage of 
literacy than Muslims and Sikhs, though lower than Hindus. However, the percentage of 
literate people who were also literate in English was about four times higher for 
Christians than for the other faith-communities.93 In 1978 it was reported that the literacy 
rate in Christian villages ranged from 30% to 60%, whereas the national average was 
20%.94 Apart from the question of education and ability, an important factor is 
undoubtedly that Christians tend to lack influence and influential friends, which is
93 Webster op. cit. pp.228-230
94 The Role o f  Minorities in National Development -  papers from a seminar held 27-29 April 1978 under 
the auspices o f the Institute o f Political and Social Studies o f F.C. College, Lahore p.42
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significant in a society where jobs are often allocated on the basis of favours owed or 
friendships sought.95 Whatever the true figures and reasons, it is a very commonly 
expressed cause of frustration for Christians who see a disproportionately large number 
of their co-religionists being passed over for promotion.96
Bonded Labour
Illegal but widespread, the practice known as “bonded labour” is effectively slavery. 
Families of labourers, including men, women and children, work long hours in atrocious 
conditions97 (usually in brick kilns or agricultural work) for no money, on the basis that 
they are paying back a family debt owed to their zamindar. Commonly the debt 
originated several generations earlier, and the labourers have no paperwork to indicate 
their progress in paying it off. They are bought and sold by their zamindars. Some are 
chained to prevent them running away. Those who do run away may be rounded up by 
men with dogs and rifles.98 According to the NCJP some are kept in the private jails of 
their zamindars, though this was denied by Justice (Retd.) Salahuddin Mirza, the Sind 
provincial ombudsman.99
95 Streefland op. cit. p.20
96 For example the story o f Christofer Anderson, a video engineer, as reported in Shirvanee op. cit.
97 The conditions o f  women and children in particular are described in detail by Asma Jehangir in a report 
to the Supreme Court in the famous Darshan Masih case in which she represented Darshan Masih. 
“Submission o f report the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of bounded (sic) labour A.R. (L)/88-S.C.J. 
in All Pakistan Legal Decisions Vol. XLII (1990) SC583-588
98 Scott-Clark and Levy op. cit. p.36
99 Human Rights Monitor 97  p.46
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Being an illegal practice which the zamindars involved usually take care to disguise, 
estimates of the numbers of bonded labourers are hard to find. The NCJP, which seeks to 
release bonded labourers, claimed at the end of 1997 that there were “thousands” of 
people living in bondage.100 It has found that most of the bonded labourers it has 
recovered or reported were Christians.101 This may be compared with a statement by the 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan’s Special Task Force in Sind concerning 4,000 
agricultural workers from Sind whom they had enabled to gain their freedom since 1995, 
of whom a large majority were Hindus.102 If both these statements are true, it indicates 
that the numbers of Christian bonded labourers in the country as a whole must be many 
times greater than 4,000. A long-term investigation of bonded labour by Human Rights 
Watch/Asia, begun in late 1993, asserts that this practice involves “millions” of 
workers.103 With regard to brick-kiln workers, Asma Jehangir of the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan estimates that 80% of brick-kiln workers are Christians.104 
Human Rights Watch/Asia comments that Christians form “a high proportion” of bonded 
brick-kiln workers in the Punjab relative to their numbers in the total population.105
Bonded labour in the agricultural sector is known in both Sind and the Punjab. The 
NCJP comments that it is not a problem specific to the religious minorities, but the 
predominance of Christians involved is because “their social vulnerability as a minority
100 ibid. loc. cit.
101 “Bonded labour in agricultural sector: dead souls are stalking in Punjab” The Mirror Vol. 1 issue 3 
(October/December 1997)
102 reported in Human Rights Monitor 97 p.46
103 Contemporary Forms o f  Slavery in Pakistan (New York: Human Rights Watch/Asia, 1995) p.l
104 Jehangir, Asma “Minorities and women in Pakistan” p. 129
105 Contemporary Forms o f  Slavery in Pakistan p.31
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group must have contributed to their plight.”106 Similarly, Khalil Ramdey, Advocate-
General of the Punjab, commented in 1988 about brick-kiln workers: “Most of the
workers in this industry are Christians and even on this score being the minority they
perhaps do not feel confident enough to challenge the maltreatment being meted out to
them by the Brick-Kiln Owners who belong to the majority class with all the resources,
political involvements at their disposal.”107 Human Rights Watch/Asia “found it difficult
to document particular abuses against non-Muslim bonded labourers as non-Muslims”
but quoted the comment of a Christian lawyer in Lahore, who wished for safety reasons
to remain anonymous, that “Christian bonded labourers suffer double exploitation as
religious minorities and as bonded labourers”. They also reported that eight Christians
and three Hindus interviewed said they were forced to work harder and punished more
108brutally than Muslim bonded labourers.
Bonded labour is prohibited in the constitution.109 A number of individuals have 
obtained their freedom by legal proceedings, either under Section 100 of the Pakistan 
Penal Code110 or by filing Habeas Corpus petitions.111 A landmark case was that of 
Darshan Masih and twenty other Christians in 1988-9, in which the court ordered that the 
workers repay current debts to the brick-kiln owners and return to work, while the brick­
kiln owners were to cancel past debts of the workers and refrain from coercive methods
106 “Bonded labour in agricultural sector: dead souls are stalking in Punjab” The Mirror Vol. 1 issue 3 
(October/December 1997)
107 Ramdey, Khalil report submitted to a meeting held under the direction o f the Supreme Court o f Pakistan 
(31st August 1988) All Pakistan Legal Decisions Vol. XLII (1990) SC555
108 Contemporary Forms o f  Slavery in Pakistan pp. 15,31
109 “Slavery, forced labour etc.” are prohibited by Article 11 o f the Constitution, Butt op. cit. p.9
110 Concerned with the right o f private defence o f the body
111 See All Pakistan Legal Decisions Vol. XLII (1990) SC528,532
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to retain the workers against their will. Further provisions attempted to stop any future
1 1 0debts getting too large or women and children being made to work against their will.
The court was concerned to avoid having to try similar cases in the future and set up a 
committee to make recommendations regarding long-term measures to prevent bonded
1 JO
labour practices in brick-kilns. In 1992 the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 
was passed, which required all bonded debts to be cancelled and prescribed a prison 
sentence and fine for those who compelled anyone to render bonded labour.114 A set of 
rules related to the implementation of this Act was published by the government in 
1995.115 Nevertheless, it remains very difficult for bonded labourers to gain their 
freedom. Society as a whole, and the police in particular, do not see much to object to in 
the practice, and therefore do little to assist.116 The wealth and influence of the 
zamindars helps them evade the consequences of the law, whereas the lack of education
• 117and lack of confidence of the labourers themselves have the opposite effect.
112 All Pakistan Legal Decisions Vol. XLII (1990) SC540-544
113 The case and the deliberations o f the committee are reported in All Pakistan Legal Decisions Vol. XLII 
(1990) SC513-595.
114 Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1992, reproduced in Shafi, M. and Shari, P. Labour Code o f  
Pakistan 13th edition (Karachi: Bureau of Labour Publications, 1999) pp.32A-32F
115 Bonded Labour System (Abolition)Rules (20 July 1995) reproduced in Shafi, M. and Shari, P. Labour 
Code o f  Pakistan 13 edition (Karachi: Bureau o f Labour Publications, 1999) pp. 32G-32L
116 Several cases in which the police ill-treat runaway Christian bonded labourers or refuse to help them or 
return them to their zamindars are described in Contemporary Forms o f  Slavery in Pakistan pp.29,39,41




In chronologies of their grievances, Pakistani Christians often list in first place the so- 
called nationalization of the Urdu-medium Christian schools and colleges, which began 
in October 1972. These institutions -  originally founded by missionaries - are generally 
recognized as one of the Christian community’s greatest contributions to Pakistan, 
because of their high quality.118 Their loss was bitterly resented.119 Between 1972 and 
1974 all the Urdu-medium Christian schools and colleges in the Punjab and Sind were 
nationalized, along with private Muslim schools. This was a decision made at provincial 
level and did not affect the few Christian schools in Baluchistan and North West Frontier
190Province. No compensation was given since the churches remained the nominal 
owners i.e. they held the title deeds, although management passed to the provincial 
governments. At the time of nationalization it was promised that the character of the 
Christian schools would be maintained, but in 1979 a policy of Islamizing education was 
introduced. Christians voiced concern at the gradual loss of the Christian character of the
191schools. This included a growing emphasis on the teaching of Islam (Islamiyat) and 
the ideology of Pakistan in all schools, whatever their origin. Islamiyat was made a 
compulsory subject in board examinations for Muslims, and non-Muslim students were 
not allowed to offer their own religion as a subject, or even study it at school.122 Instead 
non-Muslims were allowed to study “ethics”. However, no practical arrangements were
118 Hussain, Sheher Bano writing in Newsline (August 1997) pp.81-2
119 See for example Malik, Alexander John, Bishop of Lahore Serving Community (Lahore: Tanzeem-i- 
Nau, no date but before April 1982) pp. 16-19
120 Human Rights Monitor 97 p.58
121 Butler op. cit. p.50'
122 The Christian Voice Vol. XXXIX No. 31 (31 July 1988)
183
made for this, and anyway most non-Muslims chose to study Islamiyat because it was a 
necessary qualification for all tertiary education.123 Christians also complained that some 
textbooks gave inaccurate information or information biased against Christians.124 It 
became difficult for Christians to gain admission to (Muslim) state schools -  applications 
were often refused on the grounds that there were “no places” or that Christians should 
go to Christian schools. (All Christian schools were fee-paying so not accessible to many 
poorer Christians.) Of those Christians who did gain places in the Muslim state schools, 
many performed poorly, played truant or dropped out altogether. When this happened it 
was generally attributed by the Christians to the discrimination and hostility which 
Christian students suffered at school, sometimes even being deliberately failed in their 
examinations. Those from sweeper families were easily recognizable by their 
“sweeper culture” manifested in language, outward appearance and hygiene habits. 
Specifically the “sweeper culture” includes coarse language, the wearing of old and dirty 
clothes, and the habit of using the public road as a latrine, all of which contribute to the 
Christians being despised.126
At tertiary level also, Christians found it hard to get places to study, and there was a 
perception that places were not granted on merit. The Bishop of Lahore expressed the 
opinion of many Christians when he complained that it was hard for Christians, as an 
impoverished community, to study at college, for good marks were only obtained by
123 Tebbe, J.A. “Separate Curriculum in Religious Education for Christians” in “News from the Country: 
the Christian community” Al-Mnshir Vol. XXVII No. 2 (Summer 1985) p. 120; Kraan, J.D. “Education in 
Pakistan: developments in 1984-1985” Al-Mushir Vol. XXVII No.l (Spring 1985) pp.9-10
124 Butler op. cit. p.51
125 Ismail, Zafar Pakistan: the Islamic state and the Christian community unpublished paper presented at a 
consultation held at Glen Eyrie, Colorado Springs, 8-12 November 1992
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bribes and most Christians did not have the financial resources for bribery!127 Many 
Christians believed that the main purpose of the nationalization of the schools and 
colleges, which so dramatically changed the character of Christian schools while scarcely 
affecting Muslim schools, was to weaken the Christian influence in Pakistan.128
Continued Christian protests eventually resulted in a promise to denationalize the 
educational institutions including the Christian ones, but it was many years before this 
was put into practice for the Christian schools and colleges.129 The process began in 
1990 in the Sind. In 1996 the Punjab announced its decision to offer nationalized schools 
back to their previous owners/managements conditional on meeting certain financial 
conditions.130 The following year, some schools were indeed returned to the control of 
their original owners, in return for a deposit of six months salary for the teachers, but by 
1999 there were still many which had not yet been returned.131
Assumed disloyalty to the state
The rationale behind many of the restrictions on dhimmi is their assumed disloyalty to the 
Islamic state. Sardar Feroze Khan writes that “It is generally suspected by orthodox 
[Muslim] religious elements that as Christians we are tied to the culture, civilization and
126 Comfort op. cit. p.l 19
127 Malik, Alexander John “Welcoming speech”
128 “Pakistan” (author not given) in Barrett op. cit. p. 544
129 “Bishop criticizes discrimination against Christians” Dawn (21 November 1997)
130 “Nationalized schools to go to previous owners” The Nation (27 July 1996)
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politics of the West and that our supposed links and western orientation can sabotage the 
very foundational ideology - Islam - of the state.”132 Naseem George, a Christian 
politician, summarizes the situation by saying that Pakistani Christians are considered to 
be foreigners “belonging to the West”.133 Thus, for example, the loyalty of non-Muslim 
Pakistanis was considered suspect during the war with India in 1965, and non-Muslim 
war veterans received minimal recognition.134 Khurshid Ahmad attributes Christian 
opposition to Shari’ah to the influence of past colonialists.135 The kind of Muslim 
attitude which, at least in Christian perception, is so widespread is that of Naheed Jehan 
Lodhi who writes:
Muslims in an ideological Muslim state cannot permit the substance o f  
sovereignty to slip from their hands. There is an impression of 
militancy associated with a non-Muslim dominated government in any 
state where Muslims are in majority. It is not advisable to allow for the 
formation o f hostile government at war with the mainstream majority’s 
welfare.136
131 “10 Christian schools to be denationalized” The Muslim (27 November 1997); “Bishop criticizes 
discrimination against Christians” Dawn (21 November 1997)
132 Khan, Sardar Feroze op. cit. p.8. See also Charles Amjad-Ali’s use o f the term “fifth column” in 
“Islamization and Christian-Muslim Relations” p.78
133 George, Naseem “The role o f religious minorities in Pakistan’s politics and the future direction” -  a 
paper given at a seminar on “Religious Minorities in Pakistan: struggle for identity” (July 1996) reproduced 
in a book o f the same title ed. Moghal, Dominic and Jivan, Jennifer (Rawalpindi: Christian Study Centre,
1996) p.89
134 Jacob, Peter “The Question of Identity for Religious Minorities” -  a paper given at a seminar on 
“Religious Minorities in Pakistan: struggle for identity” (July 1996) reproduced in a book o f the same title 
ed. Moghal, Dominic and Jivan, Jennifer (Rawalpindi: Christian Study Centre, 1996) p.54
135 Siddiqui, Ataullah Christian-Muslim dialogue in the twentieth century (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press 
Ltd, 1997) p. 134
136 Lodhi, Naheed Jehan op. cit. pp.4-5
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Similarly, Qazi Hussein Ahmad of the Jamaat-i-Islami caused outrage amongst Christians
• 137when he stated on 9 December 1990 that Christians cannot be the friends of Muslims. 
While some Christians do feel and demonstrate a greater loyalty to the Western
1 o o
“Christian” world, Sardar Feroze Khan and many other Christians in Pakistan are at 
pains to assert their loyalty to their motherland, Pakistan. Justice Cornelius even 
described himself as a “constitutional Muslim”.139 At the time of the 1990-1 Gulf War, 
the National Council of Churches of Pakistan held a press conference in which they 
stated that Christians in Pakistan were loyal citizens of Pakistan and their loyalty should 
not be doubted.140 Many other affirmations of their desire to work for the good of the 
country as a whole, not just for Christians or non-Muslims, are given in various 
forums.141
Media
Many Christians in Pakistan feel that they and their faith are routinely misrepresented in 
the electronic and print media.142 Christians and other non-Muslims are often portrayed 
unsympathetically in screen and radio dramas or on posters. Alternatively, their
137 Statement o f protest issued by M. Joseph Francis o f the Pakistan Christian National Party (undated, but 
shortly after 9 Dec 1990)
138 George op. cit. p.89
139 cited in Butler op. cit. p.52
140 Saroia, Yousaf G. (executive secretary o f the National Council o f Churches of Pakistan) and Bakhsh, 
Bishop J.S. (vice-president of the National Council o f Churches of Pakistan) at a press conference reported 
in the Daily Imroz (Urdu) (3 February 1991)
141 For example Final Statement o f the national seminar on “Religious Minorities in Pakistan: Struggle for 
Identity” pp. 96-7; Malik, Alexander John Serving Community passim
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existence is ignored altogether. Christians call for a greater emphasis and recognition to 
be given to the positive contribution they have made to the country.143 Non-Muslim 
religious festivals do not pass unrecognized by the Muslim majority. For example, there 
are normally short Christmas programmes on television and messages from the President 
and Prime Minister. Newspapers often take the opportunity to describe Christmas 
traditions, the charity work of a Christian organization or sometimes the discrimination 
which Christians face.144 However, a seminar on the religious minorities in 1996 called 
for more positive coverage of all non-Muslim festivals in order to “develop better 
understanding among the people of Pakistan”.145
Until early 1999, it was normal for the word isai (followers of Jesus, Isa) to be used in 
the media to refer to Christians. This is a derogatory term which carries negative 
connotations as it has come to mean “sweeper”. Christians themselves therefore did not 
use this word, but referred to themselves as masihi (followers of Christ/Messiah, masih) 
A one-man letter-writing campaign was mounted in December 1998 by Altaf Naseem, a 
Christian who appealed to the president, prime minister and others in the government to 
stop the practice of using the derogatory term isai in the media.146 A directive was duly
142 Khair Ullah, F.S. “The future of Christians in Pakistan” Al-Mushir Vol. XV No. 1 (1973) p.6
143 Final Statement o f the national seminar on Religious Minorities in Pakistan: struggle for identity p. 104; 
Butler op. cit. p.50
144 Amjad-Ali, Christine “Opening the curtains” pp. 137-8
145 Final Statement o f the national seminar on Religious Minorities in Pakistan: struggle for identity pp. 104- 
5
146 For example, e-mail from Altaf Naseem to Mushahid Hussain, the Federal Minister o f Information ()12 
January 1999) who replied by e-mail saying “I have given necessary instructions in this regard” (14 
January 1999)
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issued by the government to television stations and newspapers, which soon began to 
refer to Christians as masihi,147
Food and utensils
One of the forms of discrimination most clearly linked to Chuhra origins is that related to 
food and the refusal of some Muslims to eat and drink with Christians or share utensils 
with them. This is a consequence of the belief that the impurity of the Chuhras will be 
passed on by physical contact with them.148 A young Christian journalist found that a 
female Muslim typist would not eat with her for this reason.149 An elderly Christian man 
who staffed the press lounge at the National Assembly was banned by the National 
Assembly canteen staff from touching any canteen utensils or even carrying a tray.150 A 
Christian student of science at the Islamia College in Karachi was forbidden by his fellow 
students to drink from the tap.151 Five Christian schoolgirls from St Mary’s School. 
Gujrat, who were taking a Home Economics practical examination on 25 February 1997, 
found that the Muslim examiner would not test or mark the food they had cooked. She 
ordered the Christians’ food to be put in the dustbin, but tested the food of their eight
152Muslim classmates in the normal way.
147 Zafar Ismail noticed the change in terminology in the media in March 1999.
148 Streefland op. cit. pp. 2-3,19
149 Jacob, Noshin op. cit.
150 Baabar, Mariana “Apartheid at NA canteen” The News (6 November 1997)
151 See the case history o f Daniel Scot in chapter 5. The refusal to share a tap with Christians is noted by 
Streefland op. cit. p. 19.
152 “Christian students humiliated” Dawn (1 March 1997); Centre for Legal Aid, Assistance and Settlement 
Update on Cases from January till June 1997 pp.9-10
189
This kind of behaviour is actually forbidden153 though by no means uncommon in rural 
areas. In the cities it is quite rare, as demonstrated by the outrage of Muslim journalists 
when the Christian staff member in the National Assembly press lounge explained why 
he was not able to bring them any tea from the canteen.154 Indeed, many restaurants are 
run by Christians and staffed by Christian chefs. Nevertheless, when this form of 
discrimination does occur, it is personally very hurtful to those who experience it. A 
Christian man who earns his living by cleaning six Muslim homes, while his wife cleans 
for various other families, commented wistfully, “We have to have our own utensils in 
order to eat or drink at any house in case they offer something. We are also human 
beings with emotions and passions.” When his wife gave birth to a longed-for son at last, 
the man brought a cake as a gift to one of his employers to celebrate the birth. The 
employer himself ate the cake willingly but his wife and children were reluctant to share
Identity cards and passports
The identity cards issue concerns a move proposed in 1992 which was abandoned in 
response to the protests of the non-Muslim minorities. However, the memory of this
153 Article 20 o f the 1956 constitution runs “Untouchability is abolished, and its practice in any form is 
forbidden and shall be declared by law to be an offence.” Government o f Pakistan Ministry of Law The 
Constitution o f  the Islamic Republic o f  Pakistan p.6
154 Baabar op. cit.
155 Shirazi, Saj “Meet your sweeper” The News (22 June 1997)
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“narrow escape” still lingers and continues to be referred to by both Muslims and non- 
Muslims as an example of a successful minorities’ protest.156
Under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, a government proposal was made to indicate on 
identity cards the religion of the bearer. The demand originated with the Islamic
1<7 1parties, who suggested cards of a different colour for non-Muslims, and was 
modified by the government to the insertion of a “religion column” on the card. This 
procedure was agreed on 13 October 1992 but Christians responded with press 
conferences, posters, letters, street meetings, rallies, processions, sit-ins, strikes, hunger 
strikes etc. The minority MNAs passed a motion opposing it159 and -  less predictably -  
the Provincial Assembly of Sind passed a unanimous resolution opposing it.160 The Sind 
Provincial Assembly at this time was dominated by the socialist-leaning Pakistan 
People’s Party and the liberal, educated Muttahidda Quami Movement, both of which 
voted on principle against this proposal. By December it appeared the government was 
trying to find a way to reverse the decision, and on 25 December an official of the 
Ministry for Interior Affairs announced that ID cards would continue to be issued as 
before.161
Religious identification on passports was introduced in 1977 and has not been a cause of 
distress to Christians, because they are not in use in daily life. The chief complainants
156 For example Abbas, Azhar “Standing apart” The Herald (February 1997) p.69
157 Ahmad, Eqbal “Sectarianising national identity” Dawn (18 October 1992)
158 “’Fundamentalists creating problems’” Frontier Post (27 February 1992)
159 “Religion column: MNAs move motion in NA” Dawn (8 November 1992)
160 “Sindh PA rejects religion column” Dawn (3 November 1992)
161 Mendes, Bonnie “Looking back at the ID card issue” Focus supplement Vol. 13 (1993);
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against this are the Ahmadiyyas who consider themselves Muslims but whose faith 
prevents them signing the declaration of belief which Muslims must sign in order to be
•  1 £Ddescribed on the passport as a Muslim.
Conclusion
Discrimination against Christians in Pakistan is a complex phenomenon, in which Islamic 
tradition, Pakistani law, a prevailing culture of corruption, and a deep-rooted caste system 
originating from Hinduism are all contributor}7 factors. The poverty of the Christians has 
a double effect making them not only despised but also powerless in a society where 
bribery of the police and judiciary is commonplace. The scarcity of Christians in 
positions of authority is also detrimental for the community as a whole, since having 
influential friends and contacts is another important way to attain a goal in Pakistani 
society. According to Balchin’s analysis, “For the marginalised communities, the 
‘scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours’ syndrome is a disaster; alienated from the
1 fsXmainstream, Christians automatically have less to ‘offer’”. Despite an excellent 
secular legal system, they can rarely gain redress for the wrongs done to them. This can 
be either because of the use of Shari’ah-derived legislation such as the Hudood 
Ordinances, or because of the bias of those members of the judiciary, that bias originating 
either from honest conviction or from fear of reprisals from Islamists.
162 “Religion column in passport to stay” The Frontier Post (14 January 1997) p.4
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All the kinds of discrimination described in this chapter are in addition to those 
prescribed by the Shari’ah for dhimmi. Village Christians in Pakistan do not even have 
the theoretical rights and protection due to dhimmi. Furthermore, a recent report has 
concluded: “Today, Christians in Pakistan are worse off than the untouchables of India: 
socially stigmatised for being poor as well as for their faith.”164 History and geography 
have combined to make Pakistan’s Christian community -  or at least the impoverished 
majority of the Christian community - not only more discriminated against than non- 
Muslims in an Islamic context but also more discriminated against than scheduled castes 
in a Hindu context.
Writing in 1996, Dominic Moghal of the Christian Study Centre in Rawalpindi declared 
his desire to see Pakistan become a true Islamic state because he believed the position of 
Christians would improve. He asserted that the implementation of the “Islamic values of 
tolerance, equality, brotherhood and social justice” would give Christians a better 
position than the feudalism, class and caste systems of the present.165 It should be noted 
that Moghal’s understanding of the status of non-Muslims in an Islamic state seems to be 
derived largely from a work by Hamidullah166 which asserts the unusual position that 
non-Muslims had equal status with Muslims during Muhammad’s lifetime and hence also 
in an ideal Islamic state. Nevertheless, this is indicative of the multiple burden borne by 
the majority Christians in Pakistan -  their faith, their poverty, and their caste origins.
163 Balchin op. cit.
164 Scott-Clark and Levy op. cit. p.36
165 Moghal “The right o f dual vote” p.76 [of English version]
166 Hamidullah, M. Status o f  non-Muslims in Islam Publication no. 40 (Islamabad, Da’wah Academy, 
International Islamic University, 1989)
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Moghal’s stance is unusual, despite the assertion of Khurshid Ahmad, a deputy leader of 
the Jama’at-i-Islami and founder of the Islamic Foundation in Leicester, that the 
Christians and some of the leaders of the Hindu scheduled castes in the First Constituent 
Assembly demanded the establishment of an Islamic State, believing that their rights 
would be better safeguarded in such a state.
As a response to the needs of the minorities, the government allocates certain sums of
1 Aft t •money for the economic development of the minority communities. In 1997-8 this 
amounted to Rs65 million (about one million pounds sterling) which included revolving 
loan funds for scholarships, financial gifts at Christmas, the Hindu festival of Divali, and 
Parsi religious festivals, for needy Christians, Hindus and Parsis respectively, and a 
scheme of National Cultural Awards with prizes in various kinds of arts for which only 
the minorities were eligible. However, the sums involved are so small that few seem to 
benefit beyond the friends and family of the minority MNAs.169
Looking to the future, a significant new factor is the growing anti-Western sentiment 
amongst Pakistani Muslims, a response to the perceived Muslim-Western conflict in 
various parts of the world, for example, Iraq. This attitude can manifest itself in anti- 
Christian action, following the age-old equating of the Western world with the Christian
167 Ahmad, Khurshid’s editorial footnote in Maududi The Islamic Law and Constitution p.70
168 A list o f the various funds and schemes for financial assistance o f the minorities is given in the United 
Nations Fourteenth Periodic Report o f States pp.7-8
169 “No systematic discrimination against minorities in Pakistan” The News (31 July 1997); see also the 
alleged misappropriation o f Rs2,500,000 intended for the welfare o f Christians by a Christian MNA 
reported in “Complaint against Salhotra lodged” The Frontier Post (27 February 1992). Other reports o f  
government funds for minority development are given in “Rs 18.44m earmarked for minorities 
development” The News (21 October 1997) and “Govt committed to minorities welfare: Zafar” The Muslim 
(22 September 1998)
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world. This suggests that anti-Christian prejudice in society, police and judiciary is likely 
to increase rather than decrease, and therefore the problems of poor Christians will tend 
to grow.
As suggested in the introduction to this chapter, a likely additional cause of non-dhimmi 
discrimination against Christians is that it is in a sense a “by-product” of the 
discrimination which is legitimized by the Shari’ah. In other words, if the Shari’ah 
teaches Muslims to discriminate in certain ways against Christians, it is not surprising to 
find that individual Muslims may also discriminate against Christians in other ways, not 
listed in the Shari’ah. The Shari’ah creates a mindset of anti-Christian discrimination 
which individuals may put into practice with greater or lesser attention to the limits set 
out in the Shari’ah. If this is indeed a factor tending to produce de facto discrimination, it 
is likely that the increasing Islamization of Pakistan’s laws and society will bring 
increasing de facto discrimination against Christians in its wake.
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Chapter 5
The development of national legislation and attitudes to blasphemy and 
apostasy, and their outworkings in practice
Blasphemy
Introduction
Blasphemy has become one of the most pertinent current issues for the Christian 
community in Pakistan. Indeed, it affects other minorities and even the Muslim 
majority. From independence in 1947 until the 1980s, only six cases of blasphemy 
were registered. The maximum two-year sentence was rarely awarded. Between 
19861 and 1995, however, at least sixteen blasphemy cases were brought against 
Christians, at least nine against Muslims and at least 100 against Ahmadiyyas.2 By 
June 1997 three Christians, one Sunni Muslim and two Shi’a Muslims had been 
sentenced to death under Section 295-C (defiling the name of Muhammad), though 
all were acquitted on appeal.3
The blasphemy legislation has become a weapon in the context of personal disputes, 
biased as it is in favour of the accuser - for the accuser has nothing to lose, the accused 
everything, even his life. This includes not only disputes between Muslims and non- 
Muslims but also between Muslims themselves. A famous case of the latter is that of 
Dr Akhtar Hameed Khan, an active reformist Muslim, who had accusations of
1 The year in which the key part o f the “blasphemy law”, Section 295-C o f the Pakistan Penal Code 
was added to the legislation.
2Figures for Christians from Haider, Ejaz “A live given to a worthy cause” The Friday Times (15-21 
May 1998) which lists fifteen with name, date and place for each case. In addition there is the case of 
Daniel Scot (see below). Figures for Muslims and Ahmadiyyas from U.S. Department o f State Country 
Reports on HumanRights Practices fo r  1995 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, April
1996) p. 1344 which mentions only nine Christians.
3Amnesty International Pakistan: Time to Take Human Rights Seriously Index ASA 33/12/97 (1 June
1997) p.23
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blasphemy made against him by militant Muslims who were "utilising the blasphemy 
law to delegitimise him and enforce their own notion of orthodoxy".4
Unofficial changes made by the Government in 1995 to procedures for filing 
blasphemy charges (see below) have been followed by a significant drop in the 
number of blasphemy charges.5 Nevertheless, the law is still a fearsome instrument to 
which Christians are particularly vulnerable. Though the number of Christians 
directly affected is small in absolute terms, the blasphemy law is felt to be a sword of 
Damocles6 and has developed a huge symbolic signficance which contributes 
substantially to the atmosphere of intimidation of Christians. The detrimental effect 
of the law on community relations is most dramatically illustrated by the incident at 
Shanti Nagar in February 1997 in which tens of thousands of rioting Muslims 
destroyed hundreds of Christian homes and other Christian property, following an 
accusation of blasphemy.
Furthermore, the blasphemy law has engendered a "wave of private violence".7 
Equating blasphemy with apostasy (see below) and influenced by "the tradition of 
direct violent action and self-help, which goes back to the earliest times of Islam", 
some Muslims feel that they are entitled to enforce the death penalty themselves.8 
While no one has yet been executed by the state for blasphemy, four Christians9 
charged with blasphemy have been murdered with little police investigation of the 
murders (see below). In addition one Muslim was murdered because he was mistaken
4Forte, David F. "Apostasy and Blasphemy in Pakistan" Connecticut Journal o f  International Law  
(Fall, 1994) p. 57
Statement by Human Rights Commission o f Pakistan, reported in U.S. Department o f State Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices fo r 1996 (February 1997) p. 1474
6 This metaphor was used by Dr Ruffan Julius, a Christian Member o f the National Assembly, quoted 
in Dawn (September 7, 1998) p.8
7Forte op. cit. pp.54-56
8An-Na'im, Abdullahi Ahmed Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights and  
International Law (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990) p. 184,
9Full list given below in section on “Misuse o f the blasphemy law.
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for a Christian who had been accused of blasphemy.10 Death threats against 
Christians are not uncommon, and an entire Christian community may be forced to 
move away from the place where they have lived for generations.11 This phenomenon 
of unofficial punishment according to the blasphemy law is very important, 
particularly in that the judiciary and police often appear to be intimidated themselves 
by the strength of religious feeling against alleged blasphemers, and therefore do not 
move to control or punish the violence.12 Writing after the first two murders of 
Christians accused of blasphemy, Chaudhry Naeem Shakir, a Christian High Court 
advocate, spoke of the "general scare and insecurity" amongst non-Muslims.13 After 
the murder of the fourth, George Clement, a Roman Catholic Member of the National 
Assembly, commented on how insecure this made the minorities feel.14 After the 
protest suicide of Bishop John Joseph of Faisalabad in May 1998, his fellow-bishop, 
Joseph Coutts, Bishop of Hyderabad wrote of “the fear and tension in which minority 
communities are living because of the misuse of this law by extremist and 
unscrupulous elements”.15 It must be emphasised that this violence is a new 
phenomenon which has followed the introduction of Section 295-C. In the words of 
Bishop Michael Nazir Ali, there was no pre-existing “law of the jungle” which might
10 Emmanuel Luther, a Christian, was accused o f blasphemy with respect to the Urdu translation o f a 
book he had published in English in 1989 on the life of Muhammad. He went into hiding and escaped 
to the United States in January 1991. A Muslim called Abdul Rehman Lothar from Gujranwala was 
murdered because extremists confused his name with Luther’s. See Dildar, Peter Jacob and Mughal, 
Alexander Aftab Section 295-C Pakistan Penal Code: A Study o f  the History, Effects and Cases under 
Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan (Faisalabad: National Commission for Justice and Peace, 1995) pp.43-44 
In addition Dr Sajjad Farooq, a Muslim, was murderd by an angry Muslim crowd on 21 April 1994 
after he had been accused o f blasphemy. See Khan, Aamer Ahmed “The blasphemy law: the bigot’s 
charter?” The Herald (May 1994) pp.46b-50
n For example, the 32 Christian families in the village o f Ratta Dhotran where Salamat Masih, Rehmat 
Masih and Manzoor Masih, all arrested for blasphemy on 11 May 1993, had lived. In addition, 18 
Christian families had to leave the village o f Arifwala (Chak 353/E.B) following the arrest o f Ayub 
Masih for blasphemy under Section 295-C on 14 October 1996. The Herald, May 1994 pp.52-54; 
"Update on cases from 1st July -31st December 1996" Centre for Legal Aid, Assistance and 
Settlement, Lahore
12U.S. Department o f State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices fo r 1998, Vol. II 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999) p. 1951
13Shakir, Chaudhry-Naeem "Fundamentalism, enforcement o f Shariah and the law on blasphemy in 
Pakistan" Al-Mushir Vol. 34 No. 4 (1992) p.l 14
14"Blasphemy law being misused, say MNAs" Dawn, 22 April 1994
15 Coutts, Joseph letter published in Dawn (28 May 1998)
198
have been considered to need dealing with by the introduction of this Section of the 
Penal Code.16
Basis in Shari'ah
The Shari'ah does not emphasise blasphemy nearly as forcefully as it does apostasy; it 
is a ta'zir offence,17 rather than a hadd offence. The definition of blasphemy is rather 
more broad than simply insulting God, for a denial of any of the essential principles of 
Islam is defined as blasphemy.18 This opens the way for condemning as a blasphemer 
anyone with a different interpretation of Islam. Forte comments that "none of the 
great intellectual leaders of Pakistan's pre-history, from Muhammad Iqbal even to 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, would have been immune to attack".19
In South Asian forms of Islam the figure of Muhammad is invested with a special 
sanctity, as veneration of the Prophet developed in association with Sufism.20 Hence 
alleged insults to Muhammad are treated in the same way as insults to God, or as even 
worse.21 Thus Mohammad Asrar Madani, a much respected conservative Pakistani 
scholar (now director of the Islamic Research Institute, Toronto), whose opinion is 
followed by Pakistan's Shari'ah Court, gives a definition of blasphemy which is 
centred on Muhammad:
16 Rt Rev. Dr Michael Nazir Ali, interview with author (11 May 1998)
17i.e. the punishment is discretionary
18Hughes, T.P. Dictionary o f  Islam (Lahore: Premier Book House, 1885)
19Forte op. citp.67
20Schimmel, Annemarie And Muhammad is his messenger: the veneration o f  the Prophet in Islamic 
piety  (Lahore: Vanguard, 1987) passim, especially pp.239-256 on how love o f the Prophet coloured the 
work o f Muhammad Iqbal; Lewis, P. "The Shrine Cult in Historical Perspective" in Al-Mushir, Vol. 
XXVI No. 2 (Summer 1984) pp.54-9; Geibels, M. "The Prophet Muhammad's Birthday Festival" in 
Al-Mushir Vol. XXVIII No. 4 (Winter 1986) pp. 133-145
21Halliday, Fred '"Islam is in danger': Authority, Rushdie and the Struggle for the Migrant Soul" in 
Hippier, Jochen and Lueg, Andrea (eds.) The Next Threat: Western Perceptions o f  Islam transl. Laila 
Friese (London: Pluto Press, 1995) footnote 10
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Reviling or insulting the Prophet (peace be upon him) in writing or speech; 
speaking profanely or contemptuously about him or his family; attacking 
the Prophet's dignity and honour in an abusive manner; vilifying him or 
making an ugly face when his name is mentioned; showing enmity or 
hatred towards him, his family, his companions and the Muslims; accusing 
or slandering the Prophet and his family, including spreading evil reports 
about him or his family; defaming the Prophet; refusing the Prophet's 
jurisdiction or judgement in any matter; rejecting the Sunnah al- 
Nabawiyya', showing disrespect, contempt for or rejection o f the rights of  
Allah and His Prophet or rebelling against Allah and His Prophet.22
Traditionally Islam (apart from the Hanafi school)23 taught that a Muslim found guilty 
of blasphemy was to be sentenced to death.24 This is the opinion of Ibn Taymiyya 
(1263-1328), the reformist Hanbali scholar and jurist, who dealt extensively with the 
issue of insulting Muhammad in his work Kitab al sarim al maslul ala shatim al 
rasul25 According to Ibn Taymiyya, anyone who defames the Prophet must be 
executed, whether the offender is a Muslim or not. Such opinions have survived into 
the modem age, as exemplified by Madani who asserts that an insult to Muhammad is 
considered to be an insult, injury and threat to the entire Muslim umma.26 In addition, 
he states that "respect for [the Prophet] and his family ... is part of the Divine scheme 
for the preservation of His deen. The Messenger's integrity, honour and dignity are 
essential for the propagation of the message."27
22Madani, Mohammad Asrar Verdict o f  Islamic Law on Blasphemy and Apostasy (Idra-E-Islamiat, 
Lahore, Pakistan, 1994) pp. 19-20
23Lewis, Bernard "Behind the Rushdie Affair" Am. Scholar (1991) 185,188
24Hughes op. c it .; Madani op. cit. passim
25Hyderabad, 1905.- See also Thomas Michel in Ibn Taymiyya, A Muslim Theologian's Response to 
Christianity pp. 69-71. Both cited in Ruthven, M. A Satanic Affair (London, Hogarth, 1991) p.51
26Madani op. cit. p. 12
27ibid. p. 40
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According to Madani, basing his reasoning on the hadith collection of Al-Saif al- 
Sarim, while Muhammad lived he had the option of forgiving blasphemers, but now 
apologies and repentance from blasphemers cannot be accepted - the offender must be 
killed.28 Ibn Taymiyya also insists that repentance will not save the offender from 
execution.29 (This contrasts with the apostasy law which, according to some schools, 
allows a three-day period for possible repentance so as to avoid execution.)
With regard to blasphemy committed by non-Muslims, there is variation according to 
different schools of law. The Maliki school teaches that a dhimmi who criticises 
Muhammad is only guilty of blasphemy if his criticism goes beyond merely stating 
what is a necessary part of a non-Muslim's belief. This school also teaches that a non- 
Muslim blasphemer who is guilty according to the above definition may still escape 
execution by converting to Islam.30 This option was practised in Sukkur in 1995 
when a fourteen-year-old Christian girl, Carol Daphne, was obliged to convert to 
Islam after having submitted an allegedly blasphemous answer in a school test. Carol 
and her relatives had received many death threats and processions led by extremist 
Muslims had called for the death penalty for the girl and her headmistress. Ironically, 
some ulema in Sukkur insisted that the child was still responsible for her blasphemy 
even after her conversion to Islam.31 Salman Rushdie also tried the same in December 
1990 but found that re-converting to Islam - without condemning his allegedly 
blasphemous The Satanic Verses - did not result in the lifting of the Ayatollah 
Khomeini's death sentence.32
28ibid. pp. 109,126
29Ruthven op. cit. p .51
30"A1-Risala" (Maliki manual) 37.19 Crimes Against Islam in Lawbase (London: The Islamic 
Computing Centre, 1993?)
31 Sardar, Asawal "Test o f faith" Newsline September 1995 p.59
32Kharroufah, Prof.* Dr Ala'ul Deen The Judgement o f  Islam on the Crimes o f  Salman Rushdie "Death 
Sentence Still in Force" (Kuala Lumpur, Percetakan Sentosa (KL) Sdn. Bhd., 1991) passim but 
especially pp.9-11; Rushdie, Salman "Why I have embraced Islam" in his Imaginary Homelands 
(London: Granta Books, 1992)
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Madani quotes a fatwa  of Ibn Taymiyya which specifically contradicts the teaching 
that execution can be avoided by converting to Islam: "In the case of a non-Muslim 
who embraces Islam after committing the crime, his conversion cannot save him from 
the punishment."33
The case with Shafi'i law, which is one of the two schools applied in the Indian sub­
continent, is very different. Here the same offence is to be punished by death, 
whether committed by a Muslim or a non-Muslim, i.e. there is no exemption for non- 
Muslims who are merely stating the beliefs that make them non-Muslims. The 
argument is that a dhimmi who blasphemes the Prophet has broken his contract of 
subjection and is thus no longer protected but liable to the same penalty as an 
apostate.34
However, the school of law which is predominant in the Indian subcontinent is the 
Hanafi. The main Hanafi text relating to blasphemy committed by non-Muslims in 
the He day cP5 runs as follows:
If a Zimmee (sic) refuse to pay capitation-tax, or murder a Mussulman (sic), or 
blaspheme the prophet, or commit whoredom with a Musslima, yet his contract o f  
subjection is not dissolved; because the thing in virtue o f which the destruction o f  
Zimmees is suspended is the submitting to capitation-tax, not the actual payment thereof; 
and the submission to it still continues. Shafei has said that the contract o f subjection is 
dissolved by a Zimmee's blaspheming the prophet; because if he were a believer, by such 
blasphemy his faith would be broken*; and hence, in the same manner, his protection is
33Madani op. cit. p. 124
3477ze Hedaya Vol. II p. 221 There is one difference between a dhimmi and an apostate which is that if  
the dhimmi flees to infidel territory and that territory is later conquered by Muslims who also capture 
the dhimmi, the dhimmi will be enslaved rather than killed as an apostate in the same situation would 
be.
35The Hedaya: Vol. II p. 221
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thereby broken, since the contract o f subjection is merely a substitute for belief. The 
argument o f our doctors is that the blasphemy in question is merely an act o f infidelity 
proceeding from an infidel; and as his infidelity was no obstruction to the contract of 
subjection at the time o f making it, this supervenient act o f infidelity does not cancel it.
* That is, he would become a virtual apostate, and forfeit the protection and privileges o f  
a believer. The consequence attending a breach o f the contract o f subjection is 
mentioned a little further on.
To summarize, according to Hanafi law, a Christian or Jew who blasphemes against 
the Prophet Muhammad is only acting as a non-Muslim naturally would act, and 
therefore should not be penalized. This is an even more lenient stance than the Maliki 
law, and runs contrary to the strict blasphemy legislation contained in the Pakistan 
Penal Code - an illustration of the fact that the traditionally dominant Hanafi law is 
not always followed.
Development of the legislation
Blasphemy is dealt with under Section 295 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The original 
law, based on the British Indian Law's Indian Penal Code of 1860 and amended by the 
insertion of Section 295-A in 1927,36 simply stated that defiling any place of worship 
or deliberately insulting the religious beliefs of any group was to be punished with up 
to two years' imprisonment:
36Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, XXV o f 1927
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295. Injuring or defiling place o f worship, with intent to insult the religion 
o f any class : Whoever destroys, damages or defiles any place of worship, 
or any object held sacred by any class o f persons with the intention of 
thereby insulting the religion of any class o f persons or with the 
knowledge that any class o f person is likely to consider such destruction, 
damage or defilement as an insult to their religion, shall be punished with 
imprisonment o f either description for a term which may extend to two 
years, or with fine, or with both.
295-A. Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings 
o f any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs : Whoever, with 
deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings o f  
any class o f the citizens o f Pakistan, by words, either spoken or written, or 
by visible representations insults the religion or religious beliefs o f that 
class, shall be punished with imprisonment o f either description for a term 
which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.37
This was far more liberal than the English blasphemy law which protects only a single 
Christian denomination - the Church of England - and has no requirement for criminal 
intent.
In 1982, under Zia, an amendment was added which made wilfully defiling or 
damaging a copy of the Qur'an an offence, punishable with mandatory life 
imprisonment (Section 295-B).
295-B. Defiling, etc., o f Holy Qur'an : Whoever wilfully defiles, damages 
or desecrates a copy o f the Holy Qur'an or o f an extract therefrom or uses
37 Nizami op. cit. pp.269-271
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it in any derogatory manner or for any unlawful purpose shall be 
punishable with imprisonment for life.38
In 1986, an amendment added the crime of insulting the Prophet Muhammad 
(Gustakh-e-Rasool) in the form of Section 295-C:
295-C. Use o f derogatory remarks, etc., in respect of the Holy Prophet:
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, 
or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, 
defiles the sacred name o f the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) shall be 
punished with death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to 
fine.39
Section 295-C is significantly harsher than the rest of Section 295 in that it omits any 
requirement for the offence to be committed deliberately or with criminal intent. This 
harsher attitude is more closely in line with English blasphemy law.
In 1991, a ruling made by the Federal Shari'at Court in October 199040 came into 
effect. This disallowed the more lenient option, on the basis that it was “repugnant to 
the injunctions of Islam”, and the death penalty became mandatory.41 This was 
supposedly in accordance with the constitutional obligation to amend any law to the 
extent that it has been found un-Islamic by the Federal Shari'at Court.42 
Benazir Bhutto, then in opposition, criticised the Shari'at Court for increasing the 
severity of punishment for blasphemy. In response to this Maulana Abadu Sitar
38 ibid. pp.271-2
39 ibid. p.272
40 Points 67 and 69 o f a judgement given by Gul Muhammad Khan in a case against Muhammad 
Ismail Qureshi (Shariat Petition No. 6/L o f 1987) Federal Shariat Court, 30 October 1990 All Pakistan 
Legal Decisions Voi. XLIII (1991) FSC35
41Khwaja, Imrana "Guilty even if  proven innocent" The Friday Times (27 Feb -  4 Mar 1992) p.5
42Impact International (13 Sept-10 Oct 1991) p.3
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Niazi, the Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, issued a fatwa in 1992 which 
declared her to be a "kafir who is liable for the death penalty".43 By denying what 
was considered to be an essential truth of Islam, Ms Bhutto was deemed to have 
committed blasphemy and thus made herself a kafir, effectively an apostate. (See 
below.) The following year, as prime minister, a case was registered against her in the 
Lahore High Court under Section 295-C by Zia U1 Islam, leader of the Pakistan 
Movement Workers, for criticizing the blasphemy law and separate electorates 
system 44
In 1993 a bill targeting Shi'as was introduced which provided for severe penalties for 
those guilty of defiling the names of Muhammad's family and Companions 45 The bill 
was rejected by the National Assembly in July 1994.46
The Federal Shari'at Court had also recommended in 1991 that a clause be added to 
Section 295-C to include other prophets so that defiling the name of any prophet 
would carry a mandatory death sentence.47 In June 1994 Judge Mian Nazir Akhtar 
expressed his hope that “the provision be made more comprehensive to as to make 
blasphemy qua other Prophets including the Holy Christ, punishable with the same 
sentence of death” 48 The problem here is that if a Christian were to declare his or her
43"Nearer, my God, to theocracy" The Economist, Sept 5-11, 1992 p.38; Dildar and Mughal op. cit. 
p.64
44"Persecuted" Newsline, Nov/Dec 1993 p.26; Human Rights Commission o f Pakistan, State o f  Human 
Rights in Pakistan 1993 (1994?) p.27; Dildar and Mughal p.64. The First Information Report o f  the 
case registered against Benazir is not available to the public.
45U.S. Department o f  State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993 (February 1994) 
p.1377
46"Pakistani Parliament Rejects Religion Bill" (UPI, 24 July 1994) cited in Forte op. cit. p.41
47 Point 68 o f a judgement given by Gul Muhammad Khan in a case against Muhammad Ismail 
Qureshi (Shariat Petition No. 6/L o f  1987) Federal Shariat Court, 30th October 1991 All Pakistan Legal 
Decisions Vol. XLIII (1991) FSC35
48 Riaz Ahmed v. State, Criminal Miscellaneous No. 140/B o f  1994, 9 June 1994 All Pakistan Legal 
Decisions Vol. XLVI (1994) Lahore 502. See also Lahore 494 for the arguments o f the lawyer 
representing the Christian parties in this case.
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belief that Jesus is the Son of God this would be blasphemy to a Muslim.49 However, 
no such case has so far been brought.
On 16 February 1994, the Pakistan Law Commission decided to send Section 295-C 
to the Council of Islamic Ideology for further examination.50 Amendments to the 
legislation were proposed by Benazir Bhutto's government in 1994 with the aim of 
somewhat redressing the balance between accuser and accused. Her cabinet approved 
an amendment whereby a case could not be registered until a court had enquired into 
it and found that there was a case to answer. If the court found the complaint to be 
false, the complainant would be liable to a prison sentence.51 Her cabinet also twice 
examined the possibility of changing the mandatory death sentence into a prison 
sentence. It considered making blasphemy a non-cognizable offence in which the 
State had no responsiblity. It also considered the possibility of requiring proof that 
the blasphemy was uttered deliberately and with malicious intent.52 When, however, 
on 6 May 1994 the Federal Law minister announced two amendments designed to 
discourage false accusations and prevent the exploitation of suspects by the police, 
radical Islamic groups immediately offered $40,000 for his death.53 The government 
then abandoned their efforts to introduce the amendments. In February 1995 Prime 
Minister Benazir Bhutto stated that she still intended to amend the law, but she did not 
achieve this before being ousted from power.54
However, according to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), unofficial 
changes made by the Government in 1995 to procedures for filing blasphemy charges
49"Pakistan: Prophet and Loss" The Economist (7 May 1994) p.78
50"Draft o f blasphemy law would be sent to CII" The Frontier Post, February 17, 1994
51 "Amending the blasphemy law" Dawn, May 9, 1994
52Irfan, Ahmad "47 years! Time to roll back Islam" in Impact International (August 1994) pp.8-9; 
"Pakistan: Prophet and Loss" The Economist (7 May 1994) p.38 ; "Pakistan May Amend Blasphemy 
Law" Agence France Presse (8 May 1994); Sarwar, Beena "Pakistan: Blasphemy Law to Stay, Minor 
Modifications" Inter Press Service (19 July 1994)
53"Extremists Put Contract on Law Minister" The Independent (11 July 1994) p.l 1
54The News International, February 14, 1995; International Herald Tribune February 15, 1995
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have been followed by a significant drop in the number of blasphemy charges. Under 
the new procedures, magistrates are required to investigate allegations of blasphemy 
to see if they are credible before filing formal charges. The HRCP reports that in 
1996 one charge was brought against a Christian, three against Ahmadiyyas and none 
against Muslims.55 In May 1999 the Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, Raja 
Zafar-ul-Haq, announced that the initial invesitgation of an accusation of blasphemy 
must be made by a six-member enquiry committee comprising two noted religious 
leaders each from the Muslim and Christian communities, the deputy commissioner 
and the Senior Superintendent of Police of the district concerned. This committee 
would visit the place where the case of blasphemy had been reported to verify the 
facts before a First Investigation Report would be registered.56
Also relevant is Section 298 of the Penal Code.
298. Uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound religious 
feelings : Whoever, with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious 
feelings o f any person, utters any word or makes any sound in the hearing 
o f that person or makes any gesture in the sight o f that person or places 
any object in the sight o f that person, shall be punished with imprisonment 
o f either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, 
or with both.57
An amendment was added in 1980.
55Reported in U.S. Department o f State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices fo r  1996 
(February 1997) p.1474
56 Research staff o f the Christian Study Centre “Country Focus” Al-Mushir Vol. 41 No. 2 (1999) p.84
57 Nizami op. cit. p.274
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298-A. Use o f derogatory remarks, etc., in respect of holy personages :
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, 
or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, 
defiles the sacred name of any wife (Ummul Mumineeri), or members o f  
the family (Ahle-bait), o f the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), or any o f  
the righteous Caliphs (Khulafa-e-Rashideen) or companions (Sahaaba) o f  
the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) shall be punished with 
imprisonment o f either description for a term which may extend to three 
years, or with fine, or with both.58
Further amendments were added in 1984 (298-B and 298-C) concerning the activities 
of Ahmadiyyas, specifically forbidding them from using certain Islamic epithets, 
descriptions and titles, from calling themselves Muslims, and from preaching or 
propagating their faith (see below). These amendments do not affect Christians.
At the time of writing it seems unlikely that any further amendments to these laws 
will be passed, owing to the atmosphere of intimidation. Death threats were issued in 
1998 by the “Pakistan Taliban” against Christians and Ahmadiyyas who might protest 
against Section 295-C. They also threatened the “groups which were supporting the 
Christians’ cause” and the government, should it attempt to change Section 295-C.59 
An illuminating remark was also made by the Speaker of the Pakistan National 
Assembly, Elahi Bux Sumro, who indicated that change in the law is unlikely. He 
sought to lay blame for the current situation on both President Zia and the American 
government, asserting that during the 1980s the American government had sought 
Zia’s help to oust the Russians from Afghanistan. In return the Americans refrained 
from challenging the passing of Section 295-C and other Islamic measures, which
58 ibid. pp.275-6
59 “Deobandis for forming “Taliban-e-Pakistan” The News (29 August 1998)
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have now become so firmly entrenched that they cannot be changed. Whether or not 
this is factual and accurately interpreted, it is noteworthy that he, as a representative of 
the upper echelons of the government, sought to dissociate himself from Section 295- 
C and to place the responsibility elsewhere.60
Illustrations
(a) Daniel Scot - the first case to be registered under Section 295-C 61
Daniel Scot was bom into a Christian family in 1951 and brought up in a Christian 
village in Punjab Province. In 1968, he was sent to the Islamia College Garu Mandir 
in Karachi. Out of 8,000 students in the science section there were only two 
Christians, Daniel and one other. The other Christian student deliberately did not 
reveal his faith, but Daniel was open about his. As a result, he was banned by his 
fellow students from drinking from the tap, in accordance with the belief that Muslims 
cannot share cooking or eating utensils with Christians (see chapter 4).
Later the same year, he entered into debate with an Ahmadiyya student in his class.
The Ahmadiyya student criticised Jesus Christ, and Daniel responded by criticising 
the founder of the Ahmadiyya sect, Mirza Ghulam Ahmed, concluding that Mirza was 
insane and not a prophet. As a result the Ahmadiyya student gathered about 25 others 
in order to kill Daniel. The group dragged him from the room in order to push him off 
the edge of the balcony, but his life was saved when a professor intervened.
60 Elahi Bux Sumro, Pakistan High Commission, London, interview with author (13 May 1998)
61 The following account is taken from Daniel Scot’s own written testimony (July 1996). His case is 
also mentioned in Gul, Muhammad Shan “Courting the Law” Friday Times (29 May -  4 June 1998) 
p.23 and described, though with some inaccuracies particularly on dates, in Chaudhry, Gulzar Wafa “A 
prophetic kiss: self-sacrifice for liberation” The Minorities' View (September -  October 1998) pp.3,5
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Always active in trying to spread the Christian faith, Daniel was accused in 1969 by 
Muslim students of being an American spy propagating a Western religion. In 1974 
during the third year of his B.Sc. degree Daniel had a talk with Professor Kahar Ali 
Khan. In the context of a discussion of relativistic mass, the professor condemned 
Christians for not believing in Muhammad's journey to heaven. Daniel pointed out to 
him that many Muslims also do not believe that this journey took place physically but 
rather spiritually. The professor was angry, but did not refute what Daniel had said. 
That year, Daniel received the minimum marks to pass in all his subjects, which he 
believes was the result of having angered Professor Khan. The next year this 
professor left and Daniel received a first class M.Sc. degree.
In 1976, Daniel began teaching at a nationalized mission college in Lahore. He was 
transferred in 1985 to the Government Degree College in Okara, which was a centre 
of the Jamaat-i-Islami. In 1986 Section 295-C of the Penal Code was introduced, and 
Daniel noticed a change in attitude and behaviour of his Muslim colleagues at the 
College. Later in the year, one of the senior physics professors asked Daniel what he 
thought of the Qur'an. He replied that the differences between the Bible and the 
Qur'an indicated that they could not have the same source. The following day, Daniel 
was summoned before the College Council and told that he must give up preaching 
Christianity and become a Muslim. If he refused a case of blasphemy would be filed 
against him, under the new legislation. Daniel replied that if he were to reject his 
Saviour Jesus Christ, who else would save him? One of the professors declared that 
Muhammad would save him. Daniel then quoted from the Bible, the Qur'an and the 
Hadith to support the sinlessness of Christ and the fact that Muhammad was not sure 
of his own salvation, let alone anyone else's.
As a result, Professor Changase Mohammad and Professor Omar Ali filed against 
Daniel a case of insulting Muhammad. The professors incited the students against
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him and 5,000 students turned out, many of them armed with guns and daggers, trying 
to find him to kill him.
A case was registered against Daniel under the newly passed Section 295-C, the First 
Information Report being registered on 24/26 September 1986. On 27 October 1986, 
120 Christian leaders, including foreign missionaries as well as Daniel, met President 
Zia ul-Haq. Daniel was told that the case against him could not be dismissed, but that 
nothing serious would happen to him immediately. He and his wife and children 
spent several months in hiding in various places and eventually managed to get visas 
to leave for Australia.
Daniel's case was the first charge made against a Christian of defiling the name of 
Muhammad. It was uncharacteristic of subsequent cases against Christians in two 
ways:
Firstly, it appears that the conversation for which Daniel was accused of blasphemy 
was deliberately contrived by his opponents. Thus he did indeed criticize 
Muhammad, whereas in many other blasphemy cases the accused and their witnesses 
have vehemently denied that any derogatory remarks were made.
In most cases of blasphemy registered against Christians, it appears that the 
complainant has had some sort of earlier grudge against the accused and is using the 
blasphemy law as an easy weapon of retaliation. In Daniel's case this is also true in 
that his openness about his Christian faith, and his constant proselytizing had created 
many enemies. It is, however, unusual that the cause of the quarrel should be simply 
and directly religious.
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(b) Gul Pervaiz Masih - the first Christian to be convicted under the 
Blasphemy Law62
Gul Pervaiz Masih, a Christian, lived in a village to the east of Sargodha. In 1991 he 
was asked by the other villagers to have the communal water tap repaired, and he was 
given 35 rupees to get the job done. The tap was repaired, but soon failed again, and 
on 10 December 1991 Gul's neighbour, Sajjad Hussain, allegedly a member of the 
Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP), a militant Sunni group which is violently anti-Shi'a, 
questioned Gul about the faulty repair job, implying that Gul had pocketed the money. 
A heated argument followed, moving on to politics and religion, drawing other 
villagers to listen, including Gul's brother Bashir. Bashir persuaded Gul and Sajjad 
Hussain to make peace.
However, Rasheed Tunda, an employee of a local landowner called Mohammad 
Aslam Kachela, went to the local police station and filed a First Information Report 
(FIR) dated 13 December 1991 against the two Masih brothers on behalf of Sajjad 
Hussain. According to Gul Masih, Rasheed Tunda had had a grudge against him, 
because Gul admonished him for harassing the village women.
The brothers were arrested by the police on 14 December 1991. In the FIR, Sajjad 
Hussain accused Gul of making derogatory statements about the Prophet Muhammad 
and his wife Aisha. He also alleged that Gul had condemned some local maulanas, 
saying that they often indulged in adultery.
62Zaidi, Mazhar "Doomed by Faith" in Newsline (May 1994) pp. 132-3; The 'B lasphem y' Episodes: An 
HRCP inquiry (Human Rights Commission o f Pakistan, no date given); Judgment in the Court o f  Khan 
Talib Hussain Baloch, Additional Sessions Judge, Sargodha, Sessions Case No. 6 o f 1992, Sessions 
Trial No. 6 o f 1992, The State vs. Gul Masih s/o Dolat Masih caste Christian r/o Chak No. 46 N.B.
City Sargodha
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According to Bashir Masih, his brother had not made any defamatory remarks, but 
Aslam Kachela had manufactured the incident as part of his campaign to get elected in 
the local bodies election. There was a dispute between him and Aziz Masih, a brother 
of Gul and Bashir, who was also prominent in local politics and who had formerly 
been his ally.
The police declared Bashir innocent and released him on 13 January 1992. They also 
said there was no substance in the case against Gul, but they were not empowered to 
release him. No lawyer could be found to represent the Masihs, until their case was 
taken up by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. Posters put up in the town 
by mullahs called for the death of both brothers. They also appointed death squads of 
young college students to carry this out. After the release of Bashir Masih there were 
demonstrations in the streets calling for him to be re-arrested and both brothers to be 
killed.
At the trial two prosecution witnesses denied that Gul had made any derogatory 
statements against the Prophet Muhammad or his wife. Only Sajjad Hussain spoke 
against him. Nevertheless the Sessions Judge stated in his judgement of 2 November 
1992:
Sajjad Hussain is a young man o f 21 years age, student o f  the 4th year 
with a beard and out look (sic) o f being a true Muslim and I have no 
reason to disbelieve him... In my view the prosecution has succeeded to 
prove the guilt o f the accused beyond any reasonable doubt. I see no 
mitigating circumstances in favour o f the accused nor any such is pointed 
out to me, therefore, accused is convicted u/o. 295-C PPC and sentenced to 
death and fine of rupees five thousands.63
63 Judgement in the court of Khan Talib Hussain Baloch pp. 10-11
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Gul Masih lodged an appeal against the death sentence on 5 November 1992.64 He 
was acquitted by the Lahore High Court on 27 November 1994, and released from 
prison.65 He is now living in Europe.
Gul Masih was the first Christian to be convicted under Section 295-C. His case is a 
clear illustration of a feature which typifies the majority of blasphemy cases against 
Christians, namely, that the accusation is made by someone who already has a reason 
to dislike the accused and to want to harm him. The blasphemy law is thus being used 
as a safe way to retaliate. In Gul Masih's case, there appear to have been two factors - 
Gul's ongoing disagreement with Rasheed Tunda about the treatment of women (they 
had even come to blows about this) and the local political situation described above.
In Tahir Iqbal's case (see below) , both accused and accuser offered coaching to 
children, but Tahir Iqbal had recently started to offer his lessons free of charge thus 
undercutting his accuser Peerzada Ali Ahmed Sabir. In the case of thirteen-year-old 
Salamat Masih, accused in regard to an incident on 9 May 1993, he was identified by 
a boy who had reportedly had a fight with him a day earlier.66 Chand Barkat, a bangle 
seller, was accused under Section 295-C in a case filed on 10 October 1991, by a 
competitor of his in the local market who resented the success of Chand's stall.67 The 
accusations of desecrating the Qur'an which led to the rioting in Shanti Nagar and area 
(see below) were thought by many to have been concocted by police officers who had 
been been accused of desecrating a bible by some Christians in Shanti Nagar.
MThe Guardian, 6 November 1992
59U.S. Department o f State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices fo r 1994, (U.S. Government 
Printing Office, February 1995) p. 1253; Mughal, Aftab Alexander "Freedom Without Fear" Newsline, 
December 1994
66Shakoore, S. "Pakistan for all?" in Frontier Post (date unknown, probably December 1993 or 
January 1994) pp.30-31
67Khwaja, Imrana "Guilty even if  proven innocent" The Friday Times (11 Feb -  4 Mar 1992) p.5
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(c) Tahir Iqbal - allegedly killed because o f a charge ofblasphemy6*
Tahir Iqbal was bom into a Muslim family in 1959. In 1984 he became paralysed in 
his lower limbs, and was obliged to retire from his job as a mechanic with the 
Pakistan Air Force. He converted to Christianity and was baptized.
A First Information Report (FIR) was filed against him on 7 December 1990 by 
Peerzada Ali Ahmed Sabir.69 He was immediately arrested and imprisoned in 
Kokhlapat Central Jail where he died on 19 July 1992.
According to the FIR, Tahir Iqbal had converted from Islam to Christianity; was 
coaching Muslim children free of charge and criticizing Islam to them; claimed that 
he could prove from the Qur'an that "illicit intercourse, drinking and sodomy are 
justified in Islam"; prepared a schedule mentioning various verses and chapters of the 
Qur'an "and he has marked and underlined those various verses according to his 
references"; abused Islam and the Prophet Muhammad when he heard the call to 
prayer. Whilst offences against all three parts of Section 295 of the Pakistan Penal 
Code were listed in the FIR, the police charged him under Section 295B only 
(desecration of the Qur'an). The complainant himself offered coaching to children but 
he charged for his lessons.
Mullahs openly voiced threats against Tahir Iqbal's advocate and declared that they 
would kill Tahir Iqbal if he were released on bail. Local Christians felt that prison 
was the safest place for him, and Tahir Iqbal himself expressed this opinion.
68First Information Report No. 297/90 Police Station South Cantonment, Lahore (7 December 1990); 
Ismail, Zafar, "Report on the Tahir Iqbal Case" (5 August 1992, unpublished)
69 First Information Report No. 297/90, Lahore Cantonment Police Station
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While in prison, Tahir is reported to have continued to slander the religion of Islam 
and the prophet Muhammad. This resulted in additional charges being made against 
him under other sections of the Penal Code.70
The Christian community were not in favour of publicity for Tahir's case, feeling that 
this would lead to open confrontation with the mullahs and hence jeopardize his 
safety. It was, however, brought into the limelight by others: firstly by the Human 
Rights Commission of Pakistan when they decided to take the bail petition to the High 
Court (July 1991), then by the publication of an article in The Economist (October 5, 
1991), then an article by the Western Christian news agency News Network 
International (December 12, 1991) and then a report by the Western Christian 
missionary organization Open Doors (June 1992). This publicity had exactly the 
effect which the Pakistani Christians had feared. The open involvement of the two 
Western Christian groups, News Network International and Open Doors, was 
interpreted by Muslims as a crusade against Islam.
In March 1992 Peerzada Ali Ahmed Sabir submitted an application to Additional 
Sessions Judge Sabah Mohyuddin that Tahir Iqbal be sentenced to death for apostasy 
from Islam. The case was heard on 23 April 1992 by Judge Sabah Mohyuddin, who 
dismissed the application, saying that the accused would only be sentenced to death if 
the prosecution could prove that he had defiled the name of Muhammad.71
Tahir Iqbal died some time during the night of 19-20 July 1992. There was no post 
mortem, but some of the Christian community believe that he was murdered.72
70Ismail, Zafar, "Report on the Tahir Iqbal Case" p.2
7^'Convert in Christianity dies mysteriously in prison" The Friday Times (30 July- 5 August 1992) 
p.3; Raiwind Diocesan Newsletter (September 1992)
72"Christians feel insecure after prisoner's mysterious death" The News, Vol. 2 No. 227 (23 July 1992); 
"Bearing the Cross" Newsline, September 1992; Allen, Trevor "Report on the death o f Tahir Iqbal" 
(undated MS reporting information he received on 7 October 1992 in Lahore)
217
Tahir Iqbal's case illustrates a feature of several blasphemy cases against Christians, 
namely, that the accused is murdered before the due process of law has been 
completed. Other examples are given below. Another characteristic of Tahir Iqbal's 
case is that he made his situation worse than it needed to have been, in his case by 
continuing to make blasphemous remarks while in prison. In a minority of other 
cases, this has also appeared to happen - sometimes the blasphemer has been known 
to be mentally unbalanced. An example of this is Anwar Masih, a heroin addict who 
had converted from Christianity to Islam and then back to Christianity again, believed 
by his family to be insane, who had an FIR filed against him on 2 February 1993 
under Section 295-C.73 Mohammad Arshad Javaid, a Muslim from Bahawalpur, 
reportedly mentally unsound, was convicted of blasphemy and sentenced to death.74 
(He was eventually acquitted on appeal in January 1995, on the grounds of insanity.75)
Tahir Iqbal's case also illustrates the link between apostasy and blasphemy (see 
below). While the former is a capital offence under the Shari'ah and the latter is 
considered much less serious, in Pakistani law the situation is reversed. Indeed, 
apostasy is not punishable at all according to the Pakistan Penal Code. His conversion 
to Christianity was the first offence listed against him in the FIR, but is not an offence 
under law, so he could not be charged with it. The blasphemy charge may have been, 
to a greater or lesser extent, a substitute for the apostasy charge which his accuser 
would have liked to make had it been available within the scope of the Pakistan Penal 
Code. It is significant that his step-mother, Hamida Bibi, who attended the court 
several times with the prosecution witnesses, had often condemned Tahir Iqbal for his 
apostasy, and asked the court to punish him according to Shari'ah.76 However, it
73Mir, Anita "That way madness lies..." The Frontier Post (29 January 1994)
74U.S. Department o f State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices fo r 1994 (February 1995) p. 
1253
75Dildar and Mughal op. cit. p.67
76Shakir op. cit. p. 123
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could be argued that blasphemy very often amounts to apostasy if committed by a 
Muslim (see below).
(d) Shanti Nagar and area - the first - and so far the only - example of 
mass rioting and large-scale destruction ofproperty as a result of an 
accusation of blasphemy11
The twin villages of Shanti Nagar and Tibba Colony (Bhoota Abad) lie about 12km 
east of Khanewal in the Punjab. Most Christians work on the land and are considered 
to be economically well off.
On 14 January 1997 three police officers raided the Shanti Nagar home of Raj Paul, a 
60-year old Christian also known as Raji Baba, who was suspected of running a 
gambling den and an alcohol distillery. During the search one officer dropped a copy 
of the Bible on the floor. Raji Baba pleaded to be allowed to pick the bible up. The 
officer forbade him to do so, and kicked the bible. Raji Baba was taken to the police 
station.
Some residents of Shanti Nagar approached Khanewal Deputy Superintendent of 
Police Habib Ahmed Ghumman and another police officer named Azizur Rehman 
Dogar to seek Raji’s release and the registration of a case of desecration of the Bible 
against the police officials concerned. The police responded by releasing Raji Baba
77Wafa, Gulzar, 14 February 1997; The Daily Dawn, 13 February 1997; The Daily Khabren, 8 
February 1997; Aftab, Fauzia, 22 February 1997; The Friday Times, 20-26 February 1997; The Nation, 
7 February 1997, 8 February 1997; Dean, George "Incident at Shanti Nagar, Pakistan, Feb 5th and 6th 
1997" 8 February 1997; "Muslims blaming Christians burning Holy Qur'an" (unidentified Catholic 
source); Fazal, Asghar (teacher at St Joseph's Catholic School, Khanewal) 11 February 1997; Yusaf, 
Patras, Catholic Bishop o f Multan in press release o f 8 February 1997 issued by Caritas Pakistan; 
Ismail, Zafar 14 February 1997; Daily Jang, 8 February 1997; Azariah, Bishop Samuel and nine other 
Christian leaders Press Conference on the Desecration o f  Churches, the Holy Bibles, and the Houses o f  
Christian in Khanewal and Shantinagar (8 February 1997).
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but refused to register a case of desecration. The Christians increased their protest, 
and organized a protest procession on 17 January. This moved the senior police 
officials to suspend and order the arrest of the police officers involved in the incident. 
A First Information Report (FIR) was registered under Sections 452, 148 and 149 of 
the Pakistan Penal Code.78 But before their arrest, the police officials arranged bail 
for themselves. They were not treated as accused persons, but were actually called on 
to go on duty during the elections of 3 February.
When Christians saw these police officers on duty again during the elections (3 
February 1997), a huge Christian protest was organised against the civil authorities, 
demanding the immediate arrest of the police officers involved and the registration of 
another FIR under section 295-A. The Khanewal Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Haseeb 
Atthar, ordered the registration of the FIR and an immediate dismissal of the police 
officer who was chiefly involved in desecrating the bible.
An announcement that tom or burnt pages of the Qur’an, with blasphemous
statements written on them had been found near a bridge 6.5 km from Khanewal and
2.5 km from Shanti Nagar was made from Jamia Masjid Gapwal-Khanewal at 10.30
p.m. on 5 February. Both Christians and Muslims of Shanti Nagar denied the truth of
£
the allegation. The announcement included the information that the desecration was 
blamed on a Christian resident of Shanti Nagar known as Raji Baba. Afterwards 
motorists and motorcyclists, equipped with megaphones, rode around Khanewal 
spreading the news and urging the Muslim inhabitants to gather for revenge. Several 
announcements were made from mosques in and around Khanewal, urging Muslims 
to assemble to march to Shanti Nagar and other Christian localities to avenge the 
alleged desecration.
78 These Sections are concerned with trespass and armed rioting.
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A mob of several thousand Muslims assembled in Khanewal the same evening and 
marched towards Shanti Nagar and Tibba Colony. The police intervened and the mob 
returned to Khanewal, setting fire to Christian property on the way.
The following morning the number of Muslims involved in the rioting had risen to 
between 20,000 and 30,000.79 More damage was done to Christian property in 
Khanewal, while the largest section of the crowd attacked Shanti Nagar. By 9.00 
a.m. the Muslims had reached the village, and the police withdrew. The rioters, led by 
Muslim clerics, were armed with sticks, axes, stones, rocks, knives, firearms, 
explosives and petrol bombs. Homes were looted and then set on fire, resulting in the 
destruction of 785 of the 905 houses in Shanti Nagar, Tibba Colony and four other 
settlements nearby. Telephone and electricity connections were broken. Taps, water 
pumps and water tanks were damaged, making it impossible to extinguish the flames. 
Cattle were driven away. A number of women and girls disappeared. Some later 
reported that they had been kidnapped. At least ten suffered attempts to force them to 
recite the Muslim creed (the implication of this for their marriages is described in 
chapter 4). They were threatened with violence. Some may have been raped, though 
families will not admit to such a dishonour.80 Eventually the army intervened and the 
rioters left. Similar attacks were made on the Christian basti of Civil Lines in 
Khanewal, home to around 250 families. Sixteen houses, five shops and a church were 
burnt.81
79Ahmed, Khaled "The sack o f Shantinagar" The Friday Times (20-26 February 1997) p.8; George, 
Sister Naseem and Mughal, Aftab Alexander Shantinagar's Incident: special report (Justice and Peace 
Commission o f the Conference o f Major Religious Superiors in Pakistan, 13 February 1997); 
"Shantinagar licks its wounds" in Dawn (13 February 1997) p.8
80 The Friday Times 20-26 February 1997; The Daily Dawn 13 February 1997; The Daily Khabren 8 
February 1997; Yusaf, Patras op. cit.; Ismail, Zafar 14 February 1997; Wafa, Gulzar 14 February 1997; 
Reuters in Daily Jang, 7 February 1997
81The total list o f damaged buildings is as follows:
CHURCHES
1. Catholic Church and Priest’s residence, Khanewal
2. COP Church and Pastor’s house, Khanewal
3. Salvation Army Church, Khanewal
4. Baptist Church, Khanewal
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The event appears to have been carefully planned and orchestrated, possibly by the 
suspended police officers. The date on which the accusations of desecration was 
made was the 27th of Ramadan," the night of power", when the mosques were full 
and news could be spread quickly.
Investigation and interviews with district administration and police officials showed 
that the allegation against Raji Baba was completely baseless.82 The two religious 
communities in the area had previously lived in peace, despite a strong presence of the 
Sipha-e-Sahaba in Khanewal.
The lives of some Christian clergy in Khanewal were saved by their Muslim 
neighbours. Some of the Muslim religious leaders whose names were used to incite
5. Catholic Church and Priest’s residence, Shanti Nagar
6. Salvation Army Church and Pastor’s house, Shanti Nagar
7. Full Gospel Assemblies Church, Shanti Nagar
8. Calvary Baptist Church, Shanti Nagar
9. Salvation Army Church and Pastor’s house, Tibba Colony
10. Full Gospel Assemblies Church, Tibba Colony
11. Catholic Church, Chak 8 1-82/10-R
12. COP Church, Chak 81-82/10-R
13. Catholic Church, Chak 83-85/10-R
14. COP Church, Chak 85-86/10-R
15. Catholic Church, Chak 87/10-R
16. COP Church, Chak 12, Rakh Kabirwala 
DISPENSARIES
1. Salvation Army Dispensary, Khaniwal
2. Private Hospital o f Dr. Izzat Jamal, near Shanti Nagar
3. Salvation Army Dispensary, Shanti Nagar 
SCHOOLS AND HOSTELS
1. St. Joseph’s High School, Khanewal
2. St. Joseph’s Boys’ Hostel, Khanewal
3. Salvation Army High School, Shanti Nagar
4. Christian Education Centre, Chak 81 -82/10-R 
PROPERTIES
1. Civil Lines, Khanewal: 5 houses and 15 shops, affected 26 families o f 200 members
2. Shanti Nagar: 306 houses and 80 shops, affected 326 families o f 5500 members
3. Tibba Colony: 285 houses and 25 shops, affected 305 families o f 2874 members
Sources: Justice and Peace Commission (13 February 1997); Asghar Fazal (11 February 1997); Gulzar 
Wafa (14 February -1997) all cited in Ismail, Zafar Pakistan: Violence in Shanti Nagar - Khanewal 
February 5 and 6, 1997 (17 March 1997)
82"Shantinagar licks its wounds" in Dawn (13 February 1997) p.7
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the crowd had themselves condemned the violence and declared the alleged 
desecration of the Holy Qur'an to be false. Some Muslim religious leaders attempted 
to defuse the situation and to calm the frenzied crowd.83
There is some suspicion that those orchestrating the riots may have sought help from 
the Sipah-e-Sahaba in Khanewal and Harakat-ul-Ansar, a militant group fighting for 
the liberation of Indian-occupied Kashmir.84 The criminalization of Sipah-e-Sahaba 
as a terrorist organisation was confirmed by the police high command in Punjab 
through a press conference in which Sipah offenders confessed to bank robberies and 
other violent crimes.85 Sipah-e-Sahaba is strengthened and given immunity by its 
offshoot Harakat-ul-Ansar, which the state authorities have to tolerate because of its 
participation in the Kashmir “jih a d \  Harakat-ul-Ansar has killed a number of Shi'a 
leaders in the province. In October 1996, Sipah-e-Jhangvi (another offshoot of Sipah- 
e-Sahaba) killed a Shi'a deputy commissioner, Ali Raza Kharal, in Khanewal.
Leaders of both Sipah-e-Jhangvi and Harakat-ul-Ansar were members of the Punjab 
and National Assemblies after the 1993 elections and wielded considerable political 
influence in Khanewal.
These events illustrate the way in which an allegation of blasphemy or desecration 
could incite not just a few zealous individuals to seek out the alleged culprit and kill
83These included Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the Amir o f the Jama'at-e-Islami, appealed for peace, and 
condemned the desceration o f the Qur'an and the arson that followed. He declared that Christians 
could not have been responsible for desecrating the Qur'an as minorities could not be involved in such 
a heinous act as they comprise downtrodden classes who are harmless. His statements had a degree of  
ambiguity since he went on to say that the act of an individual cannot be blamed on the whole 
community. He said it was the responsibility o f Muslims to safeguard the life and property of  
minorities. Maulana Ajmal Qadiri, a leader o f  the Jamiat-Ulama-e-Islam, blamed the police for what 
had happened, and urged the president to ask the Christians for forgiveness. Muslim members o f the 
local Peace Committee, Hakim Mohamad Alim, Mir Zahirul Hassan, Maulana Mohamad Abass 
Akhtar, Sufi Abdul Haq Rizivi, Fateh Mohamad Hamadi and Inam Uilah Qureshi, and two local 
leaders o f the Jama'at-i-Islami, Sufi Mohamad Sabir and Aziz Latif, expressed that they were deeply 
grieved by the loss.suffered by their Christian brothers, and expressed their willingness to assist them.
84"Shantinagar licks its wounds" in Dawn (13 February 1997) p.8; Howard, Roger "Wrath o f Islam: 
the HUA analysed" in Jane's Intelligence Review  (October 1997) pp.467-8
85Ahmed, Khaled op. cit.
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him or her, but tens of thousands of people to large-scale, well organized and well 
equipped attacks on any Christian property which they could find. That such a large 
number should take part in the violence indicates that many if not most of them must 
have ordinarily been moderate Muslims rather than extremists. The violence at Shanti 
Nagar also illustrates how the existence of the blasphemy law, which normally targets 
individuals, can impact communal relations on a much wider scale. At the time of 
writing this case is the only example of its kind. It remains to be seen if this pattern 
will be repeated in future blasphemy cases.
Misuse of the blasphemy law
The decision of the Federal Shariat Court in 1991 to prescribe a mandatory death 
sentence for derogatory remarks against the Prophet Muhammad made the blasphemy 
law a deadly weapon. The punishment was the most severe possible. Yet the crime 
was only a matter of spoken words; therefore an accusation was easy to make and 
hard to disprove. The accuser ran no risk in making the accusation. Many if not most 
accusations of defiling the Prophet's name appear to have been made by individuals 
who already had a grudge against the accused for some completely separate reason. 
Another important aspect is that once an accusation has been made, some extremist 
Muslims may see it as their duty to kill the person concerned, whether or not their 
guilt has been proven. Processions and calls for their death increase the popular 
feeling against the accused.
Naimat Ahmer, a Christian school-teacher, was accused of blasphemy against the 
Prophet and stabbed to death by Farooq Ahmed, who had read about the alleged 
blasphemy in an anonymous pamphlet (6 January 1992). Tahir Iqbal died in 
mysterious circumstances in jail after much publicity of his case (20 July 1992) - see 
above. Bantu Masih was stabbed by his accuser (May 1991) while in police custody.
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He never recovered from the stabbing and died on 23 October 1992.86 Manzoor 
Masih was shot dead as he emerged from the Lahore High Court, having been granted 
bail on 5 April 1994.87
According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan:
The severity of the punishment apparently oversensitises weaker or more 
fanatical elements and makes them eager to become ready agents of the 
presumed divine wrath themselves. It also gives unscrupulous elements in 
society a handle to play their own prejudices against, or settle their scores 
with, individuals by easily alleging blasphemy and putting them in a 
difficult spot.88
The left-wing daily newspaper, The Frontier Post, reported the concern of the 
Pakistan Law Commission over the way Section 295-C is misused by the police and 
sectarian organisations. The paper commented:
It is no secret now that the law has been used to harass and persecute the 
minorities, particularly. A number o f persons including children have 
been sent to jail under the law on the basis o f allegations o f questionable 
veracity to the effect that by some word or deed they had deliberately 
sought to insult the name of the Holy Prophet (PBUH). The environment 
o f hysteria that is rapidly built up around such cases by the interested 
parties usually makes it very difficult for the victims to obtain relief from 
the courts. A central problem with the law is that the term 'defile' is open
86Sarwar "God forbid..."
87Sarwar, Beena "God forbid..." Frontier Post (25 March 1993); The Herald, May 1994 p.52
88"Blasphemy Laws Targeting Minorities: an inquiry" Human Rights Commission o f  Pakistan 
Newsletter Vol.3 No. 2 (April 1992) p.28
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to all kinds o f interpretation and, on the other hand, contrary to what is a 
major consideration in criminal law, it does not accord any room to the 
issue o f motive or intent. Even Section 295-B inserted by General Zia in 
1982 makes wilfulness a crucial factor constituting offence. Other similar 
laws also accord due importance to motive and the issue o f offence arises 
only when something is considered to have been deliberately done in order 
to insult religion or hurt someone's feelings.
The Law Commission is in favour of sending the law for further 
consideration to the Council o f Islamic Ideology. The question is whether 
Section 295-C is really needed. As far as any deliberate insult to the name 
of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) is concerned such an offence is already 
covered under section 295 or 298. The CII should equally consider ways 
o f tightening the law to bring to book those guilty o f  false accusations o f  
blasphemy for ulterior, self-serving motives. Beyond that the media must 
be used extensively to inculcate a better understanding o f religion and to 
prevent its use, so contrary to the spirit, as an instrument o f repression 
against the weaker sections o f our society.89
Anita Mir, a respected left-wing journalist, writing in The Frontier Post a few days 
earlier, asserted that the blasphemy law and the Hudood Ordinance "encourage some 
people to victimize other people". Religious minorities, she claimed, are seen as 
enemies inside the country, just as India and the West are seen as external enemies. 
"Christians are persecuted in this country because: 1) we have given people a law 
which invites them to make victims of Christians; 2) Pakistani Christians, though 
indigenous to the land, are seen to be connected with the white man (their shared
89"Misuse o f blasphemy law" The Frontier Post (19 February 1994)
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religion). From here it is a short step to anger at the white man's dominance and 
revenge— taken out on local Christians."90
Apostasy Law
Introduction
Apostasy (ridda or irtidad) is often considered in Islam to be a hadd crime.91 This 
puts it in the same category as adultery, false accusation of adultery, drinking alcohol, 
theft, and highway robbery (and in some lists rebellion against the government). The 
punishments specified for the five main hudood offences include death (by stoning, 
crucifixion or beheading), amputation of hands and/or feet, whipping and 
banishment.92 There are detailed rules concerning the evidence required to prove a 
hadd offence - either voluntary confession, or the testimony of a certain number of 
adult male Muslim witnesses (four for adultery, two for the other offences), or 
indisputable circumstantial evidence.93 The evidential requirements for apostasy vary 
according to different schools of law. Unsurprisingly, Hanafi Sunni law, which does 
not include apostasy among the hudood, has no mention of proving apostasy by the 
witness of others,94 whereas some Shi'a statements include provision for not only 
confession95 but also the witness of "two just and truthful men".96
90Mir, Anita "Citadels o f difference?" The Frontier Post (16 February 1994)
91The main alternative to a hadd offence is a ta'zir offence i.e. an offence whose punishment is not 
specified in the Qur'an or Sunnah but is left to the discretion of the legitimate authorities. Some 
discussion o f whether apostasy is a hadd offence or a ta'zir offence is given in M.S. El-Awa 
Punishment in Islamic Law: a comparative study (Indianapolis: American Trust Publication, 1982) 
pp.54-6, 61-2
92Sidahmad, Muhammad 'ata Alsid The Hudud (Petaling Jaya: Muhammad 'Ata al Sid Sid Ahmad, 
1995) pp.219-254
93Sidahmad op. cit. pp. 146-208
94The Hedaya, Vol.. II pp. 225-246
95"Apostasy is a glaring sin in Islam" Kayhan International (3 March 1986) cited in Appendix B of  
Syed Silas Husain and Ernest Hahn's translated and annotated The Punishment o f  the Apostate 
According to Islamic Law by Abul Ala Mawdudi (no publisher given, 1994) p.83
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Apostasy is listed as a hadd crime by the Shafi'i, Maliki and Hanbali schools of law. 
The Hanafi school separates it from the hudood crimes, but compares it to a hadd 
crime.97 Unlike most of the hudood offences, there is no clear-cut penalty prescribed 
in the Qur'an for apostasy. Indeed, some interpreters consider that the Qur'an does not 
impose any earthly penalty at all, although the apostate is condemned to eternal 
damnation.
Nevertheless, the death penalty for apostasy is clearly specified in all four main 
schools of law,98 and the reasoning which is sometimes given for such a punishment 
is the analogy with treason, for rejecting the Islamic religion is seen as equivalent to 
rejecting the Islamic state. This was the case for example, soon after the death of 
Muhammad, when many tribes apostatized from Islam and rebelled against Muslim 
rule. It continues to be a key argument.99 Some Muslim scholars, for example the 
renowned Pakistani jurist, S. A. Rahman, have argued that apostasy which is not 
accompanied by rebellion against the Islamic state should not be punished.100 
However, the distinction between on the one hand merely falling from faith, and on 
the other hand falling from faith accompanied by rebellion is not recognized in 
classical Islam.101 Indeed, not only are those who leave the faith normally considered 
to be in rebellion against Islamic rule, but often those who rebel against Islamic rule 
are considered to have thereby proved themselves to be apostates.102
96Khomeini, Ayatollah Imam Tahrir al-Wassilah vol. 2 p. 496 cited in Kayhan International (3 March 
1986) in Mawdudi The punishment o f  the apostate p.83
97Sidahmad op. cit. pp.36-40
"except for women in the Hanafi school, The Hedaya vol. II p.227
99 Dr Suhaib Hasan, Secretary o f the Islamic Shari’a Council (UK) uses this argument in a letter to The 
Times (27 May 1998) stating that “Apostasy is treated as a crime against the Muslim State, exactly like 
treason, and is punished accordingly.”
100Rahman, S.A. op. cit pp.161-166
101 See, for example, Mawdudi The Punishment o f  the Apostate pp.46-52,61-64
102For example, a Muslim who refuses to pay zakat (compulsory alms, one o f Islam's five "pillars" - 
practical duties) is considered an apostate (though one who refuses to pay while acknowledging the 
obligation to do so is defined as a rebel). See Joel L. Kraemer "Apostates, rebels and brigands" Israel 
Oriental Studies 10 (1980) pp.36-7; Mawdudi The Punishment o f  the Apostate pp.26-27
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Khadduri draws a distinction between, on the one hand, individual apostates who have 
left Islam but with no intention of leaving the Islamic territory and, on the other hand, 
a group of apostates who have left the territory of Islam. The former are still to 
receive capital punishment, while the latter will find themselves the target of a 
jihad ,103
How, it may be asked, can a Muslim who leaves Islam for one of the other God- 
ordained religions - Christianity and Judaism - be regarded as committing treason? In 
effect, all he is doing is entering a religion which already exists within Muslim society 
with the special protected dhimmi status. This, however, is not the Islamic view of an 
apostate's position. According to Islam, an apostate cannot be considered a dhimmi 
because he has not paid jizya, the obligatory payment by dhimmi to their Muslim 
rulers in return for their protection. An apostate is neither a Muslim nor a dhimmi, 
therefore an apostate is an infidel.104 The Hedaya expressly forbids not only the 
imposition of jizya on apostates but also the acceptance of jizya from them.105 An 
apostate is thus prevented from making any voluntary payment of jizya and has no 
way in which to be recognized as a dhimmi. Mawdudi asserts that it is a universal 
feature of human nature to distinguish between "one who was never affiliated and 
another who was affiliated and then severed the affiliation".106
Basis in Shari'ah
Islamic law (Shari’ah ), both Sunni and Shi’a, lays down that an adult male Muslim 
who chooses another religion should be killed. It was derived from the Qur'an and
103Khadduri op. cit. pp.76-7, 149-152
104The Hedaya, Vol. II pp.213,226; Khadduri op. cit. p.76
105The Hedaya Vol. II p. 213
106Mawdudi The Punishment o f  the Apostate pp.57-61
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ahadith as follows. In the Qur'an there is an emphasis on God's punishment of 
apostates in the next life. "Anyone who, after accepting faith in God, utters disbelief - 
except under compulsion, his heart remaining firm in faith - but such as open their 
breast to unbelief, - on them is wrath from God, and theirs will be a dreadful penalty 
... without doubt, in the hereafter they will perish" (S. 16:106,109). Similar teaching is 
found in S.88:23,24; 3:86-91; 4:137 and 5:54).
Several controversial verses or passages are used by different interpreters to add 
weight to one or other side of the argument. These include:
S.2:217 speaks of those who die as unbelievers, but is sometimes 
mistranslated as a command that apostates should die for their apostasy.107
S.9.11-12 commands "fight ye the chiefs of unfaith", understood by 
Mawdudi108 and by Muhammad Iqbal Siddiqi, a scholar who follows Mawdudi’s 
school,109 as a command to execute apostates but by some other commentators110 as 
referring to pagans.
The "Sword Verse" S.9:5 states "Fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find 
them".111 Taken at face value, this would appear to say that every non-Muslim 
(except those who had made a special arrangement with the Muslims), whether or not 
he has ever professed Islam, should be killed, but this has almost never been taken 
literally.
107For example, Ath Tha'alibi, Fakhr-ud-Din-ar-Razi, also Al-Khazan commentary (used at Al-Azhar) 
which quotes from Malik ibn Anas, Ahmad ibn Hanbal and others, both cited in S.M. Zwemer The 
Law o f  Apostasy in Islam (London: Marshall Brothers, Ltd, 1924). p.34
108Mawdudi The Punishment o f  the Apostate pp. 18-19
109Siddiqi, Muhammad Iqbal The Penal Law o f  Islam (Lahore: Kazi Publications, 1979) p. 97
110For example, A. Yusuf Ali's commentary in The Holy Qur'an: Text, Translation and Commentary 
pp. 440-441
11 M entioned in the context o f  apostates in The Hedaya Vol. II p.226
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S.4:88-89 refer to the munaflqun, a group of Muslim dissenters led by 
Abdullah b. Ubayy, who deserted the rest of the Muslims at the Battle of Uhud in 625 
and are to be killed. Some Muslim commentators consider the munaflqun to be 
apostates (as indeed they are described in S.63:3 and S.9:73-87), and extend the 
command to all apostates.112
S:2:256 "Let there be no compulsion in religion" is a verse whose meaning 
and applicability have been much debated. It is sometimes used as an argument 
against the death penalty for apostasy113 but others believe that it merely means that 
no one can be forced into the Islamic faith.114
Many ahadith report Muhammad's words transmitted by Ibn 'Abbas and others, "Slay 
him who changes his religion" (e.g. Bukhari, Ibn Madja, Nasa'i). According to 
another hadith of Ibn 'Abbas and Aisha it is permissible to take the life of someone 
who "abandons his religion and separates himself from the community" (Bukhari, 
Muslim, Nasa'i). There are many reports in the form of a list of occasions when it is 
permitted to kill a Muslim, that is, in cases of adultery, murder and apostasy.115 The 
question of the correct method to be used in killing an apostate was given attention in 
various ahadith and commentaries, normally beheading.116 There are also ahadith 
which report Muhammad himself ordering the execution of specific individual 
apostates, and not drawing the line at women.117
112For example, Baidhawi, quoted in Zwemer op. cit pp.33-4; al-Tabari Garni' al-bayan f i tafsir al- 
Qur'an ed. A.M. Sakir and M.M. Sakir (Cairo, 1954) IX p. 18, cited in Kraemer op. cit. p.35; al- 
Zamakhshari Al-Kashshaf (Cairo, 1966) I p.551, cited in Kraemer op. cit. p.35; Marmaduke Pickthall 
The Meaning o f the Glorious Qur'an: text and explanatory translation (Delhi: Taj Company, 1988) 
p.89 footnote
113For example Rahman, S.A. p. 160
114 Maududi, S. Abul A ’la The Meaning o f  the Quran (Lahore: Islamic Publications (Pvt.) Limited, 
13th edition, 1993) Vol. I p. 186, note 285 p. 186
115Siddiqi op. cit. pp.99-101; Zwemer op. cit. pp.37-8; El-Awa op. cit p.52
116See, for example, Heffening W. "Murtadd" in C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs and C. 
Pellat (eds.) The Encyclopaedia o f Islam, new edition (Leiden: Brill, 1993) Vol VII p.635; “Apostasy 
from Islam” in T.P. Hughes Dictionary o f  Islam (Lahore: Premier Book House) p. 16
117For example, Baihaqi and Daraquini quoted in Siddiqi op. cit. pp.103-4
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There are contradictory traditions concerning whether an apostate should be given a 
chance to repent. Some ahadith say that God will not accept the repentance of 
someone who has previously renounced Islam, while others say that even Muhammad 
forgave apostates.118
Mawdudi cites ten examples of the execution of apostates during the period of the 
Rightly Guided Caliphs, claiming that death was always the punishment for apostasy 
under these four caliphs. Mawdudi further adds the example of the first Caliph's jihad  
against apostates, and argues that the war was waged to counter apostasy, not to 
counter rebellion.119
Sunni Schools
All four schools agree on capital punishment for adult male apostates. A summary of 
Sunni laws on apostasy is given in Mohammed A1 Abdari Ibn Hadj's legal treatise, Al 
Madkhal: "As for apostates, it is permitted to kill them by facing them or coming 
upon them from behind, just as in the case of polytheists. Secondly, their blood if 
shed brings no vengeance. Thirdly, their property is the spoil of true believers. 
Fourthly, their marriage ties become null and void."120
(a) The Hanafi School
A list of criteria for recognizing apostasy is provided by the Hanafite scholar 
Shaykhzadeh in his Madjma' al-anhur. This list includes many details of doctrinal
118For examples and lists o f ahadith, see “Murtadd” in Gibb, H.A.R. and Kramers, J.H. Shorter 
Encyclopaedia o f  Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1974) p.413
119Mawdudi The Punishment o f  the Apostate pp.22-27
120Ibn Hadj, Mohammed Al Abdari Al Madkha, (Cairo edition) vol. II, p. 181 quoted in Zwemer op. 
cit. p.50
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error and such actions as translating the Qur'an into another language or paying 
respect to a non-Muslim.121
The Hedaya lays down a procedure for dealing with apostasy.122 Firstly the Islamic 
faith may be explained to the apostate, in the hope that this can persuade him of the 
rightness of Islam. (This step is desirable but not obligatory.) The apostate is to be 
imprisoned for three days, and if he has not returned to Islam by the end of that time 
he is to be killed. No penalty is incurred by anyone who kills an apostate before he 
has been given an exposition of the faith, even though such a premature killing is 
"abominable" (makruh i.e. disapproved and improper but not totally unlawful).
Women apostates are treated differently. They are not to be killed, but to be 
imprisoned until they recant. A boy who is a minor is also not to be killed, but 
imprisoned until he comes of age. If he has not returned to the faith by that time, he is 
then to be killed. Lunatics and drunkards are not held responsible for their act.
There are also detailed instructions in the Hedaya regarding other penalties for 
apostasy. A male apostate loses his right to choose how he disposes of his property; 
on death it can only be inherited by his Muslim heirs or go to the public treasury.123 
Any property transactions he may have in progress are suspended. He is immediately 
separated from his wife. The property of a female apostate will go to her heirs as 
normal, though her Muslim husband cannot inherit in normal circumstances.
121Shaykhzadeh Madjma' al-Anhur 1 pp.629-37 summarised in Peters, Rudolph and De Vries, Gert J.J. 
"Apostasy in Islam" Die Welt des Islams XVII, 1-4 (1976-7) pp.3-4
n i The Hedaya Fo/..//pp.225ff.
123Inheritance by Muslims from an apostate is a subject of complex argument and subtle reasoning 
because o f the necessity to adhere to the rule that Muslims cannot inherit from infidels. See The 
Hedaya Vol. II p. 230.
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The Hedaya also contains complex rules about the status of children and 
grandchildren of apostates. In general, the children are also regarded as apostates and 
may in some circumstances be "compelled" to become a Muslim, whereas an 
apostate's grandchild is considered "an original infidel and an enemy".
(b) Other Sunni schools of law
The other schools of law vary slightly in emphasis from each other, but perhaps the 
most important difference is that the Shafi'i124, Maliki125 and Hanbali schools require 
that female apostates, as well as male, should be put to death for apostasy.126 The 
Maliki school attaches importance to ascertaining whether the alleged apostate was 
formerly a true, practising Muslim.127 The Shafi'i school teaches that mere intention, 
thought or words spoken in jest can be evidence of apostasy as much as words in 
earnest or actions.128 The Hanbali129 school places emphasis on the three-day period 
for repentance.130 Other variations between the different Sunni schools cconcem 
such details as the disposal of property or the definition of extenuating circumstances.
124mainly followed in Egypt, Syria, South India, Pakistan, East Africa, Malaysia, Indonesia, the 
southern part o f the Arabian peninsula (“ash-Shafi” in Hughes op. cit. p.571; Goldziher, Ignaz 
Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, transl. by Andras and Ruth Hamori (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1981) p.49; Zwemer op. cit. p.47)
125mainly followed in North Africa, Egypt and West Africa (“Malik” in Hughes op. cit. p. 312, 
Goldziher op. cit. p.49)
126Ruxton, F.H. "Convert's Status in Maliki Law" The Moslem World Vol. 3, no. 1 (1913) p.38
127Peters and De Vries op. cit. pp.279-80
128Nawawi Minhaj-at-Talibin: A Manual o f  Mohammedan Law according to the School o f  Shafi'i 
(French edition of A. W.C. ven dem Berg by E.C. Howard, District Judge, Singapore. London: 
Thacker, 1914) cited in Zwemer op. cit. p.47
129mainly represented nowadays by the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia (“ibn Hanbal” in Hughes op. cit. 
p. 188; Goldziher op. cit. p.243)
130From a hadith about the third caliph, narrated by Ahmad b. Hanbal, Al-Saif al-Sarim p.321 al- 
Mughni vol. 10 p.74, cited in Mawdudi The punishment o f  the apostate p.28
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Shi1 a law
Shi'a Islam remained in close contact with Sunni Islam during the development of the 
four Sunni schools of law. Consequently Shi'a law very much resembles Sunni law, 
differing no more from it than the four schools differ from each other.131
The Shi'a law on apostates is very similar to Hanafi Sunni law. A male apostate must 
be executed, his wife be separated from him and his property confiscated. A female 
apostate is imprisoned and "beaten with rods" at the prayer times. A child bom to 
apostate parents is also considered an apostate; his murderer would not be punishable 
under the law of retaliation.132
Contemporary debate
Many contemporary Islamic thinkers reinforce the teaching of the Shari'ah on the 
punishment of apostates, often basing this on the traditional argument that apostasy is 
equivalent to treason. As capital punishment is often the penalty for treason, so, 
according to this reasoning, it should apply also for apostasy.133
Mawdudi considers that "the true position of an apostate is that he by his apostasy 
provides proof that he not only rejects the foundation for the order of society and state 
but offers no hope that he will ever accept it in the future". If such a person does not 
leave the country, argues Mawdudi, he should be stripped of his rights of citizenship
131Schacht, Joseph An introduction to Islamic Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1964) p. 16
132A. Querry Droit Musulman. Recueil de Lois concernant Les Musulmans Schyites Vol. II (Paris, 
1872) pp.528-533 quoted in Zwemer op. cit. pp.50-51
133For example, Kurdi, Abdulrahman Abdulkadir professor o f Qur'an and Sunnah at Umm al-Qura 
University in his The Islamic State: A Study based on the Islamic Holy Constitution (London: Mansell 
Publishing Limited, 1984) pp.52-3
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or killed. According to Mawdudi the latter option is preferable both from society's 
point of view and from the point of view of the apostate.134
Siddiqi counters the argument that the Islamic punishment for apostasy is too severe 
by pointing out that Islam is not merely a religion of the heart, but is externalized in 
politics, economics, law, international relations etc.
"In such circumstances it is quite obvious that when a person rebels against 
the Kingdom o f Heaven within his heart, he commits high treason against 
the Kingdom o f  Heaven on earth, the visible and concrete expression of  
the Kingdom o f Heaven within the heart. The persons who commit treason 
are always dealt with severely in every political order. A stem attitude is 
always adopted by all sane governments against rebels and disruptionists, 
and so is the case with Islam. There is nothing unusual in what Islam has 
done. In Islam religion is not a matter o f private relationship between man 
and Allah, but is intertwined with society. So when he abandons Islam he 
in fact revolts against the authority of the Islamic State and society."135
Mohammad Asrar Madani confirms that the punishment for apostasy is death. The 
death sentence can be lifted if the apostate repents sincerely, unless he or she has also 
engaged in activities hostile to Islam, in which case forgiveness is not permitted.136
Execution for apostasy is not just directed against those who have professed another 
faith. The definition of an apostate is widened by some authorities to include anyone
134 Mawdudi The Punishment o f  the Apostate pp.44 ff. especially pp. 49-52
135Siddiqi op. cit pp. 108-9
136Madani op. cit. pp. 130-149 esp. pp. 131, 134-5
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who disagrees with what they consider to be orthodox Islam.137 Given the historical 
divergence of view on questions of Islamic theology and law, there exists a broad 
range of Muslim belief, which until modem times was generally tolerated and 
accepted. However, many Muslims now find themselves classified as apostates 
according to the standards of certain governments or groups. Even if Muslim 
minorities are not executed for holding views that the government considers heretical, 
they may suffer discrimination, harassment and imprisonment. In Pakistan, 
Ahmadiyyas are officially classified as non-Muslims, in contradiction to their own 
claim, and there is legislation specifically directed against them. (See above.)138
An alternative line is taken by some modernist scholars, who argue from the Qur'an 
and from the historical context in which the events recorded in the ahadith occurred, 
that an apostate should not be put to death unless he is also a danger to the Islamic 
state.139 Thus they differ from the traditionalists in asserting the possibility of 
apostasy without rebellion. Following this line of argument, S. A. Rahman believes 
that there should be no punishment for apostasy, either as a hadd offence or as a ta'zir 
offence.
137For example Madani op. cit. (p. 130) includes among a list o f the acts which constitute apostasy, 
"repudiating any o f Islam's basic and principal tenets" and " showing or expressing revulsion against 
the implementation o f any o f the laws o f Islam".
1380ther examples include the execution o f Mahmoud Muhammad Taha, leader o f the Sudanese 
Republican Party, in 1985 partly for offences against the state and partly for apostasy. The charge of  
apostasy stemmed from his claim that the abrogation of the benign Meccan Qur'anic texts wby the later 
and more intolerant Medinan texts should be reversed in modem times. See An-Na'im, Abdullahi 
Ahmed "The Islamic Law o f Apostasy and its Modem Applicability: a Case from the Sudan" Religion 
Vol. 16 (1986) pp.197-221. Tunisians who adopted French nationality and thus became subject to 
French law were regarded as apostates by Tunisian nationalists on the grounds that they refused to 
judge or be judged by the Shari'ah. See Peters and De Vries op. cit. p. 12. Sheikh Muhammad Ghazali 
o f Al-Azhar University, Cairo, testified in court on 22 June 1993 that a Muslim who opposed the 
implementation o f Shari'ah as an apostate "liable to be killed". See Human Rights Watch Press Release 
(10 July 1993)
139Peters and De Vries op. cit. pp. 14-15; the Lebanese scholar Subhi Mahmassani 'Arkan huquq al- 
insari (Beirut: Dar al-'ilm li'l-ma-layin, 1979) p. 123-124 cited in Mayer, Ann Elizabeth Islam and  
Human Rights: Tradition and Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991). p. 170
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In the humble opinion of the present writer, such a consummation would 
be in conformity with the Qur'anic texts which remove punishment for 
disbelief, whether original or adopted, from the purview o f the short span 
of human life on this earth and relegate it to the eternal life after death.
The august practice o f the Prophet of Islam is in no sense in conflict with 
this position.140
Another Pakistani, Fazlur Rahman, similarly believes that apostasy should not be 
confused with rebellion and should not be punished since “if apostasy had been 
considered a punishable crime in this world, the Qur’an would certainly have 
provided some punishment”.141 An additional argument against the death sentence 
was put forward by the Egyptian scholar Abd al-Muta'ali al-Sa'idi, deduced from the 
opinion of Ibrahim al-Nakha'i that the apostate should be asked indefinitely to repent. 
This implies that the point is never reached at which the apostate should be killed. It 
is interesting to note that, in addition to scriptural evidence, Al-Sa'idi places almost 
equal emphasis on upholding the principle of freedom of religion in Islam.142
Another argument against the death sentence was put forward by Uthman Safi in 
1970. Safi holds that man-made secular law i.e. law made by a constitutional 
legislator, takes supremacy over Islamic law. Writing in 1970, Safi believed that no 
Islamic country had laws which regarded apostasy as a penal offence; therefore, he 
argued, apostates could not be punished. Almost thirty years later, such laws do now
140Rahman, S.A. op. cit p. 170
141 Rahman, Fazlur “Non-Muslim minorities in an Islamic State” Journal o f the Institute o f  Muslim 
Minority Affairs Vol. 7 (1986) p. 16
142'Abd al-Muta'ali al'Sa'idi al-Hurriyah al-diniyyah f i  al-Islam, 2nd imp. (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-'Arabi, 
no date but probably second half o f 1950s) cited in Peters and De Vries op. cit pp. 15-16
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exist in a number of Muslim countries,143 but many apostates would still not be 
punished according to Safi, because the required criminal intention is often lacking.144
Development of the legislation
Although there is legislation which prevents an apostate from inheriting,145 Pakistani 
law has no legislation to prohibit the conversion of Muslims to another faith.
However, apostasy is sometimes punished in practice by the application of the 
blasphemy law.146 The introduction of the Hudood Ordinances in 1979 was a point at 
which an apostasy law might well have been enacted. However apostasy was not 
included in the list of offences included in the Hudood Ordinances.
It is worth noting in this connection that in 1974 the National Assembly, under Z.A. 
Bhutto, unanimously passed a bill which declared that Ahmadiyyas were non- 
Muslims. In 1984 further legislation was passed under Zia ul Haq which prohibited 
Ahmadiyyas from calling themselves Muslim, or using any Islamic nomenclature, 
following any Islamic practices of worship or propagating their faith (Pakistan Penal 
Code Sections 298-B and 298-C).147 While not strictly speaking condemning 
Ahmadiyyas as apostates, this reflects the general perception that the group as a whole 
have apostatized from Islam, hence they are severely harassed by Muslim extremists. 
They suffer more severe treatment than do Christians, who are dhimmi.
143Countries which have the death sentence for apostasy from Islam include Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Sudan and Iran.
144Uthman Safi Ala hamish naqd al-fikr al-dini (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, 1970) pp.87-93 cited in Peters 
and De Vries op. cit p. 14, footnote 37
145Pearl, David A Textbook on Muslim Personal Law, 2nd ed. (1987) p.211 cited in Forte op. cit., 
footnote 64
146 See for example the case o f Tahir Iqbal, described above, and analysed below specifically from this 
standpoint.
147Human Rights Commission o f Pakistan State o f Human Rights in 1995 p.81
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The Zikri sect in Baluchistan are also widely regarded as non-Muslims by orthodox 
Muslims. The Muslim religious parties of Baluchistan are calling for the Zikri to be 
declared non-Muslim, like the Ahmadiyyas.148
Case study - Esther John (formerly Qamar Zia) 149
Qamar Zia was bom on 14 October 1929 to a Muslim family living in Madras. At the 
age of about seventeen she had to leave the government school she had been attending 
and was sent instead to a Christian school. Here she began to study the Bible and then 
converted to Christianity. When she told her parents they were angry and took her 
away from the school.
Soon after the partition of India in 1947, the family moved to Karachi. Here a 
Christian missionary made contact with her and gave her a New Testament, which she 
read secretly for seven years, having no contact with any Christians. Then Qamar's 
parents began to take steps to arrange a marriage for her with a Muslim. She was not 
willing to disobey what she understood to be Christian teaching by marrying someone 
of another faith, so in June 1955 she ran away from home. She found some Christians 
who sheltered her and helped her to escape to Sahiwal, several hundred miles away.
In Sahiwal, Qamar was baptized in 1955 and took the name of Esther John. She 
completed her schooling and then attended the United Bible Training Centre in 
Gujranwala to train as an evangelist. During her studies there (1956-59) she returned 
twice to her family in Karachi during the holidays, who welcomed her and did not
148ibid. p.83
149Stacey, V. "Of whom the world was not worthy” Missionary Fellowship quarterly magazine o f  the 
Bible and Medical Missionary Fellowship (June 1960) p.34-5; White, Janet Ballantyne Esther a  
Pakistani girl (Bible and Medical Missionary Fellowship, 2nd edition, 1962); Wootton, R.W.F. Jesus 
more than a prophet (Inter-Varsity Press, 1982) pp.47-51
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press her hard to renounce her Christian faith. In April 1959 she finished her course 
at Gujranwala and began to work as an evangelist in the villages around Chichawatni, 
under the supervision of missionaries from the American Reformed Presbyterian 
Mission.
Her family in Karachi wrote to her, repeatedly pressing her to return home. She 
decided to visit them after Christmas 1959, but wrote to them, by registered mail, that 
she would return only on two conditions: that she be allowed to live as a Christian and 
that she should not be forced into marriage. She did not receive any reply to this 
letter.
On 1 February 1960 she was murdered in her bed in the missionaries' bungalow at 
Chichawatni. Her skull had been smashed by a heavy, sharp instrument. The police 
were unable to track down her assailant, but some believe it was one of her own 
brothers.
The case of Esther John has been documented in unusual detail, probably owing to her 
close association with Western missionaries. Any attempt to survey the persecution 
faced by Pakistani converts from Islam to Christianity can only be very superficial 
and partial, since there may be many individual converts whose sufferings are never 
known outside of their own family or perhaps their local church, let alone investigated 
and recorded with scholarly accuracy. Nevertheless it is useful to compare Esther 
John's case with what is known of others.
This author is aware of only one other case of a Pakistani convert in Pakistan being 
killed for apostasy from Islam. This was the case of Rahila Khanam, a 22-year old 
Muslim woman living in Lahore. She begetn attending Bible studies with a Christian 
friend at the home of a Christian pastor. When her family discovered what was 
happening, they quickly began to make arrangements for her to marry a Muslim.
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Rahila fled into hiding in a women's refuge. She was found by her family some 
weeks later and immediately shot by her brother (16 July 1997), who readily admitted 
his act, saying that he had done his religious duty by killing an apostate from Islam. 
He was arrested and charged with murder.150
The kind of problems more commonly faced by apostates in Pakistan have been 
documented by Syijanen who interviewed 36 Pakistani converts from Islam to 
Christianity in 1973-4 and 1978. The most frequently reported problems were being 
beaten by their relatives and driven from the home. Other problems included threats 
from family and community (some vague, some specifically to shoot them), anger and 
insults from parents and community, having their water supply cut off by other 
villagers, being pensioned off from a job, and expulsion from school.151
More recent examples of similar attitudes include a fatwa issued by their local mosque 
in 1998 against three girls aged 11,13 and 15, who had converted from Christianity to 
Islam. It stated that if they returned to Christianity they would be “chopped into little 
pieces”.152 The National Commission for Justice and Peace also reports various cases 
of violence or threatened violence related to apostasy. One case concerns a Christian 
woman who married a Muslim man according to Islamic marriage rites. A few 
months later her husband converted to Christianity, which caused her employer to tell 
her that if she did not leave her husband she would be taken to court. The reasoning 
behind this was that, having had an Islamic wedding, she was considered to have 
converted to Islam, so that her husband’s conversion to Christianity meant that his 
marriage was dissolved because according to Islam a Christian man cannot be married
150Ismail, Zafar, interview with author (July 1997); Francis, Joseph Update on Pastor Salim and 
Saleema Case (Centre for Legal Aid Assistance and Development, undated but probably soon after 7 
August 1997)
151SyijSnen, Seppo In Search o f Meaning and Identity: Conversion to Christianity in Pakistani Muslim 
Culture (Vammala: The Finnish Society for Missiology and Ecumenics, 1987) pp. 70-75, 205-227
152 Scott-Clark and Levy “Beyond B elief’ op. cit. p. 36
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to a Muslim woman.153 In another example, a Christian man married a Muslim 
woman who converted to Christianity. Her two children by her previous marriage 
were baptised, according to their own wishes. In April 1997 she answered the door to 
an unknown man who shot her. This was believed by her husband to be in retaliation 
for her conversion to Christianity fourteen years earlier.154 In October 1997 a young 
Muslim man from Faisalabad was shot and seriously injured by other Muslims who 
objected to him reading the New Testament and called him an apostate.155 This 
sample of converts' experiences indicates that the murder of a convert such as Esther 
John or Rahila Khanam - though rare - is simply one end of a spectrum of reactions to 
apostasy which is chiefly characterized by anger and violence of varying degrees.
Links between the blasphemy law and the apostasy law
Blasphemy and apostasy are distinct terms with distinct meanings in the English 
language. In Islam, too, they each have a separate and distinct Arabic term, namely 
ilhad for blasphemy and ridda or irtidad for apostasy. However, the Arabic word 
kaflr is often used to describe both a blasphemer and an apostate, thus closely linking 
the two issues in the minds of Muslims. The word kafir, originally meaning "one who 
obliterates or covers [God's blessings]" i.e. ungrateful, later took on the sense of 
"infidel, unbeliever". Kafir includes not only infidels who have never been Muslim 
believers, but also Muslims who are deemed - by themselves or others - to have left 
the faith.156 A Muslim can become a kafir in one of three ways:
(a) by committing a serious sin i.e. by behaving like a kafir;
153 Human Rights Monitor 97 p.l 1
154 ibid. pp. 13-14 .
155 ibid. p. 17
156Bjorkman, W. "Kafir" in Bosworth, C.E., van Donzel, E., Lewis, B. and Pellat, Ch. (eds.) 
Encylopaedia o f  Islam (Leiden: Brill vol. IV (1978) pp.407-8; “Blasphemy” in Hughes op. cit. p.43
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(b) by denying (hiding) an essential truth of Islam, i.e. blasphemy; (Benazir Bhutto 
experienced this in 1992 when, criticising the Shari'at Court's ruling on the 
blasphemy law, she was declared by the Religious Affairs Minister to be a kafir. 
Doubtless she would have profoundly disagreed with his assessment.)
(c) by apostasy (irtidad)
Thus a blasphemer and an apostate are both kafir. The two concepts of blasphemy 
and apostasy are further confounded by the fact that the meaning of ilhad (literally 
"digression") is not always confined to blasphemy, but like another Qur'anic term, 
shirk (literally "sharing" i.e. denying the oneness of God), can also be used 
interchangeably to cover atheism, apostasy, heresy and blasphemy.157
This overlap of terminology may explain why in some cases of blasphemy, it appears 
that the offence is linked with apostasy. Anwar Masih, accused of blasphemy in 
February 1993, had converted from Christianity to Islam and then back to Christianity 
again.158 This makes him an apostate from Islam.
The FIR about Tahir Iqbal stated "He has disowned Islam and embraced Christianity." 
When his lawyers moved an application for bail it was dismissed. The judge, Mr Zia- 
ur-Rahman, additional sessions judge, Lahore, had repeatedly asked the lawyers to 
withdraw the application for bail, and after five months issued his formal order 
refusing bail (order dated 8 July 1991). This refusal was based on Tahir Iqbal's 
conversion to Christianity, despite the fact that this is not illegal.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner has conceded before me that the 
petitioner has converted himself as Christian. With this admission on the
157Halliday '"Islam is in Danger1” footnote 10
158Mir "That Way Madness Lies"
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part of petitioner's Counsel, there is no need to probe further into the 
allegation as contained in the FIR because learned DDA (Deputy District 
Attorney) has disclosed that charge has already been framed by the Illaqa 
Magistrate and the accused is facing trial. Since conversion from Islam to 
Christianity is in itself a cognisable offence involving serious implication, 
hence I do not consider the petitioner entitled to the concession o f bail at 
this stage. This application is accordingly dismissed.159
It should be emphasized that the judge was in error when he stated in his order that 
conversion from Islam to Christianity is a cognizable offence.
Tahir Iqbal's next bail petition was moved in the high court before Mr Justice Izar 
Nisar. This time no issue was made about Tahir Iqbal's conversion. The complainant 
appeared in court, saying that since Tahir Iqbal's crime was liable to capital 
punishment he should not be granted bail. Others who had also come to attend the 
hearing demanded the death punishment for him without further trial, so that the judge 
decided that it was better for Tahir Iqbal's safety to keep him in prison.
The complainant moved an application to the effect that since Shari'ah had been 
declared to be the supreme law of the land by the Enforcement of Shari'ah Act 1991. 
there was no need to try Tahir Iqbal under the Pakistan Penal Code. According to the 
complainant, since the Shari'ah punishment for apostasy is death, the trial should be 
stopped and Tahir Iqbal should be awarded the death penalty. This application was 
argued by the various counsels, and then dismissed by Mr Sabah Mohi-id-Din, 
additional sessions judge, on the grounds that so far there was no law for blasphemy 
in place other than Sections 295 and 298 of the Pakistan Penal Code.160
1590rder o f Judge Zia-ur-Rahman, dated July 8, 1991, quoted in Shakir op.cit. p. 122
160 Shakir op. cit. pp. 122-3
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Later the complainant agreed (at the request of Christian leaders and others) to drop 
his case against Tahir Iqbal on condition that Tahir Iqbal made a declaration in court 
stating that he was still a Muslim and was not a Christian. Tahir Iqbal refused to do 
this (13 July 1992)161 and died a week later, probably poisoned.
Mohammad Ijaz Hussain of Faisalabad converted from Islam to Christianity on 26 
November 1978. When his family learnt of his conversion, his elder brother, a 
general in the Pakistan army, had him implicated in a blasphemy case. He was 
arrested on 19 January 1979 under sections 295-A and 295-B of the Pakistan Penal 
Code and spent the next seventeen years (or more162) in prison.163 In this case, it 
appears that the family, unable to have him arrested for apostasy which is not a legal 
offence, used the charge of blasphemy instead.
Another clear example of confounding blasphemy with apostasy is the case of Salman 
Rushdie, whose allegedly blasphemous novel, The Satanic Verses, resulted in his 
condemnation as an apostate, even after his own claim to have re-converted to 
Islam.164
Conclusion
Pakistan's blasphemy legislation in Section 295 of the Penal Code, made potent by the 
crucial addition of Section 295-C in 1986, has become a convenient weapon for the 
settling of personal disputes. Although the Muslim majority are also affected, it is 
minorities such as Ahmadiyyas and Christians who are most vulnerable. The rioting
161ibid. pp. 124-5
162At the time o f writing he was still in prison.
163Centre for Legal Aid Assistance and Development, Lahore Update o f  Cases from 1st July - 31st 
December 1996
164Kharroufah op. cit. passim
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in Shanti Nagar in February 1997 indicated that not only individuals but whole 
communities may be targeted by those with a grievance against one or more 
Christians. It is also a convenient way for aggrieved Muslims to punish those who 
have caused offence not at a personal level such as local politics (for example, Gul 
Masih) or commercial competition (for example, Tahir Iqbal, Chand Barkat), but in a 
religious context. Examples of this include Christians who have converted from Islam 
(for example, Tahir Iqbal, Muhammad Ijaz Hussain) and Christians who are active in 
proselytization (for example, Daniel Scot). Neither conversion from Islam nor the 
proselytizing of Muslims are offences under Pakistani law. Yet they are banned in 
many Muslim countries and are commonly held to be unacceptable by Muslims. 
Apostasy from Islam is particularly important in this respect, given the clear teaching 
of the Shari'ah that it should be punished by death.
As well as the blasphemy legislation itself, with its lack of requirement to prove 
criminal intent and (since 1991) mandatory death sentence, a number of other factors 
combine and interact to make this law one of the greatest causes of fear to the 
Christian community. The most important of these factors are: the method of 
investigation of complaints, which is biased in favour of the accuser; the Islamic 
tradition of confounding blasphemy with the capital crime of apostasy; the Islamic 
tradition of private individuals enforcing death sentences for crimes against Islam; the 
influence of local mullahs in rousing popular sentiment against alleged blasphemers. 
Thus, as demonstrated in the case studies, innocence of blasphemy is of minimal use 
in the courts, and of no use at all in the context of society at large. Those accused 
have spent long periods in prison, with three being found guilty before being acquitted 
on appeal. More importantly some - apparently innocent - have been killed by 
Muslim zealots.
The fear which this law causes throughout the Christian community in Pakistan is 
thus well-founded. Even Muslim political leaders who may consider it harsh or unjust
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seem powerless to change the situation, as Benazir Bhutto found. The legislation 
cannot be amended because of threats by religious extremists. Even if it were to be 
amended, it would be unlikely to lessen the influence of local Islamic leaders who 
could call for the death of a named individual, such as Gul Masih, or the destruction 
of a named community, such as Shanti Nagar.
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Chapter 6
Christian responses to Islamization and discrimination 
Introduction
The response of Pakistani Christians to the influence of Islamization and discrimination 
has been characterized by lack of co-ordination, planning or unity. A series of initiatives 
-  usually completely separate from one another - have come from individuals in the 
church hierarchies and from Christian politicians. In most cases these have had little or 
no mandate or support from the Christian community. These initiatives have varied 
widely as will be described below. A particular area of difference has been over whether 
or how much to liaise with the West in the form of expatriate missionaries to Pakistan 
and Western-based advocacy and human rights organizations.
Christians at the grass-roots have been little involved in such initiatives. One obvious 
reason for this is that they generally need to concentrate their whole energy on simply 
surviving. The low level of literacy also hampers an active engagement in intellectual 
and political debate. But another reason has been suggested arising from the psychology 
of the Christian community as an oppressed minority, which leads to a submissive 
apathy. Munawar Rumalshah, the Church of Pakistan Bishop of Peshawar, writes:
The psyche of the church is very parochial. It is a church that 
continually wants sympathy for being “sinned against”, in this case for
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being at the harsh end o f an Islamic dominance where mere survival is 
taken as a matter o f triumph.1
A clear example of this attitude occurred in the Bishop’s own diocese a few months after 
he spoke. Nine members of a Christian family in Nowshera were murdered on the night 
of 17-18 November 1998. Christians assumed that it was a sectarian attack by Islamic 
extremists and would not co-operate with the police investigation for fear of reprisals. 
However, a Christian human rights group which investigated concluded that the attack 
was probably made for personal reasons, not sectarian. A very similar observation on 
Christian attitudes comes from a Muslim source, namely, the prestigious Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan who wrote in their 1998 report that “Christians generally nursed 
a feeling of not being equal citizens with the majority population.”
It is perhaps understandable that few Pakistani Christians should have cared to put on 
record comments like those of Bishop Rumalshah.4 It is also understandable that few 
comments of this nature have been made in recent decades by non-Pakistanis, since 
sociological and political sensitivities militate against such sentiments in an age when 
independence and self-sufficiency are highly valued. Yet earlier there were many 
observations of the same phenomenon from Westerners living in Pakistan (or India). In 
the 1950s Comfort spoke of the Christian community’s “inferiority complex growing out
1 Rumalshah “Hear the cry" p.41
2 Francis, Joseph M. Christian massacre in Nowshera CLAAS (30 November 1998) passim
3 State o f  Human Rights in 1998 (Lahore: Human Rights Commission o f Pakistan, 1999) p. 157
4 Another who was willing to do so was Aftab Pervaiz, a Christian school teacher, who said that Christians 
should “stop waiting around for handouts... Crying doesn’t change anything” quoted in Balchin p. 14
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of long dependence on others for help and guidance”.5 This dependence of the Pakistani 
Christian community pre-dated the creation of Pakistan and the advent of Muslim 
zamindars (see chapter 4). Before partition the Christians depended on Hindu and Sikh 
zamindars. Before that, i.e. before their Chuhra forefathers converted to Christianity in 
the mass movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the community 
had been Hindus of the lowest possible social strata. Phillips comments that they “think 
of themselves as naturally dependent upon others... This tendency has been engrafted in 
them for 1000 years, and is now part of their very nature.”6 Pickett describes them as 
having been “trained by centuries of exploitation and servility to avoid the acceptance of
n
responsiblities that may prove burdensome..
It might be thought that the observations of Westerners can only be of limited value, 
since their association with the colonial powers is likely to have affected the way in 
which people behave to them. Yet these observations are in line with the conclusions of 
Heinrich’s careful study The Psychology o f a Suppressed People, which compares the 
behaviour of African Americans with that of the scheduled castes of India. He describes 
a number of abnormal patterns of behaviour which result from continued oppression of a
Q
community including “apparent submissiveness and acquiescence”. He also comments 
on “the suggestion of [the Indian Christian’s] own inferiority constantly conveyed by the 
dominating position of the European missionary and the Mission” as well as by the
5 Comfort op. cit. p.6
6 Philipps, Godfrey E. The Outcast’s Hope (London: Church Missionary Society, 1912) p. 16
7 Pickett op. cit. pp.217-8
8 Heinrich op. cit. pp.2-3, 77
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abnormal behaviour (in the sense used above) of other Indian Christians and of his own 
low caste (if applicable).9
Heinrich identifies another characteristic of suppressed peoples, namely, a “craving for 
superiority that finds expression in the minimizing and undervaluation of others”.10 This 
he says is most common amongst groups which are beginning to emerge from their 
oppression, for example the Christian descendants of scheduled castes show it more 
strongly than their Hindu ancestors did.11 Self-assertion and “a conflict attitude” are also 
characteristics of a depressed group which sees some hope of improving its lot.12 This is 
manifested in division and mistrust between Christians. Streefland comments on how
1 7village Chuhras look down on Chuhras who have moved to the towns. The few in the 
towns who have managed to gain a respectable job look down on those in the towns who 
work as sweepers.14 The Christians from non-Chuhra origins look down on all the 
Chuhra Christians,15 some refusing to eat or drink with them, just as Muslims refuse to do
1 7Christians are well aware of the divisions amongst them. Some blame their
• 1Rdenominationalism on the Western missionaries. But there are many other divisions
9 ibid. pp.66,74
10 ibid. pp.39-41
11 ibid. p. 60-1.
12 bid. p.57
13 Streefland op. cit. p.6
14 ibid. p.21
15 Moghal Human Person in Punjabi Society p.47; Streefland op. cit. pp.28,30,34
16 Streefland, op. cit. p.32; Deedes, W.F. and Combe, Victoria “Christians and the Cross” The Daily 
Telegraph (29 March 1999)
17 “The Christian Church in Pakistan: a vision for the 21st century” final statement o f a seminar held at the 
Pastoral Institute, Multan, 7to 11 April 1997 published in Al-Mushir Vol.39 no. 2 (1997) p.82
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apart from between denominations. The Church of Pakistan Bishop of Sialkot, Samuel 
Pervez, rebuked the destructive criticism of his diocesan committees and boards, and his 
pastors who were concentrating on “politicking” to the neglect of their duties.19 The 
press reported a dispute over the appointment of a pastor between Full Gospel Assembly 
Christians in Lahore in 1998 which resulted in the closure of their church.20
Development of the Christian community is severely hampered by the biradari culture
and the divisions which result from it. It is normal for loyalty to one’s biradari (network
of related extended families) to be paramount over the needs of the community as a 
0 1whole. According to Moghal:
A person lives and dies for his/her [biradari] and in (sic) most 
occasions o f his/her life remains faithful to the biradari... This 
concept basically trains a person to help his close relatives obtain 
advantageous positions even if  they are not capable o f holding these 
positions. The welfare o f the family is considered far more important 
than the “common good”...22
18 One such is Philip Lall, quoted by Deedes and Combe op. cit. as claiming that the caste system is “alive 
and well” in Pakistan, practised even by bishops, with churches for untouchables although they are not 
named as such.
19 Minutes o f the 24th annual meeting of the Sialkot Diocesan Council held on May 06 and 07, 1996 pp.7-8
20 Gul, Muhammad Shan “Christians versus Christians” Friday Times (6-12, February 1998) p.4
21 SyrjSnen, Seppo “Bradri -  Millat -  Ecclesia: the interrelationship o f faith and community” Al-Mushir 
Vol. XV Nos. 11-12 (Nov-Dee 1973) pp.362-3
22 Moghal Human Person in Punjabi Society pp.65-6
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Campbell comments: “From the beginning of the mass movement churchmen and 
particularly western churchmen saw that the biradari was a competitor of the idea of
9^church and Christian community.”
McClintock elaborates on the implications of the biradari system for the church, also 
noting the “double standards” whereby the biradari system is resented by those who are 
suffering because of it, but exploited by the same people when they have opportunity to 
do so.
. Social identity is so enmeshed in this web o f relationships that other 
duties and responsibilities -  to friends, patrons, employers, religious 
sects, and the state -  become subject to the interests of the biradari.
The leaders o f the various denominations and parachurch organizations 
in Pakistan are subject to these same familial pressures. They are 
expected to use their positions within the church to provide economic 
and political support to their immediate family and to other members of  
their biradari as well. If they ignore the requests o f relatives for jobs or 
other material aid their relationships with other members o f the 
biradari become very strained. Yet, if  they do respond positively to 
some o f these requests for aid from their relatives, they will be heavily 
criticized by other leading members o f the church for practising 
nepotism. Should any of these critics have a similar opportunity to use 
their own positions within the church to secure economic benefits for
23 Campbell op. cit. p.43, see also pp.44-7
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their own relatives, however, they probably would not hesitate to 
exploit it.24
Therefore the biradaris compete with each other at the expense of the community as a
9 S • •whole. A few Christian biradaris control most of the Christian institutions and the 
benefits tend to be channelled primarily to their own relatives. Similarly, the 
government’s donations towards the economic development of Christian communities 
find their way mainly to the relatives of the four Christian MNAs. When the office­
holders of the Christian school boards were negotiating with the government over the 
nationalization of the Christian educational institutions (see chapter 4), they gave 
preference to their family’s own interests over the interests of the community as a whole. 
Thus they sought to have total control of the schools given back to them and their 
relatives, and would not accept the government’s compromise offer of a Christian 
headteacher and a minimum percentage of Christian staff and students at each school. 
Because of their leaders’ refusal to negotiate on this, the Christian community lost even 
the offer regarding head, staff and students. This would have been much more 
advantageous for the Christian community as a whole than the system which the 
government chose in the end which excluded the Christians from management 
completely and provided no quotas for Christian pupils. One Christian engineer 
described Christian leaders as “the biggest robbers”, meaning that they did not help their 
community.26
24 McClintock op. cit. pp.349-350
25 Tebbe, R.F. “Education in Pakistan: a minority perspective, 1982” Al-Mushir Vol. XXV No. 3 & 4 
(Autumn and Winter 1983) p. 184
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Even Muslims criticize the Christian community for its divisions27 and poor leadership. 
A Muslim judge rebuked some bishops who were willing to have their case heard on 1st 
January, a day on which the Christian community traditionally held New Year services, 
rather than postpone it as the judge suggested. The bishops told the judge they would 
make other arrangements so that he could hear their case, but the judge attacked them as 
bad shepherds who did not care for their sheep. In this context it is less than surprising 
that Christians do not speak with a united voice when they respond to Islamization and 
discrimination.
Political engagement
Pakistan’s Christians have commonly been viewed by others29 and by themselves30 as 
meekly accepting their situation, without attempting to remedy it. As Alexander Malik 
the Church of Pakistan Bishop of Lahore, states, they have “shunned participation in the
o 1
political life of the country” or, in the words of Charles Amjad-Ali, “more or less
“39abdicated our responsibility in this debate”. This meekness and apathy are often 
attributed to the influence of missionaries. Moghal asserts that because the missionaries,
26 Vivian John, quoted in Balchin op. cit. p. 14
27 For example, Rev. Gerald Mall, professor o f Old Testament at St Thomas’ Theological College, Karachi, 
speaking at Gujranwala Theological Seminary (28 January 1999). He told o f a Muslim judge who rebuked 
Christians for bringing him a case challenging the election o f the Bishop o f Karachi and told them to settle 
their disputes among themselves, as commanded in the New Testament.
28Rev. Gerald Mall, professor o f Old Testament at St Thomas’ Theological College, Karachi, speaking at 
Gujranwala Theological Seminary (28 January 1999)
29 For example Khan, Aamer Ahmed “Bearing Their Cross” The Herald Annual (January 1993) p.99
30 for example Aftab Pervaiz quoted in Balchin p. 15
31 Rt Rev. Alexander Malik, Bishop o f Lahore and Moderator o f the Church of Pakistan, paper given at a 
Christian consultation (title unknown) in Lahore (September 1988) p.5
32 Amjad-Ali, Charles “Religion and Politics” in Miller, Roland E. and Mwakabana, Hance A.O. Christian- 
Muslim Dialogue: Theological and Practical Issues (Geneva: Lutheran World Federation, 1998) p. 127
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as foreigners, could not be active in politics, they taught the Pakistani Christians similarly 
to eschew political involvement and to concentrate their hopes on the next life.
Certainly the evangelical Western “mother-churches” of some Pakistani denominations 
(for example, Brethren, Baptists and Presbyterians) had a tradition in their country of 
origin of avoiding political and social involvement. Another line of reasoning considers 
that a generation of “mission compound” Christians developed the habit of non­
involvement in politics, and this continues today. In the context of the mission 
compound there were two reasons why the Pakistani Christians tended to be passive and 
uninvolved in politics. Firstly, the missionaries took on the role of looking after the 
converts and Christians and this included interacting with the authorities on their behalf.
It was a logical division of labour given that the educated, confident and relatively 
invulnerable Westerners were likely to have greater success and at a lower risk than were 
the indigenous Christians. Secondly, the missionaries would often actively discourage or 
prevent the Pakistani Christians in their compound from political involvement because 
any antagonism the Christians might inadvertently produce could have resulted in the 
missionaries losing their visas.34 They were “indoctrinated to abstain from politics as if it 
was the ‘forbidden tree’.”35
When Zia proposed the system of separate electorates, the Christians, who were 
effectively without political leadership from their own community, turned to the clergy 
for guidance. The clergy endorsed Zia’s proposal, a fact which is now bitterly resented
33 Moghal, Dominic “Alienation o f the local people: the future o f religious minorities in Pakistan” Al- 
Mushir Vol. 37 No. 2 (1995) p.39
34 Ismail, Zafar, interview with the author (2 July 1999)
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by many Christians today. Some consider it a short-sighted bargaining ploy in response 
to Zia’s suggestion of returning to clergy control the Christian schools which had been 
nationalized in 1972 by Bhutto. Christian political parties today are divided on the 
issue of separate electorates.
The introduction of separate electorates ensured that four Christians would be members 
of the National Assembly but severely curtailed Christian political power (see chapter 4). 
At least sixteen Christian political parties quickly developed, nine of which openly 
supported Zia’s martial law regime. The first four Christian MNAs, elected in the 1985 
elections - a businessman, a lawyer, a retired army colonel and a headmaster37 - all 
supported Zia. The goals of Christian politicians were mostly limited to seeking to 
provide Christian communities with sewerage, electricity, metalled roads and clean 
water. Christians continued to avoid substantial involvement in politics.38
Christian leaders now are painfully aware of the isolation - political and social - of their 
community. A seminar for Christians and other non-Muslims held at the Christian Study 
Centre in Rawalpindi in 1996 included the following paragraph in their final statement:
We shall try to come out from our isolation and alienation. We shall 
leave our ghettoized mentality and try to be a part o f the main stream.
For this purpose we shall blend and merge with others. We shall try to
35 Akhter, Salamat Tehrek-e-Pakistan he Gumnam Kirdar [The anonymous heroes o f the Pakistan 
Movementl (Rawapindi: Christian Study Centre, 1997) p.21 quotation is translated from the Urdu text
36 Khan, Aamer Ahmed “Bearing their cross” pp.99-101
37 Tebbe, James “Interviews with Christian Members o f the National Assembly” pp.93-103
38 Khan, Aamer Ahmed “Bearing their cross” p. 111
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get the full support o f those Muslim groups who believe in the full 
rights o f citizenship o f the non-Muslims in Pakistan. This means that 
we shall join those political parties which will struggle for the full 
rights o f non-Muslims in Pakistan.39
Christian political parties and politicians40
There is little co-operation between the Church establishment and the Christian political 
parties. Originally just four, there is now a multiplicity of Christian parties which 
prevents the Christian community from speaking with a unified voice, and leaves it 
vulnerable to manipulation by the larger political parties in power.
Two months before partition, in June 1947, the Punjab branches of the original four 
Christian parties - the All India Christian Association, the All India Christian League, the 
Catholic Association and the All India Anglo-Indian Association - merged to become one 
body, known as the Pakistan Joint Christian Board. This was re-named the All Pakistan 
Christian League in 1949. It was closed down in 1958, along with all the other political 
parties in the country, under the military rule of Ayub Khan, but then re-established in 
1964 as the Pakistan Masihi League (PML), under the leadership of Chaudhury Chandu 
Lai. The decision to re-establish this party was in part at least a reaction to a motion 
proposed in the first National Assembly elected under the 1962 constitution. This
39 Final Statement o f national seminar on “Religious Minorities in Pakistan: struggle for identity” p. 106
40 A detailed history of the elections and parties will not be attempted here, but the most significant and 
characteristic points will be mentioned.
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motion, proposed by an MNA called Sheikh Abdul Aziz, declared that “Christians are 
like cylinders of poisonous gas, polluting our atmosphere. Their missionary and 
educational activities should be brought under strict control.”41 The PML stood for more 
representation of Christians in local politics, for economic development for Christians in 
rural areas including the allocation of land to them, and for religious tolerance, resisting 
the anti-Christian aspirations of the mullahs and Islamic extremists. It was very active in 
protesting against the nationalization of the schools in the early 1970s. It was closed 
down again when General Zia took power in 1977 and closed all the political parties, but 
re-opened on his death in 1988.42
The introduction of separate electorates resulted in the blossoming of a multitude of new 
Christian parties as well as a number of independent candidates. The numbers are 
indicated by the fact that in the February 1997 elections, there were 30 Christian 
candidates for the National Assembly and 38 for the Punjab Provincial Assembly.43 
Unlike the PML, the policies of most of these parties and individuals could be described 
as “the politics of survival” -  their foremost concern was simply the survival of the 
Christian community. With little in the way of ideology, they were very much dependent 
on the personalities of their respective leaders. Amidst the plethora of current Christian 
parties, some of the more significant are:
41 quoted in Akhter op. cit. p. 180
42 Akhter op. cit. pp. 179-180
43 Their names are listed in “Minority NA candidates” The Nation (1 February 1997) p.2
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• The Pakistan Masihi Party, led by Tariq C. Qaiser, who polled the most Christian 
votes in the 1997 elections. This party is mainly supported by upper class and middle 
class Christians.
• The Pakistan Christian National Party, led by Joseph Francis. This party is closely 
allied to Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party, who assist with funding. It is 
supported by Christians who are sympathetic to the PPP’s secularist stance.
• The Pakistan Liberation Front, led by Shabaz Bhatti. This is a relatively new party, 
supported mainly by younger Christians. Its candidate, Simon Jacob, was elected to 
the National Assembly in 1997 in fourth place.
It will be noticed that, of the four significant parties described above (the PML and the 
three newer ones), only two currently have their own MNAs. The other two Christian 
seats in the National Assembly were won by independent candidates, Rufin Julius and 
Peter John Sahotra. These are both Roman Catholics, and stand as independents because 
Catholic teaching forbids clergy to stand for election. There is therefore no Catholic 
political party in Pakistan, as the natural leadership of such a party is not allowed to take 
on this role.44 Despite this handicap, many Catholic bishops manage to be closely 
involved in politics through their relatives.
44 Akhter op. cit. pp. 179-180; “EC notifies results o f minority communities” The Nation (14 Februaiy
1997) p. 11
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The whole Christian political system is not unlike the classic millet system45 of the 
Ottoman empire, whereby the Muslim rulers permitted their religious minority 
communities to be self-governing, and controlled them through the minority leaders 
rather than directly communicating with the ordinary non-Muslims 46 The separate 
electorates system created the same gap between the minorities and the government, 
bridged only by their elected leaders. Even prior to the establishing of the separate 
electorates, General Zia tended to work through the bishops and other church leaders in a 
similar way, by-passing those Christians who had been elected to political leadership.
The church leaders’ willingness to embrace the separate electorate system is perhaps 
indicative of their understanding of the enormous personal power they would have 
forfeited if they had lost their role in liaising between their people and the government. 
The Finnish scholar of Pakistani Christian society, Seppo Syijanen, asserts that the millet- 
like character of the Christian community in Pakistan has affected the quality of Christian 
leadership, producing leaders who are more concerned with external dignity than with 
spirituality, just as tend to be found in other millet systems.47
Rallies and protests
Beginning in 1972 when the Christians schools were nationalized, Christians have 
organized rallies and public gatherings to draw attention to their grievances. This method
45 SyrjSnen “Bradri -  Millat -  Ecclesia” p.368
46 Kymlicka, Will Multicultural citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) p. 157; Bowen, Harold and 
Gibb, H.A.R. Islamic Society and the West Vol 1 Islamic Society in the eighteenth century part II (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1957) pp.212-213; SyrjSnen “Bradri -  Millat -  Ecclesia” pp.364-5
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of expression was halted from 1977-88 under General Zia’s martial law, but resumed 
again once democracy was restored. Like the earliest rallies which protested about the 
nationalization of the schools, many rallies focused on particular topical issues. Many 
were held, for example, towards the end of November 1992 to protest about the proposed 
religion column to be added to identity cards.48 Two years later, nationwide protests 
were organized by Rt Rev. John Joseph, the Catholic Bishop of Faisalabad, when 
Manzoor Masih was shot dead by Islamic extremists as he left the court building 
following his trial for blasphemy with two other Christians.49 In February 1997 a rally 
was held in response to the mass violence at Shanti Nagar.50 In 1998, following Bishop 
Joseph’s own protest suicide over the death sentence for another Christian accused of 
blasphemy, Christians demonstrations were held across the Punjab on 15 May.51 Some 
rallies had a more general purpose, for example that held on 11 August 1998, organized 
by the Christian Liberation Front but attended by Hindus and Sikhs as well as Christians. 
This gathering had the dual purpose of giving voice to the minorities’ problems and 
expressing solidarity with all Pakistanis.
Other ways of drawing public attention to certain issues or events are also used, such as 
press conferences and statements. For example, ten prominent individuals, both
47 anen “Bradri -  Millat -  Ecclesia” p.368
48 Khan, Aamer Ahmed “Bearing Their Cross” p.99
49 “Bishop Commits Suicide in Pakistan” Associated Press Report, (6 May 1998)
50 “Christians rally demands Blasphemy Law’s repeal” The Muslim (16 February 1997)
51 “Police brutalise Christians protesters” The News (16 May 1998); “Bishop’s death: Christians protest 
across Punjab” Dawn (16 May 1998)
52 “Minorities plan solidarity rally on Aug 11” Dawn (23 July 1998|) p.8; “Minorities to hold rally for 
national solidarity” The News (23 July 1998) p.3
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Christians and human rights activists, issued a joint statement at a press conference on the 
violence at Shanti Nagar in February 1997.53
A special mention must be made in this section of Julius Salik, a former MNA, who made 
himself notorious by the dramatic gestures he used to highlight the plight of the 
Christians. These included a hunger strike, setting fire to all his furniture in front of the 
Punjab Assembly building, and tying himself to a cross.54 Although dismissed as a 
madman by some, he was recommended for the Nobel Peace Prize by Prime Minister 
Benazir Bhutto, who included in her commendation “his courageous defence of the rights 
of Pakistani Christians”.55
Human rights advocacy
Pakistan has a very influential non-sectarian advocacy body, the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan. But in addition the Roman Catholic community have been 
active in engaging the Muslim community in this way. Because of their size and their 
inherent unity, coupled with the courageous and outspoken leadership of Bishop John
53 Press conference on the desecration o f  churches, the Holy Bibles and the houses o f Christian (sic) in 
Khanewal and Shantinagar, a statement addressed to journalists and signed by Bishop Samuel Azariah, o f  
the Church o f Pakistan Diocese of Raiwind, Mr Joseph Francis of the Centre for Legal Aid, Assistance and 
Settlement, Hina Jilani o f the Human Action Forum, I. A. Rehman, director o f Human Right o f Pakistan, 
Group Capt (retd.) Cecil Chaudhury o f St Anthony’s School, Robert Taylor, territorial commander o f the 
Salvation Army, Amjad Saleem Mehnaz o f Punjab Nojawan, Younas Rahi o f the Pakistan Christian 
National Party, Chaudhury Naeem Shakir o f the Committee for Justice and Peace, and Shahtaj Qasilbash of 
the Joint Action Committee
54 Khan, Aamir Ahmed “Protest resignations are a family trait” The Herald (November 1992) pp.61-63
55 Letter from Benazir Bhutto to the Chairman of the Nobel Peace Prize Committee (10 April 1996)
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Joseph, they have been able to develop two human rights advocacy organizations, both 
based in Lahore, and with an emphasis on helping minorities, especially Christians.
One was established in 1984 by the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Pakistan and is 
called the National Commission for Justice and Peace. It is a very well respected and was 
chaired, until his suicide, by Bishop John Joseph. It describes its objectives as:
1. To organise and conduct seminars, workshops on human rights 
education and training on para-legals and human rights activism.
2. To provide legal aid and paralegal assistance to the victims of  
injustice, especially the victims o f discriminatory laws.
3. To organize fact finding missions on cases o f gross violation of 
human rights.
4. To keep a record o f such cases, arrange studies on these cases and 
issues o f national importance especially those relating to 
minorities.
5. To publicize such reflections/reports, for awareness and advocacy 
purpose, through newsletter, pamphlets, books etc.
6. To network and collaborate with like-minded organization, (sic)
Church based or non-government in accordance with the objective 
of NCJP.56
The other organisation is called Centre for Legal Aid Assistance and Settlement 
(CLAAS), also based in Lahore. It was founded in 1996 and is directed by Joseph
56 Human Rights Monitor 97 p.64
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Francis, a respected human rights activist who is also the chairman of the Pakistan 
National Christian Party. It describes itself as:
a multi-religious organisation which works to address human rights 
issues faced by religious minorities; women and children. The twin 
focus o f its activities are: Legal aid assistance and settlement. Its 
activities reinforce and strengthen the human rights issues in Pakistan.
In this context CLAAS seeks cooperation and close working 
relationship (sic) with other human rights organisations and groups to 
advance human rights for everyone.57
CLAAS publishes regular updates on the human rights cases it is dealing with. It has 
recently opened an office in London.
Research and documentation
The most significant organization concerned with researching the situation of Christians
• • • SRin the Islamic context of Pakistan is the ecumenical and international Christian Study 
Centre (CSC) in Rawalpindi, which was established under this name in 1967, but had 
been developing in stages since 1951. Its purpose is to promote good relations between 
Christians and Muslims in Pakistan.59 Research, teaching and seminars focus primarily
57 Human Rights Today (Jan-Feb 1997) p.5
58 Kraan, J.D. “Muslim-Christian relations and Christian Study Centres” Al-Mushir Vol. XXVI Nos. 3 & 4 
(1984) p.176
59 Christian Study Centre Rawalpindi Annual Report 1997 p.l; introductory leaflet produced by Christian 




on Christian-Muslim relations, Islam, minorities in Pakistan and developing contextual 
Christian theology. Secondary foci are human rights, women’s issues and 
democratization.60 A journal, Al-Mushir, is published by the CSC in English and Urdu 
(varying in frequency).
Pakistani Christians have at various times and using various media made efforts to 
communicate the fact that they have significantly contributed to their country in many 
different ways. A three-day seminar was held in 1978 on the theme of “The Role of 
Minorities in National Development”.61 One of the resolutions contained in the final 
statement from the seminar on religious minorities in Pakistan held at the CSC in 1996 
was that “we shall document the contribution of the non-Muslims for the creation and 
development of the country”. Christians ask for their positive role in the formation of 
Pakistan to be remembered, as well as Christians who have been prominent in politics, 
law, the armed forces, and other fields.64 It must be acknowledged that, in recent years, 
there have been various public statements by prominent Muslims, also affirming the 
contribution of Christians to Pakistan’s formation, development and prosperity. Special 
mention is often made of Christian contributions to education, health, sports and 
culture.65 When Lahore Cathedral celebrated its centenary in 1987, President Zia himself
60 “Study Islam in Pakistan” leaflet produced by Christian Study Centre (undated but not earlier than 1995)
61 The Role o f  Minorities in National Development -  papers from a seminar held 27-29 April 1978 under 
the auspices o f the Institute o f Political and Social Studies o f Forman Christian College, Lahore
62Final Statement o f a national seminar on “Religious Minorities in Pakistan” p. 106
63 For example, Herbert Fernandes, President o f the Catholic Association, speaking in May 1997 and 
reported in “Minorities role” The Nation (15 May, 1997) p.7
64 For example, Michael Javed, a Christian member o f the Sind Provincial Assembly reported in 
“Christians urged to help in country’s progress” Dawn (15 September 1997) p.2; Ansari op. cit. p.4
65 For example, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reported in “Muslims, Christians enjoy complete 
harmony :PM” Dawn (23 December 1997) p.6; Hidayatullah Khan Chamkan, acting governor o f the North 
West Frontier Province, reported in “Chamkani praises minorities’ role in country’s prosperity” The Nation
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commended the patriotism of Pakistani Christians as a whole and the specific role of the 
cathedral in education, health and social welfare.66 Nawaz Sharif, then chief minister of 
the Punjab, also praised the cathedral’s work in education and social welfare.67
Sometimes particular issues have prompted the publication of related materials, with a 
view to making the situation more widely known. A typical piece of work of this kind is 
a 17-page photocopied booklet produced by the National Affairs Commission of the 
National Council of Churches in Pakistan after the murder in 1992 of Naimat Ahmer, a 
Christian accused of blasphemy. More than half the pages are simply reproductions of 
other reports on the incident.
Engaging the international arena
Having recognized that the government of Pakistan, its structures and institutions seem 
unlikely to change merely from pressure within the country, some Christian leaders have 
in the last few years appealed to the international community and particularly the West to 
apply pressure on the Pakistani government to make the desired changes. This came 
about at an opportune moment in the early 1990s, after the fall of Communism in Europe
(30 December 1997) p.4; Saleem Zia, Law Minister o f Sind reported in “Christians urged to help in 
country’s progress” Dawn (15 September 1997) p.2
66 President’s message in Phailbus, Theodore (ed.) The Cathedral Church o f  the Resurrection Lahore 1887- 
1987 (Lahore? Allied Press Limited, 1987) p.4
67 Message from Nawaz Sharif in Phailbus, Theodore (ed.) The Cathedral Church o f  the Resurrection 
Lahore 1887-1987 (Lahore? Allied Press Limited, 1987) p. 10
68 Brutal murder o f  Christian teacher Naimat Ahmer under the garb o f  the blasphemy law  (Lahore:
National Affairs Commission o f the National Council o f Churches in Pakistan (no date but probably late 
January 1992)
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and the Soviet Union, when the Church internationally became aware of the situation of 
Christians in Muslim-majority countries and began to develop an interest in religious 
liberty in Islamic contexts. Bodies such as the World Evangelical Fellowship created 
religious liberty commissions, and various para-church agencies in the West that were 
initially engaged in other tasks added religious liberty in the Islamic world to their 
portfolios. Through their campaigning this was to impact heavily on Western 
governments and institutions. A two-way process developed in which Western 
organizations approached Pakistani Christians offering help in advocacy. In turn, 
Pakistani Christians realized the potential of utilizing these and other bodies outside their 
country to bring pressure on their own government, and began to initiate approaches of 
their own to such bodies.
Bishop Munawar Rumalshah of the Church of Pakistan Diocese of Peshawar has in 
particular played a key role. He made four proposals for the international context, which, 
if implemented; would in his view affect the Pakistani situation:
1. The setting up o f a type o f UN of religious bodies. This would 
offer an open platform where major issues, especially those of 
conflict or harmony, could be discussed.
2. The setting up o f a Religious Prominent Persons’ Group. This 
means a group o f prominent religious leaders, who would go to 
places of religious conflict and bring about reconciliation.
3. The teaching o f all religions, either through schools or through 
some other organised way, so that people do not grow up in a 
monochrome religious environment.
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4. The issue o f a Bill o f Rights for religious minorities. This is o f 
utmost importance in situations where even the civil rights of the 
minority are in danger o f being swallowed up by the majority 
religion.69
The growing Christian indignation concerning the blasphemy law has been the main issue 
aired in the international arena. In particular the mass violence at Shanti Nagar in 
February 1997 and the protest suicide of Bishop John Joseph in May 1998 -  both 
resulting from the blasphemy law - drew international coverage and appeared to spur 
many organizations and individuals to speak out and act.
The events at Shanti Nagar drew a particularly strong response from British Pakistani 
Christians, many of whom have relatives in Shanti Nagar. They were also supported in 
this by some indigenous British Christians and by some British Pakistani Muslims.
David Smith, the Anglican Bishop of Bradford, whose diocese has one of the highest 
concentration of British Muslims, responded to the destruction of Christian property in 
Shanti Nagar with a strongly worded letter of protest to the Acting Pakistani High 
Commissioner in London. It was signed not only by the Bishop himself but also by three
• 70other Christian leaders and five Muslim leaders. The Bishop went on to visit Pakistan
69 Rumalshah, Munawar “Contemporary Challenges to the Religious World in Pakistan”
Al-Mushir Vol. 39 No. 2 (1997) p. 53. The same points were first offered by Bishop 
Rumalshah at an inter-religious conference in 1990 in a paper entitled “South Asia:
Cradle o f Religious Conflict”.
70 Letter dated 19 February 1997 to Mr Moin Jan Naim, Acting High Commissioner for Pakistan, signed by 
Rt Rev. David Smith, the Bishop o f Bradford and Rev. Canon Peter Maguire, representing the Catholic 
Bishop o f Leeds, Councillor Mohammed Ajeeb, ex-Lord Mayor of Bradford, Rev. Geoff Reid, representing 
the Rev. Peter Whittaker, Chairman of the Methodist Church West Yorkshire District, Sher Azam, ex­
president o f the Bradford Council for Mosques, Mr Andrayas Khan, Pakistan Christian Action Group, Faqir 
Mohammed, general secretary o f the Bradford Council for Mosques, Khadim Hussain, President o f the 
Bradford Council for Mosques, and Ishtiaq Ahmed, director of Bradford’s Racial Equality Council
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in November 1997, also as a response to the events in Shanti Nagar nine months earlier.71 
Another response to Shanti Nagar came from a large church of Pakistani-origin British 
Christians meeting at Walthamstow, east London, who wrote to the Prime Ministers of 
Britain and Pakistan to express their concern asking for practical steps to be taken to 
ameliorate the suffering and insecurity of Christians in Pakistan.72 A sympathetic reply 
was received from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, indicating their 
continued concern about the human rights of Christians in Pakistan and violence against 
individual Christians. In the United States, Pakistani Christians held a protest 
demonstration outside the United Nations and the Pakistani Consulate.74
The anniversary of the day on which Jinnah made his famous speech on 11 August 1947 
to the Constituent Assembly promising freedom and equality for all faiths in the new 
country of Pakistan has become a symbolic date for Christian protests. Thus on 11 
August 1997, a large demonstration was held in Faisalabad against the death sentence for 
blasphemy. But the Christians of Pakistan were not the only ones marking this day in 
this way. On the same day, Austrian Christians demonstrated in Vienna for the same 
cause, under the auspices of Christian Solidarity International, a Western advocacy and
ne
human rights organization.
71 The human family and the duty o f  religion Address by the Archbishop o f  Canterbury at the International 
Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan, visit to Pakistan 4-7 December 1998 p.2 p.8
72 Letter dated 17 February 1997 to Rt Hon. John Major from Shaheen Zar, secretary o f the Asian Christian 
Church (London)
73 Letter dated 25 March 1997 from S. Homer o f the South Asian Department o f the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office to Shaheen Zar, secretary o f the Asian Christian Church, Walthamstow
74 “Pak Christians protest in US” The Nation (1 March 1997); “Pakistani Christians demonstrate at UNHQ” 
Dawn (1 March 1997)
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Christians in Pakistan were encouraged by a state visit from George Carey, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, to Pakistan in December 1997. He spoke of the prejudice 
towards minorities and called for tolerance and specifically for amendments to the 
blasphemy law and an improvement in the situation regarding Christian schools.76 His 
statements on the blasphemy law caused a furious outcry from Muslim religious
77leaders. In a speech at the International Islamic University in Islamabad on 5 December 
1997 about the status of religious minorities, specifically Muslims in Britain and 
Christians in Pakistan, he spoke of the need for a better kind of “tolerance” than “being 
allowed to exist on sufferance”. He called for a tolerance that involved mutual respect
• 7 0and true security for the minority groups. He also listed five areas for practical action: 
places of worship and education, freedom to convert, mutual understanding, freedom to 
participate in public life, and valuing the gifts of the minorities. He deplored the
7Qtendency of minorities to “retreat into enclaves”. His visit, made at the invitation of the 
Church of Pakistan, succeeded in bringing not only encouragement to Pakistani 
Christians but also prominence to their problems.80 It was well reported in the Pakistani 
press and sparked some lively debate amongst Pakistani Muslims, and even in the 
National Assembly. Responding to a motion tabled by four MNAs that the Archbishop 
had caused public resentment by his comments about propagating religion, the Federal
75 Joseph, John Bishop o f Faisalabad Vienna rally against death sentence in blasphemy law  (unpublished 
paper, dated 11 August 1998)
“Pakistan urged to amend blasphemy law” The Nation (5 December 1997) “Archbishop stresses need for 
tolerance” Dawn (7 December 1997) p.7; “Archbishop’s remarks resented” The Muslim (9 December 1997)
P-2
Ali, Mayed “Pakistani religious leaders respond angrily to Carey’s suggestion for rethink on blasphemy 
law” The News (8 December 1997); Iqbal, M.M. “Blasphemy law” The News (22 December 1997) p.7
78 Carey The human family p.2
79 ibid pp.7-8
80 Nazir Ali, Michael, Bishop o f Rochester, quoted in “Dr Carey appeals for Pakistani Christians” Church 
o f  England Newspaper (12 December 1997)
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Minister for Religious Affairs, Raja Zafar-ul-Haq, made a statement in the National 
Assembly that the Archbishop’s remarks had not been anti-Muslim, and affirmed the 
freedom of all to propagate their own religion.81
On 6 May 1998, Roman Catholic Bishop John Joseph shot himself dead in protest 
following the pronouncement of a death sentence for Ayub Masih, a Christian found 
guilty under the blasphemy law. This stirred international interest for a short time, and 
Pakistani Christians inside and outside of their country took every opportunity to draw 
attention to their situation. Michael Nazir Ali, Anglican Bishop of Rochester, spoke of 
how the blasphemy laws had “poisoned” relations between faiths in Pakistan.82 The 
Pakistan Christian Welfare Organisation (UK) met with the Pakistani High 
Commissioner in London, Mian Riaz Samee, and the Speaker of Pakistan’s National 
Assembly, Elahi Bux Sumro, on 13 May 1998 to discuss the problems which Christians 
in Pakistan faced, especially from the blasphemy laws. The following day another 
group of British Pakistan Christians visited the Prime Minister’s office and the Pakistan 
High Commission.84 On 25 May 1998 Pakistani Christians in Britain held a protest 
march in London, organized by the Pakistan Christian Alliance in Europe.85
81 “The Archbishop’s remarks are not anti-Muslim” Daily Jang (12 December 1997)
82 “Pakistan: WCC urge repeal o f blasphemy law” circular issued by the Anglican Communion News 
Service (22 May 1998)
83 David, Dr P.J. and Shams, Qamar, (president and general secretary respectively o f the Pakistan Christian 
Welfare Organisation) letter to Mr Elahi Bux Sumro, speaker o f the National Assembly o f Pakistan and 
Mian Riaz Samee, High Commissioner o f Pakistan (13 May 1998); Feedback from meeting on 13 May 
1998 -  Pakistani High Commission notes taken by Stone, Rev. Christopher (representing the Bishop o f  
Rochester at the meeting)
84 Dean, Dr George, fax letter to the author (undated, but some time between 7 and 13 May 1998)
85 “Protests to Pakistan Government” Baptist Times (28 May 1998)
273
Support in the aftermath of Bishop Joseph’s suicide was also voiced by Christians from 
other countries, by Muslims and by politicians. The World Council of Churches, 
representing 322 Protestant and Orthodox churches world-wide, called on the Pakistan 
government to repeal Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code in a letter to Ambassador 
Munir Akram, Pakistan’s permanent representative at the United Nations, made public on 
13 May 1998. Petitions were raised. Christian Solidarity Worldwide, a British 
advocacy and human rights organization, collected 4,000 signatures and presented them
07
to the Pakistani High Commissioner in London in May 1998. The Barnabas Fund, an 
international Christian relief and development charity, collected 31,410 signatures from 
26 countries covering every continent on a petition calling for the repeal of Sections 295- 
B and 295-C. The petition was presented to the military secretary to the President of
00
Pakistan in Islamabad in January 1999. The Minorities Council of India issued a 
statement on 11 May 1998 through their leader, Prof. Iqbal Ansari (a Muslim), which 
expressed serious concern over the events which led to the bishop’s suicide and urged
OQ
Pakistan to bring their law and practice into conformity with human rights standards.
The persecution of Christians in Pakistan was raised in the British House of Commons, 
and the British High Commission in Islamabad led a European Union demarche to the 
Pakistan authorities on 14 May 1998 about the situation of religious minorities, in 
particular the death penalty imposed on Ayub Masih.90 This was followed by a visit to 
Pakistan by Derek Fatchett, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
86 Brown, Stephen “World Council o f Churches urges Pakistan to repeal blasphemy law” ENI Bulletin No. 
10(27 May 1998) p.7
87 “Protests to Pakistan government” Baptist Times, 28 May 1998
88 “Pakistan Blasphemy Petition Update No. 3” produced by the Barnabas Fund (19 March 1999)
89 “Aligarh minorities’ body deplores ‘religious intolerance’ in Pakistan” The News International, London 
edition (12 May 1998)
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Affairs, in February 1999 during which he raised the issue of the treatment of religious 
minorities with Pakistan’s Law Minister. Senior officials from the British Foreign Office 
held discussions with their Pakistani counterparts in Islamabad in May 1999, which 
included the subjects of religious persecution and the blasphemy laws. Furthermore the 
UK development programme for Pakistan, run by the Department for International 
Development (with an annual budget of about £25 million) places an emphasis on 
funding projects which will improve human rights and in particular to create greater 
justice for marginalized groups -  this would directly benefit Christians.91
The blasphemy law -  particularly cases involving Christians -  has been raised repeatedly 
at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The Special Rapporteur, Bacre 
Waly Ndiaye, submitted an urgent appeal in September 1993 concerning the death 
sentences passed on Salamat Masih (aged 13 at the time of his alleged offence), Rehmat 
Masih and Manzoor Masih.92 In 1994 he raised the murder of Manzoor Masih outside 
the court by Islamic militants, and also a number of other blasphemy cases pending (not
no
only of Christians). In 1995 David Littman, representing the Indian Institute for Non- 
Aligned Studies, raised the issue again at the UN Commission on Human Rights, making
90 Fatchett, Derek, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, House o f Commons Hansard 
written answers for 23 June 1998 column 470)
91 Hoon, Geoffrey, UK Minister o f State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (House of Commons Hansard 
debates for 9 June 1999 column 611)
92 Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr Bacre Waly Ndiaye, submitted pursuant to commission on human 
rights resolution 1993/71, Commission on Human Rights, 50th session (1994), E/CN.4/1994/7 (7 December 
1993) p. 107
93 Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr Bacre Waly Ndiaye, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human 
Rights resolution 1994/82, Commission on human rights 51st session (1995), E/CN.4/1995/61 (14 
December 1994) p.78
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particular reference to Christians accused and murdered because of the law.94 Later the 
same year, another UN Special Rapporteur, Abedlfattah Amor, visited Pakistan and 
presented a report on the status of religious minorities to the UN Commission on Human 
Rights in January 1996. This report expressed concern about the blasphemy law and 
many other areas of legislation affecting minorities.95 The pressure has continued, with a 
quick response to the suicide of Bishop John Joseph in the form of an appeal by Littman 
and his colleague Rene Wadlow of the Association for World Education to Mary 
Robinson, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, calling for the 
repeal of Sections 295-B and 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code.96
Having had their problems highlighted by Bishop Joseph’s death, Christians in Pakistan 
continued to organize events to keep their grievances in the public eye. On 21 June 1998 
the Christian Liberation Front organised a conference for minorities on the subject of 
discrimination against them and solidarity among them. The conference was attended not 
only by political leaders and other minority leaders from within Pakistan but also by
Q7delegations of Pakistanis living abroad. A rally was held in Lahore on 11 August 1998 
organised by the Christian Liberation Front of Pakistan to protest about the problems of 
the minorities. Similar rallies were held on the same day in the United States, Canada 
and Britain.98
94 Statement by Representative David Littman on 6 February 1995 to the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights, Geneva (30 January -  10 March 1995)
95 Rehman, I.A. “UN advice on minorities” The News (12 July 1996)
96 Littman, David and Wadlow, Ren6, Association for World Education, letter to Mary Robinson (8 May 
1998)
97 “All minorities parties conference on 21st” The News (15 June 1998) p.3
98 “Minorities plan solidarity rally on Aug 11” Dawn (23 July 1998) p.8
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Though Christians in Pakistan marked the first anniversary of Bishop Joseph’s suicide on 
6 May 1999," internationally much of the public and media interest had waned within a 
few weeks of the bishop’s death. Significantly, the debates in the British House of 
Commons, which had been so concerned for Pakistani Christians in May and June 1998, 
in the following twelve months mentioned the problems of Pakistani Christians only as 
an adjunct to those of Indian Christians100 and of Pakistani Ahmadiyyas.101 
(Nevertheless, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was active behind the scenes, as 
mentioned above.)
Some Pakistani Christian leaders have taken the opportunities provided by overseas 
travel to speak of the difficulties faced by Christians in Pakistan to audiences they would 
not normally be able to address. On 27 April 1998 Joseph Coutts, the Roman Catholic 
Bishop of Hyderabad, addressed a meeting of Asian bishops at the Vatican and spoke of 
the suffering caused to Asian churches by Islamic “intolerance, militancy and
i nooppression”. Bishop Munawar Rumalshah testified before the U.S. Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on 17 June 1998 on the subject of “Being a Christian in Pakistan”103 
In this speech, Bishop Rumalshah gave a frank and strongly worded description of the 
problems facing Christians in Pakistan. Mohan Lai Shahani travelled to the United States
99 Akkara, Anto “Pakistani Christians remember bishop’s ‘ultimate’ sacrifice for tolerance” ENI Bulletin 
No. 9 (21 May 1999) pp.17-18
100 House o f Commons Hansard debates for 10 February 1999 column 443-4
101 House of Commons Hansard debates for 9 June 1999 column 605-611
102 “Pakistani bishop denounces Islamic ‘intolerance’” The News International, London edition (29 April
1998) p.12
103 Rumalshah Being a Christian in Pakistan
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and Britain, hoping to “create awareness in the West about the plight of Christians and 
other religious minorities in Pakistan”.104
Various Western Christian human rights organizations (such as Jubilee Campaign and 
Christian Solidarity International / Worldwide) have taken up the causes of Pakistani 
Christians, and they have also become a regular focus of some Christian news agencies, 
such as Compass Direct, which has a part-time Pakistani reporter based in Pakistan. 
These are helping to remind the international community that the problems which led to 
the violence at Shanti Nagar and the death of Bishop John Joseph remain basically 
unchanged.
Inter-faith dialogue and links
As Charles Amjad-Ali notes with regret, there are few organized attempts at building 
relationships the Muslim and Christian communities. Christians are sycophantic towards 
Muslims in public but denigrate them in private. Muslims largely ignore the Christian 
community except when they attack them and their faith in sermons and literature.105 
This lack of contact is a development since the process of Islamization began under Zia; 
formerly there were more contacts between the two communities.106 Khurshid Ahmad, 
who had been one of major players in dialogue with Western Christians while living in
104 “Interview with Mohan Lai Shahani” in Rutherford International Vol. 2 Issue 8 (August 1998) p.2
105 Amjad-Ali, Charles “Political and Social Conditions in Pakistan” in Miller, Roland E. and Mwakabana, 
Hance A.O. Christian-Muslim Dialogue: Theological and Practical Issues (Geneva: Lutheran World 
Federation, 1998) p.341
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Britain,107 describes as “threadbare” the discussions which parliamentary committees in 
Pakistan had with Catholic and Church of Pakistan leaders,108 which would seem to 
indicate a lack of determination in pursuing dialogue with Pakistani Christians.
The main promoter of Christian-Muslim dialogue has been Father Archie deSouza, 
working in Karachi, whose efforts have extended over many years, including weekly 
study sessions for Muslims and Christians with the aim of understanding each other.109 A 
one-day conference attended by ulema from various Islamic schools and Christians from 
various denominations was held in May 1998. The aim of the meeting, organised by the 
former Christian MNA Julius Salik, was to build good relations between the two 
communities.110
Other public initiatives to promote good relations with Muslims are few in number. One 
was included in the final statement of the seminar for religious minorities held at the CSC 
in Rawalpindi in 1996. This included a resolution to “strengthen existing networks of 
support and create new links in order to share our resources with one another in our 
common struggle with other Muslim fellow citizens, of discerning our identity as equal 
citizens of Pakistan”.111 Levrat’s study of Christian study centres in Muslim countries 
(including the one at Rawalpindi) makes the interesting point that the existence of such
106 Kraan “Muslim-Christian relations and Christian Study Centres” p. 176
107 Some o f Khurshid Ahmad’s appointments and activities in the UK and the West are listed in Siddiqui, 
Ataullah op. cit. p. 125
108 Unpublished interviews with Ataullah Siddiqui, Leicester (22 April 1991) quoted in Siddiqui, Ataullah 
op. cit. pp. 134-5
109 Jillani, Shahzeb “Choosing to stay with his people” The News (21 December 1997) p.28
110 “Joint meeting calls for unity among Muslims and Christians” Dawn (28 May 1998); “Muslims, 
Christians should jointly foil designs o f vested interests” Pakistan Observer (20 May 1998)
111 Final Statement o f national seminar on “Religious Minorities in Pakistan: struggle for identity” p. 106
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study centres in itself promotes dialogue with Muslims if Muslims are encouraged to use 
them as well as Christians.112
In 1997 a seminar was held at the Pastoral Institute, Multan, attended by representatives 
of the Presbyterians, Salvation Army, Catholic Church and Church of Pakistan. The final 
statement arising from this seminar called for the urgent formation of an inter­
denominational, inter-faith theological group.113 As a result a “Muslim-Christian 
dialogue group”, organised by Father James Channdn, now meets monthly at a 
Dominican centre in Lahore. Meetings are attended by 70 to 80 Muslim and Christian 
theologians, lawyers, academics and journalists.
A group describing themselves as “liberal Muslims of Pakistan” formed the Muslim- 
Christian Solidarity Council of Pakistan, based in Karachi in 1998 with the aim of 
strengthening understanding between Muslims and Christians, to safeguard religious 
freedoms and to solve problems facing minorities in Pakistan.114 It is interesting to note 
that this Muslim group, which invited co-operation and collaboration from “all peace and 
human loving persons”, was formed as a result of a message sent by Cardinal Francis 
Arinze, president of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, at the end of 
Ramadan in 1998. The message spoke in generalizations of the importance of “religious 
values” and educating the young to respect other people’s faiths. It ended with the
112 Levrat, Jacques Une Experience de Dialogue. Les Centres d ’Etude Chretiens en Pays Musulmans 
(Thdse de Doctorat pr£sent6e h la Faculty de Thdologie de Lyon, 1984) reviewed in Kraan “Muslim- 
Christian relations and Christian Study Centres” pp. 176-7
113 “The Christian Church in Pakistan: a vision for the 21st century” p.83
114 Letter dated 8 April 1998 from A.H. Zameer Ahmed Binyamin, convener / chief executive o f the Group 
o f Liberal Muslims, on behalf o f the Central Organising Council o f the Muslim-Christian Solidarity 
Council o f Pakistan to the Bishop o f Peshawar (copy supplied to the author by the addressee)
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statement “It may be necessary for Christians and Muslims to meet together more often in 
order to search together, before God, for answers to these questions.”115
A pertinent comment on the subject of contemporary inter-faith dialogue and the possible 
dangers for minorities involved is made by Avril Powell who observes that Pakistani 
society is far more homogeneously Islamic now than when the state was created.
Minority comments on religious issues, she concludes, “when perceived to be in conflict 
with the ideology of the Islamic state, can certainly not be engaged in safely in a public 
arena in the 1990s”.116
Affirmation of Muslim aspirations
A very small number of Christians have firmly identified with Muslim aspirations for 
Pakistan. As mentioned previously, Dominic Moghal of the Christian Study Centre, 
would like to see Pakistan becoming an Islamic state under Shari’ah. If few Christians 
would go as far as desiring a true Islamic state, many had been active in the pro-Pakistan 
movement before partition, supporting the calls for the formation of Pakistan.117 The
115 Letter from Cardinal Francis Arinze, president of the Pontifical Council for Religious Dialogue, to Mr 
A.H. Zameer Ahmed, chief executive o f the Group of Liberal Muslims, Lahore (undated but received 18 
February 1998)
116 Powell, Avril “Contested Gods and Prophets: Discourse among minorities in late nineteenth-century 
Punjab” Renaissance and Modern Studies (December 1995) p.59
117 Sada, Mehboob “The cheating of history” Al-Mushir Vol. 38 No. 3 (1996) p.l 19
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lack of recognition given to this fact by the Muslim majority is a long-standing grievance
i 10
of the Christian community.
Dr Frank Khair Ullah, principal of Murree College, Sialkot, took a middle position, 
affirming the central nature of Islam in Pakistan without seeking an Islamic state. He 
wrote of the need for Pakistani Christians to “identify ourselves with the aspirations of 
the people and do all that we can for the achieving of this goal”. He had earlier in the 
same sentence written of the search by Pakistani leaders for “a common basis of life for 
the translation of the ideology of Pakistan into practical form”, the ideology being Islam 
and the search being chiefly the search for a consensus on the place of Islam in 
Pakistan.119
Calls for the arming of the Christian community
Considerable publicity was given to the suggestion of the Christian community arming 
itself, which was made by Rt Rev. Alexander Malik, Church of Pakistan Bishop of 
Lahore. His warning was given in the aftermath of the protest suicide of Bishop John 
Joseph. Addressing a press conference, Bishop Malik spoke of the possibility of a Sipah- 
e-Masiha (Guardians of the Messiah) being formed if the violence and discrimination 
against Christians continued. The name cited by the bishop made a clear comparison 
with the Sunni Muslim militant group Sipah-e-Sahaba (Guardians of the Friends of the
118 For example, Akhter op. cit. passim
119 Khair Ullah. “The future o f Christians in Pakistan” p.l
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Prophet) which has been linked to many sectarian killings, mainly of Shi’a Muslims, and 
was perhaps involved in the Shanti Nagar violence.120
The suggestion was apparently a reaction to Bishop Joseph’s suicide and the idea has not 
been adopted by anyone else, or even pursued by Bishop Alexander himself. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in other countries where Christians suffer regular 
violence at the hands of Muslims, the previously passive Christian community has
•  • 191 199recently m certain areas started to arm itself or actually to retaliate.
Withdrawal from mainstream society
The majority of Pakistani Christians live in small groups of their co-religionists either in 
Christian bastis or colonies within a mixed settlement or in Christian-majority villages.
In some cases this situation has arisen because missionary societies have bought plots of 
land and leased it to Christians. In other cases it is because, considered “untouchables”, 
the Christians were prevented by social pressure from living close to anyone else and 
therefore had to live with each other.
Furthermore, most urban Christians are isolated from Muslims in that they follow 
Western customs at the major rites of passage, such as birth, marriage and death. Some
120 “Lahore Bishop warns o f establishing ‘Sipah-e-Masiha” The News (13 May 1998); “Bishop rejects govt 
claim on blasphemy law” Dawn (13 May 1998); “Pakistan Christian Militant Group Forms ” Daily News 
B rief from Catholic World News (13 May 1998); Goldenberg, Susan “Fear among reviled believers breeds 
Christian soldiers” The Guardian (11 June 1998) p. 17
121 For example, Egypt
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Christian men adopt Western dress, particularly in urban contexts and for Christian 
ceremonies such as attending church worship services or weddings.123 This strongly 
proclaims a Western identity, since Muslims going to mosque would all wear the 
traditional shalwar kameez. Since Zia’s time it has been compulsory for civil servants to 
wear shalwar kameez at work. Goan and Anglo-Indian Christians124 put a strong 
emphasis on using Western table manners (eating with cutlery rather than fingers, for 
example) and following Western food customs such as the consumption of alcohol and 
pork. These cultural choices are of course permitted but not necessary for Christians; 
they create barriers for social intercourse with Muslims. Christians in rural areas tend to 
remain closer to Pakistani customs and culture. It is relevant to mention here that rural 
Christianity in Pakistan is commonly characterized by much syncretism, so that rural 
Christians tend to follow not only the culture but also the spirituality of their non- 
Christian neighbours, adopting many religious practices from Islam and even 
Hinduism.125
Because of the socio-economic status of the Christian community, the church 
establishment is very dependent financially on foreign mission agencies. An example 
which demonstrates this clearly is the budget for the Church of Pakistan Diocese of 
Peshawar. Figures are given below for the years 1995 (actual) and 1996 (expected) in
127rupees.
122 For example, Nigeria
123 Heinrich op. cit. p.l 15
124 Jamshaid, Arif “The people time forgot” The News (15 June 1997 ) p.25
125 McClintock op. cit. pp.348-9
126 Malik, Alexander paper given at a Christian consultation (September 1988) p.4
127 Figures calculated from Ghauri, Sardar Hassan (Diocesan Treasurer) Diocese o f  Peshawar Church o f  
Pakistan Budget fo r  1996
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Bank interest Total %
Western
sources
1995 5,680,442 3,631,758 145,500 9,457,700 60.1
1996 4,488,875 4,912,700 100,000 9,501,575 47.2
From this it can be seen that Western sources accounted for over 60% of the diocesan 
budget in 1995 and were expected to amount to almost 50% of the 1996 budget. It 
should be noted that both years the diocese was running at a deficit.
Migration
Some Christians respond to feelings of alienation from society by migrating. Anglo- 
Indians in particular (who usually prefer to focus on their European heritage rather than 
on their Asian heritage) left the country in large numbers in 1960s for Australia, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. Many young Anglo-Indians would still like to
leave Pakistan but find it difficult because of stricter immigration laws in their would-be
• » 1 9 8  destination countries.
In other cases migrants are the Christians of greatest ability and intellectual prowess who 
have been offered jobs in the West. For example, two Pakistani bishops now occupy 
senior Anglican posts in the UK, while Charles Amjad-Ali, former director of the CSC in 
Rawalpindi, is now a lecturer at Princeton Theological Seminary in the United States. It
128 Jamshaid op. cit. p.25
285
has become very difficult for Christian hospitals in Pakistan to find Christian Pakistani 
doctors for their staff, as most such doctors have emigrated.
A third! category of migrants are those Christians who have been accused of blasphemy 
and acquitted by the courts. Because of the continuing danger to their lives from Islamic 
militants, some have been granted asylum in the West, for example Salamat Masih and
• 190Rehmat Masih in Germany. Others have escaped before trial, for example Daniel Scot 
to Australia.130 In the context of Gul Masih (see chapter 5), Shaukat Masih, advisor to the 
Chief Minister of Baluchistan, wrote of the likelihood that Christians would have to seek
l o t
“political asylum” in other countries.
Pakistan’s Christian community are conscious that many are emigrating from their 
community to the West. While no comprehensive figures are available, Christians
» • • • 199  # .believe that emigration is increasing. DeSouza estimates that the Christian population 
of Saddar, Karachi, which had numbered 15,000 to 18,000 in 1947, was reduced to 7,000 
or 8,000 by 1997. Most of this he believed to be due to emigration to the United States, 
Canada and the United Kingdom in the previous 25 years, and in particular since the 
process of Islamization had begun under Zia in the late 1970s. Amongst those
129 Moghal “Alienation o f the Local People” p.34
130 See the case history in chapter 5
131 Masih, Shaukat letter to Benazir Bhutto, published in Jaudat International Vol. 5 no. 40 (April 1995) 
pp.25-26
132 Moghal “Alienation o f the local people” p.28
133 Father Archie deSouza o f St Patrick’s Church, Saddar, quoted in Askari, Hussain “A departure from the 
past” The News (25 May 1997)
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emigrating were all deSouza’s own relatives, he himself staying only because of his 
responsiblities as a priest to his people.134
Emigration is a costly option in terms of finance and is therefore normally open only to 
those of substantial means. (An exception to this is individuals accused of blasphemy 
whose high-profile cases have gained them financial support from Western human rights 
organizations.) Moghal points out that the first Christians to emigrate were the Goans, 
who were economically better off than most other Pakistani Christians.135 DeSouza 
states that most of the Christians who emigrated from Saddar were financially secure. 
(Indeed, they were mainly Goans and Anglo-Indians, that is the wealthiest and most 
Westernized of Pakistani Christians.) In other words, these Christians were not primarily 
economic migrants.
The emigration of the relatively more prosperous members of the community -  usually 
the better educated -  is obviously detrimental to the wellbeing of the community as a
196whole, leaving them poorer and more vulnerable over all.
Calls for the creation of a Christian state
The possibility of a separate independent state for Pakistani Christians -  to be called 
Takistan137 - has sometimes been suggested. Arguments used to support this are the
134 Jillani, Shahzeb op,, cit.
135 Moghal “Alienation o f the local people” p.28
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comparable population size of various European countries (3-4 million) and the logical 
parallel with the creation of Pakistan itself as a homeland for the Muslim minority in 
India.138 Moghal suggests that the need for a separate homeland would be triggered by 
Pakistan becoming a theocratic state, i.e. with Shari’ah dominant over secular law, as 
proposed in the Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment Bill of 1998.139
The idea of Takistan first emerged following the nationalization of the Christian schools 
in 1972. It is a concept familiar to all educated Christians, who mostly consider it an 
unattainable ideal and do not expect it ever to become a reality. A marginally more 
feasible suggestion is that made by Pitras Ghani, the leader of a Christian party called 
Aqliati Haq Parast Party, who suggested soon after the suicide of Bishop John Joseph, 
that if Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code was to remain on the statute books, 
Christians should be allocated a separate province within Pakistan.140 There are six 
adjoining districts of Punjab where Christians are most densely concentrated. These are 
Lahore (190,169 Christians), Faisalabad (164,415), Sialkot (118,992), Sheikhupura 
(108,922), Gujranwala (109,659) and Kasur (75,611); together they have 58.9% of the 
total Christian population of Pakistan. Yet this still amounts to only 4.4% of the total 
population of the six districts, making it very unlikely that they could ever be made into a 
specifically Christian province.141
136 Yusuf, Zohra “The apartheid card” The Herald (November 1992) p.60
137 literally “vineyard” -  a biblical allusion
138 Moghal “Alienation o f the local people” p.35
139 Moghal “The right o f dual vote” p.76
140 quoted in “Redress o f Christians’ grievances demanded” The News (14 May 1998)
141 Figures derived from the 1981 District Census Reports as presented in Addleton op. cit. pp.40-45
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An interesting comment was made at the time of the first elections with separate 
electorates (1985) by one of the victorious Christian candidates who spoke of the need for 
unity and a single political party for Christians. He compared the Christians of Pakistan 
with the Palestinians, saying that the Palestinian Liberation Organisation’s leader Yasir 
Arafat, was considered a head of state, though there was no Palestinian state. “So it can 
be with the Christians of Pakistan.”142
Conclusion
For the first 50 years of their country’s existence, Pakistani Christians had two self- 
imposed handicaps in responding their problems. The first was an apathy bom of self- 
pity and missionary influence and the second was their disunity. Furthermore, the ablest 
of their community tend to emigrate so that the best leadership is unavailable to lead.
Thus the many disparate efforts in politics, research, publicity, dialogue etc. have had 
little effect in stemming the effects of Islamization as they impinge on Christians.143 
Social reaction has mainly involved a withdrawal from contact with the majority 
community, and efforts at dialogue with Muslims have been few and far between. 
Christians feel increasingly that they have no place in Pakistan and are unsure whether 
their identity as Christians is compatible with being Pakistanis. In the February 1997 
elections, the Muslim League’s slogan ran: “If you are a Muslim then join the Muslim
142 Emmanuel Zafar quoted in Tebbe, James “Interviews with Christian Members o f the National 
Assembly” p. 102
143 with the exception .of the successful protests about the proposed religion column on national identity 
cards (see chapter 4)
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League”. The Jama’at-i-Islami and other Islamic parties had the slogan: “What is the 
meaning of Pakistan? -  There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His Apostle!” A 
sympathetic Muslim journalist of repute commented: “The atmosphere pervading the 
entire country is so completely Muslim in its ambience and impact that a non-Muslim 
appears to be something alien and out of place.”144 Moghal reports feelings of 
desperation such as “non-Muslims have no place in Pakistan and now it is totally a 
country of the Muslims” or “they have to leave this country in order to retain their 
religious identity”.145
Some indeed do leave the country while others drop their Christian names (for example, 
“Masih”, meaning “Messiah”) and adopt Muslim names or give their children Muslim 
names in an attempt to integrate more successfully.146 A Christian audio engineer, who 
was known by the Muslim name Sohail, described how useful it was to be generally 
thought a Muslim. In the middle of filming a scene, “all of a sudden I heard the director 
calling my real name [Christofer]. He didn’t call me Sohail. It was only then that I 
realised that people had recognised me, and were only too willing to beat me up. I 
wished my director had used Sohail to call me. You see, it helps.” Interestingly, his 
Muslim name had been given him by a school-teacher who found the word “Christofer” 
too difficult to say.147 Although not his own initiative, he still valued the concealment of 
his religious identity in this way.
144 Rahman, Hafizur “Minorities in our midst” Dawn (23 September 1998) p.21
145 Moghal “Alienation o f the Local People” pp.25,28
146 Yusuf op. cit. p.60; Jacob, Noshin op. cit. p.26
147 Shirvanee op. cit. p.29
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A seminar on the subject of the “struggle for identity” faced by religious minorities in 
Pakistan was held at the CSC in 1996. The final statement of the seminar included the 
following comment, indicating the realization of the minorities that the Muslim majority 
may also be unclear about their identity:
We realized that our identity in the country is confused. We want to be 
equal and wish to play a positive role but the legal and political 
processes in the country had (sic) cut us from the national main 
stream.148
The extreme and dramatic events of the destructive rioting at Shanti Nagar in 1997 and 
Bishop John Joseph’s suicide the following year have had a marked effect, apparently 
radicalizing Pakistani Christians and lifting them from their previous lassitude to greater 
efforts and more courageous outspokenness. This has applied not only to Pakistani 
Christians within Pakistan but also to those in the diaspora. However the problem of 
disunity remains. The Christian community is fragmented along ecclesiological and 
theological lines, and further along biradari and family lines. In addition there are 
divisions because of socio-economic status and the remnants of the caste system, the 
rural-urban differences, and the fact that the community is scattered geographically. It is 
hard to see how the Christians can unite to confront Islamic ideology together.
A further problem concerns the fact that their Western links and history of influence by 
Western missionaries have resulted in a Christian community which is by and large not
148 Final statement of the National Seminar on Religious Minorities in Pakistan p. 104
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trained in how to approach Islam. Its leaders have mainly been educated according to 
Western patterns only and are therefore ill-equipped to communicate and argue with the 
ulema. The two most notable exceptions -  Bishop Michael Nazir Ali and Dr Charles 
Amjad-Ali, who were trained in Islam - have now both left the country. Other Christian 
leaders149 tend to protest and complain, making uncompromising Western-type demands 
for human rights, in a way that is unlikely to convince the ulema, but could even push the 
ulema to the extreme of actually declaring Christians to be dhimmi. A better method 
would appear to be to negotiate with the ulema, reasoning from appropriate Islamic 
teachings and traditions, to find a middle ground acceptable to both sides. This, however 
is an unrealistic expectation because the current leadership generally lacks the necessary 
skills.
In the light of so many problems caused by Western links, it is ironic that perhaps the 
greatest immediate hope for Pakistani Christians comes from international pressure, 
which has developed greatly since the Shanti Nagar rioting in February 1997. Bishop 
John Joseph’s suicide note (May 1998) said that his death would be the first “sacrifice” in 
a renewed campaign to get the blasphemy law repealed. So indeed it has proved to be. 
The day before his death Bishop Joseph had released to the press a letter he had 
addressed to the people of Pakistan, calling for action to have Sections 295-B and 295-C 
repealed. He said that this required unity and co-ordination, including bishops inside and 
outside Pakistan, Parliamentarians, Muslims, Christians and Hindus, Pakistani NGOs and 
foreign NGOs, and urged contact with other governments who could act through their
149 A good example is-Alexander J.Malik, Bishop of Lahore, who makes frequent use o f the words “human 
rights” and often refers to the United Nations, when he speaks about the difficulties which face Christians.
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embassies in Pakistan.150 It is interesting to note how many of these groupings have 
indeed got involved (though without much co-ordination and collaboration) since the 
Bishop’s death and mainly as a direct result of his death. The Muslim initiative on behalf 
of Christians that was created in 1998 in response to a friendly message of greetings from 
Cardinal Arinze in the Vatican is also of interest.151 Despite the years of pleading from 
Pakistani Christians in Pakistan, it was in the end a mildly worded Western approach 
which resulted in sympathetic action by Pakistani Muslims. It must also be noted that the 
American decision to withdraw aid from countries with a poor record on religious
1 S9liberty give a financial edge to international opinion which seems certain to increase 
the concern of the Pakistani government to earn the good opinion of that country at least.
150 “The final step against 295-C” Open letter dated 5 May 1998 from Dr John Joseph, Bishop o f  
Faisalabad; Jillani, Anees “Blasphemy laws and the minorities” The News (14 May 1998)
151 Arinze, Cardinal Francis op. cit.
152 The International Religious Freedom Act o f 1998 passed by the U.S. Senate on 9 October 1998, see for 





This study has sought to demonstrate the growing marginalization and oppression of the 
Christian community in Pakistan over the last 52 years. Islamization has led to changes 
in the religious, cultural and political fabric of Pakistan which have had severe effects on 
the minority Christian community. As Bishop Michael Nazir Ali noted in 1987, “The life 
of the Church of Pakistan is lived out today in a context which is becoming more and 
more difficult. There is cause for concern, and even for fear.”1 The situation has 
continued to deteriorate as the inequalities have increased.
Implications of the two nation theory
The rationale for the creation of Pakistan was the “two-nation theory”, according to 
which it was impossible for Indian Muslims to continue to share a state with Hindus. 
Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, firmly embraced this argument.
Nevertheless, he stated clearly that all citizens of the new state were to be equal, 
irrespective of their religion or caste. Less than two years after the creation of Pakistan, 
and just months after Jinnah’s death, a process began which would eventually negate 
Jinnah’s expressed ideals of equality. The first step was the adoption of the Objectives 
Resolution in March 1949, which was later incorporated into the various constitutions. 
Non-Muslims were immediately alarmed at the influential position given to Islam within
1 Nazir Ali, Michael Frontiers in Muslim-Christian Encounter (Oxford: Regnum Books, 1987) p.91
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the Objectives Resolution. But perhaps even more significant, though few realized it at 
the time, was that it drew a distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims. As Joshua 
Fazl-ud-Din pointed out, “There is a clear picture of two peoples, the Muslim majority 
and the non-Muslim minorities. With regard to both these communities the State has 
clearly assumed definite duties which have naturally got to be different and distinct from 
each other.” The Muslims of the new state of Pakistan had separated themselves from 
“two-nation” India only to find that there were two “nations” in Pakistan, though this 
time the Muslims were the majority.
To distinguish between Muslims and non-Muslims is far more than a mere statement of 
fact. From its very inception Islam has been acutely conscious of its relations with non- 
Muslims. The vast majority of Islamic teaching - in early times the whole of it -  assumes 
that the political, social and military dominance of Muslims over non-Muslims is the 
normal state; where this does not obtain, it must be sought. Modernist interpretations of 
Islam do not follow this pattern, so that distinguishing Muslims from non-Muslims would 
have little or no significance in such a context. But, as this study has shown, the overall 
trend in Pakistan is persistently towards conservative Islam. Given this fact, to 
distinguish Muslims from non-Muslims is to imply superiority and inferiority 
respectively. Three chapters (chapters 3 ,4  and 5) have been devoted to examining the
out
workingjof this in Pakistan today with respect to Christians. Some aspects are 
enshrined in the legislation, most notably the blasphemy law (chapter 5). Other 
important areas of legal discrimination include the separate electorates system and the
2 Fazl-ud-Din, Joshua “Separate electorates -  the life-blood o f Pakistan” reproduced in Grover and Arora,
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laws of evidence for the Islamic legal system. Other aspects of the inferiority of non- 
Muslims arise not from legislation but from the choice and practice of individuals. As 
well as Islam there are other contributory factors, most notably the jajmani system in 
rural areas, the fact that the majority of Christians are descended from the despised low- 
caste Chuhras, and early missionary policies which hampered the political development 
of the Christian community. It is notable that, both in legislated discrimination and in the 
discriminatory choice and practice of individuals, discrimination is not limited to the 
specific requirements of the Shari’ah but extends more broadly. With respect to the 
choice and practice of individuals there is a great diversity of forms of discrimination and 
humiliation. It is small wonder that when the radical Islamic group Tanzeem-i-Islami 
protested against the government’s proposal to give non-Muslims a dual vote, its 
complaint was that the government was “trying to wipe out differences between Muslims 
and minorities”.3
Particular mention should be made here of the role of the police. If they chose to enforce 
and uphold the existing legislation many of the problems of Christians would be 
eliminated, for example bonded labour, physical violence, seizure of their property, etc. 
This could even be extended to discrimination in education and employment. However, 
the police commonly not only turn a blind eye to crimes against Christians but very often 
exhibit the same prejudices themselves. Hence the frequent reports from Christians about 
visiting the police station to report a crime of which they were the victim and finding 
themselves beaten up by the police, not to mention the other examples of injustice
op. cit. p. 176
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described in chapters 3 and 4 4 It is interesting to note that one of the projects funded by 
the UK development programme for Pakistan is a training scheme for senior police 
officers.5
Having established that it is intrinsic within Islam that Muslims should have a higher 
status than non-Muslims, it seems with hindsight inevitable that a state founded on the 
basis of Islam should be unable to hold long to its founder’s promise of equality 
irrespective of religion. Chapters 2 and 3 describe how the process of official 
Islamization developed by means of law and constitution, slowly at first, and then 
gathering momentum when General Zia gained power in 1977.
Considerable space has been devoted to the various constitutions of Pakistan. This 
subject is far from irrelevant to ordinary Pakistani Christians. Writing in 1973, when the 
Christian community was still shocked by the nationalization of its schools the previous 
year, Dr Frank Khair Ullah discussed the importance of the constitution for Christians. 
“Our interest in the constitution-making process and in the end product of it, that is the 
permanent constitution, is very vital to us. Our future, our life and death, will be 
determined by the type of document that would finally emerge.”6 “If the permanent 
constitution does not give us a real and honourable protection, we are doomed.”7 
Similarly, Joshua Fazl-ud-Din wrote of the non-Muslim minorities that “their main
3 “Protest against dual vote right” Dawn (12 March 1996) p.6
4 A detailed study of police corruption and malpractice is given in Chaudhry, M.A.K .Policing in Pakistan 
(Lahore: Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd, 1997)
5 Hoon, Geoffrey (House of Commons Hansard Debates for 9 June 1999 part 15, column 610)
6 Khair Ullah “The future o f Christians in Pakistan” p.3
7 ibid. p.6
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source of strength lies in the fact that in the last resort they can always fall back on the
• f o
constitution as their mainstay.” The very fact that Pakistan struggled so long with 
constitution-making, a pre-occupation decried by the right-wing political analyst, Z.A. 
Suleri,9 was an indication of the enormous importance of the issue and the vastness of the 
gulf which existed between Westernized Pakistanis and the religious (i.e. Muslim) 
establishment.10 Khair Ullah recognised the theoretical possibility that a constitution 
might be framed which would relegate Christians, as dhimmis, to the status of second- 
class citizens. He discussed the possible logical developments by which Christians, left 
unprotected by a faulty constitution, might even lose the right to profess, practise and 
propagate their religion, or that Muslims might lose the freedom to convert to 
Christianity. However, he finishes his discussion with the comment that he “cannot 
conceive in this enlightened age such a thing would happen in Pakistan”.11 Yet exactly 
quarter of a century later in 1998 the Prime Minister of Pakistan was proposing just such 
a measure, a constitutional amendment which would deprive the constitution of all power 
to protect non-Muslims. At the time of writing this proposed legislation has not been 
rejected by Parliament but merely set aside with no decision having been reached.
8 Fazl-ud-Din “Separate electorates” op. cit. p. 182
9 Suleri, Z.A. Politicians andAyub (Rawalpindi: Capital Law and General Book Depot, 1965) p.7
10 Khair Ullah “The future o f Christians in Pakistan” p.2
11 ibid. p.6
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The role of Islam
The place and role of Islam in Pakistan has been an area of continuing controversy since 
before partition. The ulema strove to give Islam a place superior to all man-made 
institutions and documents and make Pakistan a theocracy.12 Politicians resisted this, and 
for many decades the ulema had to accept the position of opposition rather than 
supremacy.13 In 1991 the Shari’ah had been made the supreme law, though this had no 
practical effect because the constitution remained independent. The Fifteenth 
Constitutional Amendment Bill proposed in 1998 would, if passed, give to Islam the 
long-sought supra-constitutional status. The implications of this for Christians would be 
enormous, relegating them to dhimmi status with no legal way to reassert their former 
rights.
Mention must also be made of militant Islamic groups, many of which are closely linked 
with the religious schools.14 As yet they do not enjoy massive political backing in 
Pakistan as a whole, nor are they even united.15 In rare cases they have a direct effect on 
Christians, one example of this being the destructive rioting at Shanti Nagar and 
Khanewal in 1997, which appears to have been orchestrated with the help of Sipah-e- 
Sahaba and Harakat-ul-Ansar. Mostly, however, their activities are directed at other 
targets, particularly the forces of secularism and opposing Islamic sects or schools.
12 Khan, Mohammad Asghar “Pakistan’s Geopolitical Imperatives” in Khan, Mohammad Asghar ed.. The 
Pakistan experience: State and religion (Lahore: Vanguard Books Lrd, 1985) p.236
13 Pirzada op. cit. pp.26-47
14 Malik, Jamal Colonialization o f  Islam: Dissolution o f  traditional institutions in Pakistan (Lahore: 
Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd, 1996) pp.303-6
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Nevertheless, there is an indirect effect on Christians in that an increasing number of 
Muslims in public office feel that their own security (both physical and occupational) 
requires them to be seen to be thoroughly Islamic. This can result in them showing bias 
against non-Muslims. The validity of these concerns is illustrated by the fact that when a 
judge acquitted on appeal Christians who had been accused of blasphemy he was himself 
threatened and eventually assassinated. It is difficult to speculate about Nawaz Sharif s 
motives, but it is interesting to note that his Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment Bill of 
1998 which was to greatly increase his personal political power, would also have made 
the Qur’an and Sunnah the supreme law. If the latter measure was intended to sweeten 
the pill, it would nevertheless have had dire consequences for non-Muslim minorities.
First generation converts from Islam form only a very small percentage of the Pakistani 
Christian community, yet the subject of apostasy from Islam must also be included here. 
Pakistan has no law against this, and yet so strong is the conviction amongst Muslims that 
those who convert away from Islam should be punished that sometimes the blasphemy 
law is used for this purpose. Here is another example of Christian suffering caused not 
by laws and institutions but by biased and faulty interpretation, apparently due to 
prejudice. While numbers affected are small the problems for those involved can be 
enormous, even leading to death. Many converts lose their jobs or homes, and therefore 
there are some who keep secret from the Muslim community their change of faith.16
15 Hyman op. cit. p.4
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Christian identity
In a nation created as a homeland for Muslims, Christians have an identity problem 
(chapter 6). Jameel Jalibi, the Vice Chancellor of the University of Karachi, addressed 
the issue of Pakistani culture without considering that there were any non-Muslim 
Pakistanis at all:
It is a fallacy to expect unity among different parts o f Pakistan to 
remain established simply by virtue o f the fact that their inhabitants are 
all Muslims. Unity among them can be maintained only on the basis o f  
culture; and culture, as I will explain later on, comprehends a religion, 
beliefs, customs, social living, material resources and needs and, 
indeed, all societal factors.17
Jalibi considers religion -  meaning Islam - to be an intrinsic part of Pakistani culture and 
devotes more than a quarter of his book to the subject of the link between them. This is a 
widespread attitude which seems to have increased with the process of Islamization over 
the years. Christian Pakistanis are considered to be semi-Westerners as it were, 
following what is held to be a Western faith.
Many Pakistani Christians struggle hard to demonstrate that they are not Western- 
orientated. A complicating factor is that most Christians in Pakistan today are descended 
from converts made by Western missionaries. The fact that there was a Christian
16 Ismail, Zafar various interviews with the author (June 1999)
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community in Pakistan which pre-dated Islam and existed alongside Islam for some time 
before being apparently eliminated is not widely acknowledged by Muslims. Amongst 
Christians, however, this fact is very precious and hence the space devoted to it in chapter 
1. The other message which Christians try to communicate is that they are not 
immigrants or the descendants of immigrants, but “sons of the soil” and as such are loyal 
citizens of Pakistan.
The crisis of identity is not helped by self-generated confusion on the part of some 
Pakistani Christians. In rural areas there is much syncretism amongst the Christians and 
many add elements of Islam and Hinduism to their faith. These Christians possibly feel 
less of an identity crisis than urban Christians as they are more sure about their identity as 
Pakistanis although less sure about their identity as Christians. In urban contexts, a 
contrasting problem exists - some Christians adopt Western cultural practices, unrelated 
to the Christian faith. This tends to reinforce to themselves their religious identity as 
Christians but blurs their cultural identity as Pakistanis.
It is primarily this identity crisis -  as opposed to economic motives -  which leads many 
better off Christians to emigrate to the West, while those who remain dream of a separate 
homeland for Christians of the sub-continent. The secession of minorities is not 
unknown in today’s world and Bangladesh set a local precedent in 1971. However, the 
demographics of the Christian community make this unrealistic, as they are nowhere 
concentrated enough to be anything but a small minority within a Muslim majority. This
17 Jalibi, Jameel Pakistan: the identity o f culture (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1984) p. 12
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also is the conclusion of Mordechai Nisan, of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, as he 
surveys the situation of minorities in the Middle East (a term to which he gives a broad 
meaning):
The logic o f separation remains a latent possibility in the political 
equation. Where state-level compromise and conciliation do not exist 
or do not succeed ... separating peoples by possibly decomposing 
multinational states is the obvious resolution o f such a political 
problem. Life for the minority may be unbearable and meaningless 
without a collective self-assertion o f national rights. But across the 
region, aside from the successful instance o f Bengali separation from 
Pakistan in 1971, the possiblity of minority separation seems slim.18
The future
If secession is an impossibility, then what does the future hold for Pakistan’s three 
million Christians? Campbell19 writing in 1961 and Webster20 writing in 1976 were both 
very optimistic about the future of the Church. But this was before Zia began to increase 
the pace of Islamization in 1977 at a time when few were alert to the signs of 
Islamization which had already taken place or had any concept of how things might 
develop. It is perhaps also significant that both authors were Westerners, a factor which
18 Nisan, Mordechai Minorities in the Middle East: a history o f struggle and self-expression (Jefferson, 
North Carolina: McFarland and Company, Inc, 1991) p.24
19 Campbell op. cit. .
20 Webster op. cit.
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could possibly dull their appreciation of the pressures and handicaps which Pakistani 
Christians faced.
Previous safeguards in law and constitution (see chapter 3) have been gradually eroded 
and are on the brink of being overridden altogether if the Fifteenth Amendment Bill is 
passed. As a largely poor and uneducated community, it is hard for Christians even to 
avail themselves of the existing safeguards in a society where bribery and anti-Christian 
prejudice are the norm. Christians feel themselves betrayed. The majority of Punjabi 
Christians were loyal supporters of the creation of Pakistan, whose community leaders 
made a positive decision to be part of the. new Muslim-majority state rather than remain 
within India. As early as 1949 Joshua Fazl-ud-Din expressed the sense of betrayal with 
respect to the fact that there were no Christian representatives in the Constituent 
Assembly and therefore no Christian voice in the framing of the Constitution. “All 
deputations and appeals of the community have failed to move the Central Government, 
although the promise of ‘fair and generous treatment’ towards the minorities has never 
been doubted by the Christians”.21 Fazl-ud-Din urged Christians to replace their attitude 
of suspense with one of optimism.22 Yet hopes for positive change continue to be 
disappointed.
The Christians’ disappointment is understandable, but perhaps their hopes of equality in a 
Muslim homeland had been unrealistic, given the nature of Islam. Jinnah’s promise of
21 Fazl-ud-Din Future o f Christians in Pakistan p. 10
22 ibid. p. 144
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equality could never have been kept for long, as non-Muslims cannot be equal citizens 
with Muslims in an Islamic context. Their perceived “betrayal” was inevitable.
Although the human desire for equality will always remain, realistically speaking it 
would seem doubtful whether calls for equal status with Muslims will ever be completely 
effective; possibly they could even be counter-productive. However, from this study of 
the process of Islamization in Pakistan it would appear that there are some practical 
possibilities for improving their condition which could realistically be attempted by the 
Christian community. One possible way forward might be to work for the proper 
enforcement of the existing laws and constitution and their protection from being over­
ridden by the proposed fifteenth amendment to the constitution. If this could be achieved 
it would give Christians at least access to justice to right many of the wrongs committed 
against them by individuals, including false accusations under the blasphemy law. In 
seeking this, Christians would have the support not only of other non-Muslim minorities 
who would benefit too, but also of many secular Muslim organizations, notably the 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, who are already advocating this. It would be a 
difficult but not impossible task. The police force has very little to recommend it at the 
moment, but with the judiciary the picture is somewhat better. Incidents of gross 
injustice towards Christians do occur, for example the case of Gul Masih who was found 
guilty of blasphemy because the one person who testified against him was a bearded 
Muslim. On the other hand there are many judges who are courageous and fair-minded 
and willing to over-rule unjust decisions made at a lower level. Thus Gul Masih was 
later acquitted.
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A second possible realistic goal to aim for would be an amendment to the electoral 
system so as to give Christians more political power. This is supported by the Pakistan 
People's Party. Like the first goal, it would be difficult in that there is much opposition 
from the Islamic parties, but it need not be considered impossible, especially given the 
fact that many other Muslim-majority countries have equal voting rights for all their 
citizens.
A third possible achievable goal might be to change the attitude and behaviour of 
Christians themselves. Naturally there are exceptions, but generally speaking the Church 
is severely weakened by disunity and particularly by selfish leadership arising principally 
from the biradari system. William Young, a former Bishop of Sialkot, who studied 
Church-State relationships in the East up to 820 AD, drew from his studies a number of 
lessons for minority churches today, concluding:
“This brings us to our final point. For the spiritual health o f the 
Church, and to ensure its security and respect in a non-Christian State, 
it is absolutely essential that Christians lay to heart the importance of  
avoiding in-fighting or inter-denominational conflicts. Where visible 
union is possible, it is not only desirable but right; where it is not
possible, at least the various churches should co-operate with one
23another and aim at unity of spirit.”
23 Young Patriarch, Shah and Caliph p. 182
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Effective Christian response is also emasculated by a self-pitying apathy. Again, there 
are many valiant exceptions to this, notably the protest suicide of Bishop John Joseph in 
May 1998. Also, it is only to be expected that an impoverished and poorly educated 
community, for whom mere existence is a struggle, trained two or three generations back 
to avoid political involvement, should be fairly passive. Help has been sought in recent 
years from abroad, but there would appear to be more which Christians could attempt be 
doing for themselves if they so wished.
It seems that Pakistani Christians might be well advised to try to accept that it is doubtful 
whether they will ever have equality with Muslims. Unpalatable though it may be, 
acceptance of this probable outcome could help the Christian community to learn to live 
as an unequal minority in a society where the majority has been conditioned by history to 
be especially nervous and suspicious of them. Having said this, there are areas in which 
they already have advantages over traditional dhimmi, for example the freedom from 
paying jizya  (although they do have to do military service), and the legal freedom to erect 
churches (albeit there are often difficulties in practice, and it is not possible in the North 
West Frontier Province). Also relevant is the freedom for Muslims to convert to 
Christianity. On the other hand there are areas in which they are deprived beyond the 
traditional restrictions on dhimmis, for example, the violence to person and property 
which affects Christians disproportionately and for which they find it so hard to get 
redress. Dhimmi status is not as high as Muslim status but nevertheless carries many 
rights which are not available to all minorities in Muslim contexts today. Pakistani 
Christians might be able to improve their situation by arguing from the teachings of Islam
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itself to seek for themselves the full rights of dhimmi where these are lacking, while also 
safeguarding the “extra” benefits which they already have. It is possible to draw a 
parallel with the experience of Muslim feminists who have tended to make better 
progress for the rights and freedoms of women when working within the Islamic 
paradigm (such as in Saudi Arabia and Iran) than outside it.24 At a more hopeful time 
than the present, Dr Khair Ullah, though reluctant to believe that Pakistani Christians 
would ever find themselves relegated to second-class status, wrote:
If we are officially considered as dhimmis, we, at least, would like to 
know what are our rights and duties. What would be worse still is to be 
merely tolerated as a minority, without any special privileges but 
surrounded with many invisible and intangible handicaps.25
This study has shown that Islamization has had a seriously detrimental effect on the 
Christian community in Pakistan. However, it may be possible for the process, at least as 
it affects Christians, to be halted or even reversed; the methodology most likely to be 
effective in achieving this is to make use of Islamic principles.
24 Yamani, Mai (ed.) Feminism and Islam: legal and literary perspectives (Reading: published for Centre 
for Islamic and Middle Eastern Law SOAS by Garnet, 1996) passim
25 Khair Ullah “The future o f Christians in Pakistan” p.6
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